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March 4, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Stortz CA1/1

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A171098

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (10.6K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/4/26 P. v. Stortz CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, A171098
v.
(San Francisco City & County
MICHAEL STORTZ, Super Ct. No. CRI23016291)
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Michael Stortz was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment after a jury
convicted him of kidnapping. (Pen. Code,2 § 207, subd. (a).) In this appeal,
he urges us to reverse that conviction, arguing the trial court erroneously
denied Stortz’s request to represent himself under Faretta v. California
(1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta). As we explain below, the trial court’s denial of
Stortz’s Faretta motion at the preliminary-hearing stage was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, and Stortz has forfeited any appellate claim with
respect to representing himself at trial. Accordingly, we will affirm.

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.) We provide a limited factual summary because our opinion is
unpublished and the parties know, or should know, “the facts of the case and
its procedural history.” (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.)
2 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Under Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 807, “a defendant in a state
criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he
voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.” Although the deprivation of that
right at trial “cannot be harmless” (McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168,
177, fn. 8), such a deprivation at the preliminary hearing “is subject to
harmless error analysis” pursuant to Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
18, 24, which held that no reversal is required for certain errors that are
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.3 (People v. Tena, supra,
156 Cal.App.4th at p. 615.)
Here, any error in the trial court’s denial of Stortz’s Faretta motion at
the preliminary-hearing stage was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Neither party explains how Stortz’s inability to represent himself at the
preliminary hearing contributed to the verdict, and we see no way it could
have done so. There were only two witnesses at the preliminary hearing:
Officer Grande, who authenticated video evidence, and investigating Officer
Lopez Martinez who relayed statements from the complaining witness. The
record simply belies any suggestion that Stortz could have cross-examined
these witnesses better than his professional counsel: When the trial court
earlier questioned Stortz about his Faretta motion, Stortz voiced his belief
that kidnapping was a misdemeanor, ignored the judge’s request not “to talk
about the facts” of the case, and otherwise spoke in a confusing,
nonresponsive, and sometimes self-contradictory manner. Defense counsel’s

3 We reject Stortz’s contention in his reply brief that the extension of

harmless-error analysis “to Faretta violations at the preliminary hearing
stage” was based on “flawed” reasoning. In People v. Tena (2007)
156 Cal.App.4th 598, 614, the Second District analogizes the right to self-
representation to the right to counsel, whose deprivation at the preliminary
hearing is also subject to harmless-error analysis under Coleman v. Alabama
(1970) 399 U.S. 1, 11.

2
performance, on the other hand, helped defeat a holding order for a violation
of section 209.
Nor is it reasonable to believe that Stortz would have called other
witnesses. At the hearing, Stortz acknowledged that while he remained in
custody, he “ha[d] no ability to go and get witnesses or evidence in order for
the trial.” In any event, the incident underlying the offense was witnessed
only by the victim, the perpetrator, and perhaps one other person who was
never identified.4 And at trial, the only defense witness was an expert on
eyewitness identifications, whose testimony might plausibly raise a
reasonable doubt at trial, but could not reasonably influence the preliminary-
hearing finding of probable cause, which was based in part on videotape
evidence depicting “distinctive features” of the perpetrator. For those
reasons, it is beyond any reasonable doubt that denying Stortz’s Faretta
motion at the preliminary-hearing stage did not affect the outcome.
Then there is the question of whether Stortz was deprived of his right
to represent himself at trial. As the Attorney General persuasively argues,
Stortz abandoned his Faretta motion and thereby forfeited this claim on
appeal. A “waiver of the right to self-representation may be presumed from
conduct.” (People v. Kenner (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 56, 61.) Here, when the
trial court first denied the Faretta motion, the court specifically told Stortz he
could “bring this motion again.” Stortz’s subsequent conduct—failing to
renew his motion and proceeding to trial with court-appointed counsel—
provides ample ground for a presumption of waiver of the right to self-
representation in his case. (Cf. People v. Weeks (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 882,

4 According to the victim’s trial testimony, an unknown person yelled

out from across the street when she was in the alley on the ground—but “it
was . . . dark shadowy.”

3
where the defendant waived that right by proceeding to trial with retained
counsel.5)
Finally, we are not persuaded by Stortz’s argument that we cannot
presume Stortz abandoned his Faretta motion because the trial court
“conditioned any later motion on appellant meeting a condition that is
constitutionally irrelevant under Faretta: acquiring enough ‘foundational
knowledge’ to represent himself.” This account omits crucial context. Even
after the trial court made its remark about foundational knowledge, Stortz
maintained that he was “completely ready” and “would like to go on . . . .”
Then the court replied in relevant part: “I would do your own research, talk
to the public defender, and you can bring this motion again.” Thus,
notwithstanding any error in the trial court’s remarks, the record shows that
even after those remarks, Stortz still believed himself to have the requisite
knowledge upon which the trial court allegedly “conditioned any later
motion.” Consequently, there is no reason to believe that those remarks
caused Stortz to undertake the course of conduct he did.
DISPOSITION

We affirm.

5 We disagree with Stortz that the court-appointed posture of his own

counsel sufficiently distinguishes his case from Weeks. Unlike Weeks, Stortz
was invited to renew his motion at a later date, a fact that balances any
weight we might ascribe to the fact that Weeks’s counsel was retained.

4

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SMILEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

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HUMES, P. J.

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BANKE, J.

People v. Stortz / (A171098)

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