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March 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re A.P.

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 743
• Docket Number: 115350

• Judges: Ryan

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (6.5K)

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Syllabus

Civ.R. 60(B); child-support order; jurisdiction; bootstrapping. This court did not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Appellant did not appeal the trial court's initial denial of his Civ.R. 60(B) motion. Instead, he filed a second Civ.R. 60(B) motion and is challenging the denial of that motion. Appellant is improperly trying to "bootstrap" the denial of his second Civ.R. 60(B) motion to indirectly and untimely appeal the denial of his first Civ.R. 60(B) motion.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as In re A.P., 2026-Ohio-743.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE A.P. :
No. 115350
A Minor Child :

[Appeal by Father, A.P.] :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: DISMISSED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 5, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Juvenile Division
Case No. PR11721029

Appearances:

A.P., pro se.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:

Father A.P. appeals the decision of the Cuyahoga County Common

Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, denying his “Motion to Vacate Judgment” under

Civ.R. 60(B). After a review of the pertinent facts and law, we dismiss this appeal.

The record shows that on November 9, 2011, a complaint was filed

against A.P. to establish paternity and for a child-support order for his minor child.

Although service on A.P. was initially not perfected, on April 5, 2012, A.P. waived
service of summons, acknowledged receipt of the complaint, and voluntarily entered

his appearance. He also acknowledged paternity.

The juvenile court entered a child-support order ordering A.P. to pay

$238.19 or $268.07 per month (the amount depending on if private health

insurance was provided). He was also ordered to pay $64.58 in cash medical

support for the child.

On April 27, 2012, A.P. filed a motion to modify child support.

A.P. appeared at the May 29, 2013 pretrial hearing on the motion. The trial court

held a hearing on the motion on May 23, 2014, and A.P. appeared for that hearing

as well. On June 25, 2014, the court issued its decision granting A.P.’s motion to

modify and ordered that he pay $127.55 per month and $0 in cash medical support.

On February 11, 2022, a motion to show cause was filed alleging that

A.P. was $3,898.66 in arrears as of December 28, 2021. Although initial attempts

to serve A.P. with the motion were unsuccessful, he was eventually served on

July 14, 2022. A.P. appeared at hearings on the motion on October 5 and

November 13, 2022. The court granted the motion to show cause and ordered A.P.

to pay $127.55 per month in child support and $48.59 per month in arrears. The

court also found A.P. to be in contempt for failure to pay child support, sentenced

A.P. to serve eight days in jail, and suspended the sentence.

A.P. continued to be involved in the case, appearing for hearings on

July 14, 2023, December 27, 2023, and April 16, 2024. On April 16, 2024, the court
found that A.P. had not purged his contempt and ordered him to serve his jail

sentence.

On November 12, 2024, A.P. filed a “Demand for Dismissal with

Prejudice,” pursuant to Civ.R. 60, arguing that he had not been served with the

initial service of summons and, therefore, the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction

over him. The court denied his motion on November 26, 2024. A.P. did not appeal

that decision. Rather, on June 4, 2025, A.P. filed another Civ.R. 60(B) motion, titled

“Motion to Vacate Judgment and Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Pursuant

to Civ.R. 60(B) and Civ.R. 4.” In this motion, A.P. again argued that he was never

properly served with the complaint, so the court did not have jurisdiction over him.

On June 17, 2025, the trial court denied his motion, and the case is now before us

on appeal.

In his sole assignment of error, A.P. argues that the trial court erred

when it denied his June 4, 2025 motion.

As an initial matter, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction

to hear this appeal. A.P.’s two motions, filed on November 12, 2024, and June 4,

2025, are largely the same motion. Both state that the motion is being made

pursuant to Civ.R. 60 and both contain substantially the same argument — the trial

court did not have personal jurisdiction over him because he was never properly

served with the complaint. Although the trial court denied A.P.’s first Civ.R. 60(B)

motion, A.P. did not appeal that decision. Rather, he filed a second Civ.R. 60(B)

motion, making the same arguments he made in his previous motion.
Civ.R. 60(B) provides that a court may relieve a party from a final

judgment for several enumerated reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or

excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud, misrepresentation or

misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or

discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or

otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have

prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.1

We have consistently refused to address assignments of error from a

final order that was not the subject of a timely notice of appeal when those

assignments of error are raised as part of an otherwise timely appeal — an act known

as “bootstrapping.” Issa v. Cleveland Metro. School Dist., 2025-Ohio-4848,

¶ 9 (8th Dist.), citing Basit v. Chapman, 2016-Ohio-4562 (8th Dist.).

“Bootstrapping” is:

“the utilization of a subsequent order to indirectly and untimely appeal
a prior order (which was never directly appealed) [and] is procedurally
anomalous and inconsistent with the appellate rules which
contemplate a direct relationship between the order from which the
appeal is taken and the error assigned as a result of that order. See,
Appellate Rules 3(D), 4(A), 5 and 16(A)(3).”

Issa at id., quoting Winters v. Doe, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4221, *6 (8th Dist. Sept.

10, 1998).

1 In his November 12, 2024 motion, A.P. claimed he was entitled to relief under

Civ.R. 60(B)(4); in his June 4, 2025 motion, he did not specify under which subsection he
was seeking relief.
A Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment is not a substitute for

an appeal. Issa at id., citing Basit; see also Doe v. Trumbull Cty. Children Servs.

Bd., 28 Ohio St.3d 128 (1986), paragraph two of the syllabus; Key v. Mitchell, 81

Ohio St.3d 89, 90-91 (1998). Here, the trial court issued a final appealable order on

November 26, 2024, when it denied A.P.’s first Civ.R. 60(B) motion. In case there

was any confusion as to the finality of the order, the order denying the motion stated:

Pursuant to Rule 34(J) of the Rules of Juvenile Procedure and Rules 3
and 4 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appeal of the order
herein may be taken to the Eighth District Court of Appeals by filing a
Notice of Appeal . . . within thirty days of the entry of judgment or final
order. Failure to file a timely Notice of Appeal may result in the
dismissal of the appeal.

A.P. was required, under App.R. 4, to file his notice of appeal within

30 days of the trial court’s November 26, 2024 order denying his first Civ.R. 60(B)

motion. But A.P. did not appeal that decision. Instead, A.P. waited several months

and filed a second Civ.R. 60(B) motion, which the trial court denied on June 17,

2025.

By appealing from the June 17, 2025 journal entry denying his motion

to vacate, A.P. is attempting to bootstrap arguments that are time-barred. In other

words, A.P. is attempting to utilize the instant appeal to improperly seek review of

alleged errors that he failed to timely appeal. As a result, we lack jurisdiction to

consider this appeal. See Issa, 2025-Ohio-4848, at ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing Bukovec

v. Keger, 2024-Ohio-1162 (8th Dist.) (holding that this court does not have

jurisdiction to hear an appeal when appellant was trying to bootstrap a prior order
that was never properly appealed to challenge the trial court’s denial of Civ.R. 60(B)

motion).

Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

---

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR