State v. Earl - Postconviction Relief Motion Denied

IN THE SUPE RIOR COURT O F THE STATE O F DEL AWARE STATE OF DEL AWARE,)) v.) ID No. 2205001 959) MELVIN L. E ARL,) Defendant.) Submitted: Decem ber 8, 2025 Decided: March 5, 2 026 Upon Defenda nt Melvin L. Ear l ’ s Motion for Postc onviction Rel ief, DENIED. ORDER U po n c onsideration of the Defendan t ’ s M otion f or Postconviction Relief (D.I. 32), the State ’ s response (D.I. 64), his trial/plea counsel ’ s affidavit (D.I. 55), Defendant ’ s reply (D.I. 65) and various supplementals (D.I. 72, 73, 74, 75, 82, 85, 86, 87), the State ’ s supplemen tal response (D.I. 84), and the record in t his matter, it appears to the C ourt t hat: F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACKGROUN D (1) In November 2022, Defendant Mel vin L. Earl, Jr., wa s indicted for tw o counts of firs t-degree rape, three counts for first -degree unlawful sexual contact, one count of first-degree s exual abuse of a child by a person of t rust, and one count of

-2- second-degree s exual abuse o f a child b y a person of tr u st. 1 (2) These multiple offenses ar o se from the s exual abuse of an 8 -year-old little girl with whom the then- 55 -year-old defendant had a distant familial relationship. Ev i dence of this behavior included video recordings of oral copulation between the two. Mr. Ear l’s explanation for this degeneracy: T he child was the “aggressor,” “all of this w as [the child’s] idea. She never discussed this with me beforehand. S he just did things t o me.” 2 (3) At his f i nal case review, Mr. Earl pleaded g uilty to a si n gle count of rap e in the first degree. 3 He did so in e xchange for the State’s: dismis sal of the six other felony counts charg i ng various forms of sexual abuse of the eight -year- old; withholding of a petition for applicat ion o f a particular st atutory sentence enhancement; a n d, favor able sentenc ing recommendation. 4 (4) Mr. Earl’s sentencing occurred s everal months later, after a comprehensi v e presentence investigative (PSI) report w as prepared. In addition to 1 D.I. 6 (Indictment). 2 These were statements made during the presentence investigation process. See Sentencing Tr. at 3- 5, 8 (D.I. 13) (both counsel recounting the tro ubling nature of Mr. Ea rl’s comments during the presentence investigation). The Court notes that at other ti mes prior to and since sentencing, Mr. Earl has said: “ I am fully respon sibl e for thi s whole incident. She is n ot to blame for any of this. I myself was totally wrong. I Melvin Earl am the adult in this matter. . . . There is no one to blame but myself. I ’m sorry.” S ee id. at 7, 10 - 11 (Def.’s S ent. Ex. 1 (Mr. E arl’s day -of-sentencing letter expressing remorse)). 3 D.I. 9 (Plea Agreement). 4 Id. at 1 (“State will a gree to cap the recommendati on for unsusp ended Level 5 ti me at 20 years.. . . State agrees not to seek enhancement of sentence pursua nt to 11 Del. C. 4205A.”).

-3- the materials compiled in that PSI report, t he defense filed its own supplemental sentencing memorandum. All of that w as thoroughly exa mined by the Court before the sentencing hearing. 5 The Court also considered the parties’ sentencin g presentations, Mr. Earl’s final written statement of remorse, and his allocution before imposing his sentence. 6 (5) Mr. Earl was sentenced as follows for the rape in the fi rst degree count: 50 years at Level V, s uspended after he serves 20 years imprisonme n t, for 30 years of Level IV super vision, suspended after 6 months of Leve l IV supervisi on, for two years of inten s ive commu nity supervision. 7 (6) His 20-year period of u nsuspended imprisonmen t is compris ed, in part, of a 1 5-year term that must be imposed under Delaware’s first -degree rape statute. 8 The Court impose d the remaining 5 year s as an exercise of its own sente n cing judgment. 9 (7) At the time of s entencing, the Co u rt noted the aggravating and mitigating circumstanc es it found: To the extent the sentence might excee d the SENTAC presumptive sentence fo r the offense as pleaded to, the Co urt 5 Sentencing Tr. at 2-3. 6 Id. at 3- 11; Def.’s Sent. Ex. 1. 7 D.I. 11 (Sentencing Order). 8 Sentenc ing Order at 2. See D EL. C ODE A NN. tit. 11, §§ 773, 531, and 4205(b)(1) (2021) (first - degree rape is a class A felony carrying a statutory minimum of 15 years at Level V). 9 Sentencing Tr. at 12.

-4- notes the Defendant ’ s vi ctim blaming — which has only recently changed — brings into doubt his true level of remorse. The victim in this case was a ver y young child who was p articularl y vulnerable due to the living circumstances of the Defendant and victim. Th e Court h as considered the Defendant ’ s obvi ous mental health i ssues and med i cal circ u mstances. 10 (8) Mr. Earl prosecute d no direct appeal from his convicti on o r sentence. But he immediately began docket ing pro se applica tions under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35 challenging the legality of or requesting reduction of his prison term. 11 (9) The Court considered these on their merits. 12 Upon Rule 35 review, the Court fully examined Mr. Earl ’ s applications, the relevant law, the record of his case, his prior history, all materials p rovide d with his correction of sentence and s entence- reduction moti on, and all sente n cing information available. The Court found that when a ll those materials and the sentencing factor s in Mr. Earl ’ s case were reconsidered, a sentence re duction was no t warranted, an d the sentence wa s l egal as imposed. 13 10 Sentenc ing Order, 3; Sentencing Tr., 12 – 15 (the Court articulating the various aggravating and mitigating circumstances); s ee D EL. C ODE A NN. tit. 11, § 4204(n) (202 1) (“ Whenever a court imposes a sentence inconsistent with the pre sump tive sentences adopted by the Sentenc ing Accountability Commission, such court shall set forth on the record its reasons for imposing such penalty. ”); see also White v. State, 243 A.3d 381, 410 – 11 (De l. 2021) (identifying Delaware Supreme Court Administrative Directive No. 76 as another source for the requirement). 11 E.g. D.I. 12 (first pro se filing docketed 11 days after sentencing), 15, 18, 22, 25, 29. 12 See D. I. 45. 13 See generally State v. Earl, 2024 WL 523763 3 (Del. Super. Ct. De c. 16, 2024), appeal dismissed, 2025 WL 755723 (Del. Feb. 24, 2025). The reafter, Mr. Earl docketed another

-5- (10) Now before the Court is Mr. Earl ’ s timely Motion for Postconviction Relief that he has f il ed under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. 14 In h is motion, Mr. Earl c h allenges the validit y of his plea a nd sentenc ing pr oceedings, asserti ng cla ims of ineffective assistance of counsel and related constitutional violations. 15 Specifically, Mr. Earl alleges t hat his trial/plea counse l, Erika B. LaCon, E squire, was deficient in t he following respects: (a) failing to assert o r adequately pursue an insanity defense; (b) violating a court order by failing to submit a defense expert before the deadline established by his case scheduling order; and (c) failing t o docket various medical records that Mr. Earl contends would have supported an insanity defense — this al l eged failure by h is counsel he charact erizes as a Brady violation. 16 Mr. Earl also requests that the Court conduct an evidentiary hearing to address his claims. 17 R ULE 61 ’ S P ROCEDU RAL B ARS (11) Delaware courts m ust consider Crimi n al Rule 61 ’ s procedural unsuccessful Rule 35(a) motion. D.I. 57 and 59. That denial was affirmed. Earl v. State, 2025 WL 2083036 (Del. July 23, 2025). 14 Def. ’ s Op. Br. Postconvi ction Relief (D.I. 33). 15 Def. ’ s Op. Br. Postconvi ction Relief. 16 See g enerally Def. ’ s Op. Br. Postconviction Relief; Def. ’ s Resp. (D.I. 65); Def. ’ s Suppl. (D.I. 72, 73, 74, 75, 82, 85, 86, 87). Mr. Earl has docketed mul tiple supplemental submissions. The filings primarily address what he calls a “ Brady vi olation ” a nd are docket items 73, 74, 75, 82, 85, 86, a nd 87. The documents addre ssing the alleged violation of the court or der are docket it ems 86 and 87. As many of these filings are repetitive, the Court will refer to them collec ti vely as “ Def. ’ s Suppl. ” unless otherwise specified. 17 See gen erally Def. ’ s Op. Br. Postconviction Relief; Def. ’ s Resp.; Def. ’ s Suppl.

-6- requirements before addressin g any substantive issues. 18 The procedural bars set out within Rule 61 are timeliness, repetitiveness, procedural default, and former adjudication. 19 Of these, only on e is releva nt here. (12) Rule 61(i)(3) bars any particular claim that could have b een b ut was n ot raised at the trial/plea proceedings or on direct appeal, unless the defendant can show cause for relief from the procedural default and p rejudice. 20 Generally, Rule 61(i)(3) is inapplicable to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel — which in the norm can ’ t be raised ag ainst trial/plea counsel on direct appeal. 21 And so, the Court usually considers tho se claims o n their mer its during postconviction proceedings. 22 M R. E ARL ’ S I NEFFEC TIV E A SSISTANC E OF C OUNSEL C LAIM F A ILS. (13) A claim o f ineffective assistance o f counsel is reviewed under the familiar two-part Strickland v. Washington test. 23 A claimant asserting ineffecti ve 18 Max ion v. State, 686 A.2d 148, 150 (Del. 1996); State v. Jones, 2002 WL 31028584, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 2002). 19 Del. Super. Ct. R. P. 61(i); State v. Peters, 283 A.3d 668, 680 (Del. Super. Ct. 2022), aff ’ d, 299 A.3d 1 (Del. 2023). 20 Super. Ct. C rim. R. 61(i)(3) (“ Any groun d for relief that was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, as required by the rules of this court, is thereafter b arred, unless the movant shows. .. [c]a use for relief fr om the proce dural default an d. .. [p]rejudice from violation of the movant ’ s rights. ”). 21 Gree n v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 175 (Del. 2020); see State v. Caulk, 2021 WL 2662250, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. June 29, 2021) (“ Though [the Rule 61(i)(3)] ba r is inappli cable to allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel that, in all but the rarest of circumstances, couldn ’ t have been raised on direct appeal. ”). 22 State v. M arti n, 2024 WL 3273429, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. July 1, 2024), . 23 Neal v. State, 80 A.3d 935, 941 (Del. 2013); see generally Strickland v. Washing ton, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

-7- assistance of co u nsel must dem o nstrate that: (i) his defense c ounsel ’ s representation fell below an objective standa rd of reasonableness and (ii) t here is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel ’ s errors, the result of h is proceedings would have been different — often referred to as t h e “ prejudice prong. ” 24 An in mate must satisfy the proof requirements of both prongs — deficient performance and p rejudice — to succeed in making an i neffective assistance of counsel claim. 25 Failure t o do so on either will do o m the cla im, in which case, the Co u rt need not address the other. 26 (14) The Court first turns to Mr. Earl ’ s complaints of deficient performance. To s atisfy the performance prong, Mr. Earl must show that counsel ’ s conduct fel l below an objective standard of reasonableness — such “ that no reasonable lawyer would have conducted the defense as his lawyer did. ” 27 There is al ways a strong presumption that counsel ’ s representat i on was reasonable. 28 “Judicial scrutiny of counsel ’s performance [is] highly deferential.” 29 It is now well-accepted, that where “an attorney makes a s trategic choice after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options, the presumpti o n that an attorney acted reasonably is 24 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 – 94 (1984); Ne al, 80 A.3d at 941 – 42. 25 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 825 (Del. 2013)(Ploof I); Neal, 80 A.3d at 942; Peters, 283 A.3d at 681. 26 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Ploof I, 75 A.3d at 825; Peters, 283 A.3d a t 68 1. 27 Gree n, 238 A.3d at 174 (citing Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 791 (1987)); Stri ckland, 466 U.S. at 687. 28 Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996). 29 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Cooke v. State, 339 A.3d 418, 455 (De l. 2025).

-8- virtually uncha l lengeable.” 30 And in no instance is defense counsel required to pursue cla ims o r de fenses tha t ha v e no merit. 31 In deed, c ounsel is ethicall y prohibited from asserting claims that lack a good -faith factual and leg al foundation. 32 (15) Mr. Earl insists that Ms. LaCon was constitutionally ineffecti ve when she did not pursue an insanity defense in his case. 33 He says that Ms. L aCon failed to discuss an insanity defense with him. 34 And as best the Court can glean, that she was derelict by not submitting various materials nor engage a mental health expert to testify about hi s mental condition befor e his plea was entered. 35 Thus, accordin g t o Mr. Earl, his guilty plea was defective and unconstitutional. 36 But these charges are belied by the postconviction record. (16) The record reflects that Ms. LaCon was aware of Mr. Earl ’ s mental 30 Cooke, 338 A.3d at 455 (cleaned up); Purnell v. State, 106 A.3d 337, 342 (Del. 2014); Hosk ins v. State, 102 A.3d 724, 733 (Del. 2014) (quoting Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 840, 852 (Del. 2013) (Ploof II) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91)). 31 State v. Thomas, 2024 WL 5117117, at * 7 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 20 24) (“[C]ounsel can never be deemed Stri ckland ineffective for failing to make an otherwise futil e or inconsequential argument.”) (citing Peters, 283 A.3d at 680; Stat e v. Prince, 2022 WL 211704, at *7 (Del. S uper. Ct. Jan. 24, 2022) (colle cting cases)); Norcross v. Metzger, 2020 WL 1532370, at *22 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2020) (“It is we ll - settled that an attorney’s failure to raise meritless objections or arguments does not constitute ineffective assistance.”); United Stat es v. S anders, 165 F.3d 248, 253 (3d C ir. 1999) (“There can be no Sixth Amendment deprivation of effective counsel based on an attorney’s failure to raise a meritless argument.”). 32 See generally De l. Lawyers’ R. Prof’l Conduct 3. 1 (“ A lawyer shall not. . . asser t .. . an issue [in a proceeding], unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous ”). 33 See gen erally Def. ’ s Op. Br. Postconviction Relief; Def. ’ s Resp.; Def. ’ s Suppl. 34 Def. ’ s Resp. 5. 35 See gen erally Def. ’ s Suppl. 36 See gen erally Def. ’ s Op. Br. Postconviction Relief; Def. ’ s Resp.; Def. ’ s Suppl.

-9- health history and of his expressed desire to pursue an insanity defense. 37 Counsel reviewed Mr. Earl ’ s medical and mental health information, discussed the issue with him, and determined tha t there was no good faith basis for any viable menta l health defense to his culpability for t he child s exual abuse crimes charg ed. 38 The materials submitted t o the Court evidence that Ms. LaCon investigated a nd was abreas t of th e defense. 39 She found that s he couldn ’ t assert the defense because she didn ’ t find it was merited. 40 In her estimation, no valid “ insanity ” defense could be mustered. It 37 Ms. LaCon’ s Affidavit Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(g) (D.I. 55); Supporting Materials Under Rule 61(g) (D.I. 78) [hereinafter Def. ’ s Records in Supp. of Rule 61 Motion]. 38 Ms. LaCon’ s Affidavit Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal R ule 61(g); Def. ’ s Re cords in Supp. of Rule 61 Motion. Mr. Earl disagrees that he discussed the insanity defe nse with Ms. LaCon a nd that letter s he wrote Ms. LaCon d emonstrate that the defense wa s not pursued. S ee Def. ’ s Resp. 7 – 10 (“ My argument is that the insanity defense [conversation] she is speaking of never took place.... I can prove my defense by letters that I ’ ve written her... ”). Mr. Ea rl ’ s letters and materials evi dence the opposite — they de monstrate that the insanit y defense was considered and discuss ed by M s. LaCon and M r. Earl. See generally L etter f rom Mr. Earl to Ms. LaCon (Nov. 16, 2022) (“ I ’ ve been thinking if a guilty by insanity plea would be the appropriate thing to do. ”) (D. I. 78); Ms. LaCon’ s Affidavit Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(g) (“ On December 9, 2022, Mr. Earl inqui red about an insanity defense in a conversation we had ov er Zoom. I advised that I would not pursue a n insanity defense because I la cked a good faith basis to do so. . . ”); Letter from Mr. Earl to Ms. LaCon (April 6, 2023) (“ I will sign for 15 .... Or not guilty by insanity. I have to pay for what I did. ”) (D.I. 78). During his plea colloquy, Mr. Earl confirmed that he had discussed the de fenses available to him with Ms. LaCon. Plea Hearing Tr. 8 – 14. 39 The C ourt had ordered expansion of the record to have Ms. LaCon submit “communications or additional materials... to include: (a) any recordation of communications between Mr. Earl and his counsel (or those working on her b ehalf) related to Mr. E ar l’s alleged mental health issues or potential defenses; and (b) any of Mr. Earl’s mental health or treatment records collected by defense counsel in her representation of Mr. Earl.” D.I. 71. Those materials were provid ed under seal and consist of hundreds of p ages of c ommunications between counsel and client, as well as, social, mental health, and medical rec ords stretching ba ck to Mr. E arl’s adolescence. D.I. 78-81. 40 Ms. LaCon’ s Af fidavit Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(g).

seems that is simply n ot something Mr. Earl h as ever wanted to hear. But when warranted, it is precisely the type of advice that effective counsel is expected give. 41 (17) Even still, Ms. La Con a t tempted to utilize Mr. Earl’s back g round throughout her representa tion. She share d evidence of Mr. Earl ’ s mental health issues during plea negotiations. During his plea colloquy, Mr. Earl said that he discussed the defenses he b elieved were available to h im with Ms. LaCon and was ultimately satisfied with her as his counsel. 42 And du ring Mr. Earl’s sentencing, Ms. LaCon highlighted his mental health issues and need for treatment as a mitigating factor. 43 (18) There simply was nothing deficient or unreasonable about Ms. LaCon’ s approach to Mr. Earl ’ s mental health information. No doubt, she was aware of the 41 See State v. Dillard, 2019 WL 118437, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2019) (“ A criminal defense attorney must provide truthful information and informed legal advice; not just mouth what her client may want to hear. Doing so is required; n ot objectively unre asonable. ”); State v. Rivera, 2015 WL 4594155, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. July 29, 2015), appeal dismissed, 2015 WL 5439949 (Del. Sept. 14, 2015) (“A defense attorney who does not objectively assess a case, advising the client ac cordingly, does a disservice to the client in the end. It is the job of a criminal de fense attorney to be frank and honest with his or her client; it is not the job of a defense attorney to simply molli fy the situation by telling the client what he or she “wants” to hear during the course of the case.”) (emphasis in original). 42 Plea He aring T r. 13 – 14. 43 E.g. Sentencing Tr. 9 – 11 (“ The defense is asking for 15 years. .. . Obviously any significant jail time given his age, his medical hist ory, his mental health and his substance abuse history, all of which play ed a role in what happened, will need to be treated and can b e t reated wi thin 15 years certainly. ”) Mr. Ea rl ’ s mental he alth was considered by all parties and the Court. E.g. Sentencing Order, 3; S entencing Tr., 12 – 15 (“The Court has noted a mi tigator and that is the defendant’s obvious mental health issues and m edical circumstances that h ave been documented for the court.”).

applicable legal standards and had developed a full understa nding of Mr. Earl ’ s social, medical, and mental h ealth history. She h ad used i t to obtain the best plea bargain possible for her client and to try to convince the Court to impose the most favorable sentence within the range both the State and Mr. Earl had agreed to. Given the damning evidenc e of guilt and the paucity o f other options — including no real chance to mount the insanity d efense which Mr. Earl wished and s till wishes for — this tack was w holly reasonable. 44 (19) The analysis could end there 45 but even were Mr. Earl to demonstrate the requisite d eficie nt attorney performance on his insanity defense claim — which, again, he hasn ’ t — he falls well short of demonstratin g resultant and required prejudice. (20) When addressing the prejudice p rong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test in the cont ext o f a challenged guilty plea, an inmate must show “ that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel ’ s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on g oing to t rial. ” 46 And wh en addressi ng 44 See Sartin v. State, 2014 WL 5392047, at *3 (Del. Oct. 21, 2014) (no ineffectivene ss wh ere counsel determined his c l ient’s mental health issues didn’t rise to the level of a viable def ense, but counsel tried to use issues to lessen the severity of his sentence). 45 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Ploof I, 75 A.3d at 82 5; Peters, 283 A.3d at 681 (“A movant must satisfy both prongs — deficient attorney performance and resulting prejudice — to succeed in making an ineffective assis tance of counsel claim. Failure to do so on either prong will doom the claim, and the Court need not address the other.”). 46 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988) (q uoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)); Sartin v. State, 2014 WL 5392047, at *2 (Del. Oct. 21, 2014); State v. Hackett, 2005 WL 3060976,

the p rejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test i n the context o f a sentencing hearing, an inmate must s how that “ there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel ’ s err or, the result of [his] s en tencing w o uld have bee n different. ” 47 (21) Now for either, “ Strickland ’s sec o nd part— the pre j udice prong — presents another arduous standard.” 48 “T he likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not j u st conceivable.” 49 And while t he “objective inquiry is no t mathematica lly precise,” there can only be a finding of the required prejud i ce “when there is a substantial likelihoo d — i.e., a meaningful chance — that a di fferent outcome would have o ccurred but for co unsel’s deficie nt perform ance.” 50 (22) It appears Mr. Earl he is saying that h ad his counsel better -developed an insanity (or o ther mental illness) defense, h e would have b een offered and entered a more favorable plea or insisted on pressing to trial and been found n ot guilty b y reason of insa n ity. 51 at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 2005). 47 Brawley v. State, 1992 WL 353838, at *1 (Del. Oct. 7, 1992); State v. L indsey, 2023 WL 2535895, at * 10 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2023), aff ’ d, 2023 WL 8232287 (Del. Nov. 27, 2023). 48 Cooke, 338 A.3d a t 455 (citing Green, 238 A.3d at 174). 49 Starling v. State, 130 A.3d 316, 325 (Del. 2015) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011)); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (“ It is not enough for the [postconviction movant] to show that the errors had some conceivable effe ct on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet that test, and not every error that conceivably could have influen ced the outcome undermines the reliabilit y of the result of the proceeding.” (citation omitted)). 50 Baynum v. State, 211 A.3 d 1075, 1084 (Del. 2019) (citing Harrington, 562 U.S. at 112). 51 Def. ’ s Op. Br. Postconviction Relief, 6 – 9 (“ Had Mr. Earl been p resented with a viable option to proceeding to trial he would have utilized thi s opti on, as such based upon counsel ’ s

(23) An insanity defense is available only where, at the time of the conduct charged and “ as a re sult of mental illnes s or serious men t al disorder, ” the defenda nt “ lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of [his] conduct. ” 52 And th e burden of proof on and NGRI claim re sts squarely on the de fendant. 53 (24) Nothing in the p resentenc e investigation, in counsel ’ s affidavit, in the litany o f mater i als Mr. Earl h as s ubmitted or directed the Court to review, nor in t h e Court ’ s own examination o f the entirety of the re cord in this matter, revealed credible — much less th e compelling — evide n ce that would be necessary to mount the sort of mental health defense that could defeat a finding of guilt. 54 The record ineffectiveness M r. Earl entered an invalid plea. ”); Letter from Mr. Earl to the Court (September 9, 2025) (D.I. 74) (stati ng that if Ms. LaCon ha d provided his mental health materials to the prosecution, then a different outcome would have been possible). 52 See D EL. C ODE A NN. tit. 11, § 401(a) (2023) (de fining what is needed to support a Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (“NGRI”) verdict). The d efendant can also claim that he “ suffered f rom a mental illness or serious mental disorder which substantially disturbed such person ’ s thi nking, feeling or behavior and/o r that such mental illness or serious mental disorde r left such pe rson with insufficient willpower to choose whether the person would do the a ct or refrain from doing it, although physically c apable, the trier of fact shall return a verdict of ‘ guil ty, but mentally ill. ’” Id. at § 401(b) (otherwise kn own as GBMI). That, o f course, is less advant ageous because it doesn ’ t truly affect criminal li ability or stave off convicti on — it only governs where the GBMI convict’s sentence is served. See generally id. at § 408(b); see also State v. C alhoun, 2024 WL 261329, at *9-10 (Del. Super. C t. Jan. 23, 2024), aff ’ d, 331 A.3d 1268 (Del. 2024) (explaining the dist inction between “insanity” and “mental illness”). Whichever Mr. Earl argues he w ould have claimed, the analysis here remains the same. 53 See Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117, 131 (Del. 1990) (“ if the burden of proving mental illness were placed upon the State, it would never undertake that burden, and defendants... would always be found ‘ guilty ’”); Calhoun, 2024 WL 261329, at *10 (“And no doubt, whether one lacked the substantial capacity to appre ciate the wrongfulness of his conduct is a finding of fa ct the defendant must attain.”) (citing 11 Del. C. § 401(a)). 54 Mr. Earl identifies his m ental health records as the most significant eviden ce in support of his claim. The Court has reviewe d the extensive records submitted. See Def. ’ s Suppl.; Def. ’ s Records in Supp. of Rule 61 Motion. Those r ecords reflect a lengthy and comple x history of anxiety,

supports no more than this: that at different points in his life, Mr. E arl experienced anxiety, depression, an d s imilar personal diffic u lties. Mr. Earl w as n ’ t aff li cted with a condition a nd su b sequent mental state that one can rely (and c o unsel ethically argue) for an affirmative insanity defense. 55 So, there is no reasonable p robabili ty that an NGRI ver d ict would have b een attaina b le at trial. (25) Mr. Earl ’ s argume nt that an insani ty defense wa s left unasserted by hi s counsel, standing alone, cannot result in the setting aside of his conviction. 56 Accordingly, h i s ineffective as s istance of c ounsel claim fails. M R. E ARL ’ S M ISLA BELED “ B RADY VIOLATION ” C LAI M H AS NO M ERIT. (26) Mr. Earl contends that he is entitled to postconvic tion relief based on an alleged violation of B rady v. Maryland. 57 But Mr. E arl ’s mere penning “ Brady violation ” is unavaili ng— he has identified neither material that would be considered depression, and other physical and mental health issues dating back to Mr. Earl ’ s childhood — starting with an early diagnosis of “Conduct Disorder” and including later periods of marked by substance abuse, strokes, and related complications. See generally Def. ’ s Records in Supp. of Rule 61 Motion. These records also include those from Psychiatrist Patricia Hutkin, whom Mr. Earl suggests could have been his expert witness. See Def. ’ s Suppl.; Def. ’ s R ecords in Supp. of Rule 61 Motion. Upon the Court’s exacting review or the now expanded record, it is clear that n othing in the records support a conclusion that Mr. Earl had a mental illness or a serious mental disorder such that he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wron gfulness of his conduct when he commit ted his rape upon a young child. See D EL. C ODE A NN. tit. 11, § 401 (2023); Sanders, 585 A.2d a t 123 – 26; Calhoun, 2024 WL 261329, at *9-10. 55 See Sanders, 585 A.2d at 123 – 26; Calhoun, 2024 WL 261329, at *9-10. 56 Sartin v. State, 2014 WL 5392047, at *3 (Del. Oct. 21, 2014). 57 See generally Def. ’ s Mot. for a Brady Violation (D.I 82).

“ Brady material” nor any act by the State that could be deemed a “ Brady violation.” 58 A Brady violation arises only when the State suppresses material evidence that is favorable to the accused; put another way, it must b e evidence that was in the State ’ s possession or co ntrol and that was withheld from t he defense. 59 (27) But Mr. Earl alleges th at it was his counsel who committed a Brady violation by “ depriv ing [him] of his right to an expert witness ” and not shar i ng “ particular records ” with the Court, the prosecution, and himself. 60 Each record Mr. E arl references pertains to his own medical and mental h ealth history, that information was available to him and to his counsel through out the proceedings 61 and his counsel ’ s proper use of that information has been explained above. Becau se there was no suppression o f evidence by the State, no Brady violation could have occurred. 62 Thus, this argume n t fails as a m atter of law. 63 58 See Michael v. Stat e, 52 9 A.2d 752, 755 (Del. 1987) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)) (defining Brady material as “evidence fa vorable to the defendant and material either to guilt or punishment”); Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005) (de scribing the three components of a Brady violation: “(1) evidence exists that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that evidence is suppressed by the State; and (3) its suppression prejudices the defendant”). 59 See generally Brady, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 988 – 89 (Del. 2014); Atkinson v. State, 778 A.2d 1058, 1063 (Del. 2001). 60 Def. ’ s Mot. for a Brady Violation, 2 (cleaned up) (emphasis omitted). 61 See generally Def. ’ s Mot. for a Brady Violation. 62 Mr. Earl agrees that the State didn ’ t withhold any of the information he ’s speaking of. Def. ’ s Mot. for a B rady Violation (“ The Prosicution [sic], Mr. Earl, and Judg e Wallace are now in possession of these missing records. ”). 63 United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 861 (5th Cir. 1979)) (“ [T] h e government is not obliged under Brady

N O E VIDENTIAR Y H EARING IS N ECESSAR Y. (28) Mr. Earl reque sts that the C o urt conduct an evidentiary hearing into th e above ma tters. 64 Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(h), the decision t o hold a n evidentiary hearing rests within the Court ’ s d iscretion. 65 And where it is apparent from th e contents o f a p ostconvict i on motion, the respo nses thereto, the record of prior proceedings, and any added materials t hat the p etitioner is n ot entitled to relief, there i s no need for an evidentiary hearing. 66 Just so h ere. Mr. Earl hasn ’ t identifie d an issue that would warrant further evidentiary development, 67 particularly given the Court’s exten s ive familiari t y with his case at this p oint. 68 to fur nish a defendant with information which he alre ady has or, with any reasonable diligence, he can obtain himself. ”); U nited States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 202 (3d C ir. 2005), as amended (Mar. 8, 2005) (sam e); S tate v. McGuiness, 2022 WL 1580601, at *4 (De l. Super. Ct. May 18, 2022) (same). 64 Def. ’ s Op. Br. Postconviction Relief; Def. ’ s Resp.; Def. ’ s Suppl. 65 Johnson v. State, 2015 WL 8528889, at *4 (Del. Dec. 10, 2015). 66 Id. at *4 (quoting Hawki ns, 2003 WL 22957025, at *1). Se e also Del. Su per. Ct. Crim. R. P. 61(h) (2026) which provides: (h) Evidentiary Hearing. (1) Determination by Court. After considering the motion for postconviction relief, th e state’s r esponse, the movant’s reply, if any, the record of prior proceedings in the case, and any added materials, the judge sh all determine whether an evidentiary hea ring is desirable. * * * (3) Summar y Disposi tion. If it appears that an evid entiary hearing is not desirable, the judge s hall make suc h disposition of the motion as justice dictates. 67 See Jones v. State, 2025 WL 274887, at *3, n.14 (Del. Jan. 23, 2025) (collecting cases). 68 See Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 551 (Del. 1998) (“Given the trial judge’s extensive familiarity with the background, we are unable to conclude that he abused his discretion in

(29) Mr. Earl has proved neither d eficient performance by counsel nor the prejudice required for post convic t ion relief to be granted on his ineffectivene ss claim. Mr. Earl ’ s complaint of a “ B rady violation ” is further without merit. Resultingly, Mr. Earl ’ s Rule 61 moti on for postconvic tion relief is DENIED. SO ORDERE D, /s/ Paul R. Wa l lace _______________ _________ Paul R. Wallace, J udge Original to Pr othonotary cc: Mr. Melvin L. Earl, J r., p ro se Diana A. Dunn, Deputy Attorney Genera l Andrew R. Fletcher, D eputy Attor n ey General Erika B. LaC on, Esquire determining that an evidentiary hearing was not necessar y. ”).