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March 3, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Kathryn Taylor Franklin v. Jane Norman

Court of Appeals of Georgia

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A25A2200

• Disposition: Vacated & Remanded With Direction

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.7K)

• PDF

Disposition

Vacated & Remanded With Direction

Combined Opinion

FIRST DIVISION
BROWN, C. J.,
BARNES, P. J., and WATKINS, J.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

March 3, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A25A2200. FRANKLIN v. NORMAN.

WATKINS, Judge.

Jane Norman, plaintiff in the case below, is an independent nurse consultant

who was hired to serve as an expert witness for the husband in a divorce proceeding.

Kathryn Taylor Franklin represented the wife in that proceeding. Franklin

subpoenaed Norman to trial, and following her appearance, Norman invoiced

Franklin. After Franklin refused to pay the invoice, Norman filed suit against

Franklin, and Franklin counterclaimed for quadruple damages against Norman

pursuant to OCGA § 24-13-4. Following a bench trial, the trial court dismissed

Norman’s complaint, finding that she was not entitled to the compensation she

sought. The trial court refused, however, to award quadruple damages to Franklin
because it found that Norman did not act in bad faith when seeking the fees. Franklin

timely appealed, but Norman did not file a cross-appeal from adverse rulings against

her.1 For the reasons contained herein, we hold that the trial court erred in failing to

impose quadruple damages against Norman, and we vacate that part of the trial

court’s order with direction.

“On an appeal from an entry of judgment following a bench trial, we apply a de

novo standard of review to any questions of law decided by the trial court, but will

defer to any factual findings made by that court if there is any evidence to sustain

them.”2

So viewed, the record shows that Norman is an independent nurse consultant

who was retained by Franklin’s opposing counsel to develop a cost projection and life

care plan for the husband in a divorce proceeding. The husband’s attorney

subpoenaed Norman for trial, but placed Norman on call because she did not know

when Norman’s testimony would be needed during the trial. Franklin, the wife’s

1
In addition to finding that Norman was not entitled to the fees she sought, the
trial court also imposed attorney fees against Norman pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-14
(b). These fees are not at issue in this appeal.
2
Sanders v. TD Auto Fin., LLC, 366 Ga. App. 376, 378 (883 SE2d 53) (2023)
(citation and punctuation omitted).
2
attorney, who testified she did not know the husband’s attorney had already

subpoenaed Norman, also served Norman with a subpoena. Attached to Franklin’s

subpoena was an exhibit instructing Norman to produce various documents at trial.

Norman appeared at trial, but the case settled and she was never called to testify.

After the trial, Norman invoiced Franklin for $1,980 for “trial time” and

“travel time appearance[.]” Franklin refused to pay the invoice on the ground that

Norman was only entitled to statutory witness fees. Franklin tendered to Norman a

check for $70, which represented payment of a $25 witness fee plus mileage for

Norman to travel to the courthouse. Norman ultimately filed suit against Franklin.

Franklin answered, counterclaimed, and filed a motion to dismiss Norman’s

complaint. Franklin’s counterclaim relied upon OCGA § 24-13-4 to allege that

Norman was not entitled to the fees sought, that she had forfeited entitlement to any

fees at all, and that Norman owed Franklin four times the amount Norman had

unjustly claimed against Franklin in Norman’s invoice. After Franklin filed her motion

to dismiss, and roughly seven months after Norman’s initial invoice, Norman

amended her invoice. The amended invoice sought $4,220.70, including travel and

appearance time, as well as recovery for 12.3 hours of trial preparation. Franklin

3
amended her counterclaim to reflect the new amount of fees claimed by Norman

which she alleged would form the basis for quadruple damages.

Following a bench trial and additional briefing, the trial court granted Franklin’s

motion to dismiss Norman’s claims. The trial court found that Norman had no

contract with Franklin to provide services and that she was required to comply with

a valid subpoena just as any other witness would. The court further found that

Norman was not entitled to claim any fees other than the daily witness fee and mileage

fee provided for in OCGA § 24-13-25.3

With regard to Norman’s defense to Franklin’s counterclaim, the trial court did

not consider cases permitting witnesses to seek additional compensation if a subpoena

requires the witness to conduct preliminary review or preparation in advance of

3
[T]he witness fee shall be $25.00 per diem, and execution
shall be issued by the clerk upon affidavit of the witness to
enforce payment thereof. The payment of witness fees shall
not be demanded as a condition precedent to attendance;
but, when a witness resides outside the county where the
testimony is to be given, service of the subpoena, to be
valid, shall be accompanied by tender of the witness fee for
one day’s attendance plus mileage of 45¢ per mile for
traveling expenses for going from and returning to his or
her place of residence by the nearest practical route.

OCGA § 24-13-25.
4
testifying,4 noting that any trial preparation Norman did was in response to the

subpoena served on her by the attorney who hired her. The trial court refused to

award quadruple damages, however, because it found that Norman did not seek this

extra compensation “based on bad faith, avarice[,] or rapacity,” and that as someone

who acted in good faith, Norman should not be subjected to the statute’s “punitive

effects.” Franklin timely appealed, but Norman did not cross-appeal.

1. Franklin contends that the trial court erred in finding a “good faith”

exception to the applicability of the penalty contained in OCGA § 24-13-4. Given the

plain language of the statute, we agree.

Pursuant to OCGA § 24-13-4, “[a] witness who claims more than is due to such

witness shall forfeit all witness fees and shall pay to the injured party, in addition

thereto, four times the amount so unjustly claimed.” Here, the trial court found that

Norman was not entitled to seek any compensation beyond statutory fees provided in

4
See, e.g., Schofield v. Little, 2 Ga. App. 286, 287 (58 SE 666) (1907); see also
Kent v. Brown, 238 Ga. App. 607, 609 (1) (518 SE2d 737) (1999) (overruled on other
grounds by Styles v. State, 245 Ga. App. 90 (537 SE2d 377) (2000)) (“In this case,
however, [the expert] was asked to conduct a preliminary review of evidence in order
to better give his opinion as an expert. Thus he was entitled to demand extra
compensation for attendance in court pursuant to the subpoena[.]”).
5
OCGA § 24-13-25, and the court dismissed Norman’s complaint. Norman did not file

a cross-appeal of this adverse ruling.

OCGA § 5–6–38 (a) provides that an “appellee may institute [a] cross-appeal

by filing notice thereof within 15 days from service of the notice of appeal by the

appellant, and the appellee may present for adjudication on the cross appeal all errors

or rulings adversely affecting [her.]” Given that Norman did not appeal the trial

court’s ruling that she claimed fees to which she was not entitled, we cannot review

that decision.5

Because that is the law of the case, we now must turn to whether Franklin was

entitled to quadruple damages. “When we consider the meaning of a statute, we must

presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. To that

end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning[.]”6 We agree

with Franklin that if a witness is found to have “claim[ed] more than is due to such

witness[,]” the plain language of the statute does not contain any provision for a

5
See Selfridge v. Morrison Cafeteria Co., 192 Ga. App. 469 (2) (385 SE2d 137)
(1989).
6
Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (citations and
punctuation omitted).
6
“good faith” exception to the imposition of quadruple damages. We recognize that

this is a harsh result, but it is the penalty the General Assembly imposed in such a

circumstance. We therefore hold that, having found that OCGA § 24-13-4 applied, the

trial court erred in refusing to impose quadruple damages pursuant to Franklin’s

counterclaim.

1. In light of our holding in Division 1, we need not address the remaining claim

of error.

The portion of the trial court’s order denying quadruple damages is vacated and

the trial court is instructed to enter judgment against Norman for quadruple damages

pursuant to OCGA § 24-13-4.7

Judgment vacated in part and case remanded with direction. Brown, C. J., and

Barnes, P. J., concur.

7
The portion of the trial court’s order regarding attorney fees owed by Norman
was unappealed and remains intact.
7