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March 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Lester, T.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1243 EDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Nichols

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (614)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by Nichols

J-S39028-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
TEQUILLA LESTER :
:
Appellant : No. 1243 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 8, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-46-CR-0004488-2023

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED MARCH 6, 2026

Appellant Tequilla Lester appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after she was convicted of strangulation and simple assault following

a bench trial.1 On appeal, Appellant claims that the trial court erred by

accepting her jury trial waiver. After review, we affirm.

The affidavit of probable cause, to which Appellant stipulated at her non-

jury trial, established the following facts:

On Wednesday, July 26, 2023, at [approximately 3:30 p.m.,]
Officer Zachary Snyder, responded to 368 Indian Crest Way,
Lower Salford Township, Montgomery County, [Pennsylvania] for
a reported behavioral psychiatric emergency. The caller stated
that her 20-year-old daughter was breaking things in the house.

On location, [Officer Snyder] spoke with the caller[, Appellant].
[Appellant] stated that she and her daughter, Alliyah Lester [(the
victim)], got into an argument. [The victim] began verbally
disrespecting [Appellant], so [Appellant] told her to leave the

---

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2718(a)(1) and 2701(a)(1), respectively.
J-S39028-25

residence. This provoked [the victim] to break multiple things
inside the residence. [Appellant] stated that [the victim] got into
her face, so [Appellant] pushed her. [Appellant] stated, “I'll
admit, I pushed [the victim].” [Officer Snyder] observed a small
scratch on [Appellant’s] knee.

[Officer Snyder] then responded upstairs and spoke with [the
victim]. [The victim] stated that [Appellant] came upstairs to
question her about a past relationship. [The victim] stated that
she told [Appellant] to leave her room and when [Appellant] did
not, [the victim] began calling [Appellant] “fat.” [Appellant] then
grabbed [the victim] by the neck, threw [the victim] to the
ground, and placed her foot on [the victim’s] neck. [Officer
Snyder] asked [the victim] if she was unable to breathe when
[Appellant] had her by the neck. [The victim] stated that she
could not breathe and felt as though she was going to pass out.
[The victim] had a disheveled appearance, scratches on the right
side of her face and neck, scratches on her back, and redness to
the left side of her neck.

A juvenile witness, A.L., provided video of the physical altercation
which shows [the victim] on the floor and [Appellant] standing
over [the victim] with her foot on [the victim’s] neck region.

Based upon the above facts, [Appellant] was arrested for
strangulation, simple assault, [and] harassment.

Affidavit of Probable Cause, 7/26/23, at 4; see also N.T., 7/1/24, at 12-14

(reflecting that Appellant stipulated to the facts as stated in the affidavit of

probable cause).

On July 1, 2024, Appellant proceeded to a stipulated bench trial, at the

conclusion of which the trial court found Appellant guilty of strangulation and

simple assault.2 The trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of ten to twenty-

three months’ incarceration followed by three years of probation for her

---

2 The Commonwealth nolle prossed the harassment charge. See N.T., 7/1/24,
at 17.

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J-S39028-25

strangulation conviction.3 Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which the

trial court denied on April 11, 2025.4

Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

Did the [trial] court err in accepting [Appellant’s] waiver of a jury
trial when the oral colloquy conducted before the waiver failed to
explain that the jury would be composed [of Appellant’s] peers?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

---

3 The trial court found that the simple assault conviction merged with
strangulation for sentencing purposes. See N.T., 10/8/24, at 42; see also
Sentencing Order, 10/8/24, at 1-2 (unpaginated) (reflecting that no sentence
was entered for simple assault).

4 We note that Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on October 11, 2024.

See Post-Sentence Mot., 10/11/24. However, the trial court failed to rule on
Appellant’s post-sentence motion within 120 days, and the clerk of courts
failed to enter an order deeming the post-sentence motion denied by
operation of law. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a) (providing that the judge
shall decide a post-sentence motion within 120 days or it shall be deemed
denied by operation of law); Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c) (providing that when
a post-sentence motion is denied by operation of law the clerk of courts shall
enter an order on behalf of the court that the post-sentence motion is deemed
denied). On March 26, 2025, Appellant filed a praecipe for the entry of an
order denying post-sentence motions. See Praecipe, 3/26/25. The trial court
entered an order denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion on April 11, 2025.
See Trial Ct. Order, 4/11/25. Appellant filed a notice of appeal within thirty
days of the trial court’s order. See Notice of Appeal, 5/6/25. Under such
circumstances, we decline to quash the appeal due to a breakdown in
operations of the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Perry, 820 A.2d 734,
735 (Pa. Super. 2003) (stating “where the clerk of courts does not enter an
order indicating that the post-sentence motion is denied by operation of law
and notify the defendant of same, a breakdown in the court system has
occurred and we will not find an appeal untimely under these circumstances”).

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J-S39028-25

“[T]he decision to grant a waiver of a jury trial is one committed to the

sound discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Merrick, 488 A.2d

1, 3 (Pa. Super. 1985) (citations omitted).

This Court has explained:

The essential elements of a jury waiver, though important and
necessary to an appreciation of the right, are nevertheless simple
to state and easy to understand. The essential ingredients, basic
to the concept of a jury trial, are the requirements that the jury
be chosen from members of the community (a jury of one’s
peers), that the verdict be unanimous, and that the accused be
allowed to participate in the selection of the jury panel.
Notwithstanding the Rule’s reference to a “colloquy on the record,”
the use of a written jury trial waiver form has been deemed
sufficient in the absence of an oral jury trial waiver colloquy.

A waiver colloquy is a procedural device; it is not a constitutional
end or a constitutional “right.” Citizens can waive their
fundamental rights in the absence of a colloquy; indeed, waivers
can occur by conduct or by implication, as in the case of a criminal
trial conducted in absentia after the defendant fails to appear.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 181 A.3d 1168, 1175 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations

omitted and formatting altered); see also Commonwealth v. Mallory, 941

A.2d 686, 696-97 (Pa. 2008) (stating that “the absence of an on-the-record

colloquy concerning the fundamentals of a trial by jury does not prove, in an

absolute sense, that a defendant failed to understand the right [she] waived

by proceeding non-jury”); Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 667 (Pa.

Super. 2013) (explaining that “[t]o be voluntary, the waiver must be the free

and unconstrained choice of its maker. This requires a showing that the

defendant, after consultation with counsel (if any) and consideration of the

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J-S39028-25

right he or she is forfeiting, has decided to waive the right at issue.” (citations

omitted and some formatting altered)).

Here, Appellant signed a written jury trial waiver form in which she

confirmed that she had elected to waive her right to a jury trial and proceed

to trial before “a judge without a jury, fully understanding that if [she] were

tried by a jury . . . the jury would be chosen from members of the community

thereby producing a jury of [her] peers.” Jury Trial Waiver Form, 7/1/24.

Appellant does not argue that she did not understand the waiver form. See

Appellant’s Brief at 9-13. Additionally, Appellant confirmed that she had

sufficient time to discuss her decision to waive her right to a jury trial with

counsel. See N.T., 7/1/24, at 8-9, 12; see also Baker, 72 A.3d at 667.

Therefore, although the trial court did not specifically reiterate that Appellant

was waiving the right to a jury of her peers during the oral colloquy, we agree

with the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant was fully apprised of her right

to a jury trial and the consequences for waiving that right. See Smith, 181

A.3d at 1175 (explaining that “the use of a written jury trial waiver form [is]

sufficient in the absence of an oral jury trial waiver colloquy”). Accordingly,

we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting

Appellant’s jury trial waiver. See Merrick, 488 A.2d at 3. For these reasons,

Appellant is not entitled to relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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J-S39028-25

Date: 3/6/2026

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