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March 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Tindall CA4/1

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: D087152

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (24)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (9.3K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/5/26 P. v. Tindall CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D087152

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SWF2101230)

CHRISTOPHER JOHN TINDALL,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside

County, Timothy F. Freer, Judge. Affirmed.

Denise M. Rudasill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Evan Stele, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Christopher John Tindall of two counts each of
maintaining a place for the unlawful sale of cannabis (Health & Saf.

Code,1 § 11366, counts 1 & 3), and possession of cannabis for sale
(§ 11359, subd. (b), counts 2 & 4). The court sentenced him to two years
in prison after Tindall indicated he was unwilling to agree to any
probation terms and conditions. Tindall contends the trial court
(1) abused its discretion when it prevented him from arguing that he
possessed a religious exemption from criminal liability, and
(2) committed prejudicial misconduct by asking him and his co-founder
questions that constituted improper judicial comments on the evidence
and essentially directed a guilty verdict. He also asserts that his
conviction on count 2, possession for sale, must be reversed because the
statute of limitations was not tolled and had expired. We disagree with
his contentions and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Tindall and April M. are ministers and co-founders of Jah (God)
Healing Church (Jah Healing), a nondenominational, nonprofit religious
organization. Jah Healing operated locations in Big Bear, Fallbrook
and Murrietta. Tindall oversaw the Murrietta location. Membership in
Jah Healing was open to individuals of all religions and beliefs.
However, only individuals who came to Jah Healing and signed a
member agreement were permitted to obtain cannabis.
Cannabis was described as a sacrament of the church and as a
means of bringing individuals closer to their maker. Cannabis contains
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), a psychoactive substance. Church

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Health and Safety
Code.

2
members could meet with a minister at the church to request a
sacrament or ceremony and were asked to provide a voluntary donation
to receive cannabis. Jah Healing did not hold a license issued by the
California Department of Cannabis Control.
In 2019, Murrieta police investigated a citizen’s complaint
regarding a Jah Healing location and a residence in Riverside County.
Vehicles parked at the residence were registered to Tindall and April.
Based on observations at both locations and an undercover operation
conducted at the Jah Healing location, police obtained search warrants.
At the residence, police recovered what appeared to be a business
plan entitled “ ‘Jah game plan of healing centers’ ” which Tindall
created. The document referred to Tindall and April, including their
payment to a website used to locate marijuana dispensaries. The
document discussed business, profits, profit splitting, sales at a store,
and selling specified quantities of product for set dollar amounts. Police
also recovered timesheets, receipts, invoices, and a document labeled
“inventory” listing marijuana and THC products. Law enforcement
seized the THC products and cannabis at both locations, including more
than 30 pounds of cannabis and hundreds of pounds of THC infused
edibles, sodas, vape cartridges, and pre-rolled marijuana cigarettes.
At trial, Tindall testified that Rastafari is a religion centered on
talking about philosophical issues, chanting, and the use of the sacred
plant, cannabis. He explained that the purpose of Jah Healing was to
“spread our culture” and to consume cannabis to achieve spiritual
elevation. A corporate filing dated December 2017, listed Tindall as the
chief financial officer of Jah Healing. Tindall acknowledged providing
cannabis to church members in exchange for donations to Jah Healing.

3
Although donations were not “forc[ed]” Tindall stated that Jah Healing
could not continue helping others without receiving donations.
DISCUSSION
I. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
A. Additional Background
The People moved in limine to exclude any argument that Tindall
could not be convicted of violating sections 11359 and 11366 because
these statutes allegedly infringed his First Amendment right to free
exercise of religion to use cannabis as a religious sacrament. After
Tindall argued it would be improper to preclude a religious freedom
defense, the People agreed that religion could come in for purposes of
context but that the defense should be precluded from arguing that
there was any religious exemption for the alleged criminal conduct.
The court partially granted the motion. It allowed testimony that
Tindall had marijuana as part of his free exercise of religion but he
could not claim a defense that religious freedom permitted him to
violate the law. The court cautioned the People that they needed to
object to any testimony inconsistent with the court’s ruling. After
defense counsel sought clarification, the court indicated it would allow
limited testimony to negate the specific intent to sell, give away, or use
cannabis. Ultimately, the court granted the motion in part and denied
it in part, subject to a possible Evidence Code section 402 hearing to
determine whether proposed testimony was admissible under its ruling.
B. Analysis
Tindall argues the trial court erred by excluding testimony or
argument that his right to freely exercise his religion allowed him to
maintain a church and engage in activities that would otherwise violate

4
sections 11359 and 11366. He contends these statutes are not neutral
laws of general applicability and any burden they impose on his
religious freedom must be evaluated under strict scrutiny. He also
claims he should have been allowed to argue he possessed a religious
exemption to section 11366 under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA; 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.)
because section 11366 regulated the use of Jah Healing as a church and
doing so placed a substantial burden on his religious exercise in
violation of RLUIPA.
Tindall’s primary contention is that the trial court erred by
excluding testimony or argument that sections 11359 and 11366
burdened his ability to exercise his religion. Unlawful possession of
marijuana for sale under section 11359 requires proof that the
defendant possessed the marijuana with the intent of selling it and had
knowledge of both its presence and its illegal character. (People v.
Harris (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 371, 374; CALCRIM No. 2352.) Section
11366 criminalizes (a) opening or maintaining a place (b) “with a
purpose of continuously or repeatedly using it for selling, giving away,
or using a controlled substance.” (People v. Hawkins (2004) 124
Cal.App.4th 675, 680; CALCRIM 2440.) Here, the court instructed the
jury that Tindall was guilty only if he maintained the place for selling or
giving away cannabis. Accordingly, the jury was expressly precluded
from convicting him based solely on cannabis consumption.
“The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to
the States under the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that ‘Congress
shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise’ of religion.” (Fulton
v. City of Philadelphia (2021) 593 U.S. 522, 532.) Nonetheless, an

5
individual’s religious beliefs do not excuse “compliance with an
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate.” (Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith (1990) 494 U.S. 872, 878–879 (Smith).) Accordingly, a state may
prohibit “religiously inspired” drug use without violating the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment. (Smith, at pp. 874, 878–879
[“We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him
from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that
the State is free to regulate.”].) The Constitution therefore does not
require states to carve out religious exceptions to criminal drug laws.
The Supreme Court has explained that allowing people to
disregard neutral, generally applicable laws based on their personal
religious beliefs would undermine the rule of law and is neither
constitutionally required nor workable. (Smith, supra, 494 U.S. at
p. 885.) A violation of the Free Exercise Clause occurs only when a
regulation or law that is not “ ‘neutral’ ” and “ ‘generally applicable’ ”
burdens an individual’s “sincere religious practice.” (Kennedy v.
Bremerton Sch. Dist. (2022) 597 U.S. 507, 525.) If such a showing is
made, strict scrutiny applies. (Ibid.) A law lacks general applicability
only when it prohibits religious conduct while permitting secular
conduct that similarly undermines the government’s asserted interests.
(Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah (1993) 508
U.S. 520, 542–546.)
Here, the evidence does not show that sections 11359 and 11366
prevent Tindall or Jah Healing church members from using or
possessing cannabis as a sacrament. Instead, these statutes enforce
neutral state laws of general applicability prohibiting unlicensed

6
cannabis sales and distribution. Enforcement of such laws does not
violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. To the extent
Tindall claimed his religion required him to give away cannabis to
church members, such conduct is criminal regardless of whether it is
motivated by religious or secular believes. Religious motivation does
not transform otherwise unlawful distribution of cannabis into
constitutionally protected conduct. (Smith, supra, 494 U.S. at pp. 874,
878–879.) Accordingly, Tindall has not demonstrated that the statutes
violated his right to freely exercise his religion under the First
Amendment.
Relevant evidence is evidence “having any tendency in reason to
prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) A trial court has no
discretion to admit evidence that lacks relevance. (People v. Babbitt
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 681.) Because the right to freely exercise religion
did not permit Tindall to violate sections 11359 and 11366, the trial
court did not err by excluding testimony or argument premised on that
theory.
Tindall also claims he should have been allowed to argue he
possessed a religious exemption to section 11366 under RLUIPA.
Tindall, however, did not argue application of RLUIPA in opposition to
the People’s motion in limine and therefore forfeited this issue. (People
v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433–434 [“ ‘[W]e have consistently held
that the “defendant’s failure to make a timely and specific objection” on
the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not cognizable.’ ”].)
Accordingly, Tindall’s remedy is limited to a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.

7
To support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant
“bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
(1) counsel’s performance was deficient because it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2)
counsel’s deficiencies resulted in prejudice.” (People v. Centeno (2014)
60 Cal.4th 659, 674.) “On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for
ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses
counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or
omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or
(3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation. All other claims of
ineffective assistance are more appropriately resolved in a habeas
corpus proceeding.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.)
“RLUIPA provides that a government land-use regulation ‘that
imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a . . . religious
assembly or institution’ is unlawful ‘unless the government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden . . . is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.’ ” (Int’l Church of the
Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro (9th Cir. 2011) 673 F.3d 1059,
1066 (City of San Leandro).) A substantial burden under RLUIPA
“ ‘must place more than an inconvenience on religious exercise,’ ” and
instead must be “akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the
religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly.” (County
of San Bernardino v. Mancini (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1105.)
“RLUIPA applies if ‘. . . [the] burden is imposed in the implementation of
a land use regulation or system of land use regulations, under which a
government makes . . . individualized assessments of the proposed uses

8
for the property involved.’ ” (City of San Leandro, at p. 1066, citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C).) “[A] governmental entity makes an
individualized assessment—thus triggering RLUIPA—‘when [it] may
take into account the particular details of an applicant’s proposed use of
land when deciding to permit or deny that use.’ ” (Redeemed Christian
Church of God (Victory Temple) Bowie, Maryland v. Prince George's Cty.
(4th Cir. 2021) 17 F.4th 497, 507.)
Here, assuming without deciding that section 11366 is a land use
regulation, defense counsel could have reasonably decided not to raise a
RLUIPA defense because section 11366 is a generally applicable
criminal statute that applies equally to a church or a secular
organization. Its enforcement does not depend on, or invite, any
discretionary or case-by-case evaluation of how a particular property is
used. Because the statute does not involve individualized land-use
determinations, RLUIPA is inapplicable as a matter of law. Counsel
therefore had a rational tactical basis for declining to advance a
meritless argument, and Tindall cannot establish deficient performance
or prejudice on this record.
II. JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT
A. Additional Background
April testified that a church member could select the cannabis
product the member wanted, would be told the suggested donation
amount, the minister would bless the sacrament, and the member would
be given an envelope to provide a donation if the individual chose to do
so. She stated anyone could become a member if the individual went
through the ceremony and signed the membership agreement. When
asked by the prosecutor whether anyone is turned away, she replied “I

9
would not.” Shortly after this response, the court interrupted cross-
examination to question April:
“BY THE COURT:

“Q. What if an eight-year-old wanders into your place
and says,” I want to get closer to God. Give me
marijuana”? What are you going to do?

“A. I’m not going to do that. Well, first of all, they’re
not even of age. For myself, I mean, they’re a minor.
The parents need to be responsible for their children. I
mean - -

“Q. I didn’t see that on your church membership,
though. It said everybody can be a member.

“A. Yeah. Everybody can. Well, I guess we should put
‘except minors,’ unless there has been—I’ve had some
cancer patients. I did have a little boy that died that
we were helping with CBD oil, and he did have THC.
We gave donations to the mother, but that was the
mother gave the approval. The child ended up dying,
but that is one incident where a child would get it, but
they would not receive it inside the temple. The
mother would come get it.

“Q. But you don’t have that on your paperwork.

“A. Maybe that’s something we [sic] overseen.

“Q. Maybe.

“A. Yes.

“Q. What about the church of fentanyl?

“A. Church of what?

“Q. What if I wanted to open up a church of fentanyl?

10
“A. I can’t speak for that. I am speaking for my
cannabis church.

“Q. Right. But under your logic if I had a fentanyl
church and I wanted to provide it to anybody because
I thought I could get closer to God, got them high, got
them closer to spirit. Under that logic we could open
the church of cocaine or tar heroin.

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I would object
to this question.

“THE COURT: Right. Your objection is overruled.

“THE WITNESS: I don’t believe it’s the same thing.
Cannabis is not a drug. All those things that you just
told me are harmful. They hurt people. They kill
people every day. When have you heard that cannabis
has killed anybody? It’s only benefited people. I
mean, all those things you just said - - I’m totally
against all of that. This is completely different. This
is spiritual.

“Q. BY THE COURT: So if your drug doesn’t hurt
people, then it’s okay?

“A. Mine is a sacrament. It is not a drug.

“THE COURT: Okay.”

During further cross-examination, the prosecutor followed up on
the court’s question regarding fentanyl, with April explaining that,
“[C]annabis is our sacrament. It is 100 percent different. It’s not
harmful. Like I said, it’s a healing agent.” The court then allowed the
jurors to write questions, with one juror asking about an age restriction
for membership, with April replying a person needed to be 18 years old
to become a church member.

11
Tindall testified on direct examination that the “divine order”
required him to distribute cannabis. He accepted donations in exchange
for the cannabis sacrament or gave the cannabis away. During cross
examination, he admitted storing cannabis at his home to be given away
at the Jah Healing location to anyone who signed the membership
agreement. At one point during cross examination the court
admonished Tindall in front of the jury to answer the questions and not
respond with argument or statements. Shortly thereafter, the court
took an early break and again admonished Tindall, outside the jury’s
presence, reminding him that the jury would be instructed to consider a
witness’s conduct when evaluating credibility. After defense counsel
completed his redirect examination, the court questioned Tindall as
follows:
“BY THE COURT:

“Q. Mr. Tindall, you’re charged in counts 1 and 3 with
Health and Safety Code violation 11366. It sounds
like, in response to what your attorney’s questions and
the district attorney’s questions, that—Let put it this
way: I’m not sure what you’re saying about that
particular charge because there’s only two things that
are required: One is that you opened or maintained a
place; and, two, you opened or maintained the place
with the intent to sell or give away a controlled
substance, specifically cannabis, on a continuous or
repeated basis. And it sounds like you admitted that
you did both. Am I correct or incorrect on that?

“A. I’ll do it until the day I die or until God tells me
not to do it anymore.

“Q. Well, the exception is unless of course you’re
properly licensed to do that.

12
“A. They don’t offer a license for a church to do this.
Then it becomes contraband. Contraband is
something totally different than sacrament. So when
you go through a dispensary or license, that’s no
longer a sacrament. That’s a contraband. The way to
make it a sacrament, you’ve got to get it from God or
from a church. So if Jah Healing shut down where do
we get it?

“Q. So basically you’re telling me you don’t believe in
getting a license because you’re a church?

“A. Well, I know I can go on the Indian reservation in
Bishop, and it’s tax-free and license-free. I don’t know
why I have to be a Native Indian or on an Indian
reservation to exercise God’s law. And the Bible says,
as well as in Revelation, the leaf of the tree will be on
each side of the river, and it shall be the healing of the
nation. They were talking about cannabis and not
only for us, but it’s stopping others to partake in their
religious sacrament if Jah Healing is shut down.

“Q. Well, that may be, but the law, the secular law
doesn’t say anything that there’s a church exemption
for a violation of 11366. It just simply says if you
maintain any place. It doesn’t say anything that it’s
okay to do it if you have a church.

“A. Well, I have the RLUIPA law where it says you
can’t discriminate against a religion. That was passed
in the year 2000. If we can put it on the board for the
jury to see what RLUIPA law is? It says you’re not
supposed to discriminate against a religion. You can
do it out of the house. If we could put the RLUIPA
law on the screen for the jury so they can see what I’m
talking about. The RLUIPA law says we can’t—

“[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I’m going to object at
this.

13
“Q. BY THE COURT: That’s my point to you. It’s
sustained. [¶] The point that I’m giving and the law
that I’m going to be giving is going to be to the jury.
Are you saying that you just don’t believe the law and
that’s why—

“A. Well, I have the Ninth Amendment where it says I
don’t have to have a hunting license, a driver’s
license—

“[PROSECUTOR]: Objection. Nonresponsive.

“BY THE COURT: Are you simply saying you just
disagree with the law, or are you saying you aren’t
violating this law?

“A: I go by the common law. I go by God’s law, not
manmade law. See, just like the UCC Code, it’s
maritime, admiralty, administrator. That’s a
wartime—

“[PROSECUTOR]: Objection. Nonresponsive.

“THE COURT: All right. I think you’ve answered my
questions to the satisfaction.”

Based on defense counsel’s request, the trial court instructed the
jury with CALCRIM No. 3530 which told jurors they were the sole
judges of the evidence and believability of witnesses, the court’s role was
not to tell jurors what the verdict should be, and to not take anything
the court said or did as an indication of what the court thinks about the
evidence, the witnesses or what the verdict should be.
B. Analysis
Tindall argues the trial court’s statements, disguised as questions,
discredited his defense, effectively directed a guilty verdict on the two
alleged violations of section 11366, and constituted judicial misconduct.

14
As an initial matter, other than a single objection during April’s
testimony, defense counsel never objected to the trial court’s questioning
and Tindall has forfeited any claim of error. (People v. Raviart (2001) 93
Cal.App.4th 258, 269.) To avoid forfeiture, Tindall argues any further
objection would have been futile, an immediate admonition would not
have cured the harm, and the questioning affected his substantial
rights.
These conclusory assertions are insufficient. Tindall has failed to
show that further objection would have been either ineffective or futile.
Nothing in the record suggests the trial court would have refused to
entertain a timely objection or corrective instruction, particularly if
defense counsel had raised his objections at side bar after the court’s
questioning. Even assuming Tindall had preserved his claims, his
argument fails on the merits because the record does not support his
assertion that the questions constituted prejudicial error. (People v.
Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 781.)
A trial judge is authorized to call and interrogate witnesses.
(Evid. Code, § 775.) This includes questioning witnesses to clarify
evidence, cover evidentiary omissions, or provide witnesses with the
opportunity to fully explain their testimony. (People v. Hawkins (1995)
10 Cal.4th 920, 947–948 (Hawkins).) Judicial questioning must remain
restrained, neutral, and even handed. (Id. at p. 948.) A trial court
exceeds its authority if it excludes material evidence from the jury,
distorts the evidentiary record, signals—explicitly or implicitly—how
the case should be decided, or supplants the jury’s ultimate
responsibility to determine the facts. (Ibid.) The court must not
undertake the prosecutor’s role or “ ‘ “ ‘ “create the impression it is

15
allying itself with the prosecution.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Rockhill (2025) 115
Cal.App.5th 1230, 1242–1243 (Rockhill).) Rather, a trial judge may
examine a witness when doing so would fairly aid in clarifying the
evidence, avoiding confusion, filling gaps in the testimony, permitting
explanation, or eliciting facts necessary to a just determination of the
matter. (People v. Carlucci (1979) 23 Cal.3d 249, 256.) The trial judge,
however, may not take a witness out of the hands of his counsel and
proceed along an independent and extensive line of examination and
cross examination. (People v. Boggess (1924) 194 Cal. 212, 241.)
Claims of judicial misconduct are reviewed de novo based on the
entire record. (People v. Williams (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 191, 202.) The
analysis proceeds in two steps. We first evaluate whether the trial
court’s questioning of a witness amounted to judicial misconduct. (Ibid.)
If misconduct is found, we then consider whether it resulted in prejudice
to the defendant requiring reversal. (Ibid.) To determine prejudice, “we
must ask whether it is ‘reasonably probable the jury would have reached
a different guilt verdict had the court refrained from asking these
questions.’ ” (Id. at p. 205.)
We “determine the propriety of judicial comment on a case-by-case
basis in light of its content and the circumstances in which it occurs.”
(People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 730.) Our inquiry is not whether
the trial judge’s actions or comments were ideal, but whether the
conduct was so prejudicial that it denied the defendant a fair trial,
rather than a flawless one. (People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310,
347.)
Applying these principles, Tindall first contends the court’s
questions to April were irrelevant and highly inflammatory because

16
they put an image in jurors’ minds that Tindall and Jah Healing engage
in behavior that could harm small children. We disagree, in part.
During cross examination, April testified she would not turn a
prospective member away and “anyone” could become a member if they
go through the ceremony and sign the membership agreement. Given
that testimony, the court’s hypothetical regarding a child obtaining
cannabis did not introduce an extraneous or inflammatory issue; rather,
it tested the logical limits of April’s sweeping assertion and clarified
whether any restrictions existed. In that respect, the court’s question
whether she would give a child marijuana served to illuminate an
apparent omission in her testimony.
However, although the court’s subsequent question about a
fentanyl church may have been intended to probe whether April’s
reasoning rested on a claimed distinction between cannabis and other
controlled substances, it challenged April’s logic rather than clarifying
her testimony. The trial court would have been better advised to
sustain defense counsel’s objection, instruct the jury to disregard the
questions, and end this line of inquiry. Instead, the trial court again
became argumentative by asking “So if your drug doesn’t hurt people,
then it’s okay?”
Tindall next contends the questions the court posed to him went
even further, directing the jury to find him guilty on the two felony
counts alleging a violation of section 11366. He claims the questions
took on the role of a prosecutor, usurped the jury’s authority and denied
him his right to a fair trial. The reporter’s transcript shows that
although Tindall was evasive at times, he testified both during direct
and cross examination, that at Jah Healing he gave away cannabis or

17
accepted monetary donations in exchange for cannabis. Against this
backdrop, the court summarized the elements of a section 11366
violation and asked a yes-or-no question to clarify whether Tindall
disputed that his conduct satisfied those elements. When Tindall
responded with narratives and legal argument, instead of refocusing
him to response with a yes-or-no answer, the court commented on the
evidence that Tindall did not possess a license to sell cannabis and
responded to Tindall’s narrative responses with additional
argumentative questions.
While the court’s questions were neither discourteous nor
disparaging, nor did they involve repetitive or hostile interrogation, they
nonetheless crossed the line from restrained even handed neutrality
(Hawkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 948), into conduct that risked creating
an impression the court was allying itself with the prosecution
(Rockhill, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1242–1243). This is
demonstrated when the court challenged Tindall’s logic and engaging in
a back-and-forth dialogue.
Even so, we reject Tindall’s contention that the court’s questions
to him and April prejudiced his defense. First, the cases Tindall relies
on are inapt. In People v. Santana (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1194, the
appellate court found judicial misconduct based on repetitious and
adversarial questioning of three defense witnesses spanning “page after
page of reporter’s transcript,” which “created the unmistakable
impression [the court] had allied itself with the prosecution in the effort
to convict” the defendant. (Id. at p. 1207.) No comparable pattern
exists here. The trial court’s questions were both limited in scope and
duration.

18
This case is likewise distinguishable from People v. Perkins (2003)
109 Cal.App.4th 1562. There, the trial court aggressively cross-
examined the defendant to undermine his credibility, elicit admissions
establishing willful violations of a restraining order, and invite the jury
to draw adverse inferences bearing directly on guilt. (Id. at pp. 1570–
1573.) Here, by contrast, the court did not impeach Tindall or accuse
him of dishonesty. Nor did the court elicit new incriminating facts, as
Tindall had already admitted the conduct forming the basis of the
section 11366 charges.
Under the applicable standard, it is not reasonably probable the
jury would have reached a more favorable result absent the challenged
questioning. April and Tindall both testified that one of the primary
purposes of Jah Healing was to provide cannabis to individuals who
signed a membership agreement. Those admissions independently
established the elements of a section 11366 violation. Unlike in cases
where judicial misconduct fills evidentiary gaps or supplies missing
proof, the evidence here was overwhelming and the court’s intervention
brief. Defense counsel’s failure to object or seek a sidebar further
supports the conclusion that any potential prejudice was minimal and
not apparent at trial. Additionally, the court instructed the jury with
CALCRIM No. 3530, expressly reminding jurors that they were the sole
judges of the facts and that nothing the court said or did should be
taken as an indication of the proper verdict.
Viewed in the context of the entire record, the trial court’s
questioning did not prejudice Tindall. The court did not withdraw
material issues from the jury and did not usurp the jury’s fact-finding
role. Accordingly, because there is no reasonable probability the jury

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would have reached a different verdict absent the challenged
questioning, reversal is not warranted.
III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The People filed a misdemeanor complaint on June 18, 2019,
charging Tindall with multiple counts including that, on or about
May 8, 2019, he unlawfully sold or gave away cannabis (§ 11360,
count 1). The complaint further alleged that Tindall willfully and
unlawfully transported, imported into the state, sold, furnished,
administered, or gave away cannabis, and offered or attempted to do the
same. On August 11, 2021, the People dismissed the misdemeanor
complaint and filed the instant felony complaint.
In the felony complaint, the prosecution alleged in count 2 a
violation of section 11359, subdivision (b), unlawfully possessing
marijuana for sale, on or about May 8, 2019. Tindall contends the one-
year statute of limitations expired and count 2 is time-barred because it
was not alleged in the original misdemeanor complaint. The People do
not dispute that, where the charging document on its face indicates it
may be time-barred, a criminal defendant can invoke a statute of
limitations defense at any time. (People v. Williams (1999) 21 Cal.4th
335, 341.) They argue, however, that the misdemeanor that occurred on
May 8, 2019, alleged in the original misdemeanor complaint, stemmed
from the same conduct that gave rise to the violation of section 11359
charged in count 2 of the felony complaint. Accordingly, they contend
count 2 is not time-barred because the statute of limitations was tolled
from the time the misdemeanor complaint was filed. We agree.
We review de novo legal questions regarding application of the
statute of limitations. (People v. Brown (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 765, 771.)

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Generally, the prosecution for a misdemeanor must commence within
one year after commission of the offense. (Pen. Code, § 802, subd. (a).)
Under Penal Code section 804, prosecution commences by filing an
indictment, information, or misdemeanor or infraction complaint;
arraigning the defendant on a felony complaint; or issuing an arrest or
bench warrant that adequately identifies the defendant.
The statute of limitations is tolled when a “prosecution of the
same person for the same conduct is pending in a court of this state.”
(Pen. Code, § 803, subd. (b).) The critical inquiry is whether the charges
involve the “same conduct.” By its plain terms, section 803, subdivision
(b) applies whenever a new charge is based on the same conduct or
behavior for which the defendant is already being prosecuted or was
previously prosecuted.
Here, the misdemeanor charged as count 1 in the misdemeanor
complaint alleged a violation of section 11360 (unlawful transportation
of cannabis for sale or gift) that occurred on or about May 9, 2019. That
allegation is based on the same conduct that later gave rise to the
violation of section 11359 charged in count 2 of the felony complaint. As
Tindall noted, when the prosecution filed the instant case to charge
felony violations of section 11366, occurring on or about May 8 and 29,
2019, these replaced the two previously charged misdemeanor violations
of section 11360 (misdemeanor transport/sell marijuana) for the same
dates. Consistent with this conclusion, the People note that at
sentencing the parties and the trial court agreed that section 654
applied to count 2 because it stemmed from the same conduct as count
1. Because count 1 of the felony complaint replaced count 1 of the

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misdemeanor complaint, both counts and felony count 2 necessarily
involved the same underlying conduct.
Tindall relies on People v. Terry (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 750
(Terry) to support his contention that count 2 is time barred. This case
is distinguishable. In Terry, the original pleading alleged one lewd act
count occurring within a particular period. (Id. at p. 757.) An amended
pleading added six more lewd act counts for the same time frame.
(Ibid.) The appellate court held that the amended pleading did not
relate back to the original because the new counts did not allege the
“same conduct” as the original, noting that the prosecutor had
“maintained that each count represented a separate lewd act . . . .” (Id.
at p. 769.) Here, unlike in Terry, the charges in the original
misdemeanor complaint and the subsequent felony complaint were
based on the same conduct.
Finally, Tindall argues tolling should not apply as this would
result in an unfair “ ‘enlargement of the charges’ ” against the defendant
“ ‘after running of the statue’ ” because the prosecution appears to have
replaced count 1 of the misdemeanor complaint with count 1 of the
felony complaint, while also charging a previously uncharged offense, as
count 2 in the felony complaint. He bases this argument on a Law
Revision Commission comment to section 803, cited in Terry, supra, 127
Cal.App.4th 750 that “ ‘[t]he test of the “same conduct,” involving as it
does some flexibility of definition, states a principle that should meet
the reasonable needs of prosecution, while affording the defendant fair
protection against an enlargement of the charges after running of the
statute.’ ” (Id. at p. 768.)

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Tindall’s argument ignores the statutory scheme making criminal
statutes of limitations longer for more serious crimes. (Statutes of
Limitations for Felonies (Jan. 1984) 17 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep.
(1984) p. 313; see Pen. Code, § 799, subd. (a) [prosecution for an offense
punishable by death or life imprisonment, or for the embezzlement of
public money, may be commenced at any time]; Pen. Code, § 800 [six-
year limitations period for offenses punishable by eight or more years’
imprisonment]; Pen. Code, § 801 [three-year limitations period for
offenses punishable by imprisonment for less than eight years].)
Nothing in the language of section 803, subdivision (b) suggests tolling
depends on the seriousness of a new charge. Rather, allowing tolling to
apply irrespective of the gravity of the offense aligns with the
Legislature’s overall design. In contrast, Tindall’s proposed reading
inverts that design by lengthening the limitations period for minor
crimes while, perversely, shielding more serious offenses from
prosecution.
We conclude that the filing of the misdemeanor complaint tolled
the statute of limitations as to count 2 of the felony complaint.
Therefore, count 2 was not time-barred.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, J.*

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

• Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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