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March 4, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

April Bradley v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Child

Court of Appeals of Arkansas

• Citations: 2026 Ark. App. 154

• Docket Number: Unknown

• Opinion

• Authorities (17)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (4.7K)

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Combined Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 154
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-25-98

Opinion Delivered March 4, 2026

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
APRIL BRADLEY
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, EIGHTH
APPELLANT
DIVISION
[NO. 60JV-24-259]
V.
HONORABLE TJUANA BYRD
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF MANNING, JUDGE
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR
CHILD AFFIRMED; MOTION TO
APPELLEES WITHDRAW GRANTED

CINDY GRACE THYER, Judge

April Bradley appeals a Pulaski County Circuit Court order terminating her parental

rights to her three-year-old son, MC.1 Bradley’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw

representation and a no-merit brief pursuant to Linker-Flores v. Arkansas Department of Human

Services, 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2003), and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9

(2025), stating that there are no meritorious grounds to support an appeal. The clerk of this

court made four unsuccessful attempts to mail to Bradley a certified copy of counsel’s brief

and motion to be relieved, informing her that she has the right to file pro se points for

reversal under Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(i)(3). The packet was ultimately returned

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The father’s parental rights have not been terminated and thus, he is not a party to
this appeal.
to the clerk’s office as undeliverable, and Bradley has not filed any pro se points. We have

reviewed the record, and because we agree there are no issues of arguable merit presented,

we affirm and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On February 20, 2024, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (“Department”)

received a safety request from an investigator with the Crimes Against Children Division of

the Arkansas State Police after MC was treated in the emergency room for a laceration and

a fractured nose. Bradley could not adequately explain MC’s injuries but suggested they

could have occurred when the child headbutted something or while she was holding the

child during a physical altercation with her boyfriend, Steven Underwood.

After the discussion with Bradley regarding the incident, the Department

implemented a safety plan whereby Bradley and MC would stay with the paternal

grandmother, Sandy Reed, so that Bradley would not be in contact with Underwood.

However, when the Department visited Reed’s home, it was dirty and not environmentally

appropriate for MC. As a result, a local pastor temporarily procured a hotel room for Bradley

and MC and agreed to act as her support system. The Department further advised Bradley

that she needed to obtain a protective order against Underwood.

At a team decision-making meeting, Bradley agreed to stay at a shelter with MC and

obtain employment. She further agreed to allow MC to stay with her pastor until she

removed her belongings from her home and obtained the protective order against

Underwood. She was given three days to get her affairs in order, but she requested more

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time. The Department repeatedly texted and called Bradley over the next eight days, but she

did not respond. MC remained with the church pastor that entire time.

The Department ultimately removed MC from the home on March 6 because Bradley

had refused to go to the shelter, had failed to obtain a protective order against Underwood,

and had made no progress on making the home safe and livable. Bradley stipulated to

probable cause for the removal at the probable-cause hearing on March 14, and a probable-

cause order was entered on March 21.

After an adjudication hearing on April 25, the court adjudicated MC dependent-

neglected due to failure to protect, unexplained injury, environmental neglect, and parental

unfitness, as well as Bradley’s unwillingness or inability to provide a safe and stable home,

thereby placing MC at risk of harm. The goal of the case was determined to be reunification

with a fit parent and a concurrent goal of adoption.

A review hearing was held on August 6. The court found that Bradley was only in

partial compliance with the case plan. The court had previously ordered Bradley to have safe,

stable housing; submit to a hair-follicle drug test; and attend parenting classes and mental-

health counseling. Although there was evidence that the appropriate referrals had been made

and Bradley testified that she had submitted to a drug test and had started counseling, there

was no documentation that Bradley had availed herself of those services. The court had also

ordered Bradley to obtain an order of protection against Underwood, but Bradley had not

complied with the court’s instructions. The goal of the case remained reunification.

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That same day, the Department and the attorney ad litem (“AAL”) filed a joint

petition for termination of parental rights, claiming that it was in MC’s best interest that

Bradley’s parental rights be terminated. As grounds for termination, the petition alleged as

to Bradley (1) aggravated circumstances—little likelihood of successful reunification; (2) prior

involuntary termination of a sibling of the juvenile; (3) that the child had been abandoned;

and (4) subsequent other factors. This petition also sought termination of the parental rights

of MC’s legal father, Paul Bradley.

On September 19, a hearing was held on several pending motions. At that hearing,

the court found Justin McGinty to be MC’s legal and biological father and, accordingly,

dismissed Paul Bradley from the case. The court then granted the Department’s voluntarily

dismissal of itself as a joint petitioner in the pending petition for termination of parental

rights, granted the AAL’s motion for continuance, and ordered that the Department vet

McGinity before any potential placement.

On September 24, the AAL filed a separate petition for termination of parental rights

as to Bradley alone. The petition once again alleged that termination of parental rights was

in MC’s best interest and listed subsequent other factors, aggravated circumstances, and

prior involuntary termination of parental rights as grounds for termination.

At the October 24 termination hearing, adoption specialist Kienda McFadden

testified that she ran a data match using MC’s characteristics and that the search returned

333 potential adoptive resources, indicating that MC was likely to be adopted. Sandra

Mathis, Bradley’s landlord, testified that Bradley owed $9,450 in back rent; the utilities were

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off; Bradley had not maintained the property; and the home was currently uninhabitable.

She stated that she had not evicted Bradley because she felt sorry for her.

Bradley also testified at the hearing. She admitted that the house she was renting was

unlivable; that she owed back rent (although not as much as Mathis claimed); that she had

pending criminal charges against her in Pulaski County for which she expected to receive

probation; that she had active arrest warrants from Indiana; that she had not started

domestic-violence classes; and that she had not progressed beyond supervised visits with MC.

She claimed that she was currently employed; that she had submitted to a drug test; and that

she had obtained a protective order against Underwood. However, she did not or could not

provide any documentation that she had obtained a protective order, nor did she present

any documentation that she had attended any parenting classes or counseling sessions.

As for her relationship with Underwood, Bradley initially claimed she had not spent

any time with him after she alleged that he may have injured MC in March. However, the

Department introduced a phone call from Bradley to an unnamed male caller in April

initiated while she was incarcerated. In that call, it was clear that Bradley and the unnamed

caller were in an intimate and romantic relationship. Although this phone call occurred

shortly after MC’s removal, Bradley denied she was in a romantic relationship with

Underwood at the time of the call. She later admitted that she had had to call the police on

Underwood several times since MC’s removal but claimed she had not seen Underwood

since June. When questioned about calls to the police regarding Underwood in June and

July, she claimed she could not remember making the calls.

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Bradley was also questioned about four other recorded inmate calls in September

1. In one, Bradley informed an unnamed male caller that she had been having weird

dreams. When the unnamed caller indicated that it was probably because she was “coming

down off dope,” Bradley stated, “I know. I’ve been sleeping non-stop.” Even though the

recording of this admission was played at the hearing, Bradley denied having “funny dreams”

or being on drugs. In another call, Bradley was heard telling an unnamed male caller that

McGinty was going to let her have MC back if she got a house and got her “head out of [her]

ass.” In the third call, Bradley informed the caller that she wanted to quit doing dope when

she was released; however, at the hearing, Bradley denied telling anyone that. In a fourth

call, Bradley giggled and told the caller that she was high on speed. The caller stated he

thought Bradley had wanted to quit, and Bradley responded that she still intended to quit.

The caller then admonished her that she should not be getting high in jail.

In each of the four calls, Bradley told the unnamed male caller that she loved him.

Bradley claimed to be in a relationship with Travis Hall in September when those calls were

made but denied they were in a relationship in April when the first phone call was recorded.

Finally, in a fifth phone call, Bradley told the caller that she did not want to take her

seizure medication because she was afraid it would make her gain weight. She acknowledged

at the hearing, however, that it was important to stay on her seizure medication if she was

going to be in charge of a young child.

Despite the foregoing, Bradley claimed that she was drug-free; she could obtain stable

and suitable housing quickly; and her pending charges would not prevent her from taking

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custody of MC. She stated that she had bonded with MC and that with additional time, she

believed she could successfully bring MC home.

Sergeant Jessica Ezell with the Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility was in

charge of maintaining jail call logs, and she authenticated the recorded phone calls made by

Bradley while incarcerated.

Mahogany Smith, the caseworker, testified that the Department had made all the

required referrals, but Bradley had not cooperated and that her emails and texts to Bradley

would go unanswered. Smith testified that, as of the date of the hearing, Bradley had not

provided her with proof of income or of safe and stable housing (or potential housing); the

home Bradley currently rented was without utilities and appeared abandoned; and she was

unsure where Bradley was currently residing. She also did not have any evidence that Bradley

had complied with obtaining the court-ordered hair-follicle test and testified that Bradley

appeared to have unresolved drug issues. Smith also expressed concern about Bradley’s

romantic relationships and the fact she had not provided any evidence of taking any legal

precautions to protect MC from domestic abuse. Because Bradley had not engaged with the

services that had been ordered and had not demonstrated any improvements on her own,

Smith did not believe that adding more services or providing her with more time would

result in a successful reunification.

The last witness was Justin McGinty. He testified that it was “probably” in MC’s best

interest that Bradley’s parental rights be terminated. He stated that he believes Bradley wants

to be a good mother but noted that she had been unable to achieve reunification with any

7
of her other children. He testified that he believed drugs would be her downfall every time.

He also testified that Bradley’s testimony had not been entirely truthful at the hearing that

day; that he believed the person in the first recorded phone call was Underwood; that Bradley

had told him that Underwood accidentally hit MC during the altercation with Bradley; and

that Bradley could also be explosive and violent at times.

After hearing all the evidence, the circuit court entered an order terminating Bradley’s

parental rights. The court found that the AAL had proved by clear and convincing evidence

all the grounds for termination alleged in the petition and that termination was in MC’s best

interest. Specifically, if MC returned to Bradley, he “would be at potential risk of drug

exposure, housing instability, neglect due to exposure to other unvetted partners as she

admits to being involved with yet another man that [the Department] is not aware of and

not vetted.” The court further found credible McGinty’s testimony regarding Bradley’s toxic

and violent behavior toward him.

Bradley timely appealed the court’s order, and counsel has filed a no-merit brief and

motion to withdraw.

II. Discussion

In dependency-neglect cases, if, after studying the record and researching the law,

appellant’s counsel determines that the appellant has no meritorious basis for appeal, then

counsel may file a no-merit petition and move to withdraw. The petition must include an

argument section that lists all adverse rulings that the parent received at the circuit court

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level and explain why each adverse ruling is not a meritorious ground for reversal. Ark. Sup.

Ct. R. 6-9(j)(1)(A).

Counsel, here, addresses four clearly adverse rulings—the termination decision and

rulings on three hearsay objections—and three other objections for which there was either

no ruling or the need for the ruling was later obviated. Each will be discussed in turn.

A. Termination

A circuit court’s order terminating parental rights must be based on findings proved

by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341 (b)(3) (Supp 2023). Clear and

convincing evidence is defined as that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a

firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Posey v. Ark. Dep’t of Health &

Human Servs., 370 Ark. 500, 262 S.W.3d 159 (2007). On appeal, the appellate court reviews

termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo but will not reverse the circuit court’s ruling

unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although

there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In determining whether a

finding is clearly erroneous, an appellate court gives due deference to the opportunity of the

circuit court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.

In order to terminate parental rights, a circuit court must find by clear and convincing

evidence that termination is in the best interest of the juvenile, taking into consideration (1)

the likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted if the termination petition is granted; and

(2) the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child,

9
caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27 -

341(b)(3)(A)(i) & (ii). The order terminating parental rights must also be based on a showing

of clear and convincing evidence as to one or more of the grounds for termination listed in

section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B). However, only one ground must be proved to support termination.

Reid v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2011 Ark. 187, 380 S.W.3d 918.

Although the circuit court here found multiple statutory grounds for termination,

only one ground is necessary to support the termination. See Brown v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 303, 521 S.W.3d 183. One of the statutory grounds found by the

circuit court in the instant case was that, under Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-

341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(4)(A), Bradley had previously had her parental rights involuntarily

terminated as to another child.

At the termination hearing, the Department introduced two prior termination

orders—an October 2019 order from Indiana that terminated Bradley’s parental rights to two

children and an October 2022 order from Arkansas terminating her parental rights to a third

child. Because this statutory ground was conclusively proved at the termination hearing,

there can be no meritorious challenge to the statutory-ground element of the termination

statute.

In addition to finding the existence of at least one statutory ground to support the

termination of parental rights, a court must also find that such termination is in the child’s

best interest, taking into consideration two statutory factors: (1) the likelihood of adoption

if parental rights are terminated and (2) the potential harm caused by continuing contact

10
with the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341 (b)(3)(A). Here, the court considered both

statutory factors in light of the overall evidence, finding that termination was in MC’s best

interest. Counsel contends that there are no issues of arguable merit for reversal in

challenging this best-interest finding. We agree.

Regarding adoptability, the Department’s adoption specialist testified that she ran a

data match with MC’s characteristics, that there were 333 potential adoptive resources and

that MC was likely to be adopted. This court has long held that the testimony of a caseworker

or an adoption specialist that a child is adoptable is sufficient to support an adoptability

finding. Gonzales v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2025 Ark. App. 496, 725 S.W.3d 778; Coston v.

Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 413, 698 S.W.3d 647; Strickland v. Ark. Dep’t of

Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 608, 567 S.W.3d 870. Thus, there was sufficient evidence that

the circuit court had considered the likelihood of adoptability in accordance with Arkansas

Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(A) in finding that MC is adoptable. Accordingly,

there is no meritorious challenge to this finding.

Regarding potential harm, the circuit court is not required to find that actual harm

would result or to affirmatively identify a potential harm. Ross v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,

2017 Ark. App. 503, 529 S.W.3d 692. Potential harm must be viewed in broad terms, and

“potential” necessarily means that the court is required to look to future possibilities. Id.

Here, the court found that MC would be at potential risk of future instability,

substance exposure, and exposure to domestic violence if returned to Bradley. Here, the

Department presented evidence of Bradley’s housing instability as shown by the evidence

11
that her house lacks working utilities and is currently uninhabitable; her continued drug

usage, even while incarcerated; her failure to complete her domestic-violence classes despite

having been in a physically abusive relationship; and her failure to comply with practically

all the court’s orders other than visitation. This is in addition to all the services she was

provided in the other prior cases that also resulted in termination. This court has frequently

held that continued drug use, domestic violence, and instability demonstrate potential harm

sufficient to support a best-interest finding in a parental-rights-termination case. See, e.g.,

Beaird v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 415, 585 S.W.3d 172; Murphy v. Ark. Dep’t

of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 426, 560 S.W.3d 465; Robinson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,

2017 Ark. App. 262, 520 S.W.3d 322; Rossie-Fonner v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2012 Ark.

App. 29, 388 S.W.3d 38.

B. Other Adverse Rulings

Finally, counsel notes that, in addition to the termination decision, she has reviewed

the record for all rulings adverse to Bradley made by the circuit court on all objections,

motions, and requests made at the termination hearing in accordance with Arkansas

Supreme Court Rule 6-9(j)(1)(A). In addition to the sufficiency to support termination,

Bradley’s counsel fully briefed and discussed all but one adverse ruling. She even discussed

three other objections from which either no ruling was obtained or the ruling was later

obviated.

Three of the adverse rulings addressed by counsel were related to hearsay objections

to Bradley’s testimony regarding what she had been told by the drug-screening company and

12
by her caseworker about being referred for services and what her probation officer told her

about her pending criminal charges. We review evidentiary rulings under a manifest-abuse-

of-discretion standard, and we will not reverse absent a demonstration of prejudice. Joslin v.

Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 273, 577 S.W.3d 26. After reviewing the record,

we agree with counsel that the circuit court’s rulings were correct and that the circuit court

did not abuse its discretion. Moreover, we have held that when an adverse ruling could not

have changed the outcome of the proceeding and resulted in no prejudice, there can be no

meritorious challenge to the adverse ruling. Mayer v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2025 Ark. App.

51. Here, even if there was an error with the adverse rulings identified by counsel, the error

would nevertheless be harmless considering the other evidence presented supporting

termination of Bradley’s parental rights as already discussed above.

The other adverse ruling addressed by counsel relates to the circuit court’s denial of

a motion for continuance of the termination hearing because Bradley was not present when

the case was called. However, Bradley was represented by counsel throughout the hearing,

she appeared by Zoom shortly after the hearing began and even testified at the hearing. Thus,

the need for a continuance was obviated.

As for the one adverse ruling not fully briefed, our supreme court has held that

counsel’s failure to address every adverse ruling will not prohibit us from granting counsel’s

motion to withdraw and affirming a termination order when the ruling clearly did not

constitute reversible error. Lewis v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 364 Ark. 243, 217 S.W.3d 788

(2005). The adverse ruling that Bradley’s counsel failed to discuss—her request for more time

13
to complete the case plan—clearly does not constitute reversible error. Bradley has never been

in full compliance with the case plan and has still not addressed her substance-abuse issues

despite services being provided since at least 2018 when two of her children were removed

from her care in Indiana. Even were she to begin services now, this court has consistently

held that eleventh-hour attempts to comply with court orders do not outweigh prior

noncompliance and need not be credited by the circuit court. Watts v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 339, 669 S.W.3d 831. A parent’s past behavior is often a good

indicator of future behavior, and a child’s need for permanency and stability may override a

parent’s request for more time to see if the parent can change his or her behavior. Id.

The goal of the termination-of-parental-rights statute is to provide permanency in a

child’s life when returning the child to the family home is contrary to the child’s health,

safety, or welfare, and the evidence demonstrates that a return to the home cannot be

accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the child’s perspective. Ark.

Code Ann. § 9-27-341 (a)(3). A child’s need for permanency and stability may override a

parent’s request for more time to improve the parent’s circumstances. Morton v. Ark. Dep’t of

Hum. Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 388, 465 S.W.3d 871. Under the facts and circumstances

presented in this case, MC’s need for permanency and stability outweighed Bradley’s request

for additional time, and the circuit court did not err in denying her request.

III. Conclusion

Having carefully examined the record and the no-merit brief, we hold that Bradley’s

counsel has complied with the requirements for a no-merit termination-of-parental-rights

14
appeal and that the appeal is wholly without merit. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion

to withdraw and affirm the termination order.

Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.

HARRISON and TUCKER, JJ., agree.

Leah Lanford, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.

One brief only.

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