Winged Foot Minerals v. SWN Production Company - Oil and Gas Ownership Dispute

1 I N THE I NTERMEDIATE C OURT OF A PPEALS OF W EST V IRGINIA WINGED FOOT MI NERALS, LLC, COR ITA PRENDERGAS T, MARY LOU BUCK MAN, GRACE HOY T, CONNIE SUE GA NDEE, EUGENE PRENDER GAST, FRANK PRE NDERGAST, MELISSA ULIK, LO RI GULLING, ELIZABETH PREN DERGAST, JULYA PRENDERG AST, DAWN M IRUKA, AND PAUL P RENDERGAST, Plaintiffs Below, Petit ioners v.) No. 25- ICA -100 (Cir. Ct. Marshall Cnty. Case No. CC - 25 -2022 -C-83) SWN PRODUCTION COMPANY, LLC, E QUINOR USA ONSH ORE PROPERTIES, INC., MARY ELIZA BETH ALEXANDE R, MARY A. BARK LEY, KEVIN BLATT, IND IVIDUALLY AND A S TRUSTEE OF TH E BLATT FAMILY IRREVOCABLE TR UST DATED APRIL 1, 2011, THOMAS B LATT, PAUL E. BLATT, LAWRENC E E. BLATT, JR., JO SEPH J. BLATT, WI LLIAM J. BLATT, JR., RICHARD P. BL ATT, MICHAE L J. BLATT, STEVE N BLATT, TERESA CHURCH, LAURA M. DOLAN, PA TRICK A. FROHNAP FEL, LISA FROHNAPFEL, DA VID P. FROHNAPFE L, LYNN FROHNAP FEL, CHRISTINA M. FROHNAPFEL, MARY ANN GO DDARD, JOSEPH A. HOHMAN & MAR Y L. HOHMAN, TRUSTE ES OF THE HOHM AN REVOCABLE LI VING T RUST DATED AUGUST 8, 2014, BERTHA KLU G, NANCY KOONT Z, LISA M. LANTZ, EDNA MCC OMBS, CONSTANC E S. MILLER, MAR K H.J. MILLER, MATTHEW LOUIS NICHOLAS MILLE R, MARGARET JUL IA AGNES MILLER, KEVIN M YSLIWIEC, MARY JOSEPHINE NICE, BARBARA PANCAKE, LINDA RUCKMAN, MA RY STINE, ROBE RT FRANCIS V ILLERS, KENNETH A. WIEG AND, LEONARD L. WIEGAND, JEAN A NN WIEGAND AS EXECUTOR OF TH E ESTATE OF ROB ERT L. WIEGAND, CHARLES A. WIEGAND, DAVID PAUL WIEGAND, J OHN G. WIEGAND, MARGARET WILSON, DAVID L. WILSON, MARY CA THERINE MILLER WRIGH T, ROBERT F. YEAGE R, MICHAEL YOUN G, MINERAL ACQU ISITION COMPANY I, L.P., MAC I(YC) L.P., LYNN E. COOK, M ARY K. MCKEET S, FRANCES J. PUCH ARICH, AMY C. MU RRAY, SUZAN NE THOMPSON, SU E E. JOHNSON, AND MARSHALL COUN TY SHERIFF, AS C ONSERVATOR FOR BRENDA GAR CIA, Defendants Below, Re spondents FILED March 3, 2026 released at 3:00 p.m. ASHLEY N. DEE M, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

2 MEMORANDUM D ECISION In this appeal, Petition ers Winged Foot Minerals, LLC, Corita Pren dergast, Mary Lou Buc kman, Grace Hoyt, Connie Sue Gan dee, Eugene Prendergast, Frank Prend ergast, Melissa Ulik, Lori Gulling, Elizabeth Prendergast, Julya Pren dergast, Dawn Miruka, and Paul Prendergast, argu e that they ow n 75%, o r a 3/4 interest, of the oil and g as underlying a tract of approximat ely 227 ac res (the “ Subject Tract ”) in Marshall County, West Vi rginia. Petitioners, the successors in interest of Jam es Prendergas t, claim t hat Mr. Prendergast purchased this interest at a 1991 tax sale and obtained title through t he resulting 199 3 tax deed. In the February 24, 2025, order now on appeal, the Circuit Court of Marshall County found that the 1993 tax deed through which Petitioners claim ownership wa s void, and that a group of Respondents own the contested interest. The “ SWN Respondents ” filed a response. The “ Individ ual Respondents ” a lso filed a response. 1 Petitioners filed a reply. 2 This Court has jurisdic tion over this ap peal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51 - 11-4 (202 4). After co nsidering the parties ’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the applicable law, this Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decisio n affirming the circuit c ourt ’ s order is appropr iate under Rule 21 of the R ules of Appellate Proce dure. 1 The “ SWN Resp ondents ” inclu de SWN Production Company, LL C (“ SWN ”), and Equinor USA Onshore Properties, Inc. (“ Equinor ”), who are repre sented by Tim othy M. Miller, Esq., Robert M. Stonestre et, Esq., and Tiffany M. Arbaugh, Esq.; Mineral Acquisition Company I, L.P. an d MA C I (Y C) L.P., who ar e represented by Andrew G. Jenkins, Esq.; and Lynn E. Cook, Mary K. McK eets, Frances J. Pu charich, Amy C. Murray, and Suzanne Thomp son, who are represented by Jeffery D. Kaiser, Esq., an d Andrew R. Thalman, Esq. The Individual Respondents include all na med Respondents in this appeal aside from the SWN Respondents, Sue E. Johnson, and Marshall County Sheriff as Conservator for Brenda Garcia. These latter tw o Respond ents did no t participate in this appeal. The Individual Respondents are represe nted by Christian E. Turak, Esq., Daniel J. Guida, Esq., and S. David Wilharm, Esq. Other than SWN and Equinor, who claim to hold leases for the disputed oil and gas, the Respondents are th e individu als who claim — and were determined by the circuit court to hold — ownership ov er the disputed oil and gas interest that Petitioners claim. 2 Petitioner Winged Foot Minerals, LLC, is rep resented by John R. W hipkey, Esq. The Individual Petition ers are represented by Edmund L. Wagoner, Esq., and Mat thew B. Hansberry, Esq.

3 At the time of his deat h in 1 920, Joseph Nolt e, Sr., owned a 363.88 -acre tract in Marshall County (the “ Parent Tr act ”), and all underlying oil and gas. Through bequest s in his last will and testament, Mr. Nolte sp li t the surface into three smaller tracts: a 134.6 -acre tract to his son Joseph Nolte, Jr., a 136.4 -acre tract to his daughter Theresa Wiegand, an d a 92.8-acre tract to his granddaughters Mary Nolte and Christina Nolte. Joseph Nolte, Sr. ’ s last will and test ament also divi ded the oil a nd gas under lying the Parent Tract: 1/4 to Joseph Nolte, Jr., 1/4 to Theresa Wiegand, 1/8 to Mary Nolte, 1/8 to Christina Nolte, and 1/4 to his grandson, Jos eph Wiegand, Jr. Through a 1921 deed, Mary Nolt e and Christina Nolte transferred t heir 92.8-a cre surface tract to Joseph Nolte, Jr., reservi ng their oil an d gas i nterest. By combining this 92.8-acre tract with his 134.6-acre tract, Joseph Nolte, Jr. owned the s urface of the 227.48- acre Subject Tract at issue in this case. By virtue of his 1/4 intere st in the oil and gas underlying the larger Parent Tract, Josep h Nolte, Jr. owned 1/4 of the oil and gas underlyin g the Subject Tra ct. Similarly, because of their interests in the oil an d gas underlyi ng the Parent Tract, There sa Wiegand, Mary Nolte, Christina Nolte, and Joseph W iegand, Jr. owned the other 3/4 of the oil and gas und erlying the Subject Tract. For tax purposes, th e 1 920 Marshall Coun ty land book 3 assessed the Subject Tract to Joseph Nolte, Jr. as “ Fee ” o wnership of 227.48 acres desc ribed as “ Lynn Camp. ” In 1920, T heresa Wiegand, Mary Nolt e, Christi na Nolte, and Joseph Wiegand, Jr., were not assessed separately for their intere sts in the oil and gas underlying the entire Parent Trac t or specifically underlyi ng the Subject Tract. In the 1933 land book, written benea th the assessment on the Subject Tract, the assessor added an assessment for “ Royalty Oil ” to “ Nolte Josep h. ” This assessment reappeared in each land book until 1937, until it was crossed out with the handwritten note that “ Mr. Nolte tells Pa ul he has no royalt y. ” 3 The assessor of ea ch county in West Virgini a is required to make and maintain yearly land b ooks docu menting the tax asse ssments on each parcel of real property in that county. See W. Va. Code §§ 11-4-1 to 11-4-21. In their discussion of the vario us year ly Marshall County land books relevant to this appeal, the parties sometimes refer to land books by assessment year, and other times refer to them by taxa ble year. For clarit y and consistency, in this decision the Court will r efer to the land b ooks by asses sm ent y ear. Beginning in 1961, property was assessed as of July 1 each year. See W. Va. Code § 11-3- 1 (1961); Londo H. Brown, Change s in West Virginia Real Property Tax Law, 66 W. Va. L. Rev. 271 (1964). For exa mple, “ 1920 l and book ” refers to t he land book for the assessment year beginning on January 1, 1920, and “ 1 972 land book ” refers to the land book for the assessmen t year beginning on Jul y 1, 1972.

4 Th e assessment of the Subject Tract remained in the land books through 1945. That year ’ s land book assess ed Joseph Nolte, Jr. on the “ Lynn Camp ” prope rty for 227.48 acres. 4 The property was ass essed at a per acre value of $13 and a tot al land value of $ 3000. In 1945, Theresa Wiegan d, Mary Nolte, Christina Nolte, and Joseph Wiegand, Jr. were not separately assessed on their oil and gas inte rests underl ying the Subject Tract. In 1946, Joseph Nolte, Jr. was a gain asses sed on the “ Lynn Camp ” property for 227.48 acres at a per acre value of $13 and a total l and value of $3000. Fo r the first time, the 1946 land book assessed the “ Nolte Joseph Heirs ” on an interest described only as “ Roy. ” The “ Roy ” assessment did not include any acreage or a pe r acre value, and was assessed at a total value of $50. Joseph Nolte, Jr. died testate in 1971. Pursu ant to Mr. Nolte, Jr. ’ s last will and testament, the exec utor of his estate sol d the Subject Tract to R. Robinson Chance, Jr., via a deed issue d on Oc tober 10, 1972. In the 197 2 land boo k, the S ubject Tract was assesse d to “ Nolte Joseph Est. ” However, thi s assessment wa s crossed out, and a handwritte n note in the margin provides “ To R. Robinson Chance Jr. DB432 p36 1. ” The “ Roy ” property assessed to the “ Nolte Joseph Heirs ” wa s also crossed out, with a ha ndwritten note in the margin exp laining “ So ld to State Nov 1973 f or 1972 taxes. ” In the 1973 land book, the Subject Tract was assessed to R. Robins on C hance, Jr. as “ 222.4 A Lynn Camp. ” 5 The 1973 land book listed t he “ Roy ” assessment under a “ S old to State ” s ection; however, the assessment was crossed out, with a handwrit ten note expla ining th at the property was “ Redeemed from Aud itor May 1974 f or 1972 taxes Back taxed for 1 974. ” The 1974 land book included a hand written listing of the “ Roy ” assessment, asse ssed to R. Robinso n Chance, Jr. Beginn ing in the 1975 land book, th e “ Roy ” assessment was printed and assessed to R. Robinso n Chance, Jr. In a December 14, 1982, deed, R. Robinson Chance, Jr. conveyed the Subject Tract to Daniel B. Watkins and John L. Turcato, wi thout reservation of an y mineral rights. Th e Subject Tract was asse ssed in su bsequent lan d books to “ Watkins Daniel B E t Al. ” No party asserts that this assessment has ever become delinquent. After this transfer, subsequent land books continued to assess “ Roy ” to R. Robinson Chance, Jr. The “ Roy ” 4 Between 1920 and 1945, the format of the land books changed. In both the 1945 and 1946 asses sments f or the Subject Tract, “ 227 ” is listed unde r a column designated for listing the acreage of fee ownership of property, and “ 48 ” is listed under the column directly to the right desi gnated for listing the acreage of surface ownership of property. However, the parties in dicate that this was intended to reference 227.48 acres, not 227 acres of fee ownership and 48 acres of surface ownershi p. 5 The SW N Respondents represen t that this c hange in the acreage o f the Su bject Tract resulted from a s urvey of the property c ompleted in 1972. No party disputes that the property later de scribed as “ 222.4 A Lynn Camp ” is the same tract previously described as a 227.48 -acre property.

5 assessment became delinquent in 1990 and w as sold to Jame s Prendergast at a 1991 tax sale. On April 5, 1993, the Clerk of the County Commission of Marshall Co unty issued a tax deed to James Prendergast conveying the interest covered by this delinquent assessment. The deed described the intere st as a royalty, included a description of the Subject Tract, and characterized the interest as “ the same oil and gas reserv ed unto R. Robinson Chance, Jr., by deed date d December 14, 1982. ” On August 26, 2 022, Petitioners, the success ors in interest to Ja mes Prendergast, initiated the underlying action by filing a complaint in the Circuit Court of Mar shall County. Petitioners a lleged that the “ Roy ” as sessment added to the Marshall County land book in 1946 was a tax assess ment for the 3/ 4 interest in the oil an d gas underly ing the Subject Tract, previous ly own ed b y T heresa Wiegand, Mary Nolte, Christ ina Nolte, and Joseph Wiegand, Jr. Petitioners clai med that, by purchasing the delinquent “ Roy ” assessment and obtaining the 1993 tax deed, Mr. Pr endergast became the owner of that 3/4 interest in the oil and gas underlying the Subject Tract. 6 Accordingly, Petitioners asked for a declaratory judgment against the Indi vidual Responden ts — the successors in interest to Theresa Wiegand, Mary Nolte, Christina Nolte, and Joseph Wiegand, Jr. — that Petitioners were the owners of that 3/4 oil and gas interest. Petitioners al so raised claims for conversion and trespass against SWN and Equi nor, alleg ing that those com panies had been removing oil and gas underlying the Subject Tract without leases with Peti tioners, the owne rs. Petitioners also s ought an account ing of all proceeds paid to the Individual Respondents for the oil and gas. Some of the Respo ndents filed a c ounterclaim s e eking a decl aratory judgment that the Respondents (other than SWN and Equi nor) were the owners of t he 3/4 interest at issue. 7 On June 10, 2024, Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment on their declaratory ju dgment c laim. On September 30, 2024, the Individua l Respondents and the SWN Respondents filed separate motion s for summary judgment on Petitioners ’ claim s. Among other contentions, the Individual R espondents argued th at the “ Roy ” assessment 6 Petitioners did not cla im any right t o the 1/4 interest in the oil and gas underlying the Subject Tract initially devised to Joseph Nolte, Jr. Petitioners conceded in their complaint that the 1/4 interest in the oil and gas owned by Joseph Nolte, Jr. rema ine d unsevered from the surface of the Subject Tract and was taxed as part of the assessment of the Subjec t Tract. Petitioners ack nowledged that this 1/4 int erest i n the oil and gas was transferred with the surface interest to R. Robinson Chance in the 197 2 Deed and to Daniel B. Watkins and John L. Turcato in the 198 2 Deed. 7 It is not entirely clear from the appendix or the briefing which Respondents joined in this counterclaim. However, there appears to be no dispute that the counterclaim sought a declaratio n that the Responden ts other than SWN and E quinor, as the successor s in interest of Theresa Wiegand, Mary Nolte, Chri stina Nolte, and Joseph Wiegand, Jr., were the owners of the co ntested 3/4 interest in the oil and gas underlying the Subject Tract.

6 was a duplicative asses sment. The parties brie fed the respective motions, with Petitio ners filing a joint response t o the two motions for summary judg ment. O n February 24, 2025, the circuit court e ntered an order denying P etitioners ’ motion for summary judgment, granting t he Individual Respon dents ’ moti on for summary judgment, granting the Respondents ’ countercl aim for declaratory re lief, and dismissing Petitioners ’ complaint. In this order, the circui t court determined that the “ Roy ” as sessment and the 1993 tax deed were void for two reasons. First, the court found that, to the extent it was intended as an a ssessment of the contested 3/4 oil and gas interest, the “ Roy ” assessmen t was duplicative. The circuit court not ed that the Su bject Tract had been taxed as a f ee interest, including the co ntested 3/4 oil and gas intere st, and that when the “ R oy ” assess ment was created in 1946, the ta x assessment on the Subject Tract was not r educed in va luation to account for the remov al and separate taxation of that interes t. Accordingly, despite the creation of the “ Roy ” assessment in 1946, the Subject Tract continued to be taxed as a fee, including the conteste d interest. Because the owner of the surface of the Subject Tract continued to be taxed o n all the underlyin g oil and gas and that assessment never became delinquent, taxes were always paid on the co ntested 3/4 oil and gas interest, and thus the duplicative “ Roy ” assessment of that interest and the 1993 tax deed were void. Second, the circuit court concluded that the a ssessment was void when sold becau se it was assessed to R. Robi nson Chance, J r., who had never o wned the contested 3/4 int erest and at th e time of the sale did n ot own any interest i n the Subject Tract. It is from this order that Petitioners now appeal. 8 “ A circuit court ’ s entry of a declarato ry ju dgment is r eviewed de novo. ” Syl. Pt. 1, City of Martinsb urg v. Berkeley Cnty. Counc., 241 W. Va. 385, 82 5 S.E.2d 332 (2019) (quoting Syl. P t. 3, Cox v. Amick, 195 W. Va. 608, 466 S.E.2d 459 (1995)). Our appellate review of a circ uit cou rt ’ s order granting su mmary judg ment is de novo. See Syl. Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2 d 755 (1994). Petitioners raise a sin gle, broadly framed assig nment of erro r: that th e circuit court erred in grant ing summary judgment to Respondents and denyi ng summary judgment to Petitioners. Petitioners state that bot h allegedly erroneous rulings stem fro m the circui t court ’ s conclusion that the “ Roy ” tax asses sment at issue was void as a duplicative assessment. However, in arguin g this assi gnment of error, Petiti oners challenge each of the circuit court ’ s two gr ounds for granting j udgment to Res pondents: that the “ Roy ” 8 In their Notic e of Appeal, Petition ers indica ted that the Feb ruary 24, 2025, order on appeal was not the final order as to al l claims and pa rties in the c ase below. However, it is not entirely cle ar from the appendi x and the briefing what issues r emain pen ding before the circuit court. However, because the February 24, 2025, order dismissed Pe titioners ’ complaint, resol ved Respondents ’ declar atory judgment claim, and was certified as final under Rule 54(b) of the West Virginia R ules of Civil Procedure, we f ind that it is final for purposes of this Court ’ s appellate jurisdict ion.

7 assessment was voi d as duplicative and tha t it was i nvalid when sold because it was assessed to R. Robinson Chance, Jr., who held no interest i n the Subject Tract. Because we find no error in the circuit court ’ s conclusion that the “ Roy ” assessment was a duplicative, void asse ssment, the first issue is dispositi ve of this appeal, and it is unnecessary to address the second. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (“ SCA WV ”) ha s long recognized “ that property m ay be assessed but on ce for t axes and that one full satisfaction of such taxes is all the State may require. ” Orville Young, LLC v. Bonacci, 246 W. Va. 26, 33, 866 S.E.2d 91, 98 (2021). Therefore, “ [i] n case of two assessments of the same land, under the same clai m of title, for any year, one payme nt of taxes, under either assessment, is all t he State can require. ” Id. at 28, 866 S.E.2d at 93, Syl. Pt. 2 (quoting S yl. Pt. 2, State v. Allen, 65 W. Va. 335, 64 S.E. 140 (1909)). A tax as sessment is vo id wher e taxes on the same property are paid under another ass essment, an d “ [a] deed made p ursuant to a tax sale under a void assess ment is void. ” Id. at 35-36, 866 S.E.2d at 100-01 (quoting Syl. Pt. 4, Blair v. Freeburn Coal Corp., 163 W. Va. 23, 253 S. E.2d 547 (1979)). The SCAWV has s pecifically recognized that a tax assessment is duplicative where an interest is severed from a larger tract and assessed separately, but the assessment on the larger tract i s not adjusted to acknowledg e the diminution. In Allen, t he owner of a 9 -and- 5/8-acre tract conveyed a smaller parcel from that tract, but “ [o]n the land book no deduction for the porti on of the 9⅝ acres con veyed... was made fr om the assessment of the [larger] tract. ” Stat e v. Allen, 65 W. Va. 335, 336, 64 S.E. 140, 1 40 (1909). Although the assessment on the smaller parcel beca me delinquent a nd was sold, the SCAWV concluded that the sale of the smaller tract was void because taxes never became delinquen t on the larger tract. Id. at 338-40, 64 S.E. at 141. Similarly, in Snodgrass v. Jolliff, 59 W. Va. 292, 53 S.E. 151 (1906), the owner of a tract conveye d it, reserving only a 1/16 oil and gas interest. However, the assessor entered the tract in the new owner ’ s name at the same valuation used in the immediately preceding year, without reduc tion for remov al of the 1/16 interest. Snodgrass, 59 W. Va. a t 293- 94, 53 S.E. at 151. T he gr antor then conveyed a 1/32 interest i n the oil and gas — half of his remaining 1/16 interest — and retained the other 1/32 interest. Id. However, the grantor and the grantees were each assessed for a 1/16 interest. Id. While the assessments for the larger tract and t he gran tor ’ s 1/16 interest remained paid, the 1/16 int erest assessed to the gr antees became delinquent and was so ld. Id. The SCAWV found this sale and the resulting deed void, reasoning that tax es on the grantees ’ 1 /32 interest had alrea dy been paid twice: on ce by the owner of the larger tract, because the assessed value of that tract was not reduced to account for the removal of a 1/16 oil and gas interest, and once by the grantor, because the assessment of a 1/16 interest to the grantor included the 1/32 interest the grantor retained and the 1/32 interest conveyed to t he grantees. Id. at 292, 53 S.E. at 151, Syl. P t. 1.

8 We find no error in the circuit court ’ s conclusion that, as in Snodgrass and Allen ¸ to the extent the “ Roy ” assessment was inten ded to asses s the contested 3/4 interest in oil and gas underlying th e Sub ject Tract, it was duplicative due to the assessor ’ s failure to reduce the valuation of the assessment of the surface of the Subject Tract. As an initial matter, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the “ fee ” tax assessment added to the land books in 1920 for the 227.48- acre Lynn Camp property in the name of Josep h Nolte, Jr., was an assessment of the entirety of the surface of the Subject Tract and all the underlying oil and gas. It is undisp uted that, prior to his de ath, the entirety of the Parent Tract, including the oil and gas, was asses sed to Joseph Nolte, S r. Moreover, the 1920 land book assesse d the divided s urface of the Parent Trac t to its respective owners: a 136.4- acre tract to Theresa Wiegand and the 227.48- acre Subject Tract to Joseph Nolt e, Jr. Howe ver, the assessor did not add any assess ments for t he contested 3/4 interest in the oil and gas in the names of Theresa Wiegand, Mary Nolte, Christina Nolte, and Jos eph Wieg and, Jr. As we have recognized, t he SCAWV ’ s “ casel aw clearly establishes that whe n a mineral estate has never been separat ely assessed, it is assumed to be assessed with the surface, even when the surfac e owner and mineral owner are dif ferent. ” Ne. Nat. Energy, LLC v. LT Realty Unlimited, LLC, 2 50 W. Va. 500, 507, 905 S.E.2d 179, 186 (Ct. App. 2024) (collecting cases). As Peti tioners do not identify a ny evidence in the rec ord contrary to this presumption, the undisputed fact s show th at a ssessment of the Subje ct Tract added to the 1920 land book assess ed taxes on the entire property, including the contested 3 /4 oil and gas interest. Moreover, the undi sputed facts establish that t he 1945 assessmen t to Joseph Nolte, Jr. for the Su bject Tract still inclu ded taxes on the contested 3/4 o il and gas int erest. Petitioners do not point to any evidence in the record d emonstrating that the cont ested 3/4 oil and gas interest was removed from this asse ssment prior to 1945. While Petitioners note that the valuation of Subject Tract fluctuate d between 192 0 and 1945, they do not point to any evid ence that thes e fluctuations reflect a severanc e of the contested 3/4 oil and gas interest. Indee d, Petiti oners assert that they “ cannot state why th e various Assessors changed the relevan t values at various times, ” and that they could onl y “ guess. ” Petitioners also discuss the “ Roy alty Oil ” assessment added to the land books from 1933 to 1937. However, as this interest was assessed to Joseph Nolte, Jr., 9 and not any of the owners of the cont ested 3/4 inter est, we do not find it relevant to this appeal. Indeed, Pet itioners explicitly state that they do not c laim the 1/4 interest in t he oil and g as originally devis ed to Joseph Nolte, Jr. and that at all times this interest continued to be taxed with the surface in the assessment of th e Subject Tract. Therefore, since the un disputed facts de monstrate that the 19 45 asse ssment of the Subject Tract also i ncluded taxe s on the contested 3/ 4 oil and gas interest, the cri tical 9 As noted above, this assessment was explicitly assessed to “ Nolte Joseph, ” just as the assessment for the Subject Tract during those same years. No party argues that this was anyone other than Joseph Nolte, J r.

9 consideration under Allen and Snodgrass is whether the assessor amended the 1946 assessment of the Subj ect Tract to account for the addition of the “ Roy ” assessment. As discussed above, the assessor made no such change. The 1946 land book described the Subject Tract in the sa me way as the 1945 land book, and the valuati on, both per acre and in total, was not reduced to account for the severance of an y interest. Accordingly, we find that, pu rsuant to Snodg rass, t he “ Roy ” assessment was duplicative. As in tha t case, there was a surface interest — the Subject Tract — that was assessed on the surface and all underlying oil and gas. Moreover, just as in that case, when an assessment wa s added to tax a severed oil and gas interest, th e val uation of the surface interest was not reduced to account for that severance. According ly, the taxes on the contested 3/4 oil and gas interest were assessed u nder the assessment of the surface of the Subject Tract, and those taxes never beca me delinque nt, making the “ R oy ” assessment d uplicative and the sale of tha t interest void. In their reply brief, Petitioners at tempt t o distinguish Snodgrass, arguing that in Snodgrass, in addi tion to the delin quent assessment of a 1/16 oil and gas interest and the unreduced assessment of the surface tract that remained paid, there was also an assessment of a 1/16 interest in the oil and gas interest that never became delinquent. Petitioners argue that “ [i] t was therefore apparent, on its face, that the taxes on both were paid, regardless of the surface assessment. ” This misconstrues Sn odgrass. In that case, the SCAWV h eld that the unreduced surface assessment and the pai d assessment for a 1/1 6 oil and gas interest each independently rendered the delinquent 1/16 assessment duplicat ive, explaining “ [a] sale of the interest of [the delinquent owners] in the oil and gas f or taxes will not pass good title, because of the payment of taxes by their co -tenant, Price [who paid the 1/16 assessment] or Higgins [who paid the unreduced surface assessment]. ” Snodgrass, 59 W. Va. at 292, 53 S. E. at 151, Syl. Pt. 1. Theref ore, while in Snodgras s there were two non- delinquent assess ments covering the alle gedly delinquent interest, and this case there is only one, the SCAWV held that either of the paid inter ests wa s suf ficient to r ender the delinquent assessment duplicative and void. Accordingl y, we find Petitioners ’ attempt to distinguish Snodgrass unconvincing. Finally, Petitioners a rgue that following Snodgrass and fin ding the “ Roy ” assessment duplicative will upend many past assessments, pointing to other assessments not at issue in this case and asking the Court hypothetical que stions about whether those assessments wou ld be duplicative under this de cision. Pe titioners sugg est, for in stance, that Snodgrass is incompa tible with the severance of “ minimum assessments, ” because when an interest assessed at the minimum valuati on is d ivided, each di vided portion of that interest will necessarily also receive a m inimum valuation, meanin g that the assessor will have made n o reductio n in the valuation of the original assessment to acknowle dge the diminution of the inter est. Th is Court is without authority to answe r these hypothetical questions based on facts not before the Co urt. S ee Cumming s v. Paine, 249 W. Va. 568, 574 n.7, 899 S.E.2 d 646,

10 652 n.7 (Ct. App. 2024) (“ This Court, like the SCA WV, is n ot authorized to resolve s uch hypothetical case sce narios [.] ”). In their mot ion for summary judgment, the In dividual Respondents ci ted to the releva nt assessmen ts from 1945 and 1946 and argued that the “ Roy ” as sessment was duplicative under the h olding o f Snodgrass. In their r esponse to this motion, Petitioners asserted generally tha t the “ Roy ” assessment was not dup licative, but they did not point to any evidence demonst rating another po ssible expla nation for the assessor ’ s failur e to reduce the valuation of the Sub ject Tract. The SCAWV has held that, to resist a properly sup ported m otion for s ummary judgment, the nonmoving party must “ (1) rehab ilitate the evidence attacked by the moving party, (2) produce additional evidence showing t he existence of a genuine issue for trial, or (3) submit an affidavit explaining why further disc overy is necessary as provided in Rule 56([d]) of the W est Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. ” Syl. Pt. 3, William s v. Precision Coi l, Inc., 194 W. Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (1995). Petitioner s failed to do this in response to t he Individual Respondents ’ argument that the “ Roy ” assessment was duplicative. Therefore, we decline to speculate on how this case mig ht have differed if Petitioners had produced such evidence at summary judgment, or how f uture cases where such e vidence is pre sented sho uld be resolved. Accordingly, we find no error in the circuit court ’ s conclusion that, to the extent the “ Roy ” assessment was an assessme nt of the contested 3/4 oil and gas interest, it was duplicative. Because t he asses sment on the Subject Tract never be came del inquent, the State always re ceived t he one tax payment on the contested 3/4 oil and gas interest to which it was entitled, and the sale of that interest and 1993 tax deed were void. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court ’ s judgment. Although it wa s not a basis for the circui t co urt ’ s decision, the SW N Respondents also ar gue that that th e “ Roy ” assessment, by its description, was invalid as an assessment of the contested 3/4 oil and gas interest. W e agree and also affirm for this reason. 10 An assess ment de scribed as a royalty or a de ed conveyi ng a roy alty reserved to a particular individu al, cannot be construe d as t ransferring a severed mineral estate ow ned by others. Prior de cisions have supported this conclu sion and reinforced the neces sity of respecting the le gal di stinction b etween mineral estates, leasehold int erests, an d royal ties. In Orville Y oung, LLC, after finding the assess ment described as “202 Royalty W ells #629- 630 Nat Gas Co. W. V a.” void for other reasons, the S CA W V also explained that the “ assessment, by its very description, related only to the royalties deri ved from the su bject oil and gas leasehol d i nterests, not t o the act ual oil and gas e state. ” Orville Y ou ng, L LC, 246 W. V a. at 35 n.12, 866 S.E.2d at 100 n.12; see also V enable Royalty, L TD v. EQT Pr od. 10 See Syl. Pt. 3, Barnett v. Wolfolk, 149 W. Va. 246, 140 S. E.2d 466 (1965) (recognizing that an appellate c ourt “ may, o n appeal, affir m the ju dgment of th e low er court when it appears that such j udgment is correct on any legal gro und disclosed by the record, regardles s of the ground, reason or the ory assigned by the lo wer court as the basis for its judgment ”).

11 Co., 250 W. V a. 764, 7 67-68, 908 S.E.2d 501, 504-05 (Ct. App. 2024) (recognizing and discussing th e difference between an interest in royalties and an inte rest in an oil and gas estate). W e f ind this reasoning applicable to the “ Roy ” asses sment, as “ Roy ” is clearly shorthand for “royalty.” Because the “ Roy ” a ssessment was an a ssessment on royalties, Mr. Pren dergast did no t obtain title to the contested 3/ 4 oil and gas interest through his purchase of that delinq uent “ Roy ” assess ment and the su bsequent 1993 tax deed. Additional c ircumstances in the record support our conclusion that the “ Roy ” assessment was an asse ssment on royalti es —rather than the contested 3/4 interest in the oil and gas estate. Notably, when the asse ssor removed the earlier “Royalty Oil” assessmen t from the 1937 land book, the assessor explained in a handwritten note that “Mr. Nolte tells Paul he has no royal ty.” Further, the assessor transf erred the “Roy” assessment to R. Robinson Chance, Jr. i n the 1974 land book, and it is undi sputed that Mr. Chance never owned any portion of the contested 3/4 oil and gas interest. Indeed, in explaining that transfer in the land book, the assessor wrote “See Joseph Nolte Heirs DB 43 2 p361 per Mr. Chance,” referring to the 1972 Deed through which Mr. Chance obtained the surface of the Subject T ra ct and Jo seph Nolte, Jr.’ s 1/4 interest in the oil and gas. Additionally, the 1993 tax deed based on the d elinquent “ Roy ” assess ment described the i nterest conveyed a s the “ royalty purchased by James Prendergast. ” As Petitioners’ claim to the contested 3/4 oil and gas interest u ndisputedly de pend s on the conclu sion that the “ Roy ” ass essment was an assessment of that interest, a nd we find that it was not, we also af firm the circuit c ourt on this basis. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the February 24, 2025, order of the Circuit Court of Marshall County. Affirmed. ISSUED: March 3, 2026 CONCURRED IN B Y: Chief Judge Daniel W. Greear Judge Charles O. L orensen

12 CONCURRING AND WRITING SEPARA TELY: Judge S. Ryan White WHITE, JUDGE, concurring: I concur in the Court’s judgment affirming the circuit court. Petitioners acquired no interest in the disputed three -fourths oil and gas estate. I write separately because this case should be resolved o n narrower, statut ory grounds, and I would decline to extend Snodgrass v. Jolliff, 59 W. Va. 292, 53 S.E. 15 1 (1906), beyond it s facts. The disp ositive defect lies in t he asse ssment a nd the deed itself. Chapter 11 of the West Virgi nia Code governs tax sales, a nd its requirements are ju risdictional. Real estat e must be entered in the l and books in the name of the owner. See W. Va. Code § 11-4-9. A tax sale conveys only the interest of the person whose property was properly assess ed and became delinquent. If the interest purported ly sold was never assessed in the name of its true owner, the Stat e lacks authority to sel l it. The record is undisput ed that the three-fourt hs oil and gas interest at issue was devised in 1920 to Theresa Wiegan d, Mary Nolte, Christina N olte, a nd Joseph Wiegand, Jr., and passed to t heir successors. It was neve r conveye d to R. R obinson Chance, Jr. The 1972 deed to Mr. Chance transferred the surface and the one-fourth mineral interest owned by Joseph Nolte, Jr. It did not include the remaining three -fourths mineral estate. By 1982, Mr. Chance had con veyed away the surface and his und isputed mineral inte rest. Nonetheless, the delin quent assessment sold in 1991 was assessed t o Mr. Chance under the shorthand de signation “Roy.” At th e time of sale, he owned no interest in the disputed three-fourths mineral e state; a fact undisputed by the par ties. The Stat e th us p urported to sell, for Mr. Chanc e’s delinque ncy, an in terest h e never owned, and w hich was never assessed in the names of its true o wners. The tax sale w as void. A tax deed cannot operate to trans fer title from persons w hose interests were neither assessed in their names nor delinquent. The language of t he tax deed establishes the limited scope of what was conveyed. The April 5, 1993, dee d described the interest conveyed as “the same oil and gas reserved unto R. Robinson C hance, Jr., by deed dated December 14, 1982,” and referred to the p roperty as the “royalty purchased.” The deed expressly tied the conveyed interest to what was “reserved unto” M r. Chance in the 1982 c onveyance. There is no evidence t hat Mr. Chanc e reserved the disputed three -f ourths mineral estate in 1982. He could not have reserved what he did not own. A tax deed conveys only the interest described t herein and only such interest as the del inquent taxpayer pos ses sed.

13 It cannot enlarge the taxpayer’s estate or divest others of property not asses sed in their names. For these reasons, I would not extend Snodg rass to reach th e result. Snodgr ass addressed a specific ci rcumstance involving overlapping assessments and triple pay ment of taxes under related claims of title. It did not authorize co urts to i nvalidate tax deeds whenever a land book valuation was not visib ly adjusted, nor did it displace the threshold requirement that proper ty be assessed in the name of its owner. Extending Snodgrass beyond its facts would shift the focus away from the statutory requirements of a proper tax assessment an d toward a retrospecti ve inquiry of count y valuation practices in l and books. Mineral severances occur red frequ ently without precise adjustments to su rface valuations and often counties would employ shorthand descriptions in land book e ntries. I f the abs ence of a vi sible valuati on reductio n were sufficient to invalidate a tax dee d, the stability of mineral titles could be challen ged e ven w here the threshold statutory requirements of assess ment are satisfie d. The statute is clear and straightforward. The delinquent assessment was in the name of a perso n who never owned that estate. The tax deed c onveyed only a royalt y “reserved unto” that person. The 1993 tax deed conveyed nothing as to the disputed three -fourths oil and gas interest. For these reasons, I co ncur in the judgme nt affirming the circuit c ourt’s order.