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March 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

COMMONWEALTH v. LEVI L., a Juvenile.

Massachusetts Appeals Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-P-0493

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.9K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-493

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

LEVI L., a juvenile.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The juvenile was arrested and charged with, as relevant

here, carrying a firearm without a license, possession of

ammunition without a firearms identification card, and

possession of a large capacity firearm. After moving

unsuccessfully to suppress the evidence of the firearm and

ammunition, the juvenile tendered a conditional guilty plea to

those charges, see Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (b) (6), as appearing in

482 Mass. 1501 (2019), and then appealed from the denial of his

motion. We affirm.

Background. We briefly summarize the facts as the judge

found them, supplementing them with other evidence that the
judge either explicitly or implicitly credited,1 see Commonwealth

v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 436 (2015), and with our

independent review of body-worn video footage that was part of

the evidence at the suppression hearing. See Commonwealth v.

Yusuf, 488 Mass. 379, 380-381 (2021). We reserve certain

details for later discussion.

At approximately 8 P.M. on June 21, 2022, members of the

Massachusetts State police and the Boston police department's

"Youth Violence Strike Force" (officers) were on "directed

patrol" near the Villa Victoria housing complex in Boston's

South End. The directed patrol was a response to community

concerns about increased "gang activity, drug activity, and

firearm activity in the area of Shawmut Avenue." The officers

were aware that approximately an hour earlier, other Boston

police officers had dispersed a group of Lenox Street gang

members who were loitering and drinking in another location near

Shawmut Avenue. Accordingly, approximately six officers, split

across two cars on directed patrol, went to the Villa Victoria

housing complex, an area frequented by Lenox Street gang

1 The judge expressly and without restriction credited the
testimony of the Commonwealth's witnesses, Officers Ryan Fullam
and Jose Sanchez.

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associates and to which the officers had recently responded to

calls about gangs, drugs, and gun activity.

When the officers, including Officer Ryan Fullam, arrived

in the Villa Victoria parking lot, they saw a group of up to

eight youths standing around a car on which there were cups and

containers of alcohol. The police recognized the youths, knew

that most of the people in the group were gang affiliated, and

knew that some were not of legal drinking age. The officers

spoke with the members of the group, informing them that they

could be arrested for drinking in public.

Although the interaction between the police and the group

was relatively calm, Fullam knew that one of the members of the

group, whom we shall call Paul, had an open firearms charge.

Additionally, Fullam knew that three firearms arrests had been

made at Villa Victoria within the past two years and that two

other firearms arrests had been made in the general area of

Shawmut Avenue within approximately a month of June 21 -- one

within one-quarter mile of Villa Victoria.

After the police talked with the group and Fullam pat

frisked another member of the group without finding contraband,

another officer drew Fullam's attention to a youth who appeared

to be avoiding the officers' attention by remaining quiet,

avoiding eye contact with the officers, and leaning down toward

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a nearby car "with his head down and [his] hood over his head."

It was not until this officer drew Fullam's attention to the

youth and the distinctive Gucci sling bag he was wearing, which

the police knew belonged to Paul, that Fullam recognized the

individual to be the juvenile.

Fullam was familiar with the juvenile from the juvenile's

prior police interactions and knew that he had previously been

arrested for a firearms offense. Fullam had seen the juvenile

before June 21, 2022, including an encounter on the street three

days earlier; in those earlier interactions, the juvenile had

been "confrontational, taunting, loud, obnoxious, [and]

unpleasant," and had specifically drawn attention to his claim

to be a gang member.

Based on the juvenile's uncharacteristic behavior, his

possession of Paul's sling bag, and Fullam's awareness that the

juvenile and Paul had each been previously charged with

possession of a firearm, Fullam suspected that the juvenile had

a firearm in the bag. Thus, based on concerns for his own

safety and that of the other officers present, Fullam patted

down the sling bag the juvenile wore and discovered a handgun

inside.

Discussion. 1. Admission of Officer Jose Sanchez's

testimony about the juvenile's prior firearms arrest. On the

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first day of the motion hearing, defense counsel made an oral

motion to limit or preclude Officer Jose Sanchez from testifying

that he had been present in August 2021 when a firearm was found

in the juvenile's possession. Defense counsel argued that

because evidence of that gun was later suppressed in a separate

case stemming from that arrest, the exclusionary rule rendered

Sanchez's testimony about it inadmissible at the trial in this

case. The judge did not agree and permitted Sanchez to testify.

We are not persuaded by the juvenile's argument on appeal

that the judge's ruling constituted an abuse of discretion

requiring reversal. See Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 485 Mass. 691,

706 (2020) (abuse of discretion standard applies to judge's

determination of whether to admit evidence). The legality of

the patfrisk turned on the existence of reasonable safety

concerns, and it is therefore not clear to us that exclusion of

Sanchez's testimony about the juvenile's prior possession of a

firearm would have served the purpose of the exclusionary

rule -- "to deter police misconduct and preserve judicial

integrity by dissociating courts from unlawful conduct."

Commonwealth v. Nelson, 460 Mass. 564, 570-571 (2011). Even if

we were to conclude that Sanchez's testimony should have been

excluded, we discern no prejudice stemming from the admission of

that testimony where the same information about the juvenile's

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prior firearms arrest came in without objection through Fullam.

See Commonwealth v. Berube, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 357, 363-364

(2025) (error in admission of testimony was nonprejudicial where

testimony was "cumulative" of other evidence admitted without

objection).

1. Lawfulness of patfrisk. Whether the patfrisk was

legally justified presents a more difficult question. When we

conduct our review of the judge's denial of the motion to

suppress, we "accept the motion judge's findings of fact unless

they are clearly erroneous and assess the correctness of the

judge's legal conclusions de novo." Commonwealth v. Henley, 488

Mass. 95, 100 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Weidman, 485 Mass.

679, 683 (2020). In assessing whether an officer has reasonable

suspicion to justify a patfrisk, we ask whether a reasonably

prudent person in the officer's position would be warranted in

believing that the defendant is armed and dangerous. See

Commonwealth v. Sweeting-Bailey, 488 Mass. 741, 744 (2021),

cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 135 (2022); Commonwealth v. Torres-

Pagan, 484 Mass. 34, 36-39 (2020). "The officer's reasonable

suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and

inferences reasonably drawn therefrom." Commonwealth v.

Crowder, 495 Mass. 552, 566, cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 169

(2025). Our inquiry is both objective and "highly fact-

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specific." Id. Here, we conclude that the evidence met the

required threshold to justify the patfrisk.

First, Fullam knew at the time of the patfrisk that the

juvenile had previously been arrested for unlawful possession of

a firearm. "Knowledge that a suspect's criminal record includes

weapons-related offenses may factor into the reasonable

suspicion calculus" as to whether a suspect is armed and

dangerous. Commonwealth v. Garner, 490 Mass. 90, 92 (2022).

The police also knew that the juvenile claimed to be gang

affiliated and that he was carrying a distinctive sling bag

belonging to another gang member, Paul, who himself had a prior

firearms arrest.2 See Sweeting-Bailey, 488 Mass. at 752

("evidence of gang membership may be considered as a factor in

the determination of reasonable suspicion").

Second, the judge found that the encounter between the

juvenile and the police took place in a location "where the

officers had recently responded to calls concerning gang

activity, drug activity, and gun activity." The encounter was

also within one-quarter mile of a recent firearms arrest. This

2 The judge credited the prosecution's testimony about the
sling bag but did not consider it because the judge concluded
that "[t]he reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct a patfrisk
was present before the bag was identified by the officer." We
are not bound by the judge's legal conclusion. See, e.g.,
Henley, 488 Mass. at 100.

7
evidence bore on the existence of reasonable suspicion that the

juvenile was armed. See Sweeting-Bailey, 488 Mass. at 752-753

(judge's finding about previous firearm arrest "approximately

one-half mile away" from location of stop contributed to

reasonable suspicion analysis); Torres-Pagan, 484 Mass. at 41-42

(where evidence showed "direct connection" between specific

location and activity being investigated, characterization of

neighborhood as "high crime" area may be relevant factor when

assessing reasonable suspicion of safety threat).3 We also

consider the evidence that for most, if not all, of the

encounter leading up to the patfrisk, the officers were

outnumbered by the group of juveniles. See Crowder, 495 Mass.

at 568 (fact that trooper was "outnumbered four to one" during

nighttime roadside stop was factor in reasonable suspicion

calculus).

Third, Fullam described the marked difference between the

juvenile's quiet, retiring behavior when Fullam encountered him

3 The judge did not use the term "high crime area" in his
findings. To the extent that we read the words the judge used
as a finding that the patfrisk occurred in a high crime area, we
are not persuaded that the finding was clearly erroneous. See
Commonwealth v. Karen K., 491 Mass. 165, 169 (2023) (defining
clear error); Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass. 367, 372 (2007)
(finding no clear error in judge's determination that area
patrolled based on recent increase in firearms violence was
"high crime area").

8
on June 21 and the juvenile's brash and attention-seeking

conduct -- including his claim to gang membership -- three days

earlier, suggesting to Fullam that the juvenile was attempting

to hide something from the police. Based on the juvenile's

efforts to avoid police attention and to conceal not only his

face but also the bag he was wearing across the front of his

body, the police could reasonably have suspected that the

juvenile was attempting to prevent Fullam and the other officers

present from noticing the sling bag. See Sweeting-Bailey, 488

Mass. at 749-750 (officers' fact-based inference that individual

was behaving uncharacteristically to divert officers' attention

away from car was properly considered in determining whether

police had reasonable suspicion of weapon inside).

While we agree with the juvenile that none of these factors

considered in isolation would support reasonable suspicion that

he was armed and dangerous, our task is to consider whether the

totality of the circumstances, presented through the evidence

the judge credited, justified the patfrisk. See Sweeting-

Bailey, 488 Mass. at 745. Having done so, we are satisfied that

the events that unfolded on June 21, 2022, gave rise to an

objectively reasonable suspicion that the juvenile was

"armed" -- that is, concealing a firearm in the sling bag he

wore -- and "dangerous" because his possession of the firearm in

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the bag was presumptively illegal, given the juvenile's age.

See G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) (iv), as amended by St. 2014,

c. 284, § 48; Commonwealth v. Karen K., 491 Mass. 165, 179

(2023) (evidence that "juvenile did not legally possess the

firearm that [officer] suspected her to be carrying . . .

contributed significantly" to reasonable suspicion that juvenile

was armed and dangerous, justifying patfrisk); Commonwealth v.

DePeiza, 449 Mass. 367, 374 (2007) (officers' reasonable belief

that juvenile was carrying "concealed, unlicensed firearm"

provided reasonable suspicion that juvenile "was therefore armed

and dangerous"); Commonwealth v. Johnson-Rivera, 104 Mass. App.

Ct. 533, 536, 538 & n.5 (2024) (facts providing reasonable

suspicion that juvenile was carrying firearm also gave rise to

reasonable suspicion that juvenile was armed and dangerous).

Accordingly, the patfrisk was lawful, and the juvenile's motion

10
to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the frisk was

properly denied.

Order denying motion to
suppress affirmed.

By the Court (Massing, Hand &
Allen, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: March 5, 2026.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

11