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March 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Jessica Bugge v. Jeb S. Fannin

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: CL-2025-0377

• Judges: Fridy, J.

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (9.1K)

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Combined Opinion

Rel: March 6, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026

---

CL-2025-0377

---

Jessica Bugge

v.

Jeb S. Fannin

Appeal from Talladega Circuit Court
(DR-21-900167)

FRIDY, Judge.

Attorney Jessica Bugge appeals from an order that Talladega

Circuit Judge Jeb S. Fannin entered finding her in contempt for her

failure to attend the third day of trial as scheduled in the underlying

divorce action. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the order in
CL-2025-0377

part, reverse it in part, and remand the matter for the entry of an order

consistent with this opinion.

Background

On June 6, 2021, Jennifer Riddle commenced a divorce action in the

Talladega Circuit Court ("the trial court"). On September 23, 2021, Bugge

filed a notice of appearance in the divorce action on behalf of Riddle. The

trial court first set the divorce action for trial on April 19, 2022, but

continued it numerous times before eventually beginning the trial in

March 2023. From the record before us, it appears that the trial was held

on two days and that the third day of the trial was scheduled for May 15,

1. However, the trial court continued the resumption of the trial

several times for reasons not pertinent to this appeal.

On October 16, 2024, the trial court set the resumption of the trial

for December 9 and 10, 2024. On Friday, December 6, 2024, Bugge filed

a motion to continue the trial, which was scheduled to resume the

following Monday. The trial court granted the continuance and, on

December 11, 2024, rescheduled the trial for December 16 and 18, 2024.

On December 12, 2024, Bugge filed a notice of trial conflict and a motion

to continue, which the trial court granted.

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CL-2025-0377

The trial court held a status conference on December 18, 2024, to

determine available dates for the resumption of the trial. Based on the

dates the attorneys provided, the trial court entered an order on January

14, 2025, setting the case for trial on January 30 and 31, 2025. On

January 27, 2025, Bugge filed a notice of trial conflict. On January 29,

2025, she filed a motion to continue the trial in this case, asserting that

she had a hearing in a criminal case in the Franklin Circuit Court that

day, that a motion for sanctions relating to discovery requests was still

pending, that the defendant had requested additional documents from

her client, Riddle, and that the defendant still had not provided certain

financial information that Bugge had requested during discovery. Bugge

again sought a continuance "until such time as all pending motions in

this case have been heard, and all Orders complied with, in order that

both parties can prepare for trial based on some advance knowledge of

what issues and facts stand to be addressed." Bugge did not attend the

trial on January 30, 2025.

On February 26, 2025, the trial court entered an order ("the show-

cause order") directing Bugge to appear before the court on March 6,

2025, to show cause as to why she should not be held in contempt for

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CL-2025-0377

failing to attend the trial as ordered and to show cause why sanctions

should not be imposed on her. In the show-cause order, the trial court

explained that the trial had been specially set for January 30 and 31,

2025, based on dates of availability that Bugge had provided, but that,

when the case was called for trial on January 30, Bugge was absent. The

trial court noted that Bugge had failed to provide a justifiable reason for

her absence and had not gained the court's permission to be absent.

On March 5, 2025, Larry Riddle, the defendant in the action, filed

a motion for sanctions to recover the expenses he had incurred related to

the January 30, 2025, trial date for which Bugge had failed to appear. He

explained that he lived in The Villages in Florida and that he had

traveled 1,050 miles roundtrip to attend the trial in Talladega. Using

fifty-one cents per mile to calculate his travel expenses, he requested

$546 for his travel; $287.68 for hotel expenses; $341.77 for meals, gas,

etc.; and an attorney fee of $4,650 incurred from December 18, 2024,

through January 30, 2025.1 He attached an affidavit and documentary

evidence attesting to the validity of those expenses to his motion.

1Based on Riddle's figures, the amount he requested for his travel

should have been $535.50.
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CL-2025-0377

At the March 6, 2025, hearing, Bugge gave a rambling explanation

for her absence that boiled down to her belief, which she said was based

on court documents, that she had a jury trial in a criminal case in the

Franklin Circuit Court ("the Franklin criminal case") scheduled for the

morning of January 30. Judge Fannin asked Bugge why she did not e-

mail him that morning to notify him that she would not be in attendance

at the trial in this case. She noted that he had retired and said that she

did not have his e-mail address. Judge Fannin told Bugge that, even

though he was retired, he still received e-mail at his AlaCourt e-mail

address.2

The attorney for the defendant introduced into evidence the

AlaCourt case-action-summary sheet for the Franklin criminal case

indicating that on December 20, 2024, that case was set for a pretrial

docket on January 30, 2025, and that it was not set for a jury trial until

April 2025. The attorneys and the trial court took a closer look at the

2During the litigation of the divorce action, Judge Fannin retired.

On September 9, 2024, the presiding judge of the Talladega Circuit Court
entered an order observing that he had received an order from the Chief
Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court assigning Judge Fannin to serve
as a circuit and district judge in Talladega County, and he assigned
Judge Fannin to continue to preside over the Riddle divorce action.
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CL-2025-0377

case-action-summary sheet, which indicated that the Franklin criminal

case had never been set for trial on January 30, 2025. During a

conversation among Bugge, Judge Fannin, and defense counsel, Bugge

said that she did not remember "if this was the jury trial or if this was

the pretrial, but in either way, shape or form, I was -- I did have to be

there. I was not excused. I did try to get excused."

Judge Fannin asked Bugge whether she had tried to contact

defense counsel in the underlying divorce action about the trial setting.

Bugge's response was evasive, and the defense attorney told Judge

Fannin that his office had not received a telephone call or an e-mail from

Bugge regarding the January 30, 2025, trial setting.

Bugge told Judge Fannin that he had not responded to her request

to continue. He said: "If I didn't respond, that would mean I didn't want

to continue it. Can you not understand that?" Bugge said that she did not

and that the trial court's failure to rule on her motion to continue did not

provide her with any direction. She also told Judge Fannin that her

failure to attend the trial could not be considered contempt because, she

said, it was not willful. She also said that she believed that a criminal

case took precedence over this "financial case."

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CL-2025-0377

On April 2, 2025, the trial court entered an order ("the contempt

order") finding that the divorce action had been set for trial twice in

December and that Bugge had requested a continuance both times. After

granting both continuances, the trial court wrote, it had held a status

conference to ascertain when the attorneys for the parties could be

available for trial. The attorneys were all available on January 30 and

31, 2025, so the trial court set those dates for the trial to resume.

In the contempt order, the trial court found that, on December 20,

2024, a pretrial hearing was scheduled for January 30, 2025, in the

Franklin criminal case. It also found that Bugge did not follow the

Attorney Calendar Conflict Resolution Order ("the conflict-resolution

order")3 by failing to contact counsel for the defendant in the divorce

action immediately to resolve the conflict when she received notice of the

3Pursuant to Rule 201(b)(2), Ala. R. Evid., we take judicial notice

that the conflict-resolution order, adopted effective October 22, 1990,
outlines the procedure an attorney is to follow when he or she is
scheduled to appear in more than one court at the same time or within
such a short period that the attorney cannot reasonably be expected to
appear in both courts. The conflict-resolution order provides that, upon
receiving notice of a trial or hearing that conflicts with a trial or hearing
that has already been set, the attorney is to immediately attempt to
resolve the conflict and, if he or she is unable to do so, to "promptly"
attempt to resolve the conflict by filing an appropriate motion in the
courts involved.
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CL-2025-0377

date of the pretrial conference in the Franklin criminal case. The trial

court also noted that Bugge did not file a notice of conflict with the trial

court until January 27, 2025, and that Bugge had failed to follow the

conflict-resolution order by failing to consult with Judge Fannin or notify

him that she had made efforts to resolve the scheduling conflict and that

those efforts had been unsuccessful.

The trial court found that Bugge had filed a motion to continue in

the divorce action on January 29, 2025, the day before the trial was set

to resume, in which she referred to her scheduling conflict and other

things. The trial court did not continue the divorce action, and it noted in

the contempt order that, pursuant to the conflict-resolution order, "no

resolution of a conflict shall result in a continuation unless a continuance

is expressly ordered by the trial judge." Additionally, the trial court found

that, on the morning of January 30, 2025, Bugge called the Talladega

circuit clerk's office and said that she would not be attending the trial

that day. When the trial court called the case for trial, Bugge did not

appear. Finally, the trial court found, Bugge's "argument to support her

absence from the trial is without merit, and she should be adjudged in

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CL-2025-0377

contempt of court for her failure to attend a specially set trial, with a

specially sitting trial judge."

The trial court sentenced Bugge to the Talladega County jail for

contempt but suspended that sentence to provide Bugge with an

opportunity to purge herself of contempt. The trial court directed Bugge

to pay the defendant's attorney fee of $4,500 and $1,175.45 for the

expenses he had incurred for traveling to Talladega for the trial; she was

to remit the payments within thirty days from the date of the contempt

order. If she failed to remit those payments, the trial court ordered, the

jail sentence would be imposed.

Bugge appealed the contempt order to the Alabama Supreme Court

on May 14, 2025. That court transferred the appeal to this court on May

22, 2025, pursuant to § 12-3-10, Ala. Code 1975.

Analysis

Bugge contends that, because the contempt order does not specify

whether she was in direct or indirect contempt, or civil or criminal

contempt, it is inadequate and due to be reversed. To support her

contention, Bugge cites Charles Manufacturing Co. v. United Furniture

Workers, 361 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (Ala. 1978). However, that case involves

9
CL-2025-0377

the notice that must be provided to a person against whom contempt

charges have been levied, not what information is to be included in the

contempt judgment itself. To the extent that Bugge argues that she was

deprived of notice as to the nature of the contempt charges against her,

i.e., that she was not told whether the trial court's show-cause order

alleged direct or indirect contempt, or civil or criminal contempt, we have

found no authority that requires such specificity in a show-cause order.

In Charles Manufacturing, our supreme court discussed the various

types of contempt, explaining that

"[c]ontempts are divided along two lines: first, civil or
criminal contempt. Civil contempt sanctions seek to compel or
coerce compliance with orders of the court in the future, while
a criminal contempt is one in which the purpose of the
proceeding is to impose punishment for disobedience of orders
of the court. The second line divides contempts into those
which are either direct or indirect. Direct contempts are those
committed in the 'presence' of the judge, where all of the
essential elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the
court, and are actually observed by the court. If some of the
essential elements are not personally observed by the judge it
is an indirect contempt."

361 So. 2d at 1035-36 (citations omitted). In Ex parte Sheffield, 120 So.

3d 1091, 1094-96 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013), this court determined that the

failure of an attorney to appear for a scheduled hearing or trial

constitutes constructive, or indirect, contempt and that the accused

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CL-2025-0377

attorney is entitled to due process that requires him or her to be advised

of the charges against him or her, as well as an opportunity to be heard.

See also Ex parte Tarpley, 293 Ala. 137, 300 So. 2d 409 (1974). The

preliminary statement, here the show-cause order, "must set forth all

facts essential to the court's jurisdiction, including facts constituting a

contempt, and the statement must clearly apprise the person charged of

the nature and cause of the accusation." Charles Mfg., 361 So. 2d at 1037.

In its show-cause order, the trial court notified Bugge that the

wrongful conduct that was the basis of the alleged contempt was her

failure to attend the specially set trial on January 30, 2025, and the trial

court provided Bugge with a hearing in which she was afforded the

opportunity to address her actions and to "give testimony relevant either

to the issue of complete exculpation or extenuation of the offense and in

mitigation of the penalty imposed." Charles Mfg., 361 So. 2d at 1037.

Therefore, we conclude that the requirements of due process were

satisfied.

Bugge also argues that the contempt order did not indicate whether

she was in civil contempt or in criminal contempt and points out that

each type is governed by a different standard of review and each provides

11
CL-2025-0377

for different types of remedies. In State v. Thomas, 550 So. 2d 1067, 1072

(Ala. 1989), our supreme court discussed the differences between civil

and criminal contempt, writing:

"Contempts are characterized as either civil or criminal.
Civil contempt seeks to compel or coerce compliance with
orders of the court, while a criminal contempt is one in which
the purpose of the proceeding is to impose punishment for
disobedience of orders of the court.

"The sanction for civil contempt continues indefinitely
until the contemnor performs as ordered. A critical distinction
is that the sanction for criminal contempt is limited in
Alabama district and circuit courts to a maximum fine of $100
and imprisonment not to exceed five days."

(Citations omitted.) The Thomas court also observed that "[t]he line

between civil and criminal contempt can sometimes become blurred." Id.

at 1073. That court wrote: "Confusion arises in attempts to classify civil

and criminal contempts, because the elements often overlap. In

appropriate circumstances, however, a party's actions can support a

finding of both civil and criminal contempt." Id. See also Willis v. Willis,

329 So. 3d 650, 661-62 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020) (holding that trial court

found mother in both criminal contempt and civil contempt).

In Kizale v. Kizale, 254 So. 3d 233, 237-38 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017),

this court wrote:

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CL-2025-0377

"The two types of contempt -- criminal and civil -- are
governed by different standards of review. In the case of civil
contempt, we have often explained that

" 'whether a party is in contempt of court is a
determination committed to the sound discretion
of the trial court, and, absent an [excess] of that
discretion or unless the judgment of the trial court
is unsupported by the evidence so as to be plainly
and palpably wrong, this court will affirm.'

"Unlike civil contempt, criminal contempt requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of the alleged contemnor's guilt.

" 'The standard of review in an appeal from an
adjudication of criminal contempt occurring in a
civil case is whether the offense, i.e., the contempt,
was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ...

" ' "The essential elements of the
criminal contempt for which
punishment has been imposed on [the
defendant] are that the court entered a
lawful order of reasonable specificity,
[the defendant] violated it, and the
violation was wilful. Guilt may be
determined and punishment imposed
only if each of these elements has been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt." ' "

(Citations and footnote omitted.)

In Hill v. Hill, 637 So. 2d 1368, 1370 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994), this court

explained that whether a certain charge involves civil contempt or

criminal contempt becomes important because one facing a contempt

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CL-2025-0377

charge must be able to purge himself or herself from the contempt. To

purge oneself in a criminal-contempt case, the contemnor must pay the

fine imposed, serve the authorized time, or do both. Id. To purge oneself

in a civil-contempt case, the contemnor must comply with the court's

order. Id.

Here, the trial court found Bugge in contempt for her failure to

attend the trial as scheduled and her failure to follow the provisions set

forth in the conflict-resolution order and sentenced her to five days in the

Talladega County jail. Because Bugge could not comply with the trial

court's order to attend trial on January 30, 2025, she could not purge

herself of contempt; therefore, the trial court's finding of contempt

necessarily was intended to punish Bugge for her failure to attend the

trial as scheduled. Thus, the trial court's finding of contempt was

criminal in nature, not civil. See Ingram v. Allred, 119 So. 3d 1176, 1186

(Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (holding that attorney was held in criminal

contempt for failing to attend hearing because purpose of contempt was

to punish attorney rather to compel attendance at hearing because

attorney could not "travel back in time" to appear at that hearing to purge

herself of contempt).

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To hold a party in either criminal contempt under Rule

70A(a)(2)(C), Ala. R. Civ. P., or civil contempt under 70A(a)(2)(D), Ala. R.

Civ. P., the trial court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the party

willfully failed or refused to comply with a court order. T.L.D. v. C.G., 849

So. 2d 200, 205 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002); Shook v. Shook, 385 So. 3d 65, 85

(Ala. Civ. App. 2023). Bugge contends that, here, the evidence did not

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she had acted willfully and

deliberately when she did not attend the trial on January 30, 2025. Bugge

argues that a finding of contempt would be appropriate in this case only

if the evidence showed that she had "intended to thwart the [trial] court's

order, or to avoid completing the case." Bugge's brief, p. 6. She cites no

authority for that contention, however.

The evidence supports the trial court's findings that Bugge knew

that the divorce action was to resume in the trial court on January 30,

2025, that she made the decision to attend a pretrial docket call in the

Franklin criminal case instead, and that she did not immediately contact

defense counsel to resolve the scheduling conflict when she received

notice of the date of the pretrial conference in the Franklin criminal case,

as the conflict-resolution order requires. The evidence also supports the

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CL-2025-0377

trial court's finding that Bugge did not file a notice of conflict with the

trial court until January 27, 2025, and that she had failed to consult

promptly with Judge Fannin about her efforts to resolve the conflict, as

required by the conflict-resolution order. This evidence supports a

determination that, beyond a reasonable doubt, Bugge's failure to attend

the trial on the date scheduled was willful and deliberate and that her

conduct constituted criminal contempt. Therefore, the trial court did not

err in finding Bugge in contempt.

Bugge also contends that, if the trial court properly found her in

criminal contempt and a jail sentence was the consequence, the trial

court could not subject her to purging herself from that contempt by

requiring her to pay the defendant's expenses. In the contempt order, the

trial court directed that Bugge could purge herself from contempt if she

paid the travel expenses the defendant incurred traveling to Talladega to

attend the trial and the attorney fee the defendant incurred for his

attorney's immediate preparation and attendance at the trial on January

30, 2025. Bugge contends that the trial court's order permitting her to

purge herself of contempt in this manner is inconsistent with a finding of

criminal contempt, arguing that, if the jail sentence was punishment,

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then the finding of contempt "should not be subject to being purged by

payment of a large sum of money to the defendant." Bugge's brief, p. 19.

As discussed, we conclude that the trial court held Bugge in criminal

contempt, not civil contempt, and, as a result, we agree with Bugge that,

as part of the contempt action, the trial court lacked authority to impose

on her the requirement that she pay the defendant the expenses he

requested in his motion for sanctions to purge herself of contempt.

“Sanctions for criminal contempt are limited by statute to a

maximum fine of $100 and imprisonment not to exceed five days. See Ala.

Code 1975, § 12-11-30(5)." Pate v. Guy, 934 So. 2d 1070, 1072 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2005). "'To purge [oneself] in a criminal contempt case, the

contemnor must pay the fine imposed, serve the authorized time, or do

both." Davenport v. Hood, 814 So. 2d 268, 272 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (citing

Kalupa v. Kalupa, 527 So. 2d 1313 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985)). Because the

trial court could not properly order Bugge to pay the sanctions the

defendant requested as punishment for her criminal contempt, the

contempt order is reversed insofar as it directs Bugge to pay the attorney

fee and travel expenses the defendant requested as part of the contempt

matter. In reaching this conclusion, we are not to be understood as

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holding that a trial court can never suspend a sentence or fine under the

appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Kent v. Herchenhan, 215 So. 3d

1079, 1084 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016).

Conclusion

The contempt order is reversed insofar as it directed Bugge to pay

the attorney fee and travel expenses of the defendant to purge herself of

contempt. The balance of the contempt order is affirmed. The cause is

remanded for the trial court to enter an order consistent with this

opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED

WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Bowden, JJ., concur.

18