State v. Valentine - Affirmal of Dismissal of Illegal Sentence Motion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON Assigned on Briefs March 3, 2026 STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JOHN VALENTINE Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County No. 11-02890 Carolyn W. Blackett, Judge ___________________________________ No. W2025-01411- CCA -R3-CD ___________________________________ Movant, John Valentine, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. O n appeal, he argues that the indictm ent was defective and that his double jeopardy rights were violated. After our review, we affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed R OBERT L. H OLLOWAY, J R., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which R OBERT H. M ONTGOMERY, J R., and K YLE A. H IXSON, JJ., joined. John Valentine, Tiptonville, Tennessee, P ro Se. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Ronald L. Coleman, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Joshua R. Gilbert, Legal Assistant; Steven J. Mulroy, District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION In 2013, a Shelby County j ury convicted Movant of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. T he trial court sentenced Movant to an effective sentence of thirty- three years. This c ourt affirmed Movant’s convictions. State v. Valentine, No. W2013 -01002- CCA - R3 - CD, 2014 WL 4792801, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 25, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 20, 2015). M ovant unsuccessfully sought post - conviction relief. Valentine v. State, No. W2017 -00161- CCA - R3 - PC, 2018 WL 360021, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 10, 20 18). 03/05/2026

On May 15, 2025, Movant filed a motion, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 (Rule 36.1 motion), seeking to correct an illegal sentence. The Rule 36.1 motion claim ed that the ev idence at trial was insufficient to support the convi ctions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. T he Rule 36.1 motion did not allege that Movant’s sentence s are illegal. T he trial court dismissed the motion for failure to state a colorable claim. Movant appealed. Analysis On appeal, Movan t presents three issues. He claims that: (1) the “indictment [wa]s defective”; (2) he was “denied his protected right ag ainst double jeopardy”; and (3) “the indictment failed to protect him from double jeopardy.” The State responds that any claim that Movant’s sentence s are illegal is waived. Alternatively, the State argues that the trial court properly dismissed the Rule 36.1 motion for failure to state a colorable claim. The State further contends that any claim concerning Movant’s sentence raised on appeal is waived because Movant did not raise th e claim in the trial court. We agree with the State. Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 allows a defendant or the State to seek correction of an illegal sentence. As provided in Rule 36.1, an ille gal sentence is “one that is not authorized by the applicable statutes or that directly contravenes an applicable statute.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a)(2); see State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585, 594 (Tenn. 2015). “[A] Rule 36.1 motion must include factual al legations concerning the basis of the illegal sentence claim in order to state a colorable claim for relief.” Id. at 593. Whether a Rule 36.1 motion states a colorable claim for correction of an illegal sentence is a question of law, which we review de n ovo. Id. at 589. A colorable claim is “a claim that, if taken as true and viewed in a light most favorable to the moving party, would entitle the movin g party to relief under Rule 36.1.” Id. The purpose of Rule 36.1 “is to provide an avenue for correct ing allegedly illegal sentences.” State v. Wilson, No. E2013-02354- CCA - R3 - CD, 2014 WL 1285622, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 31, 2014) (citations omitted), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 19, 2014). “The Rule does not provide an avenue for seeking the reversal of convictions.” Id. (emphas e s in original); see State v. Gayden, No. W2024 -00865- CCA - R3 - CD, 2025 WL 1331615, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7, 2025), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 11, 2025). “If the [trial] cour t determines that the motion fails to state a colorable claim, it shall enter an order summarily denying the motion.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(b)(2). Sentencing errors fall into three categories — clerical errors, appealable errors, and fatal errors. Wood en, 478 S.W.3d at 595. Clerical errors arise from a clerical mistake in the judgment sheet and may be corrected at any time under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. Id. Appealable errors are those for which there is a right of direct appeal

pursuant to our Sentencing Act. Id. Fatal errors are errors “so profound as to render the sentence illegal and void.” Id. Only a fatal error renders a sentence illegal, and only illegal sentences may be corrected under Rule 36.1. See i d. Movant’s claims c oncerning his indictment and double jeopardy, even when “taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable” to the Movant, would not constitute fatal errors rendering the sentences illegal. If the errors claimed by Movant were in fact errors, they would have been appealable errors. Rule 36.1 provides no avenue for seeking relief from appealable errors, and this court “has repeatedly held that double jeopardy claims are not cognizable in a Rule 36.1 proceeding. ” State v. Cage, No. M2020-00360- CCA - R3 - CD, 2021 WL 3163086, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2021), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 13, 2021). To the extent that Movant argues in his brief that his sentence i s illegal, that issue is waived because it was not raised in his Rule 36.1 motion. An issue raised for the first time on appeal is waived. Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a); State v. Hardison, 680 S.W.3d 282, 310 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2023). Waiver notwithstanding, Movant’s sentences were authorized by the applicable statutes. T he jury found Movant gu ilty of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. The victim was a first - grade student. Valentine, 2014 WL 4792801, at *1. The trial court sentenced him to twenty - five years for rape of a child and eight years for aggravated sexual battery to be se rved consecutively for an effective term of thirty - three years. Id. at *4. Rape of a child, if the victim is more than three years of age but less than thirteen years of age, was a Class A felony at the time of the offense. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 522 (b)(1) (2010). Aggravated sexual battery, if the victim was less than thirteen years of age, was a Class B felony at the time of the offense. T enn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504 (b) (2010). At the time of the offense s and at the time of sentencing, the sentencing range for a Range I standard offender convicted of a Class A felony was not less than fifteen nor more than twenty - five years, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40 -35- 112(a)(1) (2010), and the sentencing range for a Range I s tandard offender convicted of a Class B felony was not less than eight nor more than twelve years. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 112(a)(2) (2010). M ovant’s sentences were authorized by the applicable statutes. Accordingly, the sentences are not illegal.

Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal of the Rule 36.1 motion for failure to state a colorable claim. s / Robert L. Holloway, Jr. ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE