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March 4, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Baltimore, M., Jr.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 445 MDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Ford Elliott

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by [Kate Ford Elliott](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8229/kate-ford-elliott/)

J-S45034-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MICHAEL BALTIMORE JR. :
:
Appellant : No. 445 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 19, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-21-CR-0003351-2019

BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED: MARCH 4, 2026

Appellant, Michael Baltimore Jr., appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County following the

revocation of probation for his conviction of theft by receiving stolen property.1

He challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentencing on appeal. After

careful review we affirm.

On August 10, 2020, Appellant pled nolo contendere to one count of

theft by receiving stolen property, which was a firearm. See Order (nolo

contendere plea), 8/10/20, at 1. On September 22, 2020, the court ordered

Appellant to serve a sentence of sixty months’ probation. See Order

(sentencing), 9/22/20, at 1. Appellant’s original sentence was a substantial

---

• Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a).
J-S45034-25

departure below the mitigated range recommended by the Pennsylvania

Sentencing Guidelines: 40 to 52 months of state imprisonment, plus or minus

nine months for aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 2 Additionally, the

court ordered that supervision would end, should Appellant serve eighteen

consecutive months without “getting into trouble” following his release from

prison. Id.

On December 27, 2021, Appellant’s probation officer filed a petition for

revocation of probation and issuance of a bench warrant, alleging that

Appellant violated his probation. See Petition for Revocation of Probation,

12/27/21, at 1. The petition stated that Appellant failed to remain free of

arrest and report any police contacts to his probation officer. See id.

Specifically, on May 24, 2021, Appellant was charged in Cumberland County

with criminal homicide, aggravated assault, persons not to possess, use

manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms, and recklessly endangering

another person. See id. The court issued a bench warrant on December 27,

1. See Bench Warrant, 12/27/21, at 1.

Appellant was a fugitive until January 13, 2023, when he was arrested

on local charges in Broward County, Florida. See Amended Petition for

---

2 See Guideline Sentencing Form, 9/22/20, at 1 (noting Appellant’s prior
record score is a repeat felony offender (REFL) and offense gravity score of
eight for theft by receiving stolen property); see also 204 Pa. Code § 303.15
(a)(4) (7th ed., amend. 4) (comprehensive offense list setting forth the offense
gravity score of 8 for theft by receiving stolen property (firearm/receiver not
in business) under Section 3925(a)); 204 Pa. Code § 303.16 (a) (7th ed.,
amend. 4) (applicable basic sentencing matrix).

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J-S45034-25

Revocation of Probation, 7/6/23, at 1. On July 6, 2023, Appellant’s probation

officer filed an amended petition for revocation of probation and requested a

probation violation hearing. See id. The amended petition alleged that

Appellant committed the following violations of his probation: (1) on January

7, 2021, Appellant was charged in Cumberland County with aggravated

assault, strangulation, fleeing or attempting to elude an officer, terroristic

threats, simple assault, and harassment; (2) the May 24, 2021 charges

mentioned above; (3) Appellant’s failure to notify his probation officer of his

changed address; and (4) Appellant’s arrest for local charges in Broward

County, Florida. See id.

On September 19, 2023, Appellant appeared for a revocation hearing.

Appellant admitted to all four violations alleged in the petition. See Revocation

Hearing, 9/19/23, at 2. The sentencing court accepted Appellant’s admission

and noted that it possessed an updated pre-sentence investigation (PSI)

report. See id. at 2-3. That same day, Appellant’s probation was revoked and

he was sentenced to four to ten years in a state correctional institution. See

id. at 3; Order (revocation of probation), 9/19/23; Order (re-sentencing),

9/19/23.3 The court further granted the defense request that Appellant remain

---

3 Appellant was resentenced within the standard range recommended by the

Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines: 40 to 52 months of imprisonment, plus
or minus nine months for aggravating or mitigating circumstances. See
Guideline Revocation/Resentence Form, 9/19/23, at 1 (noting Appellant’s
prior record score is a repeat felony offender (REFL) and offense gravity score
of eight for theft by receiving stolen property); see also 204 Pa. Code §
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

-3-
J-S45034-25

in Cumberland County jail instead of being incarcerated in a state prison, due

to Appellant’s pending homicide trial. See id. at 2-3.

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion asking the sentencing

court to reconsider his sentence, which the court denied. See Post-Sentence

Motion, 9/29/23; Order (denying post-sentence motion), 10/3/23. On

Monday, November 4, 2024, Appellant filed a timely, counseled post-

conviction relief act4 petition stating that he “wished” for counsel to file a direct

appeal, but that counsel determined it would be meritless and declined to file

the appeal. See PCRA Petition, 11/4/24. Thereafter, Appellant was granted

leave to proceed in forma pauperis and, following the grant of Appellant’s

PCRA petition and reinstatement of his appeal rights, this appeal followed.

See Order, 3/5/25, at 1 (reinstating Appellant’s appeal rights nunc pro tunc).

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and he and the sentencing court

complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. See Notice of

Appeal, 4/2/25; 1925(b) Statement Order, 4/4/25; 1925(b) Statement,

4/8/25; Sentencing Court Opinion, 6/24/25.

---

303.15 (a)(4) (7th ed., amend. 4) (comprehensive offense list setting forth the
offense gravity score of 8 for theft by receiving property (firearm/receiver not
in business) under Section 3925(a)); 204 Pa. Code § 303.16 (a) (7th ed.,
amend. 4) (applicable basic sentencing matrix). The Resentencing Guidelines
did not apply to Appellant’s revocation of probation because he committed the
stolen property offense before January 1, 2024. See 204 Pa. Code § 307 (b)(2)
(stating resentencing guidelines apply to revocation of probation for “all
offenses committed on or after January 1, 2024[.]”).

4 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542.

-4-
J-S45034-25

Appellant raises one question for our review: “Whether the [sentencing]

court abused its discretion by imposing a revocation sentence of four [] to ten

[] years in a state correctional institution was unduly harsh and excessive for

a first-time revocation?” Appellant’s Brief at 8.

We acknowledge that “in an appeal from a sentence imposed after the

court has revoked probation, we can review the validity of the revocation

proceedings, the legality of the sentence imposed following revocation, and

any challenges to the discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed.”

Commonwealth v. Slaughter, 339 A.3d 456, 464 (Pa. Super. 2025)

(citation omitted). “Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do

not entitle an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Lawrence,

313 A.3d 265, 284 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation and brackets omitted).

Since Appellant is challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence,

he must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has
a fatal defect, [see] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is
a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Harper, 273 A.3d 1089, 1096 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citing

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation

and brackets omitted)). “Only if the appeal satisfies these requirements may

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J-S45034-25

we [review] the substantive merits of Appellant’s claim.” Commonwealth v.

Luketic, 162 A.3d 1149, 1159-60 (Pa. Super. 2017).

Here, Appellant met the first three requirements. See Harper, 273 A.3d

at 1096. He filed a timely appeal to this Court, preserved the issue for our

review in his post-sentence motion, and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in

his brief. See Appellant’s Brief at 9. Therefore, we must decide whether

Appellant has raised a substantial question for our review.

“The determination of whether a particular case raises a substantial

question is to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v.

Neafie, 341 A.3d 813, 818 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation omitted). This Court

will not look beyond the statement of questions involved and the prefatory

Rule 2119(f) statement to determine whether a substantial question exists.

See Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 468 (Pa. Super. 2018). A

substantial question exists “only when the appellant advances a colorable

argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent

with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the

fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth

v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 768 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc).

Appellant states he has presented a substantial question because the

sentencing court “[i]mposed a sentence near the top of the standard range,

following only a first petition alleging violations of probation was excessive

and harsh, particularly in the context of the other unproven allegations

pending against him.” Appellant’s Brief at 9.

-6-
J-S45034-25

After our review, we find that Appellant has articulated a specific basis

on which his sentence might be viewed as contrary to a fundamental

sentencing norm and therefore has presented a substantial question for our

review.5

Our standard of review challenging discretionary aspects of sentencing

is well-settled:

The imposition of sentence following the revocation of probation
is vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, which
absent an abuse of discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal. An
abuse of discretion is more than an error in judgment – a
sentencing court has not abused its discretion unless the record
discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly
unreasonable or the result of partiality prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Starr, 234 A.3d 755, 760-61 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation

omitted).

Relevant here, Section 9721(b) provides that the “sentence imposed

should call for total confinement that is consistent with…the protection of the

public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the

victim and the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42

Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). “Our Supreme Court has determined that where the trial

---

5 We note that Appellant’s statement was close to boilerplate, which would
have been inadequate to “articulate any actual reason for […] seeking to
appeal the discretionary aspects of sentence.” Neafie, 341 A.3d at 818.
However, unlike the statement reviewed in Neafie, Appellant’s statement
specifies “where his sentence falls in relation to the sentencing guidelines” and
identifies an alleged sentencing norm, first-time revocation, that may have
been violated. See id. Accordingly, we have decided to review the merits of
Appellant’s argument.

-7-
J-S45034-25

court is informed by a pre-sentence report, it is presumed that the court is

aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, and that where

the court has been so informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.”

Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing

Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18–19 (Pa. 1988)). Regarding

revocation of probation proceedings:

The court shall not impose a sentence of total confinement upon
revocation unless it finds that: (1) the defendant has been
convicted of another crime; or (2) the conduct of the defendant
indicates that it is likely that he will commit another crime if he is
not imprisoned; or (3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate
the authority of the court.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(c) (formatting altered) (version effective at time of

Appellant’s revocation sentence; newest version became effective October 20,

2025).

Following a revocation of probation and resentencing of an offender, the

court must disclose on the record at the time of sentencing a statement of

reasons for the sentence imposed. See Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d

1033, 1044 (Pa. Super. 2014); Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(D)(2) (indicating that during

sentence following revocation of probation, “[t]he judge shall state on the

record the reasons for the sentence imposed.”). “[A] sentencing court need

not undertake a lengthy discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence or

specifically reference the statutes in question.” Commonwealth v. Pasture,

107 A.3d 21, 28 (Pa. 2014). Moreover a “court does not necessarily abuse its

discretion in imposing a seemingly harsher post-revocation sentence where

-8-
J-S45034-25

the defendant received a lenient sentence and then failed to adhere to the

conditions imposed on him.” Id.

Appellant argues that the revocation court abused its sentencing

discretion by imposing a term of incarceration “near [the] top of the standard

range” of the Sentencing Guidelines. Appellant’s Brief at 11. Nevertheless,

Appellant concedes that “it was reasonable for the court to impose a sentence

of some incarceration as a result of his admitted violations.” Id. at 16. He thus

limits his argument to a complaint that it was manifestly unreasonable to

impose a standard range of incarceration but provides no argument in support

of that claim. See id. Appellant also contends that the sentencing court

abused its discretion by failing to meaningfully consider the required

sentencing factors, by substantially relying on pending charges, and by

allowing partiality or bias to influence its sentencing determination. See id.

Appellant asserts that the sentencing court’s explanation for his

sentence “was insufficient to support consideration of his rehabilitative needs”

and other mandatory sentencing factors. Appellant’s Brief at 15 (citing 42

Pa.C.S. § 9271(b)). Further, Appellant concedes that a court may consider the

seriousness of pending charges. See id. at 17. However, Appellant alleges

that the revocation court was biased because it knew too much about him,

and as a result may have imposed a harsher sentence. See id.

Specifically, during resentencing, the court exceeded what is permissible

by taking significant offense to defense counsel’s tardiness, characterizing

Appellant’s homicide case as “uncomplicated,” indicating it would preside over

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J-S45034-25

that matter, and expressing impatience regarding perceived delay in bringing

that case to trial. See Appellant’s Brief at 11-14, 17 (citing N.T. Revocation

Hearing, 9/19/23, at 3-5).6 Also, Appellant argues that the court’s knowledge

of his extensive post-probation criminal record allowed it to overemphasize

the new pending charges. See id. at 17. He explains that his aggravated

assault charge was later vacated due to prosecutorial misconduct and that the

homicide charge had not proceeded to trial as of the filing of his appellate

brief. See id. He relies on appellate decisions expressing a preference for

deferring revocation hearings where new charges remain unresolved, to

“avoid the possibly unjust result of revoking probation only to find later that

the probationer has been acquitted of the charges that prompted the

revocation hearing.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Banks, 198 A.3d 391 (Pa.

Super. 2018); Commonwealth v. Infante, 888 A.2d 783 (Pa. 2005),

abrogated on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Foster, 214 A.3d 1240 (Pa.

Super. 2019)).

---

6 We note that in July 2024, the court later recused itself from presiding over

Appellant’s homicide case. See Commonwealth v. Baltimore, No. 1095
MDA 2024, unpublished memorandum at 2, 5-6 (Pa. Super., filed July 3, 2025)
(Commonwealth’s appeal of the denial of its motion for recusal dismissed as
moot because the trial court sua sponte issued an order for reassignment).
Although Appellant mentions the court’s subsequent recusal from his homicide
trial in his brief, we do not find that this occurrence would have caused bias
or ill-will during Appellant’s September 2023 resentencing because the record
demonstrates that during the revocation hearing, Appellant had not yet been
arraigned on the homicide charge. See N.T. Revocation Hearing, 9/19/23, at
3.

• 10 - J-S45034-25

Appellant argues that overall, the record reflects the sentencing court’s

bias, partiality, or ill will towards him. See Appellant’s Brief at 18. He argues

that the court’s “intimate familiarity” with him and its repeated references to

his pending homicide charge suggest that the sentence imposed was

influenced by the court’s “jaded” view of him rather than limited to his

admitted probation violations. See id. Finally, Appellant maintains that his

sentence was disproportionate to the probation violations he admitted he

committed. See id. He contends that his Florida conviction “occurred more

than two and half years after his original sentencing.” Id.7 Accordingly,

Appellant requests that this Court conclude his sentence was manifestly

unreasonable, vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing. See id.

Our review of the record demonstrates that Appellant overstates what

occurred at the revocation hearing. See Appellant’s Brief at 12, 16-17. The

sentencing court spoke to defense counsel about tardiness only after

resentencing Appellant. See N.T. Revocation Hearing, 9/19/23, at 5. We do

not infer from the court’s fair warning about counsel’s significant tardiness

that it caused any prejudice to Appellant. See id. Further, the sentencing

court only mentioned Appellant’s homicide case during resentencing because

of defense counsel’s request to keep Appellant incarcerated at the Cumberland

---

7 Appellant fails to mention that for those two years, he was a fugitive from

his probation officer and obtained criminal charges in three separate new
matters. See Sentencing Court Opinion, 6/24/25, at 4. Accordingly, we find
Appellant’s contention that he was a poor candidate for incarceration because
he did not commit a crime for two years to be meritless.

• 11 - J-S45034-25

County jail rather than at a state correctional institution while the homicide

case remained pending. See id. at 4. We do not find this to be unfairly

prejudicial to Appellant – the court was merely actively considering defense

counsel’s request. Accordingly, Appellant’s argument that the court exerted

bias or ill-will during the revocation hearing is meritless.

Moreover, Appellant’s reliance on Banks and Infante is misplaced.

Neither cited decision supports Appellant’s contention that the sentencing

court abused its discretion by proceeding with revocation and resentencing

while new charges remained. See Appellant’s Brief at 17. To the contrary, in

Banks, our Court rejected the argument that it was impermissible for the

court to consider the defendant’s arrest charges that were nolle prossed

during his revocation hearing. See Banks, 198 A.3d at 403. Likewise, the

Court in Infante merely recognized that a court may postpone a revocation

hearing pending adjudication of new charges; it does not impose a new

requirement to defer or suggest that holding a revocation proceeding

constitutes a reversible error. See Infante, 888 A.3d at 793. Also, we have

explained that although it may be more prudent to defer a revocation hearing

until after the resolution of a probationer’s new charges, it is not required.

See Commonwealth v. Parson, 259 A.3d 1012, 1021 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(citing Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 247 A.3d 1002, 1007 (Pa. 2021)). A

revocation court has “the authority to proceed with [a defendant’s] violation

hearing once the alleged probation violations were reported by the Probation

• 12 - J-S45034-25

Department, regardless of the status of [the defendant’s] new case or the

Commonwealth’s position” on the proceeding. Parson, 259 A.3d at 1021.

Finally, after our review, we conclude that Appellant’s boilerplate

assertion that the sentencing court did not consider his rehabilitative needs

and other sentencing factors “enough” is meritless. The sentencing court

resentenced Appellant to a standard range sentence after he admitted to four

probation violations. See N.T. Revocation Hearing, 9/19/23, at 2-4. Appellant

gave no explanations for his actions and proceeded right to sentencing. See

id. at 2. The court briefly noted that it was imposing a sentence in the standard

range because anything else would depreciate the seriousness of the offense.

See id. at 4; Pasture, 107 A.3d at 28 (stating court’s resentencing statement

of reasons does not require lengthy discourse). Therefore, the sentencing

court followed the procedures for revocation of probation, acknowledged the

sentencing guidelines, and imposed a standard range term. See Revocation

Hearing, 9/19/23, at 2-3; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(c) (version effective at that

time) & 9271(b).

Moreover, the court had the benefit of an updated PSI as well as the

first PSI used for the original sentencing. See Sentencing Court Opinion,

6/24/25, at 5; Ventura, 975 A.3d at 1135. Accordingly, we find that the

sentencing court did not abuse its discretion. See Devers, 546 A.2d at 18

(“Having been fully informed by the pre-sentence report, the sentencing

court’s discretion should not be disturbed[.]”). Appellant’s sole issue on appeal

is meritless.

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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/4/2026

• 14 -