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March 3, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Adoption of Kolleen.

Massachusetts Appeals Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-P-0803

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (19.4K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-803

ADOPTION OF KOLLEEN.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

This appeal involves the welfare of Kolleen (the child) and

her mother's capacity to care for her. After a trial, a

Juvenile Court judge found the mother unfit to care for the

child and terminated her parental rights. On appeal, the mother

challenges the judge's ultimate determination, as well as

certain findings of fact and the decision not to order post-

termination visitation.2 We affirm.

1 The child's name is a pseudonym.

2Although the mother has also claimed that the Juvenile
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, she has since waived
that claim, and we conclude that the operative petition
satisfied the statutory requirements to establish jurisdiction.
See Care & Protection of Lillian, 445 Mass. 333, 340 (2005);
G. L. c. 119, § 24.
Background. The child was born in 2013.3 The child was

hospitalized at birth and given morphine to treat withdrawal

symptoms, having been exposed to amphetamines, methamphetamines,

and Suboxone during the mother's pregnancy.

While raising the child, the mother continued to suffer

from drug and alcohol misuse, and she has been diagnosed with

opioid use disorder, alcohol use disorder, attention deficit

hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), depression, and oppositional

defiant disorder (ODD). While she sought treatment for her drug

use between November 2019 and June 2024, her participation in

treatment was sporadic and ultimately unsuccessful. During

treatment, she was advised by her medical provider of the risk

of her continued use of illicit stimulants, which included risk

of "seizure," "cardiac complications," and "psychiatric

emergencies." She nevertheless persisted in misusing illicit

stimulants. And despite her diagnosis and documented alcohol

misuse, the mother has denied her alcohol misuse and refused to

seek treatment for it. The mother has suffered multiple

seizures related to alcohol withdrawal, one of which led to the

child discovering the mother "in a pool of blood."

3 The child's putative father is not listed on the child's
birth certificate, did not establish paternity, and is not a
party to this appeal or the underlying petition.

2
The mother also struggled to maintain stable and safe

housing while raising the child. Between 2018 and 2020, they

resided in at least four different shelters, and prior to that,

they resided with a man whom the mother knew to be a sex

offender. Additionally, the mother was arrested in May 2017 for

child endangerment, and in August 2018 for assault.

The child's access to education was inconsistent. The

child was enrolled in kindergarten in 2019-2020 but did not

enroll in first grade the following year. The child was absent

from school nineteen times in 2021-2022, and twenty-six times in

2022-2023.

The Department of Children and Families (DCF) opened a case

for services in March 2023. The mother refused to engage with

DCF on multiple occasions during its investigation, and DCF was

awarded temporary custody of the child in May 2023 and has since

retained custody. During that period, the child has entered

foster care, has had consistent school attendance, has attended

therapy, and has regularly visited with her adult sister.

For several months following the child's removal, the

mother declined to engage in home visits or to schedule visits

with the child. The mother began supervised visitation with the

child in December 2023. Although the mother acted appropriately

and appeared sober during some of those visits, she canceled

others with minimal notice and justification, and at other times

3
acted erratically, including calling the child a "retard" and

"moron."

Discussion. We review the judge's findings "with

substantial deference and will not disturb those findings unless

clearly erroneous." Adoption of Cadence, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 162,

166 (2012). We also "defer to the judge's determinations

regarding the best interests of the child, and reverse only

where there is a clear error of law or abuse of discretion."

Id.

1. Termination of parental rights. The mother argues that

there was an insufficient nexus between her substance misuse and

neglect of her child and that several of the judge's findings of

fact concerning the mother's awareness of risks to her health

caused by her substance misuse were unsupported at trial. We

conclude the judge's decision is more than sufficiently

supported by the evidence.

First, we acknowledge that "evidence of alcohol or drug use

is relevant to, but not dispositive of, a parent's willingness,

competence, and availability to provide care" (quotation and

citation omitted). Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. 139, 147 (2020).

Although "parental rights should not be terminated only because

the parent has a substance use disorder," a parent's

"willingness to engage in treatment is an important

consideration in an unfitness determination where the substance

4
dependence inhibits the parent's ability to provide minimally

acceptable care of the child." Id.

Here, however, the judge's decision to terminate the

mother's parental rights was supported by clear and convincing

evidence of neglect stemming from her long-term, unresolved

substance misuse. See Adoption of Mario, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 767,

772 (1997) (affirming termination of parental rights supported

by mother's having "engaged in a pattern of neglect, due in part

to her drug abuse and resulting instability"). The mother was

diagnosed with opioid use disorder and alcohol use disorder, in

addition to ADHD and ODD. The mother's substance misuse spans

the breadth of the child's life, the child having been exposed

to methamphetamine in utero, necessitating the administration of

morphine at birth. Although the mother engaged in some

treatment for opioid addiction, which was acknowledged by the

judge, she was inconsistent, ceased treatment entirely four

months before trial, and never admitted to her alcohol

dependency or sought professional help in treating it or the

associated withdrawal symptoms it caused. These symptoms

included seizures, during one of which the child discovered the

mother "in a pool of blood." Throughout these struggles, as we

have noted, the mother could not maintain stable housing, and

the child missed a significant amount of school.

5
The mother's persistent struggles with substance misuse

caused "a pattern of neglect." Adoption of Mario, 43 Mass. App.

Ct. at 772. Furthermore, the mother's unwillingness to

consistently engage in opioid treatment and to treat or even

acknowledge her diagnosed alcohol use disorder are "important

consideration[s]" on which the judge properly relied to

substantiate his unfitness decision.4 Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass.

at 147.

We also disagree with the mother's contentions that DCF

failed to provide a "sufficiently detailed" adoption plan and

that the judge's decision to adopt the proposed plan was not in

the child's best interest. See Adoption of Varik, 95 Mass. App.

4 Ten of the judge's findings of facts stating that the
mother had been advised by medical providers to avoid using
alcohol along with Adderall are unsupported by the record.
However, the mother's medical records indicate that she was
advised that "using illicit stimulants" created a risk of
"seizure," "cardiac complications," and "psychiatric
emergencies," and she persisted in using illicit stimulants even
after being apprised of these risks. The record also indicates,
and the mother acknowledged at trial, that she had been advised
to reduce her alcohol intake due to her impaired liver function
and the increased risk of respiratory depression when ingested
concurrently with suboxone, along with the risk of acute
intoxication. She persisted in consuming alcohol, nonetheless.
Although the records do not indicate that the providers
addressed the risks of alcohol and Adderall together, and so the
judge's findings to that effect were in error, such error was
harmless. The important point is that the mother was warned
that her behavior could cause seizures, medical emergencies, and
even death, but she engaged in that behavior nonetheless, and
experienced seizures and medical emergencies. See Care &
Protection of Frank, 409 Mass. 492, 499 (1991).

6
Ct. 762, 770-771 (2019). Although DCF must present and the

judge must consider a permanency plan, G. L. c. 210, § 3, that

plan need not be "fully developed" at the time of trial,

Adoption of Paula, 420 Mass. 716, 722 n.7 (1995), but rather

need only provide enough information "that the judge may

properly evaluate the suitability of [DCF]'s proposal."

Adoption of Willow, 433 Mass. 636, 652-653 (2001).

The plan proposed by DCF in this case was adequate and, as

such, supported the judge's decision that it was in the child's

best interest "to end all legal relations between parent and

child." Adoption of Nancy, 443 Mass at 515. The proposed plan

described the child's current placement in a licensed foster

home. The foster parents wished to adopt the child and were

preparing for permanent placement, the home was being evaluated

to ensure that it contained adequate safety features and space

for the child, the child had no special needs, and the child's

medical and educational needs were being met. That the plan

also indicated that DCF had explored placement in the care of

the child's adult sister and had attempted to aid the sister in

securing stable housing supports the sufficiency of the plan's

details. Cf. Adoption of Varik, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 771 (plan

held inadequate where DCF had not pursued request to review

suitability of kinship placement with aunt). It is a strength,

rather than a deficiency, in the plan that it is flexible enough

7
to allow a kinship placement if that becomes practical. Under

either scenario, the termination of the mother's parental rights

will enable the child's guardian to care for the child without

interference. The plan's details, considered "in combination

with the overwhelming evidence presented at trial concerning the

mother's unfitness and the child[]'s best interests," supported

the judge's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights.

Adoption of Willow, 433 Mass. at 653.

1. Post-termination visitation rights. Lastly, we affirm

the judge's decision not to order post-termination visitation

rights. This decision must be based on the best interests of

the child, Adoption of Douglas, 473 Mass. 1024, 1027-1028

(2016). Although we acknowledge the bond between the mother and

the child, the existence of such a bond does not mean that

continued visitation "would assist [the child] in her

transition." Adoption of Helga, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 521, 531

(202). Rather, given the mother's history of missing visits

after the child was removed from her care, lack of contact, and

erratic and behavior, we do not find the judge's decision to be

an abuse of discretion. Adoption of Xarissa, 99 Mass. App. Ct.

610, 625 (2021) (reviewing post-termination visitation order

8
based on inconsistency and inappropriateness of post-removal

visits).

Decree affirmed.

By the Court (Vuono,
Ditkoff & D'Angelo, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: March 3, 2026.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

9