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March 4, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Harlem v. Corben CA2/6

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B339187

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/4/26 Harlem v. Corben CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

DYLAN HARLEM et al., 2d Civ. No. B339187
(Super. Ct. No. 23CV01256)
Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Santa Barbara County)

v.

KENNETH CORBEN,

Defendant and Appellant.

Kenneth Corben appeals from the trial court’s denial of his
motion to set aside the default judgment entered against him and
in favor of Krisp Productions NY, LLC (Krisp). We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2023, Krisp and other individuals (collectively
Respondents) filed a lawsuit against Corben and others in Santa
Barbara County. The lawsuit alleged, among other things, that
Corben and other defendants1 breached their obligations and
intentionally made false misrepresentations related to a joint

1 The other defendants are not party to this appeal.
venture agreement to operate a commercial marijuana farm in
Santa Maria purportedly owned by Corben’s entity, Equal 7 LLC,
and split the profits. Respondents sought the return of their
investment and punitive damages after Corben allegedly failed to
share profits with them.
In March 2023, Respondents personally served Corben with
the lawsuit and a notice of punitive damages in the amount of
$1,000,000. Corben then communicated with Respondents’
counsel and agreed to produce financial records and participate
in settlement discussions in exchange for Respondents’
agreement to not request Corben’s default. Based on Corben’s
representations that no defendant lived in Santa Barbara
County, the parties stipulated to transfer the action to Los
Angeles County. But Respondents could not file the stipulation
because Corben had not appeared in the lawsuit or paid
appearance fees. Respondents’ counsel notified Corben the
stipulation could not be filed until he paid his appearance fee.
Corben did not respond and did not appear in the lawsuit.
Nor did Corben produce the financial documents by the
promised deadline. Respondents’ counsel sent Corben several
emails requesting the documents, with no response. Counsel
advised Corben that Respondents would seek his default if he
failed to respond. In June 2023, default was entered against
Corben.
Corben then agreed to participate in a June 2023
telephonic settlement conference with Respondents’ counsel. One
minute before the call was to begin, Corben emailed to state he
would not participate due to the default entered against him.
In December 2023, a default judgment in the amount of
$507,783.64 was entered against Corben and his related entities,

2
representing Respondents’ principal investment of $350,000,
$100,000 in punitive damages, and $57,783.64 in interest and
costs.
In February 2024, Corben moved in pro per to set aside the
default and default judgment. Corben argued the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action and personal
jurisdiction over Corben; the trial court had no power to grant the
relief awarded in the judgment; and the judgment was procured
by fraud. The trial court continued the hearing on Corben’s
motion two times to allow him to file supplemental briefing
before denying the motion.
DISCUSSION
Corben contends the trial court erred when it denied his
motion to set aside the default judgment. We disagree.
Corben moved to set aside the default judgment under
Code of Civil Procedure2 section 473, subdivision (d), which
“provides a trial court ‘may, on motion of either party after notice
to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.’ ”
(Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th
1009, 1020.) We review de novo whether a judgment is void, and
we review the trial court’s decision to set it aside (or not) for
abuse of discretion. (Kremerman v. White (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
358, 369.)
A judgment or order is void if the court “lack[s]
fundamental authority over the subject matter, question
presented, or party.” (In re Marriage of Goddard (2004) 33
Cal.4th 49, 56.) Additionally, a judgment is void where the court

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

3
“ ‘ “grant[s] relief the law declares shall not be granted.” ’ ”
(Grados v. Shiau (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1053.) As the
appellant, Corben bears the burden of showing both error and
prejudice to obtain reversal of the default judgment. (Jameson v.
Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.)
Here, the record is incomplete because it does not include
Corben’s supplemental briefing in support of his motion to set
aside. Corben, as the appellant, has the burden to produce an
adequate record. Where the record is incomplete, we must
presume the trial court’s rulings are supported by the missing
portions of the record, and we may not presume error on an
incomplete record. (Null v. City of Los Angeles (1988) 206
Cal.App.3d 1528, 1532.)
In his motion to set aside the default judgment, Corben
contended Respondents “commit[ted] fraud on the court” by
obtaining the judgment after entering into the stipulation to
transfer the lawsuit to Los Angeles County. Corben contended he
resided in Los Angeles County, had never resided in Santa
Barbara County, and that the parties’ agreement contained a
venue selection clause, providing that the agreement “shall be . . .
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal and state courts
located in the County of Los Angeles, [S]tate of California.”
Corben maintained that Respondents deceived him because they
stipulated to transfer the lawsuit to Los Angeles County, only to
later obtain a default and default judgment against him in Santa
Barbara County.
But the parties’ venue selection clause does not establish
that the default judgment is void. “[W]hen venue is proper in
more than one county, a plaintiff has the choice of where to file
the action from among the available options.” (Battaglia

4
Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 309,
313.) Here, Respondents chose to file the lawsuit in Santa
Barbara County presumably because the property that was the
subject of the parties’ agreement is in Santa Maria, within that
county. Respondents also attempted to file the stipulation to
transfer the case to Los Angeles County, but were unable to do so
because Corben had not paid his appearance fees. Respondents’
counsel informed Corben that Respondents would seek a default,
noting that Respondents would do so because Corben failed to
produce the promised financial documents and failed to respond
to counsel’s numerous emails.
Corben was properly served with the motion for a default
judgment but took no action until over two months after default
judgment was entered. On this record, the facts support that
Corben was aware at all times of what he needed to do to enforce
the venue selection clause and transfer the case to Los Angeles
County. Despite this, he did nothing. His inaction does not
render the default judgment void.
Corben nevertheless contends the trial court erred by
deciding his motion to set aside at all, because the case “belonged
in Los Angeles County” by virtue of the venue selection clause.
He also contends he appropriately attacked Respondents’
selection of an improper venue with his motion to set aside. But
venue is not jurisdictional. (Newman v. County of Sonoma (1961)
56 Cal.2d 625, 627.) Even if Santa Barbara County was an
“improper” venue, that court could render an enforceable
judgment. A “final judgment[] entered on such [a] complaint[] [is]
not void.” (Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d
94, 121–122 [noncompliance with venue provisions in former
§ 396a “does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the

5
subject matter of the litigation and does not render a judgment
erroneously entered ‘void’ for lack of jurisdiction”]; see also Price
v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1055 [“Venue or
territorial jurisdiction establishes the proper place for trial, but is
not an aspect of the fundamental subject matter jurisdiction of
the court and does not affect the power of a court to try a case”].)
Corben cannot establish that Santa Barbara County was an
improper venue. The parties’ joint venture agreement centered
around property located in that county. And to the extent Corben
desired the parties’ venue selection clause to be enforced, he could
have simply paid his appearance fees and moved for a change of
venue. He did not.
Corben also contends the trial court improperly included
punitive damages in the judgment without “clear and convincing
evidence,” and without evidence of Corben’s financial condition.
But Respondents provided notice that they sought $1,000,000 in
punitive damages at the time they served the complaint; Corben
failed to appear, and the trial court awarded them $100,000 in
the default judgment. (§§ 425.115, 585.) And because there is no
written ruling for us to evaluate, we cannot say that the trial
court erred in awarding punitive damages. Corben’s failure to
provide a record supporting his contentions compels us to resolve
the issue in Respondents’ favor. (Oliveira v. Kiesler (2012) 206
Cal.App.4th 1349, 1362.)
The trial court’s judgment is “ ‘presumed correct,’ ” and
Corben, as the appellant, has the burden of establishing
reversible error. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557,
564.) Because we conclude the default judgment was not void,
there is no miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [no
judgment shall be set aside unless the complained-of error results

6
in a “miscarriage of justice”].) Nor has Corben shown an abuse of
discretion warranting reversal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents to recover their
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

CODY, J.

7
Jed Beebe, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

Keiter Appellate Law and Mitchell Keiter for Defendant
and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiffs and Respondents.