Todd Jones v. St. Joseph's University Medical Center - Medical Malpractice
Summary
The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division affirmed a lower court's decision denying a hospital's motion to dismiss a medical malpractice complaint. The court found that the plaintiff had substantially complied with the Affidavit of Merit statute, allowing the case to proceed.
What changed
The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division, in the case of Todd Jones v. St. Joseph's University Medical Center (Docket No. A-0038-25), affirmed the lower court's denial of the hospital's motion to dismiss a medical malpractice complaint. The appellate court found that the plaintiff had substantially complied with the Affidavit of Merit (AOM) statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29, despite the defendant's arguments to the contrary. The case involves allegations of professional negligence related to IV infiltration during hospitalization.
This decision means the medical malpractice lawsuit against St. Joseph's University Medical Center will proceed. Healthcare providers in New Jersey should be aware that substantial compliance with the AOM statute may be sufficient, and failure to strictly adhere to its requirements might not automatically lead to dismissal. The ruling underscores the importance of careful review of AOM filings in medical malpractice cases.
Source document (simplified)
Jump To
Support FLP
CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.
Please become a member today.
March 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note
Todd Jones v. St. Joseph's University Medical Center
New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
- Citations: None known
- Docket Number: A-0038-25
Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Combined Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0038-25
TODD JONES,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ST. JOSEPH'S UNIVERSITY
MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted December 11, 2025 ‒ Decided March 5, 2026
Before Judges Bishop-Thompson and Puglisi.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County,
Docket No. L-2326-24.
Farkas & Donohue, LLC, attorneys for appellant
(Evelyn Cadorin Farkas, of counsel; Robert G. Veech,
III, on the brief).
Friend Law Group, LLC, attorneys for respondent
(Tiffany A. Friend, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this medical malpractice action, defendant St. Joseph's University
Medical Center appeals from two orders: the July 18, 2025 Law Division order
denying its motion for reconsideration, and the May 28, 2025 order denying its
motion to dismiss plaintiff Todd Jones's complaint for failure to comply with
the Affidavit of Merit (AOM) requirement under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in finding plaintiff substantially
complied with the AOM statute. It further argues the trial court improperly
denied reconsideration, claiming it had demonstrated good cause. We affirm.
I.
On August 9, 2022, plaintiff was admitted through defendant's emergency
department after presenting with complaints of worsening shortness of breath,
an exacerbation of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and
pneumonia. At some point during his hospitalization, an intravenous (IV) line
was inserted into plaintiff's right upper arm to facilitate the administration of
contrast material for computed tomography diagnostic imaging. Five days later,
plaintiff developed, and was diagnosed with, a hematoma in his right upper
extremity as a result of IV infiltration. He exhibited "significant" anemia and
persistent hypotension. Plaintiff's condition declined, resulting in the
A-0038-25
2
development of additional hematomas and necessitating surgical intervention to
remove a blood clot. He was ultimately discharged on September 7, 2022.
On August 5, 2024, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, as well
as unnamed physicians, nurses, and other adult individuals, asserting
professional negligence, ordinary negligence, and vicarious liability under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. Specifically, plaintiff contended St. Joseph's
failed to: properly place and monitor the IV, timely recognize and respond to
the hematoma, adjust anticoagulation therapy, and admit him to the intensive
care unit for appropriate management.
On August 29, 2024, plaintiff filed and served an AOM authored by
Ramzy H. Rimawi, M.D., who is board-certified in internal medicine, infectious
diseases, and critical care medicine. Dr. Rimawi opined:
Based upon the review of the medical records provided
to me and also based on my education, training[,] and
experience in the field of internal medicine, it is my
opinion with a reasonable degree of medical
probability, that the care provided to [plaintiff] by a
physician, deviated from the acceptable professional
standards of care in the treatment of this patient and this
deviation was the proximate cause of his injuries.
Defendant filed an answer, affirmative defenses, and discovery demands
on September 26, 2024. It demanded plaintiff furnish an expert report within
sixty days, or it would seek dismissal.
A-0038-25
3
The trial court conducted a Ferreira1 conference on October 15, 2024.
During the conference, plaintiff's counsel informed the court the AOM was "in
the process of being completed," as they were seeking additional medical
records from defendant in order to identify the names of the physicians and
treating medical providers involved in plaintiff's care. The initial records
received by plaintiff did not identify these providers.
Defendant's counsel acknowledged receipt of the AOM but objected,
arguing plaintiff had filed a "blanket" AOM, which failed to identify with
specificity the physicians and nurses who may have been the negligent party or
parties. Counsel, however, did not have a list of medical providers plaintiff was
seeking. Defendant's counsel did not object to Dr. Rimawi's qualifications.
Plaintiff's counsel was advised additional time would be granted to obtain
the medical records that identified the doctors, nurses, and ancillary staff who
treated plaintiff, and instructed defendant to produce these documents. The
court also acknowledged defense counsel's reference to the 120-day filing
deadline of January 24, 2025, by which plaintiff was required to submit an
AOM. A conforming order was not entered by the trial court.
1
Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs., 178 N.J. 144 (2003).
A-0038-25
4
After the conference, plaintiff's counsel received a link to electronically
access plaintiff's medical records. However, plaintiff was unable to gain access.
Plaintiff sent multiple requests to defendant for both the complete medical
records and a list of treating providers. On December 3, 2024, defendant
produced more than 4,000 pages of medical records. Plaintiff asserted a list of
providers was not included in this production, and on January 23, 2024, plaintiff
once again requested the list. Defendant disputed plaintiff's claim, maintaining
the list had been provided.
On January 29, 2025, defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint
with prejudice, asserting the affidavit was non-compliant. Defendant reiterated
plaintiff submitted a "blanket" affidavit and failed to file a compliant affidavit
within the required 120-day timeframe.
Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing defendant failed to file or raise
timely objections in writing or during the Ferreira conference. He also asserted
defendant did not produce the complete medical records until December 3, 2024,
despite repeated requests. Plaintiff submitted a four-page detailed opinion from
Dr. Rimawi dated June 14, 2024, which attributed his injuries to deviations from
the standard of care by defendant's providers, though the providers were not
specifically identified.
A-0038-25
5
Following oral argument, on May 28, 2025, the trial court denied
defendant's motion. In its oral decision, the court applied the Ferreira standard
and found plaintiff had substantially complied with the AOM statute by serving
the affidavit shortly after the complaint was filed, thereby placing defendant on
notice of the malpractice claim. Although plaintiff subsequently submitted a
detailed opinion from Dr. Rimawi, the court noted it still did not "pinpoint the
actors" involved in the alleged conduct. Nevertheless, based on the
subsequently filed opinion, the court was satisfied plaintiff had a meritorious
claim.
Thereafter, defendant moved for reconsideration, asserting good cause to
vacate the May 28, 2025 order. Defendant argued the trial court erred in
applying the governing law regarding a compliant affidavit. It contended Dr.
Rimawi's supplemental opinion was not a compliant AOM because it did not
identify any negligent medical professional. Plaintiff opposed the motion,
contending defendant failed to demonstrate good cause for reconsideration.
On July 18, 2025, a different trial court entered an order, accompanied by
a written decision. Relying on the AOM statute and the governing law on
substantial compliance, the court found defendant had not provided any new
A-0038-25
6
information for reconsideration. The court's decision simply restated the initial
trial court's finding of substantial compliance.
II.
"[W]hether plaintiff satisfied the AOM statute is a matter of statutory
interpretation for which our standard of review is de novo." Hoover v. Wetzler,
472 N.J. Super. 230, 235 (App. Div. 2022). In medical negligence actions, a
plaintiff "must show that the complaint is meritorious" by satisfying the AOM
requirements outlined in N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. Wiggins v. Hackensack Meridian
Health, 259 N.J. 562, 574 (2025); see also Meehan v. Antonellis, 226 N.J. 216,
228 (2016). It is axiomatic "[t]he submission of an appropriate [AOM] is
considered an element of the claim." Meehan, 226 N.J. at 228; see also N.J.S.A.
2A:53A-29. The AOM statute states:
[A]ny action for damages for personal injuries,
wrongful death or property damage resulting from an
alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a licensed
person in [their] profession or occupation, the plaintiff
shall, within [sixty] days following the date of filing of
the answer to the complaint by the defendant, provide
each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate
licensed person that there exists a reasonable
probability that the care, skill[,] or knowledge
exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice[,] or
work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside
acceptable professional or occupational standards or
treatment practices. The court may grant no more than
one additional period, not to exceed [sixty] days, to file
A-0038-25
7
the affidavit pursuant to this section, upon a finding of
good cause.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.]
Thus, "where a plaintiff fails to provide an [AOM] within the statutorily
mandated timeframe, it shall be deemed a failure to state a cause of action unless
the plaintiff satisfies an exception to the [AOM] requirement." Cowley v. Virtua
Health Sys., 242 N.J. 1, 23 (2020). Absent an applicable exception, failing to
provide an AOM within the statutorily prescribed timeframe "requires dismissal
with prejudice for noncompliance." Ibid.
In vicarious liability claims, "[a]n AOM is required 'when the plaintiff's
claim . . . hinges upon allegations of deviation from professional standards of
care by licensed individuals who worked for the named defendant.'" Hargett v.
Hamilton Park OPCO, LLC, 477 N.J. Super. 390, 396 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting
Haviland v. Lourdes Med. Ctr. of Burlington Cnty., Inc., 250 N.J. 368, 381
(2022)). Thus, "[a]t a minimum, the AOM statute entitles a defendant facing a
vicarious liability claim to an AOM limited to alleged deviations by its own
licensed employees." Id. at 398.
On appeal, defendant argues plaintiff's inability to identify a single
medical professional renders Dr. Rimawi's affidavit deficient under N.J.S.A.
2A:53A-27, and therefore plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed. Defendant
A-0038-25
8
relies on Hargett for the proposition the affidavit must specifically identify
multiple defendant medical providers alleged to have negligently performed
their duties. 477 N.J. Super. 390. This argument is unavailing and fails to
address the central issue before us.
We are convinced plaintiff complied with the requirements of the AOM
statute. Our Supreme Court has expressly held a plaintiff is not required to
specifically name a defendant in the affidavit in order to satisfy the statute's
requirement. Moschella ex rel. Est. of Lowe v. Hackensack Meridian Health
Jersey Shore Univ. Med. Ctr., 258 N.J. 110, 114-15, 127-28 (2024). In
Moschella, the Court explained referencing unnamed "John and Jane Doe"
employees is sufficient when the individual actor cannot be identified at the
outset of the litigation, as long as the affidavit specifies the relevant class of
providers at one medical facility. Id. at 127-28. The Court emphasized
substantial compliance with the AOM statute provides reasonable notice and
prevents dismissal of valid claims for technical defects. Id. at 122-23.
Plaintiff alleges medical malpractice against a single institutional
defendant, predicated upon the alleged acts and omission of its physicians,
nurses, and other staff members while he was hospitalized. While neither the
complaint nor the affidavits specifically identify an individual medical
A-0038-25
9
employee, the claims are clearly grounded in professional negligence and
vicarious liability. That alone distinguishes this matter from Hargett.
One established exception to the AOM requirement is substantial
compliance. The doctrine of substantial compliance can be applied "to avoid
technical defeat[] of [a] valid claim[]." Fink v. Thompson, 167 N.J. 551, 561
(2001) (quoting Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 239 (1998)). Courts consider
these five factors to determine substantial compliance with the AOM:
(1) lack of prejudice to the defending party; (2) a series
of steps taken to comply with the statute involved; (3)
a general compliance with the purpose of the statute;
(4) a reasonable notice of petitioner's claim[;] and (5) a
reasonable explanation why there was not a strict
compliance with the statute.
Ibid. (quoting Cornblatt, 153 N.J. at 239).
"Establishing those elements is a heavy burden." Galik v. Clara Maass Med.
Ctr., 167 N.J. 341, 357 (2001).
As noted above, plaintiff's failure to identify specific medical
professionals employed by defendant in the affidavit does not render it
noncompliant, particularly in the context of a vicarious liability claim. Upon
review of the record, we are satisfied defendant was not prejudiced by the
absence of specific names because it was put on notice by both the affidavit and
the opinion, which specified the class of medical professionals—physicians,
A-0038-25
10
nurses, and staff—whose conduct was at issue. Plaintiff demonstrated good
faith and diligent effort by making multiple requests to obtain his complete
medical records and subsequently producing a more detailed affidavit, albeit
without individual names. Plaintiff generally complied with the purpose of the
AOM by demonstrating a meritorious claim.
As to the fourth and fifth elements, defendant had reasonable notice of
plaintiff's claims through both the initial AOM and supplemental opinion
authored by Dr. Rimawi, which addressed alleged deviations from the standard
of care by medical staff responsible for plaintiff's treatment. Plaintiff also
reasonably explained his inability to identify specific medical providers, citing
lack of access to the medical records and the absence of a list from defendant.
These circumstances limited plaintiff's ability to name individual professionals
when the AOM was due. In sum, plaintiff demonstrated grounds for relief under
the doctrine of substantial compliance, and therefore, we are satisfied the AOM
was compliant.
III.
A trial court's denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed under the
abuse of discretion standard. JPC Merger Sub LLC v. Tricon Enters., 474 N.J.
Super. 145, 160 (App. Div. 2022) (citing Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC
A-0038-25
11
Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015)). "Where the
order sought to be reconsidered is interlocutory, as in this case, Rule 4:42-2
governs the motion." Ibid. Under that Rule, "interlocutory orders 'shall be
subject to revision at any time before the entry of final judgment in the sound
discretion of the court in the interest of justice.'" Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J.
Super. 128, 134 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting R. 4:42-2).
Defendant renews its prior arguments before the trial court concerning the
absence of specifically named individuals prior to the 120-day deadline,
asserting this omission was fatal and warrants dismissal under Hargett. When
considering defendant's motion for reconsideration, the court properly applied
the interest-of-justice standard, noting defendant raised no new arguments. In
view of our conclusion and the precedent established in Moschella, we discern
no abuse of discretion in the court's denial of defendant's motion for
reconsideration.
Affirmed.
A-0038-25
12
Related changes
Source
Classification
Who this affects
Taxonomy
Browse Categories
Get State Courts alerts
Weekly digest. AI-summarized, no noise.
Free. Unsubscribe anytime.
Get alerts for this source
We'll email you when NJ Superior Court Appellate Division publishes new changes.