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March 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Lee, J. v. Millington, I.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2399 EDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Murray

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by Murray

J-S02029-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

JENNAH LEE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
IBRAHIM MILLINGTON :
:
Appellant : No. 2399 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered August 29, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at
No(s): CV-2018-009294

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MARCH 6, 2026

Ibrahim Millington (Father), pro se, appeals from the trial court’s August

29, 2025, final custody order granting Jennah Lee (Mother) and Father shared

legal custody, Mother primary physical custody, and Father partial physical

custody, with respect to their daughter, I.A.H.L. (born in July 2015) (Child).

After careful review, we affirm.

On November 30, 2018, Mother, pro se, filed the underlying custody

complaint, seeking sole legal custody and primary physical custody of Child.

Mother averred that Father did not have stable income or housing. Father,

pro se, filed an answer and counterclaim for shared legal and physical custody.

On February 1, 2019, the trial court entered a temporary custody order, which
J-S02029-26

awarded Father and Mother shared legal and physical custody of Child on an

alternating weekly basis.1, 2

On October 4, 2019, before the trial court had conducted a hearing on

her first notice of proposed relocation, Mother filed a notice of proposed

relocation to Newark, New Jersey.3

Nearly a year later, on September 14, 2020, Father filed a counseled

counter-affidavit regarding Mother’s relocation petition. The trial court

ordered Father and Mother to submit to a custody evaluation and scheduled a

relocation and custody trial. Ultimately, on January 26, 2022, the trial court

entered a relocation and custody order granting Mother’s request for

relocation, and awarding Father and Mother shared legal and physical custody

on an alternating weekly basis. The court also specified that Child shall

complete the school year at her then-current New Jersey school; Father must

take Child to school during his custody periods; and Mother shall find a new

---

1 Since that time, and throughout the pendency of the custody proceedings,

Mother and Father have filed a multitude of petitions for contempt.

2 In the temporary custody order, the trial court noted that Mother had
relocated to Easton, Pennsylvania, without providing legal notice to Father,
and directed Mother to “begin relocation procedures.” Temporary Custody
Order, 2/1/19. Mother formally requested relocation to Easton on March 27,
2019. Mother obtained several hearing continuances.

3 As Mother identified October 1, 2019, as the proposed date of relocation, it

appears that she again relocated without first providing legal notice to Father.

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school (approximately halfway between the parties’ respective residences) for

Child for the following school year. 4

On March 14, 2024, Father filed a petition for modification of the custody

order, seeking full custody of Child.5 Father asserted that Mother refused to

comply with the trial court’s custody order, thereby preventing him from

seeing Child, and that Mother is “abusive and overly aggressive” with Child.

Petition for Modification, 3/14/24. The trial court ordered Mother and Father

to submit to a custody evaluation prior to the scheduled custody trial.

The trial court subsequently held a pre-trial conference, at which time

the court concluded Mother and Father had failed to provide information about

proposed schools for Child. The court therefore ordered that “the situation

shall remain status quo” until the trial. Order, 9/16/24. Because the custody

---

4 During a custody hearing on October 20, 2021, Father acknowledged that

Child (who was in first grade at that time) did not attend school during the
weeks he had custody. Relocation and Custody Order, 1/26/22, Findings of
Fact, ¶ 23. In 2024, in response to one of Father’s many petitions for civil
contempt, the trial court ordered as follows:

[Child] shall be immediately enrolled in a private or charter school
located substantially equally between Hillside, NJ[,] and
Lansdowne, PA. Should this not occur within forty-five (45) days
of the date of this Order, then [Father] may enroll … [C]hild in a
school in or closer to Lansdowne, PA.

Order, 6/28/24.

5Father did not clarify whether he sought full legal or physical custody of
Child, or both.

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J-S02029-26

trial would necessarily involve discussion of where Child would attend school,

the trial court directed Mother and Father to present certain evidence

concerning their preferred school (including the cost to attend, the distance

from the school to each party’s residence, and transportation arrangements).

Following a custody trial,6 the trial court entered a final custody order

awarding shared legal custody of Child to Mother and Father, and primary

physical custody of Child to Mother. The court awarded Father partial physical

custody for every other weekend during the school year, and every other week

during the summer.

Father filed a timely notice of appeal and a simultaneous Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(1)(i) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.

Father raises the following issues for review:

1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by failing to
   conduct a complete and reasoned analysis of the 23 custody
   factors under 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5328(a), and/or by making findings
   unsupported by competent evidence[?]

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed an
   error of law by relying on a “status quo” created through
   [Mother’s] long-term noncompliance with prior final custody
   orders, rather than enforcing or giving proper weight to those
   orders and the evidentiary record[?]

3. Whether the trial court erred by disregarding uncontested
   evidence that [Mother] repeatedly and unilaterally controlled
   [Child’s] school placement and relocation contrary to [the trial
   court’s] final orders, thereby distorting the best-interest
   analysis[?]

   ---

6 Father represented himself during the custody trial. Mother was represented
by counsel.

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Father’s Brief at 4 (unnumbered) (issues renumbered). 7

When reviewing child custody orders,

our scope is of the broadest type and our standard is abuse of
discretion. We must accept findings of the trial court that are
supported by competent evidence of record, as our role does not
include making independent factual determinations. In addition,
with regard to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we
must defer to the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed
the witnesses first-hand. However, we are not bound by the trial
court’s deductions or inferences from its factual findings.
Ultimately, the test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are
unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record. We may reject
the conclusions of the trial court only if they involve an error of
law, or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the
trial court.

S.C.B. v. J.S.B., 218 A.3d 905, 913 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted); see

also Taylor v. Smith, 302 A.3d 203, 207 (Pa. Super. 2023) (stating, “it is

not this Court’s function to determine whether the trial court reached the

‘right’ decision; rather, we must consider whether, based on the evidence

presented, giv[ing] due deference to the trial court’s weight and credibility

determinations, the trial court erred or abused its discretion.” (citation and

some brackets and quotation marks omitted)).

“Subsection 5328(a) of the Child Custody Act sets forth 16 factors that

a court must consider before making any custody determination, including a

modification of a custody order.” E.B. v. D.B., 209 A.3d 451, 460 (Pa. Super.

---

7 Mother has not filed an appellee’s brief.

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J-S02029-26

2019). The court must “delineate the reasons for its decision on the record in

open court or in a written opinion or order.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(d).

In child custody cases, “the best interest of the child is paramount.”

Taylor, 302 A.3d at 207 (citation omitted). “This standard requires a case-

by-case assessment of all the factors that may legitimately affect the physical,

intellectual, moral and spiritual well-being of the child.” M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63

A.3d 331, 334 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[i]t is within

the trial court’s purview as the finder of fact to determine which factors are

most salient and critical in each particular case.” Taylor, 302 A.3d at 207

(citation omitted).

In his first claim, Father asserts the trial court failed to conduct a

complete analysis of the child custody factors under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).

Father’s Brief at 12 (unnumbered). Father contends the trial court did not

properly consider Mother’s failure to comply with court orders directing her to

locate a new school for Child approximately halfway between Mother’s and

Father’s respective residences. Id. If Mother had complied with the court’s

June 28, 2024, order, Father believes, he would have been awarded shared

custody on an alternating weekly basis. Id. at 12-13 (unnumbered).

The argument section of Father’s brief is undeveloped. Despite his

assertion that the trial court failed to consider the child custody factors under

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a), Father does not identify any particular factor he

believes the trial court failed to consider. Nor does Father cite to any other

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J-S02029-26

relevant legal authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating that an appellant’s

argument shall include “such discussion and citation of authorities as are

deemed pertinent.”). Significantly, rather than explaining how the trial court’s

custody award was contrary to Child’s best interest, Father focuses his

attention on the alternating weekly custody schedule he prefers. See 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a) (requiring a court to determine the best interest of the

child before awarding any form of custody). Father’s first claim is waived on

this basis.8 See Hayward v. Hayward, 868 A.2d 554, 558 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(concluding that appellant’s failure to cite any pertinent authority in support

of his argument resulted in waiver of his claim).

We address Father’s remaining claims together, as they are related. In

his second claim, Father argues the trial court “rewarded” Mother’s

---

8 Even if Father had properly preserved his claim, we would conclude that it

lacks merit. Our review confirms the trial court fully considered each of the
section 5328(a) custody factors and detailed its reasoning in its conclusions
of law supporting the final custody order. See Findings of Fact in Support of
Custody Order, 8/29/25, at 12-20 (the trial court setting forth its conclusions
regarding each of the enumerated custody factors). Additionally, the trial
court explained that “[t]he best interest factors which most significantly
guided [its] decision were the parental duties performed by each party, the
need for continuity and stability in the Child’s life, and the proximity of the
parties’ residences.” Id. at 21; id. at 20-23 (additional discussion supporting
the trial court’s conclusions); see also Taylor, 302 A.3d at 207 (providing
that the trial court, as the finder of fact, may decide which of the best interest
factors are “most salient and critical”). Further, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion,
the trial court reiterated its consideration of the section 5328(a) custody
factors and concluded Father’s claim lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion,
9/30/25, at 4-7. As we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in the
trial court’s analysis, Father’s claim, if preserved, would not entitle him to
relief.

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J-S02029-26

noncompliance by “cit[ing] the consequences of that disobedience as

justification for continued deprivation of [Father’s] rights.” Father’s Brief at

10 (unnumbered). Father also claims the trial court failed to enforce its prior

orders, including orders directing the parties to choose a school for Child. Id.

at 10-11 (unnumbered).

Similarly, in his third claim, Father asserts the trial court improperly

disregarded evidence of Mother’s noncompliance with orders relating to Child’s

schooling. Id. at 14 (unnumbered). According to Father, Mother ignored the

trial court’s orders and unilaterally chose Child’s schooling. Id. Father claims

that “[t]he absence of accountability created a pattern in which Mother was

effectively permitted to disregard orders with impunity, while Father’s

custodial time and parental role were steadily eroded through no fault of his

own.” Id. at 15 (unnumbered).

These claims are likewise waived due to Father’s failure to adequately

develop his argument with citation to and discussion of pertinent legal

authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); Hayward, supra.9

---

9 Even if Father had preserved this issue, we would conclude that it lacks
merit. In its opinion, the trial court fully detailed Mother’s and Father’s
ongoing dispute over Child’s school placement. See Trial Court Opinion,
9/30/25, at 8-11. The trial court noted that Father filed multiple petitions for
contempt against Mother, in which he failed to challenge Child’s school
placement. See id. at 9-10. The court also emphasized that Father never
provided any information concerning his preferred school choice for Child. Id.
at 11; see also id. (trial court stating, “[Father] opines that the trial court
has failed to enforce prior orders, but how was the trial court supposed to
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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J-S02029-26

Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s August 29, 2025,

final custody order.

Order affirmed.

Date: 3/6/2026

---

know where to send the Child if [Father] does not provide the required
information?”); id. (stating, “Father’s failure to follow through following the
2021-22 school year, when the trial court was willing to consider changing the
Child’s school to one closer to Father’s residence for the 2022-23 school year,
does not transform th[e] trial court’s August 2025 findings into an abuse of
discretion or legal error.”). Additionally, emphasizing that Child was nearly
ready to enter fifth grade at the time of the final custody order, the trial court
found that “switching schools would be detrimental to the Child’s need for
continuity and stability….” Findings of Fact in Support of Custody Order,
8/29/25, at 21-22.

Moreover, to the extent Father wishes this Court to reassess the section
5328(a) custody factors in light of Mother’s alleged noncompliance with
previous trial court orders, we reiterate that “we are not in a position to
reweigh the evidence and the credibility determinations of the trial court.” In
re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010); see also S.C.B., 218 A.3d at 913.
For these reasons, we would conclude that Father is not entitled to relief.

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