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March 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State of New Jersey v. Carlene Harris and Norman A. Thomas 4th

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: A-3395-24

• Opinion

• Authorities (19)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

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Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3395-24

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
March 5, 2026
v. APPELLATE DIVISION

CARLENE HARRIS and
NORMAN A. THOMAS 4TH,

Defendants-Respondents.

---

Argued January 22, 2026 – Decided March 5, 2026

Before Judges Currier, Berdote Byrne, and Jablonski.

On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County,
Indictment No. 24-08-1460.

William Kyle Meighan, Supervising Assistant
Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Bradley D.
Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney; Samuel
Marzarella, Chief Appellate Attorney, of counsel and
on the briefs).

Francis R. Hodgson III argued the cause for
respondent Carlene Harris.

Zachary G. Markarian, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for respondent Norman A.
Thomas 4th (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender,
attorney; Zachary G. Markarian, of counsel and on the
brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

BERDOTE BYRNE, J.A.D.

On leave granted, we are asked to determine whether three allegedly

incorrect dates contained in a certification in lieu of oath, submitted pursuant

to Rule 1:4-4(b) that rendered the subsequently issued search warrants stale,

should have been corrected by the motion court as typographical errors to

defeat a motion to suppress evidence, or whether an evidentiary hearing should

have taken place to determine whether the dates in the certification were

erroneous. The State argues it should be allowed to introduce evidence not

presented to the issuing judge to prove the controlled drug buys relied upon in

the certification took place in 2023, not 2022. It also contends the errors were

so obvious the issuing judge may have assumed the events in fact took place in

2023 and found probable cause to issue the warrants.

We reject both arguments and affirm the suppression of the evidence.

We conclude the issuing judge had no basis to issue the warrants because

nothing contained within the four corners of the certification indicated the

dates were typographical errors. On its face, the certification did not

demonstrate probable cause to search because it was based on stale

information. Also, only information presented to the issuing judge may be

A-3395-24
2
considered by a reviewing court. The State is barred from introducing

extrinsic evidence beyond the four corners of the warrant application.

I.

We recite the facts as stated in the certification submitted to the issuing

judge on March 7, 2023. Patrolman Alexander Guzman Jr. and Detective

Austin Letts of the Lakewood Police Department Street Crimes Unit met with

a confidential informant (CI) "[d]uring the week of January 29, 2022"

(emphasis added). The CI informed the officers defendant Norman A. Thomas

4th "is currently engaged in the distribution of crack cocaine/cocaine in the

Lakewood, New Jersey area." "During the week of February 19, 2022,"

(emphasis added) Detective Letts met with the CI to plan a controlled buy.

The CI called Thomas and the two agreed to meet at a location in Lakewood.

The CI was provided with "previously recorded Lakewood Police Department

confidential funds" to buy the drugs. At the same time, Guzman and Detective

Sergeant Nathan Reyes began surveilling Thomas's address at 144 John Street.

They observed Thomas drive into the parking lot in a black Hyundai Sonata

and subsequently enter Apartments 205 and 207. Thomas was then observed

driving to the meeting place and "engag[ing] in a brief hand to hand exchange

[with the CI] indicative of a [controlled dangerous substance (CDS)]

A-3395-24
3
transaction." The CI then reunited with the officers and handed Detective

Letts "a quantity of suspect crack cocaine."

"During the week of February 26, 2022," (emphasis added) Detective

Letts met with the CI, who arranged another controlled buy. The CI again

agreed to meet Thomas at a location in Lakewood. Before the meeting, Reyes

and Guzman surveilled Thomas's address at 144 John Street and observed him

conduct "numerous hand to hand transaction[s] with multiple individuals

within the parking lot." They again observed him entering and exiting

Apartments 205 and 207 before driving to the meeting location, where Thomas

and the CI were observed "engag[ing] in a brief hand to hand exchange

indicative of a CDS transaction." Additionally, after the buy, Thomas "was

observed exiting the area of the meet [l]ocation and once again conduct[ing]

another hand to hand transaction shortly after, indicative of a CDS

transaction." After arriving at the debriefing location, the CI again handed

Detective Letts "a quantity of suspect cocaine."

Guzman ran a motor vehicle records search, which indicated Thomas

resided at 144 John Street, Apartment 207, in Lakewood. He also conducted a

computerized criminal history check, which revealed Thomas was the subject

of nine arrests and five indictable convictions, including theft, burglary, and

various drug charges.

A-3395-24
4
Based upon these facts, Guzman requested warrants to search 144 John

Street, Apartments 205 and 207, as well as Thomas's person and his Hyundai

Sonata.1 Guzman signed one certification in support of all of the warrants on

March 2, 2023. An Assistant Prosecutor reviewed that certification on March

7 at 4:45 p.m. A Superior Court judge issued the warrant to search Apartment

205 later that day at 6:49 p.m. Officers executed that warrant on March 9,

2023, and found fourteen bricks of heroin, rock and powder cocaine, firearms,

and ammunition. The searches of Apartment 207 and Thomas's person yielded

nothing of evidentiary significance, but officers did find oxycodone in the

Hyundai Sonata.

On August 29, 2024, an Ocean County Grand Jury returned a twelve-

count indictment against defendants Thomas and Carlene Harris. They were

both charged with third-degree possession of a CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)

(count one); second-degree possession with intent to distribute a CDS,

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), (b)(2) (count two); third-degree possession of a CDS,

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count three); third-degree possession with intent to

distribute a CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), (b)(5) (count four); second-degree

possession of a firearm while engaged in certain drug activity, N.J.S.A. 2C:39 -

1
Separate warrants were issued for Apartment 207, the Hyundai, and
Thomas's person. Only the warrant to search Apartment 205 was provided in
the record on appeal.

A-3395-24
5
4.1(a) (counts six through eight); and fourth-degree possession of a large-

capacity ammunition magazine, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j) (count nine). Thomas was

charged with third-degree possession of a CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)

(count five) and second-degree possession of a firearm by a convicted person,

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) (counts ten through twelve).

In its narrative of events as set forth above, the certification

accompanying the warrant application used the wrong year three times. The

initial contact with the informant and the two controlled buys (which,

according to the State, occurred in January and February 2023) were listed in

the certification as having taken place in January and February 2022.

Defendants filed a motion to suppress.

In opposition to defendants' motion to suppress, grounded in the

argument that the information in the certification was stale, the State

contended, because of a typographical error, the 2022 events described in the

certification in fact occurred a year later than the dates listed. They argued the

initial meeting with the CI took place during the week of January 29, 2023,

(not January 29, 2022) and the two controlled buys took place during the

weeks of February 19, 2023, and February 26, 2023 (not February 19 and 26,

2022).

A-3395-24
6
Defendants argued the underlying facts presented in the certification (the

CI's initial tip and the two controlled buys) took place over a year before the

warrants were issued in March 2023. Thus, defendants asserted the

certification's facts were stale and insufficient to support probable cause.

The court agreed and suppressed "[a]ll evidence obtained from the

search of 144 John St. apartments 205, 207 Lakewood, NJ 08701, the person

of Thomas, . . . the black Hyundai Sonata[,]" and the "cellular telephone seized

during defendant Thomas' arrest."

In its motion for reconsideration, the State submitted police reports

showing the officers' dealings with the CI occurred in 2023. The State argued

it was entitled to an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 3:5-7(c) to prove the

dates in the certification were incorrect. The court declined to consider

evidence not presented to the issuing judge and again limited its review to the

four corners of the certification. The court denied the motion, holding the

warrants were unsupported by probable cause because they were based on stale

information.

The State then moved for leave to appeal the denial of its reconsideration

motion pursuant to Rule 2:2-4. We granted the motion. On appeal, the State

raises the following contentions:

POINT I: THE REVIEWING JUDGE FAILED TO ADHERE TO
THE PROPER SUBSTANTIAL BASIS STANDARD OF

A-3395-24
7
REVIEW BY CONDUCTING A DE NOVO REVIEW OF
PROBABLE CAUSE
POINT II: ONCE THE JUDGE FOUND THE ERROR TO BE A
"TYPO" HIS VIEW THAT IT FATALLY TAINTED PROBABLE
CAUSE IN THIS CASE WAS IN AND OF ITSELF ERROR AND
ADDITIONALLY HIS FAILURE TO CONDUCT A HEARING
WAS ALSO ERROR
POINT III: EVIDENCE CONTAINED WITHIN THE FOUR
CORNERS OF THIS WARRANT DEFEATS STALENESS

A. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE THAT PROBABLE CAUSE
WAS DEVELOPED DURING THE WEEK OF JANUARY
29, 2022, FEBRUARY 19, 2022, AND FEBRUARY 26,
2022, RATHER, PROBABLE CAUSE IS CONFINED TO
THOSE SAME DATES IN 2023 FROM THE FOUR
CORNERS OF THE WARRANT

B. A COMMON SENSE READING OF THE AFFIDAVIT
"FAIRLY INDICATES" THAT THE 2022 REFERENCE
WAS INTENDED AS 2023

1. USE OF THE PRESENT TENSE REFERS TO THE THEN CURRENT YEAR

2. USE OF "THE WEEK OF" LANGUAGE IN THE
   CERTIFICATION REFERS TO THE THEN
   CURRENT YEAR

3. THE RIGHT TO ARREST DEFENDANT AFTER
   WITNESSING MULTIPLE DRUG DEALS
   INVOKES THE THEN CURRENT YEAR AND NOT
   THE YEAR BEFORE
   POINT IV: AUTHORITY FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS
   SUPPORTS THE VITALITY OF THE WARRANT HERE

A-3395-24
8
II.

Our "standard of review on a motion to suppress is deferential." State v.

Amang, 481 N.J. Super. 355, 374 (App. Div. 2025) (quoting State v. Nyema,

249 N.J. 509, 526 (2022)). Generally, we "must uphold the factual findings

underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by

sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609

(2021) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). Although factual

findings are reviewed deferentially, the trial court's interpretation of the law

and "the consequences that flow from established facts" are subject to our de

novo review. See State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015).

We begin our analysis by acknowledging well-established legal

principles. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

Article One, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution secure the right to be

free from "unreasonable searches and seizures," which means that "[b]efore

conducting a search, the police must obtain a warrant from a neutral judicial

officer 'unless the search falls within a recognized exception to the warrant

requirement.'" State v. Cohen, 254 N.J. 308, 319 (2023) (quoting State v.

Camey, 239 N.J. 282, 298 (2019)).

Probable cause is a prerequisite for the issuance of a valid warrant. U.S.

Const. amend. IV ("[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

A-3395-24
9
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be

searched, and the persons or things to be seized."); N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7

("[N]o warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or

affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the papers

and things to be seized.").

In determining probable cause, the judge who issues a warrant "make[s]

a practical, common-sense determination whether, given all of the

circumstances, 'there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a

crime will be found in a particular place.'" State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40, 46

(2004) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).

Probable cause to search cannot be based on stale information. See State

v. Blaurock, 143 N.J. Super. 476, 479 (App. Div. 1976) (per curiam)

("[P]robable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant must exist at the

time the warrant is issued."); Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932)

("[T]he proof must be of facts so closely related to the time of the issue of the

warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time."). Whether the

information has grown stale depends largely on the nature of the criminal

activity. See Blaurock, 143 N.J. Super. at 479 ("[W]here the affidavit properly

recites facts indicating activity of a protracted and continuous nature . . . the

A-3395-24
10
passage of time becomes less significant." (quoting United States v. Johnson,

461 F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1972))).

We are mindful, in determining the validity of the warrants, we may

only consider the facts presented to the issuing judge. Our review is limited to

the four corners of Guzman's certification, including the listed dates. See State

v. Chippero, 201 N.J. 14, 26 (2009) ("In respect of that crucial probable cause

determination, it is well settled that the issuing magistrate is required to make

the determination based on only that information which is 'contained within

the four corners of the supporting affidavit' or sworn testimony provided by

law enforcement personnel." (quoting Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336,

363 (2000))). Any sworn testimony by an officer not contained in the affidavit

or certification in lieu of oath must be "recorded contemporaneously" with the

warrant application. State v. Marshall, 199 N.J. 602, 611 (2009) (quoting

Schneider, 163 N.J. at 363). There is no such contemporaneous record in this

case other than the certification. 2

2
We note the application was submitted electronically. Our court rules permit
law enforcement to electronically submit a "certification in lieu of oath
completed by the applicant in accordance with R[ule] 1:4-4(b)." See R. 3:5-
3(a). Regardless of whether an officer submits a certification electronically or
personally appears, the obligation of the judge to carefully review the
application remains unchanged.

A-3395-24
11
This mandate is consistent with federal law. See Whiteley v. Warden,

Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8 (1971) ("Under the cases of

this Court, an otherwise insufficient affidavit cannot be rehabilitated by

testimony concerning information possessed by the affiant when he sought the

warrant but not disclosed to the issuing magistrate. A contrary rule would, of

course, render the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment

meaningless." (citation omitted)); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure §

4.3(a) (6th ed. 2020) ("[E]ven in the face of absolutely unassailable proof that

the necessary facts were actually known by the affiant before the warrant

issued, . . . [allowing consideration of evidence not presented to the issuing

judge] cannot be squared with the Fourth Amendment, for it requires more

than that a valid warrant could have been obtained.").

The State characterizes the discrepancy in dates as mere typographical

errors and asserted at oral argument that "everyone knew the correct date."

However, the State provides no binding precedent, nor has our research

revealed any, supporting the State's contention that it is entitled to have the

motion court correct what it claims are typographical errors. The State's

reliance on State v. Daniels, 46 N.J. 428 (1966), is misplaced. There, the

affiant applied for a warrant to search a candy store and used the wrong

address, which was then reflected in the warrant (31 Avon Place, instead of 35

A-3395-24
12
Avon Place). Id. at 431-32, 434. The mistaken address was deemed

superfluous by the Court. Id. at 438-39. In addition to referring to the

address, the affidavit specifically identified the store as a "small candy and ice

cream store." Id. at 431. Likewise, the warrant referred to the store as a

"confectionary store." Id. at 432. The Court upheld the warrant, noting there

was "[n]o believable showing . . . that there was any other building in the

block which could be categorized as a confectionery store and was likely to be

confused with the intended premises." Id. at 438.

In contrast, the purported typographical errors in this case were neither

evident nor superfluous. The dates of the controlled buys were critical to the

probable cause determination. See State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 124

(1987) (invalidating warrant that used only the present tense to refer to drug

sales, with no reference to specific dates). If the certification is read literally,

the two controlled buys occurred in February 2022, and there was no probable

cause to issue the search warrants in March 2023. The State concedes the

warrants lacked probable cause if the 2022 dates were correct. However, it

argues the issuing judge could permissibly have inferred that "2023" should be

read in place of "2022."

There is no basis for such an inference. The certification used the wrong

dates consistently—three times over three pages. Guzman did not once use the

A-3395-24
13
correct year as he described the narrative of events, consisting of the initial

meeting with the CI and the two subsequent controlled buys. A cursory review

of the certification shows it was facially deficient with respect to probable

cause because it was based on stale information. Nothing in the four corners

of the certification suggests (1) "2022" is a typographical error, and (2) "2023"

should be substituted in its place. Nevertheless, the State contends several

"contradictions" in the certification make it clear to the reader that the dates

were typographical errors.

First, the State contends Guzman could not have participated in the

investigation if it had occurred in 2022 because, at that time, he was assigned

to the Ocean County Narcotics Strike Force. According to the certification,

Guzman began employment with the Lakewood Police Department in 2019,

was assigned to the Narcotics Strike Force in January 2022, and was re-

assigned to the Lakewood Police Department in January 2023. However, as

the trial court noted, there is no reason Guzman could not have participated in

this investigation while a member of the Strike Force in 2022. The State also

argues that since Guzman acted in an "undercover capacity" while with the

Strike Force, he could not have participated in the investigation. But the

certification mentions he worked as "a case agent, as well as in an undercover

capacity." Guzman could plausibly have worked on the controlled buys as a

A-3395-24
14
case agent rather than undercover. Moreover, it was not the issuing judge's

responsibility to ascertain where Guzman worked at what time and in what

capacity.

Second, the State argues the use of the present tense when describing the

alleged drug activity—for example, the phrase "currently engaged in the

distribution of crack/cocaine"—means the drug activity must have occurred

close in time to March 2, 2023, when Guzman signed the certification. This

contention is meritless and contrary to the rule announced nearly forty years

ago in Novembrino regarding the insufficiency of the present tense in a

warrant affidavit. See 105 N.J. at 124.

Third, according to the State, the use of the number "23-02" when

referring to the CI obviously indicates the events involving the CI must have

occurred in 2023. We disagree. Other systems, including our own court

system, use fiscal years instead of calendar years. A file denoted as "23" does

not readily advise the reader it was first generated in 2023. And, as the motion

court aptly noted, it is unlikely the issuing judge "understands the numbering

system assigned to Lakewood Police Department confidential informants."

Fourth, the State points to the use of the words "during the week of"

each time a 2022 date was mentioned. January 29, 2022, February 19, 2022,

and February 26, 2022, were all Saturdays. But in 2023 the same days of the

A-3395-24
15
month were Sundays. Because a week starts on a Sunday, the State contends it

would have been illogical to use the phrase "during the week of" if the drafter

intended to refer to the 2022 dates, which were all Saturdays. We find it

entirely implausible to assume an issuing judge would compare a certification

against a calendar, note this subtlety, and infer 2023 was the intended year.

Finally, the State argues law enforcement would not have waited over

one year to submit a warrant application, which justifies an inference the

controlled buys were conducted in 2023 instead of 2022. Again, it is the

affiant's duty to provide correct information, not the issuing judge's task to

determine or infer whether it is accurate.

The State's emphasis on subtle ambiguities in the certification ignores

the fact that the issuing judge's role is to "make a practical and realistic

evaluation of the information presented on the issue of probable cause,"

Chippero, 201 N.J. at 32, and not speculate that the certification's language

meant something other than what was expressed on the page. If there were

doubts regarding the dates in the certification, the issuing judge was free to

seek clarification from the officer or deny the application.

In this case, a practical and commonsense reading of the certification

indicates the buys occurred in 2022. There was no probable cause in March

2023 based on the observation of two controlled buys in February 2022. See

A-3395-24
16
State v. Sager, 169 N.J. Super. 38, 45 (Law Div. 1979) (noting affidavit

describing heroin sale and pattern of visits to an apartment by "known

narcotics users" would have been insufficient to establish probable cause nine

weeks later because in the interim "[t]he premises could have been

discontinued as a location for the distribution of drugs" or "the persons who

occupied the premises could have vacated the apartment"). Therefore, because

the facts in the certification were stale, the issuing judge had no basis to

conclude there was probable cause.

Additionally, it is not the trial court's role—or our role—to rewrite a

poorly prepared affidavit. See Novembrino, 105 N.J. at 129 ("Our

observations as to the officer's experience, the time spent in preparing the

affidavit, and the absence of any review reflect our conviction that an affidavit

in support of a search warrant must be carefully prepared and reviewed . . . ."

(emphasis added)). The certification was drafted by an officer and reviewed

by an assistant prosecutor, yet neither noticed the alleged incorrect dates

(appearing three times over three pages) that eliminated the basis for probable

cause. Precision is essential in any ex parte application where a person's

constitutionally protected privacy interests are at stake. To overlook their

negligence in preparing and reviewing the certification would "inevitably and

inexorably diminish the quality of evidence presented in search-warrant

A-3395-24
17
applications." Id. at 153; see also State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365, 388 (2012)

(noting evidence obtained in violation of the warrant requirement "is excluded

so as not to reward misconduct and to provide an incentive for adherence to

constitutional mandates").

To be sure, we acknowledge that warrant affidavits are usually prepared

"in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation," which means reviewing

courts "should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a

hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner." United States v.

Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965). For this reason, when a

typographical error is immediately apparent as such, and when the drafter's

intended meaning is obvious, the error should not invalidate the warrant. See

Black's Law Dictionary 683 (11th ed. 2019) (defining "clerical error" as "an

error resulting from a minor mistake . . . esp[ecially], a drafter's or typist 's

technical error that can be rectified without serious doubt about the correct

reading" (emphasis added)). For example, if a certification filed today had the

year as "2926," a commonsense reading would permit the reviewing court to

conclude the drafter meant "2026" instead of "2926."

However, haste does not trump accuracy and compliance with Fourth

Amendment principles. As our Supreme Court has stated, "New Jersey does

not recognize an officer's good faith alone as an exception to the warrant

A-3395-24
18
requirement." State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 430-31 (2017). New Jersey

courts "have maintained that strict adherence to the protective rules governing

search warrants is an integral part of the constitutional armory safeguarding

citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures." Marshall, 199 N.J. at 617

(quoting State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 134 (1983)); State v. Macri, 39 N.J.

250, 265 (1963) ("Eyes may not be closed to the infringement of a

constitutional right because the officer was well-meaning or the transgression

is deemed slight; and erosions must at all times be carefully guarded against

lest they lead to the destruction of the right itself.").

Furthermore, we reject the State's argument that it is entitled to a Rule

3:5-7(c) hearing to introduce evidence not presented to the issuing judge to

prove that Guzman wrote the wrong dates. Fourth Amendment principles

require an issuing judge to consider probable cause solely on the information

presented to the court in the accompanying affidavit. Here, the submitted

information was stale. The trial court properly suppressed the evidence seized

pursuant to the wrongly issued warrants.

Affirmed.

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