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March 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Blake CA1/2

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A172358

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/5/26 P. v. Blake CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A172358
v.
RITCHIE LEE BLAKE, (Humboldt County
Super. Ct. No. 7075)
Defendant and Appellant.

This is the third appeal brought by defendant Ritchie Lee Blake after
he was convicted by jury of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187),1
kidnapping (§ 207), and burglary (§ 459), and sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole.2 In this appeal, he challenges the trial
court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under section 1172.6
following an evidentiary hearing. Defendant contends the evidence was
insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that he was the actual killer,
and thus ineligible for resentencing, because the finding was based on
uncorroborated accomplice testimony. We affirm the order.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We granted defendant’s request to take judicial notice of the record
filed in his first appeal, People v. Blake (Oct. 15, 1975, No. 1 Crim. 13249)
(nonpub. opn.) (Blake I).

1
BACKGROUND
The Evidence at Trial
On January 12, 1973, the Humboldt County Sheriff’s Office was
informed by Arnold Ferris, manager of the Club Hupa and Club Hupa
Liquors, that one of its janitors, Gerald Marshall, was missing. On January
22, Marshall’s body was found. The cause of death was a gunshot wound to
the head.
Accomplice Testimony
Defendant’s accomplices, Milton Dowd, Gaylord Dowd,3 and Matthew
James, provided the following testimony regarding the killing.
Milton Dowd
Milton testified that late in the morning or the early afternoon of
January 10, 1973, he went to defendant’s home. About two hours later,
James arrived in his car. The three men spent the afternoon drinking
whiskey. While at defendant’s home, Milton saw defendant had a .22-caliber,
scoped-rifle.
After some time had passed, defendant, James, and Milton drove to
Club Hupa, a club with an attached store that also sold alcohol, to buy more
alcohol. Defendant brought the rifle in the car. Defendant went into the
store and purchased more whiskey. The three men then drove around,
drinking whiskey while doing so. They ended up at the home of Milton’s
sister and brother-in-law, where they played pool. Milton’s brother, Gaylord,
and another friend, met them at the house. The other friend soon left, and
defendant, Milton, Gaylord, and James continued to drink and play pool.
Around midnight, defendant left to buy more whiskey. Defendant

3 Milton and Gaylord Dowd are brothers. To avoid confusion, we refer to
them by their first names.

2
returned a short while later without alcohol, however, as Club Hupa was
closed. Defendant suggested that the group go together to Club Hupa and
break in to steal some alcohol. The men brought the gun in the car with
them.
When they arrived at Club Hupa, they saw Gerald Marshall, who
worked at Club Hupa, burning some trash in a barrel outside the building.
Defendant talked to Marshall while Gaylord went through the back door of
the building and took some alcohol.
Milton and James exited the car and went inside the building to take
more alcohol. Milton and James made three additional trips inside the
building to take alcohol. When they came out of the building a final time,
Milton noticed that Marshall was in the back seat of the car and that the rifle
was leaning against the car. Milton, Gaylord, and James got into the car
with Marshall. Defendant closed the door to the building, grabbed the rifle,
and got into the back seat next to Marshall.
James drove the group up to the Bald Hills area. At around 1:30 A.M.,
James stopped on a skid road used for logging, and everyone got out of the
car. Defendant, Milton, Gaylord, and James walked up the road to stash
some beer in the bushes, and Marshall followed behind. It was dark, and
James repositioned the car so that the headlights illuminated the area where
the group was walking. Milton and Marshall went further up the skid road
with defendant trailing behind Marshall.
When Milton started to hide the beer in some bushes, he heard two
shots. He also heard Gaylord yelling at him to come back to the car. As
Milton ran back toward the car, he saw Marshall fall to the ground. At the
same moment, defendant stepped out of the dark, holding the rifle.
Defendant walked toward where Marshall laid, and Milton continued toward

3
the car. As he got into the car, he heard an additional gunshot. That
gunshot was not as loud, and sounded more muffled, than the previous shots.
Defendant returned to the car, and the group drove away, leaving
Marshall lying on the road. Defendant stated that he had a reason for
shooting Marshall, but he did not say what it was. The men drove to a
different area and stashed the remaining alcohol before eventually driving to
Eureka.
Gaylord Dowd
Gaylord and Milton were defendant’s cousins. On the evening of
January 10, 1973, Gaylord met Milton, defendant, and James at his sister’s
and brother-in-law’s house. The four men played pool and drank whiskey. At
some point, they ran out of whiskey and defendant left to buy more. He
returned a short time later without any alcohol, apparently because Club
Hupa was closed. Defendant suggested that they go take alcohol from Club
Hupa, and the other men agreed. On the way to Club Hupa, they stopped by
defendant’s house where defendant retrieved the rifle.
When they arrived at Club Hupa, Marshall was standing behind the
building, attempting to light a fire in a trash-burning barrel. The men talked
with Marshall for a few minutes, and Gaylord went into the building and
took some alcohol. Marshall tried to stop him as he left, but Gaylord pushed
him away. Gaylord took the gun from defendant and stood guard over
Marshall while the other men continued to take alcohol from inside the
building. Among the alcohol taken were cases of Coors beer.
When they were finished, Gaylord told Marshall to get into the car and
handed the gun back to defendant. The other men got into the car, and they
drove to the Bald Hills area to stash the stolen alcohol.
They drove up an old logging road and got out of the car. Milton went

4
first, followed by Marshall, and then defendant, who was carrying the rifle.
At some point, defendant pointed the rifle in the direction of Milton and
Marshall. Worried that defendant might start firing, Gaylord warned
defendant that Milton was ahead near Marshall. Gaylord turned to walk
back toward the car, at which point he heard a single gunshot. Milton and
defendant soon walked back to the car. Defendant was holding the gun. The
four men got into the car and quickly left. Defendant said, “I’ll take the rap”
for the shooting. They then drove to Tish Tang Road and stashed the alcohol.
Matthew James
On the afternoon of January 10, 1973, James drove his car to
defendant’s home. Milton and defendant were there, and the three of them
drank a bottle of whiskey and smoked marijuana. The three men left and
drove around for a while, before returning to defendant’s home. James saw
the rifle in defendant’s car.
That evening, the three men went to Milton’s sister’s home, where they
met Gaylord, played pool, and drank more whiskey. After the group finished
a bottle of whiskey, defendant left to buy more alcohol at Club Hupa. He
returned a short while later, having been unable to obtain any alcohol.
Defendant then asked them if they wanted to go to Club Hupa to take some
alcohol, and they agreed. James drove them to Club Hupa, with the rifle in
the car.
When the group arrived at Club Hupa, they encountered Marshall, who
worked at the club. Gaylord started punching Marshall. Gaylord then went
inside the building and took some alcohol, put the alcohol in the car, then
stood near Marshall while holding defendant’s gun. James and Milton also
exited the car and went inside the building to take alcohol.
James returned to and went inside the car, and soon after Marshall did

5
too. When the two were alone in the car, Marshall told James that “he didn’t
want to die or something like that.” The other men got into the car and the
group drove to the Bald Hills area to stash the alcohol, with the rifle in the
car.
They stopped at a skid road. They all got out and headed up the skid
road with Milton and Marshall out in front. Gaylord, defendant, and James
watched as Milton and Marshall looked for a place to hide the alcohol off of
the skid road.
Defendant had the gun and began aiming it in the direction of Milton
and Marshall. Gaylord yelled for Milton to come back towards the car. After
Milton walked back, James heard two gunshots and saw Marshall fall to the
ground. James saw defendant walk towards where Marshall was lying on
the ground. James heard two more gunshots. These gunshots sounded
different than the first two. They sounded “like a pop gun or something.”
Defendant returned to the car holding the gun. As the men drove
away, defendant admitted that he had shot Marshall and said it was “just
like shooting a dog or a cat.” Defendant also said that he had to shoot
Marshall because defendant was “afraid [Marshall] might squeal on him.”
Non-Accomplice Evidence
Arnold Ferris, the manager of Club Hupa, testified that when he
arrived at the club on the morning of January 11, 1973, he noticed that
alcohol and cigarettes were missing, and that there was no sign of Marshall.
Among the items taken were several cases of Coors beer. Ferris went to
Marshall’s trailer, but there was no answer. He also called Marshall’s
mother, but she did not know where Marshall was. Ferris then reported the
burglary and Marshall’s disappearance to the Humboldt County Sheriff.
On January 22, 1973, sheriff’s deputies interviewed Gaylord in

6
connection with the burglary and the disappearance of Marshall. Gaylord led
the deputies to Marshall’s body. Deputies discovered a .22-caliber shell near
the body. Deputies also searched the crime scene area and discovered Coors
beer can cartons.
Daniel Colegrove, a friend of defendant and of Marshall, helped
Marshall’s parents search for him on January 22, 1973. Colegrove was
searching near the old logging road in the Bald Hills area, when the deputies
brought Gaylord to the scene, and Gaylord led them to the body. Colegrove
heard the deputies say that Milton and Gaylord had turned themselves into
the sheriff’s office, and that they were looking for defendant in connection
with the murder.
Colegrove went to defendant’s residence and told him that the deputies
were looking for him. Later that evening, defendant showed up at
Colegrove’s house. Defendant was scared that the police were going to come
after him and try to kill him.
Defendant stayed at Colegrove’s house for approximately one week.
While he was staying with Colegrove, defendant told him that he was present
when Marshall was killed, but claimed that James was the one who had shot
Marshall. Defendant also told Colegrove that he knew that the Humboldt
County Sheriff’s Office was looking for him, and that he did not want to go to
jail.
Colegrove also testified that he had seen a .22-caliber rifle at
defendant’s house. Also, at some point on the date of the murder, Colgrove
saw defendant, Milton, Gaylord, and James together in a car driving past his
house and in the direction of Bald Hills Road.
The pathologist who performed the autopsy on Marshall testified his
cause of death was a gunshot wound to the head. Marshall had suffered

7
three gunshot wounds. One of the wounds was to his chest, one was above
his left eye, and a third and likely fatal gunshot wound was to the back of his
head. The gunshot to the back of Marshall’s head was fired with the gun in
direct contact with, or very close proximity to, his head, leaving burned and
charred skin near the entry wound.
The Verdict and Original Sentence
In 1974, a jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (§ 187),
kidnapping (§ 207), and burglary (§ 459). The trial court sentenced him to
life without the possibility of parole for the murder and stayed execution of
the sentence for the remaining offenses.
In defendant’s first appeal, Division One of this court affirmed the
judgment of conviction. (Blake I, supra, 1 Crim. 13249.)
The Petition for Resentencing
In 2022, defendant petitioned for resentencing pursuant to what is now
section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95), arguing he could no longer be
convicted of first degree murder given the legislative changes to murder
liability.
The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage, but on
appeal, this court reversed, concluding that there was a factual question as to
defendant’s liability for murder. We therefore remanded the matter to the
trial court with directions to issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing. (People v. Blake (Sept. 26, 2023, A166459) nonpub.
opn..)
The trial court heeded these directions. At the evidentiary hearing on
September 24, 2024, the prosecution relied on the record of conviction,
including the original trial transcripts, and both parties presented argument.
The prosecution argued that the trial testimony established beyond a

8
reasonable doubt that defendant was the actual killer. The defense argued
among other things that the testimony of defendant’s accomplices implicating
him in the murder was not corroborated by independent evidence.
On December 23, the court denied the petition by written order. The
court found that the People had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant was guilty of first degree murder as the actual killer and thus
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6.
In so finding, the court rejected defendant’s assertion that the trial
testimony of his accomplices was not sufficiently corroborated. The court
explained: “In this case, Daniel Colegrove was not an accomplice to the
burglary of Club Hupa, the kidnapping of Gerald Marshall, nor Marshall’s
murder. He testified that Defendant told him Defendant was present when
Marshall was murdered, that Defendant knew that the Humboldt County
Sheriff’s Office was looking for him and that he was afraid to go to jail. This
testimony is sufficient corroboration of the testimony of Milton, Gaylord, and
James to connect Defendant to the burglary of Club Hupa, Marshall’s
kidnapping, and Marshall’s murder.” The court found other corroborative
evidence, including that a deputy had found “a .22 caliber shell near
Marshall’s body on skid road,” which the court explained, “corroborat[ed]
Milton’s testimony that the rifle was a .22 caliber.” The court added that the
pathologist’s “autopsy results confirmed that the fatal shot was close to the
back of Marshall’s head, corroborating both Milton’s testimony that the final
shot was muffled and James’s testimony that the final shot sounded like a
cap gun— i.e. it was not as loud as the other shots.” (Ibid.)
This appeal followed.

9
DISCUSSION
The Section 1172.6 Process
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which amended sections 188 and
189 to significantly limit the scope of the felony-murder rule and eliminate
second degree murder liability predicated on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448–449;
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708 & fn. 1.) Among other
things, Senate Bill 1437 added section 189, subdivision (e), which specifies
that a “participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a
[specified] felony . . . in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of
the following is proven: ¶ The person was the actual killer. ¶ The
person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual
killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. ¶ The person was
a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3, subd. (e).)
Senate Bill 1437 also created “a special procedural mechanism for those
convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief,” codified at what is
now section 1172.6. (People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708 & fn. 2.) If
the trial court finds that a petitioning defendant has made a prima facie
showing of entitlement to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause
and hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d); People v. Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 450.)
At the evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty
of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended by the

10
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3).) “If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior
conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction,
shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining
charges.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2020–2021 Reg. Sess.)
clarified that the rules of evidence apply to evidentiary hearings held under
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, §§ 1, 2; § 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3).)
The Trial Court Properly Denied the Section 1172.6 Petition
Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his petition for
resentencing because there was insufficient evidence to support its finding
that he was guilty of murder under the current law as the actual killer.
Specifically, defendant contends the trial court’s decision was based on the
uncorroborated testimony of Milton, Gaylord, and James, his accomplices in
the murder. We disagree.
Applicable Law
Section 1111 provides, in part: “A conviction cannot be had upon the
testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence
as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.”
“Section 1111 serves to ensure that a defendant will not be convicted solely
upon the testimony of an accomplice because an accomplice is likely to have
self-serving motives.” (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 547.)
To be sufficient, corroborating evidence must, “ ‘ “without aid from the
accomplice’s testimony, tend[ ] to connect the defendant with the crime.” ’ ”
(People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 32 (Romero and Self).)
Corroborating evidence “ ‘ “may be slight, entirely circumstantial or slight,
and entitled to little consideration when standing alone.” ’ ” (Ibid.; see People

11
v. Trujillo (1948) 32 Cal.2d 105, 111 [“The prosecution is not required to
single out an isolated fact which in itself, unrelated to other proven facts, is
considered to be sufficient corroboration. It is the combined and cumulative
weight of the evidence furnished by non-accomplice witnesses which supplies
the test.”].) The corroborating evidence “must tend to implicate the
defendant by relating to an act that is an element of the crime” (People v.
McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 986), but “does not need to independently
prove guilt.” (People v. Hall (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1092; accord,
People v. Negra (1929) 208 Cal. 64, 70 [“It is not necessary that the
corroborating evidence should go so far as to establish . . . that the defendant
committed the offense charged.”].) Further, “[t]he evidence ‘need not
independently establish the identity of the victim’s assailant’ [citation], nor
corroborate every fact to which the accomplice testifies.” (Romero and Self,
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 32.) “It is ‘sufficient if it tends to connect the
defendant with the crime in such a way as to satisfy the [trier of fact] that the
accomplice is telling the truth.’ ” (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 147–
148 (Valdez).)
“The requirement that accomplice testimony be corroborated is an
‘ “ exception[ ]” to the substantial evidence’ rule. [Citation.] It is based on the
Legislature’s determination that ‘ “because of the reliability questions posed
by” ’ accomplice testimony, such testimony ‘ “by itself is insufficient as a
matter of law to support a conviction.” ’ ” (Romero and Self, supra, 62
Cal.4th at p. 32.) “For this reason, ‘[t]he trier of fact’s determination on the
issue of corroboration’ is not binding on the reviewing court if the
‘corroborating evidence . . . does not reasonably tend to connect the defendant
with the commission of the crime.’ ” (People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166,
245.)

12
Independent Evidence Corroborated the Accomplice
Testimony
We agree with the Attorney General that the totality of the evidence
independent of the accomplices’ testimony tended to connect defendant to
Marshall’s murder and permitted the trial court to find the accomplices were
telling the truth.
As discussed, Daniel Colgrove, a friend of defendant and Marshall,
testified he saw defendant, together with Milton, Gaylord, and James, drive
by in a vehicle on the day of the murder in the direction of Bald Hills Road,
which is where Marshall’s body was discovered. Beyond that, Colgrove
testified that defendant admitted that he was with Milton, Gaylord, and
James when Marshall was killed, and knew that Marshall was killed by
being shot with a gun (though claiming James was the shooter). Thus, by
defendant’s own admissions, he was present at the time of the murder and
knew the manner in which the murder was committed. (See People v.
Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 680 [“The necessary corroborative evidence
for accomplice testimony can be a defendant’s own admissions”]; see also
People v. Medina (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 438, 466 [defendant’s presence at
crime scene, though “not in and of itself sufficient corroboration” under
section 1111, may be sufficient in combination with other evidence].)
Evidence that further corroborated the accomplice testimony was
Colgrove’s testimony that when defendant heard that Marshall’s body had
been discovered and that he was a potential suspect, defendant fled and hid
in Colegrove’s trailer for several days. (See People v. Garrison (1989) 47
Cal.3d 746, 773 [“evidence of flight supports an inference of consciousness of
guilt and constitutes an implied admission which may properly be considered
as corroborative of an accomplice’s testimony”], citing People v. Perry (1972) 7
Cal.3d 756, 771–772.)

13
There is more. Colgrove testified that he saw a .22-caliber rifle at
defendant’s house, the same type of caliber of a spent casing that sheriff’s
deputies found near Marshall’s body. This evidence corroborated Milton’s
testimony that defendant possessed and used a .22-caliber rifle on the night
in question. (See Romero and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 34 [“ ‘Possession of
a gun similar to that used in the commission of the crime has been deemed
competent corroborative evidence’ ”]; People v. Trujillo, supra, 32 Cal.2d at
pp. 111–112 [accomplice testimony corroborated in part by evidence the
bullet that killed the victim could have come from the gun the defendant
admitted was in his possession before the crime and which was found in his
room after his arrest].)
In addition, the testimony of the pathologist who performed Marshall’s
autopsy corroborated the accomplices’ descriptions of the shooting. The
pathologist testified that the autopsy results revealed that Marshall was shot
multiple times, and that the one, fatal shot was made in close-range to the
back of his head. This evidence corroborated Milton’s and James’s testimony
that they heard two shots and saw Marshall fall down, and that they heard
at least one additional shot that was not as loud as the previous shots, in that
it sounded muffled or “like a pop gun.” (Cf. People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th
334, 370–371 [accomplice’s testimony corroborated in part because his
“description of how [the victim’s] murder took place was corroborated by the
pathologist”].)
We conclude that the above pieces of evidence, while circumstantial,
slight, or entitled to little consideration when standing alone, together
“ ‘tend[ed] to connect the defendant with the crime in such a way as to satisfy
the [trier of fact] that the accomplice is telling the truth.’ ” (Valdez, supra, 55
Cal.4th 82, 147–148.)

14
Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Although he
acknowledges the independent evidence described above, he argues that
“[n]one of the above evidence . . . corroborated that [he] was the actual killer.”
But that is not required for evidence to be sufficient under section 1111. As
noted above, the corroborating “evidence ‘need not independently establish
the identity of the victim’s assailant . . . .’ ” (Romero and Self, supra, 62
Cal.4th at p. 31) or “that the defendant committed the offense charged”
(People v. Negra, supra, 208 Cal. at p. 70).
In a similar vein, defendant argues that evidence of his flight after law
enforcement discovered Marshall’s body and were looking for defendant
“proves only consciousness of guilt that the defendant has committed a
crime[,] but is not proof of the elements of the charged crime.” This argument
again misses the mark. We already explained that the corroborating
evidence does not need to independently prove guilt. (People v. Hall, supra,
104 Cal.App.5th at p. 1092; accord, People v. Negra, supra, 208 Cal. at p. 70.)
It is only defendant’s connection with the murder that must be corroborated
in accordance with section 1111. (See Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 147–
148.) And as our Supreme Court has explained, “The law is settled that
‘evidence of flight supports an inference of consciousness of guilt and
constitutes an implied admission.’ [Citation.] Flight tends to connect an
accused with the commission of an offense and may indicate that an
accomplice’s testimony is truthful.” (People v. Perry, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp.
771–772; accord, People v. Garrison, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 773.)
Finally, defendant argues, “the trial court erred when it relied on the
lack of evidence that the three accomplices ‘conspire[d] together to implicate
Defendant in Marshall’s death.’ ” Defendant contends, “[t]he trial court’s
suggestion that the three accomplices were truthful because they had no

15
reason to conspire to implicate [him] is tantamount to using the testimony of
each accomplice to corroborate the testimony of the others.” This argument
takes the trial court’s findings out of context. When read in proper context,
the court’s comment in its order—that “there was no evidence of any scheme
between Milton, Gaylord, and James to conspire together to implicate
Defendant in Marshall’s death”—was in response to defendant’s alternative
argument that “even if there is evidence to corroborate [the accomplices’]
testimony, the evidence is insufficient because they were too biased to be
believed . . . .” Thus, contrary to defendant’s assertion, the court did not rely
on the lack of evidence of a “scheme” among the accomplices as a basis to find
the accomplices’ testimony sufficiently corroborated under section 1111.
In sum, independent evidence sufficiently corroborated the accomplice
testimony. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s finding that defendant was the actual killer and thus ineligible for
relief under section 1172.6.4
DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition for resentencing is affirmed.

4 We reject defendant’s alternative arguments that “the independent
evidence failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] aided and
abetted with reckless indifference to human life” and that he “aided and
abetted” with the intent to kill. The People did not argue, and the trial court
did not find, defendant was guilty of murder under those alternative theories
of liability.

16
RICHMAN, J.

We concur.

STEWART, P. J.

MILLER, J.

(A172358N)

17