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March 4, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re J.N. CA2/2

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B344944

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (27)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/4/26 In re J.N. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re J.N. et al., Persons Coming B344944
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP03682A-B
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.K.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Stephen C. Marpet, Commissioner. Affirmed.

Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

---

J.K. (Mother) appeals jurisdictional and dispositional
orders concerning minors J.N. and L.N. under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1)1 and (c). Mother
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting jurisdiction,
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate custody while a
family court proceeding was pending, and the removal, custody,
and visitation orders. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
COMBINED FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
I. Family Court Proceedings
In May 2020, Mother filed for divorce from K.N. (Father).
The parties stipulated to an order for a privately compensated
temporary judge. Alleging Mother had severe substance abuse
issues, Father requested sole physical custody of the children
with monitored visitation and drug testing for Mother.
In March 2021, the private judge ordered the parents to
have joint legal and physical custody of the children, and also
ordered Mother to submit to alcohol breathalyzer testing. The
private judge observed the parents “are embroiled in a deep,
intense and destructive conflict” but determined that despite
Mother’s substance abuse challenges, the testing protocols had
kept the children safe.
In September 2023, the parents reached a marital
settlement agreement with joint legal and physical custody of the
children. In May 2024, the family law court entered a judgment
of dissolution, with custody and visitation ordered as set forth in
the settlement agreement.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 This part includes facts contained in documents attached to
Mother’s request for judicial notice, which was granted on
October 9, 2025.

2
II. The Dependency Petition
On November 21, 2024, the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a
section 300 petition seeking jurisdiction over then 11-year-old
J.N. and nine-year-old L.N.
Count b-1 alleged Mother’s history of substance abuse
rendered Mother incapable of providing regular care and
supervision of the children. Mother was under the influence of
alcohol while the children were under her care and supervision
on October 17, 2024, and on numerous prior occasions, placing
the children at risk of serious physical harm.
Count b-2 alleged Mother’s history of mental and emotional
problems and suicidal ideation rendered Mother incapable of
providing regular care and supervision of the children. Mother
failed to take her psychotropic medications as prescribed, placing
the children at risk of serious physical harm.
Count b-3 alleged that on prior occasions, Mother drove
under the influence of alcohol and prescription medication while
the children were passengers. The petition originally alleged
Father failed to protect the children, but this language was later
stricken by the juvenile court.
Count c-1 alleged Mother emotionally abused J.N. by
abusing alcohol, threatening to kill or harm herself if J.N. visits
Father and telling J.N. he should have never been born. As a
result, J.N. allegedly exhibited anxiety, insomnia, and guilt, was
afraid of Mother, and refused to return to Mother’s home.
III. Events Leading to the Petition
On October 17, 2024, DCFS received a referral after an
incident at Mother’s home. The children called Father that
morning because Mother was too intoxicated to drive the children
to school. Mother had drunk alcohol all night and was unable to
wake up. Mother was yelling, “rambling incoherently,” and
“acting really drunk” and scary. The children woke up to find
men in their bedroom.

3
When Father arrived, he observed Mother on the ground
with three men in the home. One man told Father that Mother
was unable to drive and had been drinking all night without
sleep. Father reported the children were “visibly shaken,”
necessitating an emergency session from their therapist. Both
children feared Mother’s behavior and refused to go to Mother’s
home unless she stopped drinking.
Police officers dispatched to Mother’s home did not notice
any slurring of speech, red eyes, or odor of alcohol; Mother
appeared not to be under the influence.
Following the October 17, 2024 incident, DCFS
investigated. The school social worker reported this was the
second time J.N. had been referred to her. In September 2024,
J.N. disclosed Mother tried to drive him while under the
influence. J.N. reported Mother’s alcohol use and possible pill
consumption, and said he did not feel safe with Mother.
Between October 17, 2024, and the filing of the petition on
November 21, 2024, Mother attempted to pick up the children
from school on two occasions despite their protests. On
October 29, 2024, both children refused to leave with Mother.
J.N. asked to stay in the classroom, and both children were
adamant about not going with Mother. J.N.’s teacher stated the
children had never seemed fearful of Mother until that day, and
J.N. was almost in tears. School staff smelled alcohol on Mother
but could not definitively state she was under the influence.
Mother had not driven to the school; she had arranged
transportation through Uber.
On November 6, 2024, Mother again tried to pick up the
children from school with her attorney present. The principal and
a school police officer both smelled alcohol on Mother’s breath,
though they could not definitively say whether she was under the
influence. Mother was not driving; she had a driver. Father
arrived with his attorney participating by phone. The supervising
child social worker (CSW) told the principal that the parents
should abide by the family court order, but neither parent

4
produced the order. When Father’s attorney asked what was
stopping Father from taking the children home, the officer
responded, “Nothing.” The children refused to go with Mother,
insisting they did not feel safe with her. The principal did not
believe Father was coaching the children.
The day after DCFS filed the November 21, 2024 petition,
Mother attempted to pick up the children from school with a
friend. When the children saw Mother, they ran into a classroom.
The children refused to go with Mother, even with the presence of
a trusted third party, because they did not feel safe. J.N. cried,
breathed hard, and said “[e]verything was happening at once.”
The principal thought Mother did not look healthy but could not
say whether she was under the influence.
IV. Evidence of Mother’s Substance Abuse
A. Historical substance abuse
Father reported that when he first met Mother, she was a
“recovered heroin addict.” In 2009, Mother was injured while
working and was prescribed opiates for pain, which caused her to
relapse. Mother consumed alcohol and pills during both
pregnancies. Mother took hydrocodone, Adderall, Klonopin,
sleeping pills, and alcohol while pregnant with L.N., who was
born with neonatal abstinence syndrome and heart defects
requiring surgery.
Mother admitted to using marijuana, cocaine, and heroin in
the past, stating she did “everything under the sun” as a
teenager, but denied ever having an addiction. Mother
maintained she stopped using all drugs when she was 17 years
old.
B. Current substance abuse
The children provided detailed and consistent accounts of
Mother’s ongoing substance abuse. J.N. reported Mother drank
alcohol almost every time he and L.N. were in her care, including
in the middle of the night and almost every morning. Both
children reported Mother drank tequila. J.N. saw a clear white

5
bottle on the dishwasher and observed Mother pouring tequila
into a plastic bottle. L.N. said Mother drank more than one cup of
alcohol every day.
With respect to prescription medication, J.N. reported
Mother kept 12 or 13 pill bottles with “illegal drugs” in her purse
with the labels ripped off. He identified two bottles as seizure
medication; the rest he believed were pain pills and sleeping pills.
J.N. described Mother’s intake of pain medication as “excessive.”
Although J.N. never saw Mother take pills, he determined she
was taking them by checking her purse before and after school to
see if pills were missing. L.N. confirmed Mother took pills that
made her “act crazy,” describing them as being in orange
containers.
Both children described the effects of Mother’s substance
abuse on her behavior. J.N. said Mother acted weird and angry
after drinking tequila and taking pain medication, with yelling
and sudden mood changes from “jovial and upbeat to erratic and
hostile.” J.N. also said Mother has invited strangers to her home,
given access to the children’s bedroom, and attempted to drive
them in her vehicle while intoxicated. L.N. described Mother
acting drunk and weird when she drinks alcohol, with her voice
changing and yelling. The children reported Mother smoked
cigarettes in front of them and smelled like alcohol and
cigarettes.
The children’s therapist, who had seen them for three
years, confirmed the children’s accounts, stating the situation at
Mother’s home had worsened. The children felt unsafe because
when Mother drank, she was unpredictable and incompetent to
care for them, requiring them to fend for themselves. The
children recounted times when Mother drank throughout the
weekend with no one cooking food, at which point they prepared
cereal for themselves. The therapist believed the children were
credible and not coached.

6
Paternal aunt described Mother’s excessive drinking during
the COVID-19 pandemic when the family lived with them,
reporting Mother drank more than a bottle of tequila a day. At
J.N.’s recent birthday party, paternal cousin observed Mother
looking drugged out and smelling like alcohol and cigarettes.
Paternal aunt recalled seeing 10 bottles of unknown contents
inside Mother’s purse.
Corroborating the children’s accounts, J.N.’s teacher
reported that on October 16, 2024, the children arrived late to
school around noon because they could not wake Mother up. J.N.
disclosed there were strangers in the house and a lot of noise
throughout the night. The children also reported Mother’s
substance abuse to Father’s partner, paternal aunt, and a family
friend.
C. Mother’s treatment and drug testing
Mother was diagnosed with generalized anxiety and
Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder and was prescribed
Adderall, Klonopin, seizure medication, and a muscle relaxer.
Mother’s psychiatrist last saw her in person in 2023 and
communicated with her only by e-mail for medication refills. The
psychiatrist reported no concerns regarding substance abuse,
misuse of medication, or mental health. The psychiatrist noted
Mother had several profiles on the CURES system, which tracks
controlled substance prescriptions. The psychiatrist discovered
Mother was taking significant doses of a muscle relaxer of which
the psychiatrist was unaware, indicating Mother was obtaining
controlled substances from at least one other doctor.
Mother’s therapist, who had treated her since the summer
of 2022, saw her once per week or every other week, primarily
through text. In January 2025, however, they had not had an
official session in weeks. The therapist reported no concerns
regarding substance abuse or suicidal ideation.
Mother’s drug testing results were telling. Mother tested
negative for all substances on October 28, 2024, and January 3,

7
2025. However, these negative tests showed she was not taking
Adderall as prescribed. On December 20, 2024, Mother tested
positive for amphetamines. Mother failed to drug test on
eight occasions: November 12, November 14, November 22,
December 9, December 27, 2024, and January 7, 15, and 24,
2025.
D. Mother’s driving under the influence
According to the children, Mother had driven them while
under the influence of alcohol. J.N. did not always witness
Mother drinking alcohol before she drove them. He was able to
smell the alcohol, however, and Mother acted similarly to times
when J.N. did see her drink alcohol. L.N. explained that on
October 16, 2024, he and J.N. refused to let Mother drive them
because they smelled alcohol on her. However, they acquiesced
after Mother “became emotional” and “proclaimed that she would
harm herself.” Father confirmed Mother has driven the children
while under the influence on multiple occasions.
E. Mother’s denials
In an interview conducted on January 23, 2025, Mother
denied the allegations against her. Mother denied any current
substance abuse, stating she drinks alcohol maybe once a week,
such as a glass of wine or champagne, and last consumed tequila
in December 2024. Mother said she takes psychotropic
medications as prescribed and denied any medication abuse.
Concerning the October 17, 2024 incident, Mother stated
she had been completely sober that day and the day before,
having only taken Adderall as prescribed. She denied ever having
been under the influence while the children were in her care.
Mother attributed the smell of alcohol to her hair products, which
contain alcohol as a top ingredient.
V. Evidence of Mental Health Issues and Threats of
Self-harm
Both children reported Mother threatened to harm or kill
herself. J.N. said Mother threatened to hurt herself if he and L.N.

8
did not listen or if they said they wanted to be with Father. On
October 17, 2024, when J.N. told Mother he was going to call
Father, she said, “Okay, call your dad because you won’t see me
again.” When Father arrived, Mother stated, “Everything will
die. You’re never gonna see me again!”
L.N. confirmed Mother said she did not want to live
anymore. He was unsure if she would hurt herself but said, “She
might, because she’s crazy.” Father corroborated recent instances
where the children have disclosed Mother attempts to guilt the
children by threatening self-harm if she ever has to be without
them.
The children’s therapist believed Mother might say things
to the children that made them worry she might harm herself.
The children were struggling with Mother’s ideations of self-harm
and mentioned Mother’s veiled threats of never seeing her again.
In August 2024, Mother stopped in the middle lane while
driving the children to school and told them to “get the fuck out of
the car” and walk to school. The children showed up at Father’s
door crying and repeated Mother’s words. Mother later explained
she became anxious because her vehicle had been recalled and
the lights were going on and off.
In September 2024, Mother’s boyfriend reported to Father
that Mother told J.N. to get in the car while drunk, J.N. ran off,
and Mother threatened to call law enforcement. Mother
reportedly told J.N., “I hate my life, you shouldn’t be alive,” and
“threaten[ed] to hurt or kill herself.”
Father reported Mother’s family revealed Mother had
suicidal ideation as a minor. Mother denied any history of
suicidal ideation or attempts and denied ever hinting she would
harm herself.
VI. Impact on the Children
The children exhibited significant emotional distress
because of Mother’s behavior. J.N. described his relationship with
Mother as not the best and believed Mother wanted him out of

9
the picture. He said Mother was obsessed with calling him
dangerous and blamed him for almost getting arrested. Mother
made J.N. feel like he was the cause of everything bad, including
blaming him for leaving the door open when the cat died.
Both children had difficulty focusing in school. J.N. asked
Father, “Is it my fault [Mother] drinks? She drinks because of
me, right?” J.N. felt he had to manage Mother and tiptoe around
her mood changes.
J.N. had insomnia and felt stressed out. He said he would
only hurt someone in order to protect himself, specifically
identifying Mother as the threat. He elaborated that sometimes
when Mother is being scary, he thinks he might need to block her
or spar if she comes at him, recalling an incident when Mother
grabbed him and chased him around the house.
The children repeatedly expressed fear of Mother and
insisted they did not feel safe with her. J.N. stated, “I hope I don’t
have to go back. I love it here so much,” referring to Father’s
residence. L.N. pleaded, “Please don’t make me go back until she
gets help” and “don’t make me go back anytime soon. I just don’t
wanna go [to Mother’s home].”
The children’s therapist reported the children appeared to
feel more secure and at ease in Father’s care due to the stability
of knowing they would return to Father’s home every day. L.N.,
who had previously been protective of Mother, expressed after
October 17, 2024, that he did not feel safe and did not want to
return to Mother. The therapist stated “different type of alarm
bells went off” because L.N. was always Mother’s protector.
According to the school counselor, both children appeared
anxious and expressed worries about Mother’s substance abuse.
On October 17, 2024, J.N. met with the counselor and appeared
overwhelmed, explaining he was forced to sleep in Mother’s bed
because strangers slept in his bed. J.N. reportedly had trouble
focusing in school due to Mother’s crying and threats of self-
harm.

10
The children’s pediatrician stated the children did not feel
safe returning to Mother’s house, reporting Mother was under the
influence, and there were strangers in the household. The
pediatrician was “sure that there is a clear history of substance
abuse by mother in the past,” which he discovered during
Mother’s pregnancy, though he had never personally seen Mother
under the influence.
VII. Renewed Family Court Proceedings
On October 23, 2024, Father filed a request for domestic
violence restraining order and child custody modification, seeking
sole custody and supervised visits for Mother. The request was
based largely on the October 17, 2024 incident giving rise to the
DCFS referral and Mother’s history of substance abuse. The
family court denied any temporary restraining orders but set a
hearing for November 18, 2024.
On November 18, 2024, the family court held a hearing on
Father’s request but continued the hearing to January 13, 2025,
based on the agreement of the parties and the ongoing DCFS
investigation. The court ordered the parents to comply with the
existing custody and visitation orders but noted it did not expect
anyone to force the children into a car “kicking and screaming
against their will.” After the November 18 hearing, Mother
attempted to pick the children up on November 22, 2024,
apparently believing the court admonished Father for keeping
the children from her. (See pt. III, ante.)
On January 13, 2025, pursuant to Father’s request and
because the juvenile court had assumed jurisdiction, the family
court dismissed Father’s request without prejudice.
VIII. Detention Proceeding
The section 300 petition was filed on November 21, 2024.
That same day, DCFS proposed a safety plan with measures to
ensure the children would feel safe. The measures included: the
identification of a “safety person” who would determine whether
Mother consumed alcohol and assure the children that Mother

11
was not under the influence prior to any visit; Father to provide a
cell phone to the children to use in an emergency; conjoint
counseling for Mother and the children; Mother to refrain from
alcohol, especially in the presence of the children; unannounced
visits by DCFS; and drug testing. Mother asked if the proposal
was voluntary and did not give a definitive answer on whether
she would cooperate with the plan.
On December 2, 2024, DCFS obtained authorization to
remove the children from Mother’s custody and release them to
Father. That same day, DCFS monitored a visit between the
children and Mother at a park. The children initially refused but
eventually agreed with hesitation after assurances that the CSW
would monitor the visit.
On December 4, 2024, DCFS filed a request to detain the
children from Mother pursuant to section 385. The following day,
the juvenile court ordered the children detained from Mother,
finding that remaining in her home would be contrary to the
children’s welfare.
On December 9, 2024, the juvenile court conducted the
detention hearing and kept the children detained from Mother,
released the children to Father, and ordered monitored visits for
Mother.
IX. Adjudication and Dispositional Hearing
The adjudication and dispositional hearing took place on
February 4, 2025. Mother sought dismissal of the petition based
on insufficient evidence. The juvenile court sustained the petition
largely as pled, except it found Father nonoffending and amended
the last sentence of count b-3 to strike Father’s purported failure
to protect the children. In sustaining the petition, the court relied
on the children’s statements in the DCFS reports, which it found
to be “totally believable,” as well as the statements of other
witnesses. The court declared the children dependents of the
court pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c), and placed

12
them in Father’s home under DCFS supervision with continued
monitored visitation for Mother.
DCFS recommended shared 50/50 legal custody with no
mention of tie-breaking authority. Father asked for sole legal
custody or tie-breaking authority, and Mother objected to sole
legal custody. Father joined in DCFS’s recommendation of sole
physical custody. Mother opposed removal of the children from
her home. In the alternative, Mother requested the juvenile court
maintain jurisdiction to allow an opportunity for reunification.
Mother agreed to participate in programs and comply with court
orders. If the court closed the case, Mother asked for the case to
be sent to mediation so that visitation details could be worked
out.
The juvenile court determined by clear and convincing
evidence pursuant to section 361, subdivisions (c) and (d) that
“there is a substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being . . . of the
child[ren], and there are no reasonable means by which the
child[ren]’s physical health can be protected, without removing
the child[ren] from the home and the care, custody, and control of
that or those parent(s)/legal guardian(s).” The court told Mother,
“I’m just advising you today that, when the case closes, I’m going
to be making orders about what you need to do before you can
even go to family court,” including a six-month drug and alcohol
program with weekly random drug and alcohol testing, a 12-step
program with a sponsor, a 26-week parenting class, individual
counseling, and conjoint therapy with the children when the
children’s therapist deems it appropriate.
The juvenile court indicated it would order sole physical
custody to Father and joint legal custody with Father to have tie-
breaking authority. Mother did not object to joint legal with tie-
breaking authority to Father. The court terminated jurisdiction
and stayed the order pending mediation and the filing of a
custody order.

13
X. Exit Orders and Appeal
On March 11, 2025, the juvenile court lifted the stay and
terminated jurisdiction over both children. A JV-200 custody
order and final judgment was filed. Father was awarded sole
physical custody of the children. Both parents were awarded joint
legal custody with Father having tie-breaking authority. Through
an attached JV-205 form, the court ordered supervised visitation
for Mother pursuant to the terms of an attached mediation
agreement and until further order of the court.
In an attached JV-206 form, the juvenile court justified
supervised visitation by explaining Mother “has not completed
. . . the following court-ordered programs,” including a (1) “6-
month drug/alcohol program, with weekly testing, after care, 12-
step program,” (2) “26 week parenting program,” (3) “[i]ndividual
counseling to address case issues,” and (4) “[c]onjoint counseling
with minors, when minors’ therapist deems it appropriate.” This
form also stated “[c]ompletion of one of the programs above
might, but need not, constitute a significant change of
circumstances for purposes of modifying this final custody order,”
pursuant to section 302, subdivision (d). The record contains no
objection from Mother to the terms set forth in this form.
Mother filed timely notices of appeal of the juvenile court’s
orders from February 4, 2025, and March 11, 2025.
DISCUSSION
We first examine whether substantial evidence supported
the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. We then address
whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction to make custody
orders and terminate jurisdiction. We next discuss whether the
removal, custody, and visitation orders were supported by
substantial evidence or were an abuse of discretion.

14
I. Substantial Evidence Supports Jurisdiction Under
Section 300, Subdivision (b)(1)
A. Applicable law and standard of review
As pertinent here, under subdivision (b)(1) of section 300,
the juvenile court may assert jurisdiction over any child who has
suffered, or who is at substantial risk of suffering, serious
physical harm or illness because of “[t]he failure or inability of
the child’s parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child”
or “[t]he inability of the parent . . . to provide regular care for the
child due to the parent’s . . . mental illness, developmental
disability, or substance abuse.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A), (D).)
“A jurisdiction finding under section 300, subdivision (b)(1),
requires [DCFS] to prove three elements: (1) the parent’s or
guardian’s neglectful conduct or failure or inability to protect the
child; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness or a
substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” (In re Cole L.
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601.)
Here, the petition alleged three counts under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1): count b-1 (substance abuse); count b-2 (mental
health and suicidal ideation); and count b-3 (driving under the
influence).
In a dependency proceeding under section 300, “[t]he
standard of proof at the jurisdictional stage . . . is a
preponderance of the evidence, and we will affirm the court’s
findings if they are supported by substantial evidence.” (In re
Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428, 438.) We review the
record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations,
drawing all reasonable inferences to support the juvenile court’s
findings and orders. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.).)
We do not exercise independent judgment. Rather, we ascertain
whether sufficient facts support the court’s findings, even where
contradictory facts are present. (Ibid.) “We do not reweigh the
evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses or resolve
evidentiary conflicts.” (In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 328.)

15
The parent challenging the juvenile court’s findings and orders
bears the burden on appeal. (In re M.R. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 101,
108.)
While substantial evidence is a deferential standard, it is
not toothless. (In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892.) Isolated
evidence cited out of context of the record does not suffice.
Rather, we must consider the evidence supporting dependency
jurisdiction in light of the whole record to determine whether the
evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (Ibid.)
B. Credibility determinations of juvenile courts
are entitled to deference
As a preliminary matter, the juvenile court made its
jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders based on the
DCFS reports. It found the statements of the children and other
witnesses to DCFS social workers to be credible. Relying on In re
Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616 and People v. Booth (2016)
3 Cal.App.5th 1284, Mother contends that because the findings
were based solely on documentary evidence, we need not defer to
the credibility determinations of the juvenile court.
Mother’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. In re
Rosenkrantz held that resolution of any conflicts in the evidence
and the weight to be given the evidence are matters within the
authority of the factfinder and the “ ‘some evidence’ ” standard is
“extremely deferential.” (In re Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at
pp. 665, 679.) People v. Booth involved a criminal habeas
proceeding where no live testimony was taken by any tribunal,
permitting independent review because the appellate court was
in the same position as the trial court. (People v. Booth, supra,
3 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1305-1306.) Neither case supports
abandoning the deferential standard of review in dependency
proceedings.
The California Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
appellate courts do not reexamine witness credibility
determinations made by juvenile courts. (In re Caden C. (2021)

16
11 Cal.5th 614, 640; In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633; I.J.,
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) Dependency cases are often resolved
based on witness statements in documentary reports. (See §§ 280,
281, 355, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.684(c)(1).) Under
Mother’s view, we would be called to reexamine credibility in
most dependency appeals. We therefore apply the settled
deferential standard of review governing dependency appeals.3
C. Jurisdiction is warranted based on Mother’s
substance abuse
DCFS alleged in count b-1 that Mother “has a history of
substance abuse, including, cocaine, heroin, psychotropic
medication, marijuana and alcohol, and is a current daily abuser
of alcohol and prescription medication, which renders the mother
incapable of providing regular care and supervision of the
children. On 10/17/2024, and on numerous prior occasions, the
mother was under the influence of alcohol while the children
were in the mother’s care and supervision.”
The record is replete with evidence of Mother’s substance
abuse. Mother has a history of substance abuse, including using
“everything under the sun” in her teenage years, suffering a
relapse in 2009 after taking opiates for pain, and consuming
alcohol and pills while she was pregnant with both children. This
is not merely a historical problem. Substantial evidence
demonstrated substance abuse is ongoing. J.N. said Mother
drinks alcohol “almost every time” he and his brother are under
her care, in the middle of the night and almost every morning,
sometimes leaving the children to feed themselves. Both children
reported smelling alcohol on Mother, including on the morning of
October 17, 2024, when she was supposed to take the children to
school.
With respect to medication, both children provided
numerous details about Mother taking pills. The juvenile court

3 Even if we were to abandon the deferential standard of
review in this case, we would not reach a contrary result.
17
could reasonably infer from the children’s observations that
Mother overmedicates herself.
The record contains substantial evidence of the detrimental
effects of Mother’s substance abuse. J.N. described Mother’s
behavior as weird, with yelling and instability in her mood.
Mother made the children late to school, invited strangers to her
home while intoxicated, and gave them access to the children’s
bedroom.
The accounts of the children remained consistent during
the investigation. Further, the children have reported Mother’s
substance abuse to third parties, including Father’s partner,
paternal aunt, a family friend, and school staff. Third parties,
including the children’s therapist and the school principal,
believed them and did not feel they were coached. In addition, the
principal, front desk staff, and police officer at the children’s
school smelled alcohol on Mother’s breath. Substantial evidence
supports the allegation that Mother has a substance abuse
problem.
The record also contains substantial evidence of a
substantial risk of physical harm to the children due to Mother’s
substance abuse. Mother has either driven or attempted to drive
the children while under the influence, including on October 17,
2024. Mother denied abusing alcohol or medication or attempting
to drive the children while under the influence. Mother failed to
show for drug testing for eight of the 11 requested tests. Mother’s
persistent refusal to acknowledge and confront the problem
shows that the problem is likely to continue, requiring the
children’s removal from the risk. (In re Lana S. (2012)
207 Cal.App.4th 94, 105 [denial of drug problem supported
removal order].)
Both children insisted on multiple occasions that they do
not feel safe with mother. According to the children’s therapist,
L.N. was previously reluctant to speak up against mother but
started expressing his fear of her after the incident on

18
October 17, 2024. Both J.N. and L.N. have become more forceful
in their refusal to see Mother. They ran away from Mother on
three occasions when she tried to pick them up from school.
Based on the children’s fear of Mother and efforts to avoid seeing
her, the juvenile court could reasonably infer Mother’s behavior
posed a substantial risk to their physical safety.
Mother argues that viewing the record as a whole, the
children’s statements are not credible. Mother contends J.N.
could not have known the medication Mother was taking was
“illegal” because he stated the labels were ripped off. She also
contends J.N. could not attribute Mother acting “weird and
angry” to her consumption of pain medication because he never
saw her take pills. She maintains J.N.’s “eyeball inventory” of her
pill intake by looking in her purse before and after school was not
credible. Mother also attempts to discredit the children’s and
Father’s observations of Mother’s substance abuse while under
the influence by pointing out the lack of concern from law
enforcement, Mother’s psychiatrist, and the pediatrician.
However, “[q]uestions as to the credibility of witnesses and
the weight to be given their testimony are for the trier of the
facts.” (Hansen v. Bear Film Co. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 154, 184.) A
trier of fact may give credence to a witness “whose testimony
contains contradictions or inconsistencies.” (Ibid.) In such a case,
an appellate court is concerned “with the single inquiry whether
the record contains substantial evidence tending to support the
findings assailed.” (Ibid.) Moreover, J.N.’s statements about
Mother were not the only evidence of her consumption of
medication. Father and paternal aunt also provided testimony
regarding her excessive medications. Mother has also missed
eight out of 11 drug tests. And her psychiatrist was unaware she
was taking a muscle relaxant not prescribed by her. Based on
this evidence, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude
Mother has a substance abuse problem. (In re K.B. (2021)

19
59 Cal.App.5th 593, 601, disapproved on another ground in In re
N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 560, fn. 18.)
Given substantial evidence supported jurisdiction based on
count b-1, we need not and do not determine whether substantial
evidence supported jurisdiction based on the other counts. (D.M.
v. Superior Court (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1127 [dependency
jurisdiction “may rest on a single ground”].)
D. Current risk of harm existed
Mother argues at the time of the hearing in February 2025,
the children were not at risk because she did not have
unsupervised contact with them since October 17, 2024, when
Father took custody of the children. Mother maintains that
because the children had been living safely with Father for four
months before the adjudication hearing, had refused all contact
with her, and Father had a custody modification request pending
in family court, there was no current risk of harm requiring
dependency jurisdiction.
“Jurisdiction findings under section 300 require evidence
the child is subject to a defined risk of harm at the time of the
hearing.” (In re B.H. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 469, 480.) Mother’s
argument overlooks a critical fact: at the time of the hearing,
Mother retained joint physical custody of the children under the
May 2024 family court judgment. That judgment incorporated
the parties’ September 2023 marital settlement agreement,
which provided for joint legal and physical custody. Under that
judgment, Mother had the legal right to exercise parenting time
with the children.
Moreover, despite the children’s adamant refusals to see
Mother, she repeatedly attempted to exercise her court-ordered
custody rights by appearing at the children’s school on
October 29, November 6, and November 22, 2024. On
November 6, both the principal and a school police officer smelled
alcohol on Mother’s breath. On November 22, J.N. cried, breathed
hard, and became stressed when Mother appeared, and both

20
children ran into a classroom to avoid her. Mother believed the
family court had ordered the children to go with her and told
them they had to comply with the court order. The children’s
attempts to flee and hide when Mother appeared at their school
demonstrated they remained at substantial risk during any
period when Mother might exercise her parenting time.
Critically, Father had no legal authority under the existing
family court order to prevent Mother from exercising her
parenting time. While Father filed a request for a restraining
order and custody modification in family court on October 23,
2024, the family court denied any temporary restraining orders
and set a hearing for November 18, 2024. At that November 18
hearing, the family court continued the matter to January 13,
2025, based on the parties’ agreement and the ongoing DCFS
investigation. On January 13, after the juvenile court had
assumed jurisdiction, the family court dismissed Father’s request
without prejudice due to the dependency proceedings.
Thus, from October 17, 2024, through the February 4, 2025
adjudication hearing, no family court order prohibited Mother
from exercising the parenting time to which she was entitled
under the May 2024 judgment. Indeed, at the November 18, 2024
family court hearing, the court ordered the parents to comply
with the existing custody and visitation orders, though it noted it
did not expect anyone to force the children into a car “kicking and
screaming against their will.” This left the children in an
untenable position: Mother retained the legal right to custody
under the family court order, but the children feared for their
safety in her care.
We reject Mother’s argument that the children could
protect themselves by refusing contact, particularly in light of
Mother’s repeated efforts to pick them up against their will and
to guilt them into staying with her by threatening to kill herself.
Children cannot be expected to bear the burden of enforcing their
own safety. They should not have been placed in the position of

21
having to run from their Mother, hide in classrooms, and suffer
the anxiety and stress of wondering whether Mother would
appear at their school each day. The fact that the children took
these desperate measures to avoid Mother demonstrates the
severity of the risk they faced, not its absence.
Moreover, Mother’s persistent denial of any substance
abuse problem, her continued attempts to exercise custody
despite the children’s fear, and her failure to appear for drug
testing on eight of 11 occasions since the DCFS investigation
commenced all demonstrated that the risk was ongoing as of the
adjudication hearing. About 10 days before the hearing, Mother
failed to appear for a drug test scheduled for January 24, 2025. In
her interview with the dependency investigator filed one week
before the hearing, Mother denied ever having been under the
influence while the children were in her care and denied ever
driving the children while intoxicated. “One cannot correct a
problem one fails to acknowledge.” (In re Gabriel K. (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197.)
The juvenile court’s jurisdiction was therefore necessary to
protect the children from immediate harm during periods when
Mother retained legal custody rights. While Father’s family court
request might eventually have resulted in modified custody
orders, the children needed protection in the interim. The
juvenile court’s assumption of jurisdiction provided that
protection by immediately modifying the custody arrangement
and ordering monitored visitation for Mother.
Thus, circumstances existing at the time of the
adjudication hearing warranted the juvenile court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over the children. These include Mother’s continued
denial of her substance abuse issues, her ongoing attempts to
exercise custody rights despite the children’s fear, her failure to
submit to drug testing, and the absence of any family court order
restricting her access to the children. The evidence established

22
not only past harm, but a current, substantial risk of harm at the
time of the hearing.
II. Dependency Proceedings Had Primacy Over Family
Court Proceedings
A. Applicable law and standard of review
Once a juvenile court assumes dependency jurisdiction over
a child, any issues regarding custodial rights between the parents
are to be determined solely by the juvenile court while the child is
a dependent of the juvenile court. (§ 302, subd. (c).) Once a
dependency petition is filed, the juvenile court has exclusive
jurisdiction to determine custody issues, even if the parents are
disputing custody in the family court. (§ 304; In re Alexander P.
(2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 475, 488.)
Mother contends the juvenile court had no authority to
assume jurisdiction over the children and modify the existing
custody order because (1) Father purportedly used the juvenile
court to circumvent the family court’s prior custody
determination, (2) the juvenile court found the children were not
at risk, and (3) a request concerning custody was pending in the
family court. Even if the juvenile court had jurisdiction, Mother
argues in the alternative that the termination of jurisdiction with
a modified custody order was against public policy.
“The question whether a court is authorized to perform a
certain act is a purely legal question” and therefore subject to de
novo review. (In re Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042,
1058.) A juvenile court’s termination of jurisdiction is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. (In re Leon E. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 222,
233.)
B. The juvenile court’s jurisdiction was
paramount
Mother first argues the family court is the proper forum to
resolve custody disputes. (See In re Alexandria M. (2007)
156 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1096 (Alexandria M.).) Instead of allowing
his custody request to be adjudicated by the family court in

23
connection with his request for a restraining order, Father
purportedly used the juvenile court for a tactical advantage.
Mother points to Father’s request for sole physical custody to the
family court in 2020 based on Mother’s substance abuse. Instead,
the family court ordered joint physical custody, finding alcohol
breathalyzer testing was sufficient to protect the children.
Mother argues Father, dissatisfied with the resolution in family
court, initiated the dependency proceeding by requesting an
emergency session with the children’s therapist, who was a
mandated reporter.
Mother relies heavily on In re John W. (1996)
41 Cal.App.4th 961, 977 (John W.), where the parents were going
through a “ ‘tense’ ” divorce. Due to the hostile divorce, the
parents stipulated to dependency jurisdiction based on a risk of
emotional damage under section 300, subdivision (c). (John W., at
p. 966.) There was never any finding of abuse. (Id. at p. 964.) The
appellate court determined the family court should have always
heard the case because the resources of social service agencies
are “stretched thin” and should be directed at “neglected and
genuinely abused children.” (Id. at p. 975.) “The juvenile courts
must not become a battleground by which family law war is
waged by other means.” (Ibid.) A “ ‘tense’ ” atmosphere resulting
from a divorce is “hardly enough” to warrant dependency
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (c). (John W., at
p. 977.)
“[T]he juvenile court must never, for illegitimate tactical
reasons” such as shopping for judges, “become a new front in a
family law war.” (In re D.B. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 613, 622
(D.B.).) However, where the child is truly neglected or abused,
dependency jurisdiction is paramount, even if a custody battle is
pending in family court. (In re Nicholas E. (2015)
236 Cal.App.4th 458, 466 (Nicholas E.).)
Family law and juvenile proceedings serve different
purposes. While both proceedings consider the best interest of the

24
child, the “family law court adjudicates the rights of private
parties vis-[á]-vis each other,” whereas the “juvenile court takes
into account the interest of the state as the guardian of persons
with legal disabilities.” (In re Benjamin D. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d
1464, 1469.) As parens patriae, the state is responsible for
evaluating the best interests of the child, even if that means the
child is not placed in the custody of either parent. (In re Roger S.
(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 25, 31.) By allowing juvenile courts to issue
custody orders under section 362.4, the Legislature determined
the juvenile court is the appropriate place for custody of
dependent children to be resolved with such resolution honored in
later family proceedings. (In re Roger S., at p. 31; see also § 302,
subd. (d) [§ 362.4 custody order cannot be changed by family
court absent a significant change of circumstances].) Where the
social services agency can show a basis for dependency
jurisdiction, concerns over juvenile courts adjudicating family law
disputes and limited resources “must give way to the primacy of
dependency court jurisdiction and its special role” as parens
patriae on behalf of the state. (Nicholas E., supra,
236 Cal.App.4th at p. 466.)
Here, notwithstanding a pending request for domestic
violence restraining order, and accompanying changes to the
custody arrangements filed in family court, DCFS proved with
substantial evidence J.N. and L.N. are at substantial risk of
serious physical harm. While Father’s relationship with Mother
may be described as tense, this does not necessarily mean that
dependency jurisdiction was unwarranted. Even assuming
arguendo Father somehow maneuvered his custody battle with
Mother to the juvenile court for “illegitimate tactical reasons”
(D.B., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 622), when a child qualifies as
a dependent under section 300, the juvenile court must assume
jurisdiction for the protection of the children, against both
parents if necessary.

25
This case is not like John W. The juvenile court there had
no ground for involvement because there was no finding of abuse
from the parents. (John W., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at pp. 964-965;
see also Alexandria M., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1097
[dependency jurisdiction should have been terminated because no
showing of risk to children].)
Dependency jurisdiction was proper.
C. The juvenile court’s custody orders were based
on a finding of risk of harm
Mother next argues the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to
issue custody orders because it struck the allegation Father failed
to protect the children from count b-3, thereby impliedly finding
the children were not at risk.
Mother relies on In re Phoenix B. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d
787 (Phoenix B.) in asserting juvenile courts cannot make custody
orders concerning children who are not at risk of harm. In that
case, the social services agency initially sought dependency
jurisdiction over the child after the mother was involuntarily
hospitalized. (Id. at pp. 789-790.) The agency later released the
child to the father after it determined he was able to care for the
child. (Id. at p. 790.) At the agency’s request, the juvenile court
dismissed the dependency petition. (Id. at pp. 790-791.) The
mother appealed from the dismissal, which was affirmed. (Id. at
p. 791.) Having determined the father could care for the child, the
agency was required under section 309 to release the child to the
father. (Phoenix B., at p. 792.)
Phoenix B. is inapposite because there, the juvenile court
did not assume jurisdiction over the child. (Phoenix B., supra, 218
Cal.App.3d at p. 792.) In contrast, as discussed at length above,
the juvenile court here assumed jurisdiction, which was
supported by substantial evidence of a substantial risk of serious
physical harm if the children were released to Mother. Even
though J.N. and L.N. were in Father’s custody at the time of the
hearing, Mother attempted to pick up the children on three

26
occasions without the children’s or Father’s consent. Mother was
acting on the family court’s statement that the May 2024
judgment granting joint legal custody were still in effect. Because
Mother posed a risk to the children and a dependency petition
had been filed, the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction over
custody issues, even though it obtained jurisdiction after the
family court. (§ 304; A.H. v. Superior Court (2013)
219 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1388 (A.H.); In re William T. (1985)
172 Cal.App.3d 790, 797.)
D. Terminating jurisdiction with modified custody
orders was statutorily authorized
Mother argues the juvenile court had no statutory
authority to terminate jurisdiction and place the children with a
custodial parent. Citing section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1) in its
minute orders, the juvenile court placed the children with
Father—a custodial parent—and terminated jurisdiction.
Section 361.2 allows a child to be removed from a custodial
parent and placed with a noncustodial parent, after which the
court may terminate jurisdiction. (§ 361.2, subds. (a), (b)(1).)
Mother contends section 361.2 only allows for placement with a
noncustodial parent, not a custodial parent such as Father.
However, the juvenile court has “broad authority to enter
orders to protect a dependent child and to reunite the family and
terminate jurisdiction as quickly as possible.” (In re Destiny D.
(2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 197, 207 (Destiny D.).) For example,
section 362, subdivision (a) permits the court to “make any and
all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct,
maintenance, and support of” dependent children. In addition,
section 245.5 allows the court to direct orders to parents it
“deems necessary and proper for the best interests of or for the
rehabilitation of the minor,” including orders concerning custody.
The broad authority granted to the juvenile court
“necessarily includes, in an appropriate circumstance, discretion
to terminate dependency jurisdiction when the child is in

27
parental custody and no protective issue remains.” (Destiny D.,
supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 207.) “It simply makes no sense to
conclude . . . that the Legislature intended [in section 361.2,
subdivision (b)(1)] to authorize the juvenile court to terminate its
jurisdiction at disposition after placement of a child with a
noncustodial parent when there is no longer a reason for court
supervision and not afford the juvenile court the same discretion
when the child has been released to a custodial parent and orders
made at disposition have fully resolved any issue of continuing
risk of harm.” (Id. at p. 209.)
Here, the dispositional orders resolved any continuing risk
of harm by removing the children from Mother’s custody and
ordering monitored visitation for her. Since Father obtained full
physical custody, the children feel more secure and comfortable.
These orders were authorized by the broad authority granted to
the juvenile court under sections 245.5 and 362, subdivision (a).
To the extent that section 361.2 only allows placement with a
noncustodial parent, as opposed to a custodial parent, the
citations to the incorrect statute in the minute orders were
harmless error. (In re Anthony Q. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 336, 339,
354 [despite citation to inapplicable statute, removal from
custody justified by different statute].) Absent a continuing risk
of harm, termination of jurisdiction was required. (Destiny D.,
supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 208.)
Mother argues Destiny D. was wrongly decided because
allowing the placement of children with custodial parents
purportedly goes against the public policy of ensuring juvenile
courts do not become forums for custody disputes. (John W.,
supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 975.) In addition, Mother believes she
was unfairly prejudiced by having “not only an embittered ex-
spouse, but a government adversary,” i.e., DCFS, “paid at public
expense.” (Ibid.)
We disagree. Section 304 “gives juvenile courts exclusive
jurisdiction over minors who are their dependents, and expressly

28
precludes family courts . . . from issuing orders regarding the
custody . . . of such minors. The obvious intent of this provision is
to eliminate the possibility that different courts claiming
jurisdiction over the minor could issue inconsistent orders
regarding the minor’s custody.” (A.H., supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1390.) The purpose of dependency law is to “ensure the safety,
protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children” at
risk of harm. (§ 300.2, subd. (a).) By enacting section 302,
subdivision (c), and section 304, the Legislature prioritized the
protection of children over custody disputes by allowing only
juvenile courts to determine custody issues.
The termination of jurisdiction was authorized by statute
and is consistent with the public policy of promoting the
protection of children.
III. Dispositional Orders Satisfy Substantial Evidence
and Abuse of Discretion Review
A. Applicable law and standard of review
Mother attacks the order removing the children from
Mother’s custody, the order requiring monitored visitation for
Mother, and the order awarding Father tie-breaking authority.
Section 361 governs removal of a child from a custodial
parent. “Before the court may order a child physically removed
from his or her parents, it must find, by clear and convincing
evidence, the child would be at substantial risk of harm if
returned home and there are no reasonable means by which the
child can be protected without removal.” (In re Hailey T. (2012)
212 Cal.App.4th 139, 145-146 (Hailey T.); see also § 361,
subds. (c)(1), (d).) By requiring clear and convincing evidence,
rather than preponderance of the evidence, the Legislature
recognized the parents’ constitutional rights to care for their
children and sought to keep children in their homes if they would
be safe. (Hailey T., at p. 146.) “Removal ‘is a last resort, to be
considered only when the child would be in danger if allowed to
reside with the parent.’ ” (Ibid.)

29
Section 362.4, subdivision (a) allows juvenile courts to enter
orders concerning custody and visitation. Such orders become
part of the family court file upon termination of jurisdiction. (Id.,
subd. (b).) The orders may not be modified by the family court
unless the family court finds “a significant change of
circumstances since the juvenile court issued the order” has
occurred and “modification of the order is in the best interests of
the child.” (§ 302, subd. (d).) The custody order must be in the
child’s best interests based on the totality of the circumstances.
(In re J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112 (J.M.).)
In arguing insufficient evidence in a dependency case, the
appellant bears the burden of “showing there is no evidence of a
sufficiently substantial nature to support the court’s findings or
orders.” (Hailey T., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 147, citing In re
L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) We review the removal
order for substantial evidence, keeping in mind the heightened
burden of proof. (Hailey T., at p. 146.) We review the custody and
visitation orders for abuse of discretion. (J.M., supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at p. 113.)
B. Removal order
Citing section 361, subdivision (e) and California Rules of
Court, rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i), Mother argues the removal order
was unsupported by substantial evidence.
Section 361, subdivision (e) requires the juvenile court to
state the facts supporting the removal order. During the
jurisdictional stage, the court stated it considered the DCFS
reports admitted into evidence and listened to the arguments of
counsel. During the dispositional stage, the court found removal
of the children from Mother was appropriate, holding that clear
and convincing evidence demonstrated the children were at
substantial risk of harm and no reasonable means except for
removal could ensure their safety. The court did not rely merely
on formulaic findings. During the adjudication hearing, the court
addressed the facts of this case by indicating Mother would have

30
to complete several programs “before [she] can even go to family
court,” including a drug and alcohol program with weekly testing.
By indicating Mother had to complete a drug and alcohol
program with weekly testing before she could seek a modification
to the custody order, the juvenile court clearly indicated, albeit
implicitly, Mother’s substance abuse justified the children’s
removal.
California Rules of Court, rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i) requires
DCFS to include in its report a “discussion of the reasonable
efforts made to prevent or eliminate removal . . . and a
recommended plan for reuniting the child with the family,
including a plan for visitation.” (Ibid.) The DCFS reports comply
with rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i). Upon filing of the petition, DCFS
proposed a detailed safety plan, which included a “safety person”
who could determine whether Mother was under the influence,
Mother refraining from alcohol in the presence of the children,
and unannounced visits by DCFS. Mother did not agree to the
plan, instead complaining that Father did not have any similar
measures restraining him.
While Mother indicated during the adjudication hearing
that she was agreeable to the proposed safety plan, this
acceptance was hollow. On January 29, 2025, less than a week
before the adjudication hearing, Mother denied having a
substance abuse problem, engaging in suicidal ideation, or ever
driving the children while under the influence. Moreover, Mother
had missed six of eight requested drug tests after the filing of the
petition, including the most recent test on January 24, 2025,
approximately 10 days before the adjudication hearing. Given
Mother’s denials and avoidance of drug testing, the record
contains substantial evidence, even under a clear and convincing
evidence standard, that no reasonable means short of removal
would protect the children.
Having asserted no other basis for reversal of the removal
order, Mother fails to meet her burden on appeal.

31
C. Custody and visitation orders
Mother argues the March 11, 2025 final custody order and
attached visitation order are flawed in two respects. First,
Mother contends the visitation order falsely implies she failed to
complete court-ordered programs. Second, Mother maintains the
award of tie-breaking authority to Father with respect to legal
custody has no reasonable basis.
Concerning the visitation order, the completed JV-206 form
states Mother was ordered to have supervised visitation because
she “has not completed . . . the following court-ordered programs,”
including a (1) “6-month drug/alcohol program, with weekly
testing, after care, 12-step program,” (2) “26 week parenting
program,” (3) “[i]ndividual counseling to address case issues,” and
(4) “[c]onjoint counseling with minors, when minors’ therapist
deems it appropriate.” Mother maintains the order implies she
has disobeyed court orders. We do not agree. When the court
ordered supervised visitation on March 11, 2025, Mother had not
completed the listed programs the court was then ordering. While
an appellate court may order modification of a written order to
conform to an oral ruling, it should do so based on the
circumstances of the case. (In re Maribel T. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th
82, 86.) Because the JV-206 form does not imply that Mother
disobeyed court orders, we decline to order modification of the
visitation order.
Concerning the custody order, the juvenile court awarded
joint legal custody to Mother and Father, with Father having tie-
breaking authority. Mother contends that no reasonable basis
supported this order. Mother points out DCFS recommended
shared legal custody with no mention of tie-breaking authority.
However, the court was not constrained by the recommendations
of DCFS. It had broad authority to fashion orders for the
protection of the children. (Destiny D., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at
p. 207; see also §§ 245.5, 362, subd. (a).) Here, because Mother
posed a substantial risk of physical harm to the children, denied

32
the allegations of substance abuse, and avoided drug testing, it
was eminently reasonable for the juvenile court to award tie-
breaking authority to the custodial parent in the event of any
disagreements between the parents concerning the care of the
children.
Moreover, Mother forfeited her challenges to the custody
and visitation orders by failing to object to the specific terms of
the restraining order in the juvenile court. In the juvenile court,
as to jurisdiction, Mother requested dismissal of the petition
based on insufficiency of the evidence. As to disposition, Mother
argued against removal of the children from her home, or
alternatively, for keeping the case open to allow for reunification
with the children or for mediation to allow the parents to work
out details for visitation. When the court indicated it would
award tie-breaking authority to Father, Mother did not argue
against it. Mother also never objected to the phrasing of the
visitation order in the completed JV-206 form.
“A reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge
to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in
the trial court.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.
superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re S.J.
(2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 962.) While we have discretion to
excuse forfeiture in cases presenting important legal issues
(ibid.), Mother presents no argument against forfeiture in her
reply brief. We decline to excuse Mother’s forfeiture. On both the
merits and on grounds of forfeiture, Mother’s attacks on the
custody and visitation orders fail.4

4 Having found no basis for reversal, we do not address
Mother’s request on remand for assignment to a different bench
officer.

33
DISPOSITION
The orders of February 4, 2025, and March 11, 2025, are
affirmed.

RICHARDSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

LUI, P. J.

GILBERT, J.*

• Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 34