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March 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Nelson

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: B342722

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

Filed 3/5/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B342722
(Super. Ct. Nos. 23CR07410,
Plaintiff and Respondent, 24CR03471)
(Santa Barbara County)
v.

RYAN ANTHONY NELSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

The Court of Appeal does not sit as “trier of fact” when
reviewing a trial court’s ruling either granting or denying a
motion for mental health diversion. It does not substitute its
discretion for that of the trial court. The rules on appeal are well
known and need not be repeated. (See, e.g., Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [presumption of correctness of a
trial court order]; People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 713
[substantial evidence rule]; People v. Pacheco (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 207, 213 (Pacheco) [abuse of discretion]; see also In
re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 208, 211; Brown v. Newby
(1940) 39 Cal.App.2d 615, 618.)
Ryan Anthony Nelson appeals after he was sentenced to
state prison for 12 years following a global disposition agreement
in which he pleaded guilty to three counts of commercial burglary
(Pen. Code, § 459), 1 one count of taking an automobile (Veh.
Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), and admitted two prior strike
convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and
multiple circumstances in aggravation (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a)(8)-(9), (b)(2)-(3), (5)).
Appellant contends as follows: “The court denied the
defense request for [mental health] diversion based on its finding
that the disorders were not significant factors in the commission
of the crimes and thus, appellant was ineligible, and that
appellant was unsuitable due to his not being treatable and being
dangerous due to his criminal history . . . . This ruling constituted
an abuse of the court’s discretion and is not supported by the
evidence.” As we shall explain, these contentions are without
merit.
Factual and Procedural Background
Appellant has an extensive criminal history. We know
from the probation report that appellant has had seven separate
and distinct prison sentences for theft and theft-related crimes.
Now, after spending most of his adult life in and out of
prison, he contends, based upon a psychologist’s evaluation, that
he suffers from mental health disorders which compelled him to
be a recidivist thief. The trial court acknowledged that appellant
“has been diagnosed with major neurocognitive disorder due to
traumatic brain injury, major depressive disorder, post-traumatic
stress disorder, ADHD, [and] opioid-use disorder in early
remission.” But the trial court, sitting as trier of fact, did not
credit the psychologist’s opinion. As the trial court expressly

1All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

2
found: “I find little to no evidence [appellant’s] mental health
diagnos[es] played any factor in the charged offenses.” It also
found appellant would pose an unreasonable danger to public
safety, based in part on his two prior convictions for residential
burglary, and his “ongoing criminality.”
Discussion
Section 1001.36 broadly authorizes the trial court to grant
mental health diversion where a defendant meets the statute’s
eligibility and suitability criteria. (Sarmiento v. Superior Court
(2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 890-891.) The defendant in a criminal
case is eligible for diversion if he or she has been “diagnosed with
a recognized mental disorder that was a significant factor in the
commission of the criminal offense with which [the defendant is]
charged. [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 891; § 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) If
eligibility is established, “the court must consider whether the
defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion.” (§ 1001.36, subd.
(c).)
“A defendant is suitable if: (1) in the opinion of a qualified
mental health expert, the defendant’s mental health disorder
would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant consents to
diversion and agrees to waive their speedy trial rights; (3) the
defendant agrees to comply with treatment requirements; and (4)
the defendant will not pose an ‘unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety’ as defined in section 1170.18 if treated in the
community.” (Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
124, 134 (Vaughn); § 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)-(4).)
The statute narrowly defines an “unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety,” by reference to the definition found in
section 1170.18. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) Section 1170.18, in
turn, defines the concept as “an unreasonable risk that the

3
petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning
of” section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). (§ 1170.18, subd. (c); see
People v. Williams (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 990, 1001.)
Even where the defendant meets the statute’s eligibility
and suitability criteria, the trial court retains “residual
discretion” to deny diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (a); Vaughn,
supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 134.) This discretion is not,
however, “unfettered and must be exercised ‘“consistent with the
principles and purpose of the governing law.”’” (Id. at p. 135.)
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for mental
health diversion for abuse of discretion. (Pacheco, supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at p. 213.) “A court abuses its discretion when it
makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong
legal standard [citations], or bases its decision on express or
implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial
evidence [citation].” (People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440,
449.) It is appellant’s burden on appeal to establish an abuse of
discretion occurred. (Pacheco, at p. 213.) The trial court sitting
as “trier of fact,” may reject an expert’s testimony. (In re J.S.,
supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 212; People v. McCoy (1995) 40
Cal.App.4th 778, 785 [trial court not obligated to accept even
unanimous or uncontradicted expert opinion]; accord, In re Scott
(2003) 29 Cal.4th 783, 823 [“The fact finder determines the facts,
not the experts”]; People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489, 498
[chief value of expert’s testimony rests upon the material from
which it is fashioned and the reasoning by which it progresses
from material to conclusion].)
Here, after considering the evidence, including the
psychologist/neuropsychologist’s report, the trial court factually
found that appellant’s mental health was not a significant factor

4
in the charged offenses. Indeed, the trial court said it found
“little to no evidence” that appellant’s mental health diagnoses
played “any factor” in the charged offenses, much less a
“significant factor.” The trial court’s comments amount to an
“adverse factual finding.”
“Where, as here, an appeal is premised upon facts expressly
not credited by the trial court, i.e., an adverse factual finding, the
appeal is frivolous . . . .” (In re Marriage of Greenberg (2011) 194
Cal.App.4th 1095, 1097). We need not decide if the appeal is
“frivolous.” But we do decide that appellant’s contentions are
without merit.
Finally, appellant contends he is not a danger to the
community because he has no convictions involving “violence.”
This may be true, but two of his prior theft-related offenses were
for first degree residential burglary. This crime may easily lead
to violence.
On this record, the trial court properly denied appellant’s
request for mental health diversion.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.

5
YEGAN, A.P.J., Concurring:
I write a separately concurring opinion to comment upon
the recent Fourth District opinion in People v. Cabalar (2025) 117
Cal.App.5th 41 (Cabalar). If it is correct, appellant herein would
have a much stronger argument for diversion from criminal
proceedings. Both Cabalar and Nelson suffer from mental
illness. So do a vast majority of people in state prison and county
jail. But mental illness, standing alone, does not inexorably lead
to mental health treatment in lieu of the burdens of the criminal
adjudication process. The Penal Code has not been superseded
by the mental health diversion statute.
Cabalar, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th 41 is wrong. I disagree
with its result and rationale. It does not seem to follow
traditional and time-honored rules on appeal. In fact, it seems to
retry the facts, and seems to ignore the doctrine of implied
findings. (People v. Francis (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 873, 878.) It
also seems to draw inferences away from the order under review.
It then substitutes its discretion for that of the trial court and
eviscerates the concept of “residual discretion.”
In addition, there is a pragmatic factual flaw in the overall
scheme of Cabalar’s “treatment” or punishment. No matter how
well-intentioned the appellate court, its decision to afford mental
health diversion in Orange County, cannot control whether or not
he will be incarcerated in three separate probation cases in three
separate counties. (Cabalar, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 46.)
Cabalar is a convicted felon. His possession of a firearm
and ammunition makes it difficult to imagine that he does not
pose a risk of danger to public safety. And his participation in an
uncharged conspiracy to commit grand theft of $175,000 worth of
jewelry from a department store jewelry case in a “smash and

1
grab,” hardly inspires a finding that he is not a risk to the
public’s safety. These two observations support the trial court’s
exercise of “residual discretion.” (Cabalar, supra, 117
Cal.App.5th at pp. 53, et seq.)
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATON.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

2
Von Deroian, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

Jennifer Peabody, Executive Director, Richard B. Lennon,
Staff Attorney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Harris, Gabriel Bradley,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.