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March 2, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Woods, E.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 792 EDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Neuman

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (5.4K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by Neuman

J-S04031-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ERICA T. WOODS :
:
Appellant : No. 792 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 28, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0002715-2022

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., STABILE, J., and NEUMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NEUMAN, J.: FILED MARCH 2, 2026

Appellant, Erica T. Woods, appeals from the judgment of sentence of 6

to 23 months’ incarceration to be served on house arrest, followed by 5 years’

reporting probation and 40 hours of community service, imposed after a non-

jury trial where she was convicted of charges related to a vehicular accident.

We affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts and pertinent procedural history of

this case, as follows:

Statement of Facts

On December 18, 2019, at around 8:00 [a.m.], Appellant, while
driving in reverse, at a high rate of speed, going the wrong
direction[] on a one-way street, in a residential neighborhood, in
the city and county of Philadelphia, struck an elderly pedestrian,
Evelyn Lofton, causing her to be catapulted to the ground. The
entire accident was captured by a video surveillance camera,
which the [t]rial [c]ourt viewed.

… [Ms.] Lofton testified that while she was crossing the street, she
was struck by Appellant’s vehicle and thrown to the ground. After
J-S04031-26

Appellant approached Ms. Lofton, Appellant began “rubbing [Ms.
Lofton’s] leg” and repeating the phrase “you can get up.” Ms.
Lofton heard Appellant on the phone also repeatedly stating the
name “Jesse.” Shortly after being struck, Ms. Lofton’s daughter[,]
Megan Malachi, who resided on the block, came to the scene. She
rendered aid to her mother and called 911. Appellant left the
scene prior to the EMTs[’] arrival, and she failed to provide her
name and insurance information to Ms. Lofton. As a result of the
accident, Ms. Lofton underwent surgery to repair her fractured
right tibia. She continues to experience ongoing pain and
discomfort from the incident.

[Ms.] Malachi corroborated her mother’s testimony. [She] also
testified that when she called 911, the dispatcher confirmed that
[she] was the only person to report the accident to 911. Ms.
Malachi also verified that Appellant failed to provide her name and
insurance information before leaving the scene prior to the arrival
of the EMT unit.

Police Officer William Barr testified that he was able to locate the
vehicle driven by Appellant at the time of the incident, a 2016
Chevy Malibu. The officer observed a “minor problem with the
rear” but “nothing severe, like a direct impact that would suggest
that the car hit some sort of large object.” The damage to the
vehicle “was very subtle, but it would correlate [to] … making
contact with a person.” During the officer’s inspection of the
vehicle, Appellant arrived at the location. Appellant identified
herself to the officer as “Tracy Williams” and claimed that she had
nothing to do with the incident. The officer eventually was able
to obtain Appellant’s real name, Erica Woods. A check of records
with the Pennsylvania Bureau of Motor Vehicles revealed that on
the date of the incident, Appellant had a suspended driver’s
license which expired in 2015. Officer Barr was also able to obtain
video surveillance footage of the incident. The video, viewed by
the [t]rial [c]ourt, corroborated Ms. Lofton’s and Ms. Malachi’s
testimony.

Jesse Roberts, Appellant’s husband, testified he arrived at the
scene of the incident in response to Appellant’s phone call. He
moved Appellant’s vehicle from the scene and returned on foot.
Mr. Roberts incredulously testified that he tried to call the police
“maybe twice.” [He] also incredulously testified that he instructed
Appellant to leave the scene because Ms. Malachi was being
belligerent. When Mr. Roberts spoke to the police at the scene,
he falsely reported that he had been operating the vehicle and

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J-S04031-26

that Ms. Lofton had already been lying on the ground prior. [He]
claimed he lied to the police to protect his wife.

Appellant testified in her own defense. Appellant admitted that
she was driving with a suspended license. [She] also admitted
that she provided a false statement and false name to the police
when questioned about the December 18, 2019 incident.
Appellant even signed her written statement with the false name,
Tracy Williams.

Procedural History

On December 9, 2024, [the trial c]ourt denied Appellant’s
[Pa.R.Crim.P.] 600 motion[,] finding that although the date of trial
was beyond the adjusted run date, the delay was not due to the
Commonwealth’s lack of due diligence. On December 11, 2024,
Appellant was found guilty of Accidents Involving Death or Injury
While Not Licensed, [75 Pa.C.S. § 3742.1(a)(1), Accidents
Involving Death or Personal Injury, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3742(a),] Simple
Assault, [18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a),] Recklessly Endangering Another
Person, [18 Pa.C.S. § 2705,] Driving While Operating Privileges
Suspended or Revoked, [75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(a),] Reckless Driving,
[75 Pa.C.S. § 3736(a),] and Aggravated Assault by Vehicle[, 75
Pa.C.S § 3732.1(a)]. A Presentence Investigation Report
[(“PSI”)] was ordered, and a sentencing hearing was scheduled.

On February 28, 2025, after listening to counsel’s arguments,
reviewing the [PSI], and confirming the standard range of
sentence for the most serious charge to be 6 to 14 months[’]
incarceration, plus or minus 6 months (Prior [R]ecord Score [of]
0 and Offense Gravity Score [of] 7), the [t]rial [c]ourt imposed
[the sentence set forth above] … on the charges of Accidents
Involving Death or Injury While Not Licensed, Accidents Involving
Death or Personal Injury, and Aggravated Assault by Vehicle. The
remaining convictions received either no further penalty or
merged for purposes of sentencing.

Appellant timely filed an appeal of the verdict and sentence on
March 24, 2025. Subsequently, Appellant’s trial counsel withdrew
his representation upon application to the Superior Court. On
June 3, 2025, the [t]rial [c]ourt appointed new counsel to
represent Appellant during the appeal process.

Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 7/16/25, at 2-5 (citations to the record omitted).

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J-S04031-26

Appellant subsequently filed the court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, and the trial

court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on July 16, 2025.

On appeal, Appellant raises ten issues, which we consolidate, restate,

and reorder as follows, for brevity and ease of disposition:

1. Whether the evidence introduced at trial and all reasonable
   inferences derived from the evidentiary record, when viewed in
   the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner,
   was insufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, all
   elements of each of the seven charges for which Appellant was
   convicted?

2. Whether the verdict of guilty on all offenses was against the
   weight of the evidence?

3. Whether the court erred by denying Appellant’s Rule
   600 motion, since the Commonwealth was not duly diligent and
   exceeded the 365 days to bring the case to trial as set forth under
   this rule?

4. Whether the sentence imposed on Appellant was harsh and
   excessive and an abuse of discretion, since the trial court failed to
   properly consider all the sentencing factors of 42 Pa.C.S. §
   9721(b) or any mitigating evidence when it imposed the sentence
   in question?

See Appellant’s Brief at 12-14.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In her first issue, Appellant argues “[t]he evidence introduced at trial

and all reasonable inferences derived from the evidentiary record, viewed in

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is insufficient

to establish all elements for the crimes for which [s]he was [convicted],

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Appellant’s Brief at 28 (emphasis omitted).

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J-S04031-26

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial
in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and
substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note
that the facts and circumstances established by the
Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence.
Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the
fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its
burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be
evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered.
Finally, the finder of fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of
witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to
believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Devine, 26 A.3d 1139, 1145 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation

and brackets omitted).

Appellant does not identify which specific element, of which specific

conviction, the Commonwealth failed to prove. See Appellant’s Brief at 29-

1. Instead, she merely sets forth the definition of each offense, and then

argues the evidence was insufficient because, “given these undisputed facts,

the Commonwealth failed to prove each and every element … beyond a

reasonable doubt[,]” or states, “the undisputed facts of this case negate the

elements.” Id. We agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant’s

undeveloped argument and failure to specify which element of which offense

lacked sufficient evidence results in waiver of her sufficiency challenge. See

Commonwealth’s Brief at 9; see also Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d

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J-S04031-26

766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“When briefing the various issues that have been

preserved, it is an appellant’s duty to present arguments that are sufficiently

developed for our review. The brief must support the claims with pertinent

discussion, with references to the record and with citations to legal authorities.

… [W]hen defects in a brief impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate

review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be

waived.”).

Nevertheless, even if her sufficiency challenge was not waived,

Appellant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to support her

convictions is without merit.

Appellant’s offense of Accidents Involving Death or Injury While Not

Licensed is defined as follows:

(a) Offense defined.-- A person whose operating privilege was
disqualified, canceled, recalled, revoked or suspended and not
restored or who does not hold a valid driver’s license … commits
an offense under this section if the person was the driver of any
vehicle and:

(1) caused an accident resulting in injury or death of a
person[.]

75 Pa.C.S. § 3742.1(a)(1). “If the victim suffers serious bodily injury, any

person violating subsection (a)(1) commits a felony of the third degree.” 75

Pa.C.S. § 3742.1(b)(2). Serious bodily injury is defined as “[a]ny bodily injury

which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent

disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily

member or organ.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 102.

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J-S04031-26

Our review of the record indicates the Commonwealth’s evidence

including testimony, admissions by Appellant, video footage, and business

records, as found credible by the trial court, established: (1) Appellant’s

license was suspended and expired, (2) Appellant was driving her 2016 Chevy

Malibu, which struck the victim, (3) the accident caused a torn meniscus and

fracture to the victim’s right tibia requiring surgery and the insertion of a metal

plate in the knee to repair the injuries sustained, leading to ongoing pain and

discomfort, and (4) the victim’s injuries constitute serious bodily injury under

Section 102. See N.T. Waiver Trial, 12/11/24, at 11-12, 17, 43, 78; see also

Exhibits C-5, C-6, C-7. This evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s

conviction for Accidents Involving Death or Injury While Not Licensed.

Appellant’s offense of Accidents Involving Death or Personal Injury is

defined as follows:

(a) General rule.--The driver of any vehicle involved in an
accident resulting in injury or death of any person shall
immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as
close thereto as possible but shall then forthwith return to and in
every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has
fulfilled the requirements of section 3744 (relating to duty to give
information and render aid). Every stop shall be made without
obstructing traffic more than is necessary.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3742(a). “If the victim suffers serious bodily injury, any person

violating subsection (a) commits a felony of the third degree….” 75 Pa.C.S. §

3742(b)(2).

In addition to the facts set forth above, the record supports the trial

court’s finding that “[a]lthough Appellant did remain on the scene for a short

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J-S04031-26

time, she did leave prior to the arrival of the EMT Unit, and Appellant failed to

provide her name or insurance information to either the victim … or the

victim’s daughter….” TCO at 12-13, see also N.T. Waiver Trial at 16, 31.

Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction.

For Appellant’s offense of Simple Assault, “a person is guilty of assault

if he … attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes

bodily injury to another[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1). Appellant clearly caused

bodily injury to the victim in this case. “Based on the credible testimony and

the video footage, the [t]rial [c]ourt found that Appellant acted recklessly

when she drove her vehicle in reverse, at a high rate of speed, in the wrong

direction on a one-way street, in a residential neighborhood.” TCO at 13. Our

review of the record supports the trial court’s findings. Thus, the evidence

was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for Simple Assault.

For Appellant’s conviction of Recklessly Endangering Another Person,

“[a] person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he recklessly

engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of

death or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result
from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that, considering the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct and
the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person
would observe in the actor’s situation.

-8-
J-S04031-26

18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(3). As set forth above, the Commonwealth’s evidence

established Appellant acted recklessly by driving in reverse, at a high rate of

speed, in the wrong direction down a one-way street, in a residential

neighborhood, thereby placing the victim, a pedestrian, in danger of death or

serious injury. “As the [t]rial [c]ourt explained, even if Appellant’s excuse for

backing down the street were to be believed, the fact that she did so at a high

rate of speed in a residential neighborhood was reckless….” TCO at 14

(emphasis in original). Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support

Appellant’s conviction.

For Appellant’s offense of Driving while Operating Privileges Suspended

or Revoked, “any person who drives a motor vehicle on any highway or

trafficway of this Commonwealth after the commencement of a suspension,

revocation or cancellation of the operating privilege and before the operating

privilege has been restored is guilty of a summary offense….” 75 Pa.C.S. §

1543(a). Our review of the record indicates the Commonwealth’s evidence

established Appellant was driving the 2016 Chevy Malibu on a roadway while

her license was expired, and Appellant also admitted she was driving with a

suspended license. The evidence was therefore sufficient to sustain

Appellant’s conviction for this offense.

For Appellant’s crime of Reckless Driving, “[a]ny person who drives any

vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is

guilty of reckless driving.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3736(a). As set forth above, the

Commonwealth’s evidence, including video footage, established Appellant

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J-S04031-26

drove in reverse down a one-way street at a high rate of speed in a residential

neighborhood. This was sufficient to prove she committed the offense of

reckless driving.

For Appellant’s offense of Aggravated Assault by Vehicle,

[a]ny person who recklessly or with gross negligence causes
serious bodily injury to another person while engaged in the
violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance
applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation
of traffic, except section 3802 (relating to driving under influence
of alcohol or controlled substance), is guilty of aggravated assault
by vehicle, a felony of the third degree when the violation is the
cause of the injury.

75 Pa.C.S § 3732.1(a). Our review of the record as set forth above shows the

Commonwealth’s evidence established Appellant drove recklessly and caused

serious bodily injury to the victim while in violation of multiple laws of this

Commonwealth. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to sustain her

conviction for this offense.

In sum, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, it is clear there was sufficient evidence to enable the trial

court to find the Commonwealth had proven, beyond a reasonable doubt,

every element of each of the seven charges for which Appellant was convicted.

Therefore, even if Appellant’s sufficiency claim was not waived, we would

conclude it lacks merit.

Weight of the Evidence

In her second issue, Appellant argues the verdict of guilty on all offenses

was against the weight of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 30-32. Initially,

• 10 - J-S04031-26

we conclude Appellant’s claim is waived. To properly preserve a challenge to

the weight of the evidence, that claim must be raised before the trial court.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A) (stating a claim the verdict was against weight of

evidence must be raised before trial court orally or in a written motion prior

to sentencing, or in a post-sentence motion). Appellant did not orally raise,

nor file a written pre- or post-sentence motion raising this issue, and she fails

to point to where in the record she preserved this claim prior to sentencing.

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e) (directing the appellant to set forth in the argument portion

of his brief where in the record he preserved the issue before the trial court);

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 938 (Pa. Super. 2013) (finding a

weight of the evidence claim waived where the appellant failed to raise it in a

pre-sentence motion, did not address the issue orally prior to sentencing, and

did not raise it in a post-sentence motion).

Even if the issue were not waived, we would conclude Appellant’s claim

is meritless. Our Supreme Court has explained:

A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the evidence
is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, an
appellate court reviews the exercise of the trial court’s discretion;
it does not answer for itself whether the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence. It is well[-]settled that the [trier of fact]
is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to
determine the credibility of the witnesses, and a new trial based
on a weight of the evidence claim is only warranted where the
[trier of fact]’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks
one’s sense of justice. In determining whether this standard has
been met, appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge’s
discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted
where the facts and inferences of record disclose a palpable abuse
of discretion.

• 11 - J-S04031-26

Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1135-36 (Pa. 2011) (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted).

In addition to the factual background and analysis regarding the

sufficiency of the evidence set forth above, the trial court cited the following

facts in concluding that its verdict was not contrary to the weight of the

evidence:

In the instant matter, the Commonwealth presented the credible
testimony of Ms. Lofton, Ms. Malachi, and Officer Barr. In addition
to the credible testimony, the Commonwealth provided
corroboration through video footage, medical records[,] and
business records. The Commonwealth also provided evidence
demonstrating Appellant’s consciousness of guilt [by] producing
Appellant’s use of a false name, providing a statement in which
she falsely claimed she was not driving the 2016 Chevy Malibu,
and even signing the false statement with her false name, Tracy
Williams. Finally, the [t]rial [c]ourt determined that the testimony
of Appellant and her husband, Mr. Roberts, was mostly
incredulous. Therefore, the credible testimony and corroborating
evidence amply provides a weight of evidence to support the guilty
verdict.

TCO at 19 (citations to the record omitted).

Based on the entirety of the record, we would conclude there was no

abuse of discretion by the trial court in finding the weight of the evidence

supported the verdict, even had Appellant preserved this issue.

Rule 600

In her third issue, Appellant argues “the [trial] court erred by denying

the Rule 600 [m]otion since the Commonwealth was not duly diligent and

exceeded the 365 days to bring the case to trial as set forth under this rule.”

Appellant’s Brief at 24.

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In evaluating Rule [600] issues, our standard of review of a trial
court’s decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion.
Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon
facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing
and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not merely an
error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is
overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly
unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will,
as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.

The proper scope of review … is limited to the evidence on the
record of the Rule [600] evidentiary hearing, and the findings of
the [trial] court. An appellate court must view the facts in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party.

Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en

banc) (citation omitted). Rule 600 states, in pertinent part:

(A) Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial

(1) For the purpose of this rule, trial shall be deemed to
commence on the date the trial judge calls the case to trial,
or the defendant tenders a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.

(2) Trial shall commence within the following time periods.

(a) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint
is filed against the defendant shall commence within
365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.

---

(C) Computation of Time

(1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any
stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth
when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due
diligence shall be included in the computation of the time
within which trial must commence. Any other periods of
delay shall be excluded from the computation.

…

(3)(a) When a judge or issuing authority grants or denies a
continuance:

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(i) the issuing authority shall record the identity of the
party requesting the continuance and the reasons for
granting or denying the continuance; and

(ii) the judge shall record the identity of the party
requesting the continuance and the reasons for
granting or denying the continuance. The judge also
shall record to which party the period of delay caused
by the continuance shall be attributed, and whether
the time will be included in or excluded from the
computation of the time within which trial must
commence in accordance with this rule.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A), (C).

[I]n ruling on a defendant’s Rule 600 motion to dismiss, a trial
court must first determine whether the Commonwealth has met
its obligation to act with due diligence throughout the life of the
case; if the Commonwealth meets its burden of proving due
diligence, only then may the trial court rely upon its own
congested calendar or other scheduling problems as justification
for denying the defendant’s motion.

Otherwise, the due diligence component of Rule 600 “would have
little, if any, meaningful import.” [Commonwealth v.] Mills, 162
A.3d [323,] 327 (Pa. 2017).

Commonwealth v. Harth, 252 A.3d 600, 618 (Pa. 2021) (footnote omitted).

Relevant to Appellant’s argument herein, we observe that

in Commonwealth v. Simms, 500 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1985), the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court clarified the standard for determining when the Rule

600 period begins to run in a case where multiple complaints have been filed

against a defendant. The Supreme Court explained:

[W]hen an initial complaint has been withdrawn or otherwise
dismissed, the [Rule 600 time] period begins to run anew with the
filing of a subsequent complaint only if (1) the earlier complaint
was properly dismissed by a competent magisterial or judicial

• 14 - J-S04031-26

authority, and (2) the record does not reveal evidence of a
prosecution attempt to circumvent Rule [600 1].

Id. at 803; accord Commonwealth v. Schafer, 576 A.2d 392, 394 (Pa.

1990) (holding the Rule 1100 period began to run at the filing of the second

complaint where charges were dismissed by the trial court due to a lack of a

prima facie case and a lack of prosecution and there was no attempt by the

Commonwealth to circumvent the Rule).

In this case, the extent of Appellant’s Rule 600 challenge is limited to

the following:

[Appellant] argues the Commonwealth was attempting to
circumvent Rule 600 as it proceeded with the Preliminary Hearing
knowing that it was missing crucial witnesses necessary for its
case as evidenced in these witnesses being called at the refiled
hearing. Since the original criminal complaint in this case was
filed on [November] 10, 2020, the mechanical run date is
[November] 10, 2021.

For purposes of the Rule, there could arguably be 248 days
attributable to [Appellant] and 340 days attributable to the court
in this matter; thus adjusting the run date to June 21, 2023. The
Commonwealth did not show due diligence in bringing [Appellant]
to trial within 365 days from the mechanical run date.

Appellant’s Brief at 35-36.

Appellant’s bald assertions that the Commonwealth was attempting to

circumvent Rule 600 and did not show due diligence in bringing Appellant to

trial are not supported by any pertinent legal authority or references to the

record. See Hardy, 918 A.2d at 771; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(c).

Beyond seemingly arguing the court’s Rule 600 calculation should have

---

1 Simms addressed Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100, the predecessor to Rule 600.

• 15 - J-S04031-26

included the 11 months between the filing of the first complaint and the filing

of the second, Appellant fails to specify any details regarding the periods she

concedes could be excluded from the calculations. She also does not identify

any other periods of time attributable to the Commonwealth that the trial court

should have included in the calculation but did not. Appellant also fails to

provide any specific allegations regarding at what points prior to trial the

Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence. Due to Appellant’s failure to

meaningfully develop her Rule 600 argument, we conclude it is waived. See

Hardy, supra.

Nevertheless, even if not waived, we would conclude Appellant’s claim

is meritless. In response to Appellant’s claim that the calculation for Rule 600

should run from the date of the first filed complaint rather than the second,

the trial court opined:

In the instant matter, a review of the court docket indicates that
a complaint was originally filed on November 10, 2020[,] by the
Commonwealth against Appellant regarding the December 18,
2019 incident. On October 15, 2021, the complaint was dismissed
for lack of evidence. On November 3, 2021, the Commonwealth
refiled the charges against … Appellant stemming from the
December 18, 2019 incident. This time, on April 1, 2022, the
charges were held for court.

The [t]rial [c]ourt determined [that,] because the earlier
complaint was properly dismissed by a competent magisterial or
judicial authority and the record does not reveal evidence of a
prosecution attempt to circumvent Rule 600, pursuant to Lynn,[2]

---

2 See Commonwealth v. Lynn, 815 A.2d 1055, 1058 (Pa. Super. 2003)
(quoting the Simms “standard for determining when the Rule 600 period
beings to run in a case where multiple complaints have been filed against a
defendant”).

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the date of refiling the complaint, November 3, 2021[,] was the
date to be utilized for purposes of [Rule 600] calculations.

TCO at 20.

Upon our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion in the

trial court’s determination that Rule 600 time calculations began anew upon

the filing of the subsequent complaint. Appellant’s argument rests on the

premise that the Commonwealth proceeded with the preliminary hearing

knowing it was missing crucial witnesses necessary for its case. However, this

argument is belied by the record of the Rule 600 hearing, where the following

exchange occurred:

[The Commonwealth]: The complainant and Officer Barr testified
on [October 15, 2021,] according to the notes.

THE COURT: According to your notes?

[The Commonwealth]: No. The notes of testimony that I am
looking at.

THE COURT: I don’t have the notes of testimony. So[,] you are
saying your main officer did testify, then why did it get discharged
for lack of evidence? If you had your main officer and the
complainant, how come it didn’t get past the preliminary hearing
stage?

[The Commonwealth]: So, Your Honor, I am assuming it was
based on defense argument.

THE COURT: [Defense counsel], what do you have on October 15,
2021, why it wasn’t held for court?

[Defense Counsel]: On October 15, 2021, and then on February
11, 2022. And so[,] the complainant testified on October 15 th and
Officer Barr. So that’s the two people. And the person who
testified on February 11th, the second hearing, was the
complainant’s daughter who, you know – I was there, nobody else
was, but who was present but not called at the October date.

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THE COURT: Okay. So, again, that goes to the idea that they just
put on a bad case, not that they were trying to defeat the 365.

[Defense Counsel]: One could argue.

N.T. Rule 600 Hearing, 12/9/24, at 24-25. It is clear from the record that

both Officer Barr and the complainant testified at the preliminary hearing, and

the only additional witness called at the second preliminary hearing was the

victim’s daughter. Therefore, the Commonwealth was not missing ‘crucial

witnesses’ at the initial preliminary hearing, as Appellant contends. As she

presents no other challenge to the court’s determination, we conclude there

was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding the first complaint was

properly dismissed and the record lacked evidence of a prosecution attempt

to circumvent Rule 600, as required by Simms.

Further, upon review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion in

the trial court’s decision that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence

throughout the duration of the case. The court found the delay in bringing

Appellant to trial was primarily due to “the [t]rial [c]ourt’s limited availability

in its schedule to conduct jury trials, and the long delays between the

scheduled jury trial dates was not the fault of the Commonwealth.” TCO at

22-23; see also Trial Court Docket Sheet. For instance, the court noted the

Commonwealth had to request continuances due to an eyewitness testing

positive for COVID, the “elderly victim … being exposed to COVID[,]” and the

“elderly victim[’s] being hospitalized.” TCO at 22. The court deemed this time

excusable. Id. Appellant does not assert any challenge to the court’s

determination that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence during these

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delays. Therefore, even if this claim were not waived, we would discern no

basis to disturb the discretion of the trial court.

Discretionary Aspects of Sentence

In her fourth and final issue, Appellant argues the sentence imposed

was “harsh and excessive and an abuse of discretion[,] since the [trial] court

failed to properly consider all of the sentencing factors of 42 Pa.C.S.[] §

9721(b) or any mitigating evidence….” Appellant’s Brief at 24.

Appellant’s issue implicates the discretionary aspects of her sentence.

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
entitle an appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth v.
Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000). An appellant
challenging the discretionary aspects of [their] sentence must
invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
[the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether [the]
appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
(4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence
appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing
Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super.
2006)…. Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are
generally waived if they are not raised at the sentencing hearing
or in a motion to modify the sentence imposed. Commonwealth
v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2003)….

The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul,
925 A.2d 825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). A substantial question
exists “only when the appellant advances a colorable argument
that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent
with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary

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to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.”
Sierra, supra at 912–13.

Griffin, 65 A.3d at 935 (quoting Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162,

170 (Pa. Super. 2010)).

Here, although Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a Rule

2119(f) statement, the record is devoid of any objection made at the time of

sentencing or any post-sentencing motions. Therefore, we conclude Appellant

failed to preserve this issue before the trial court and it is waived. See id. at

936 (“[I]ssues challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be

raised in a post-sentence motion or by presenting the claim to the trial court

during the sentencing proceedings. Absent such efforts, an objection to

a discretionary aspect of a sentence is waived.”) (citation omitted).

Even if the issue was not waived, and had we determined Appellant

raised a substantial question, we would ultimately conclude Appellant’s claim

is meritless.

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of
the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on
appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an
abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment.
Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record,
that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised
its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006).

Additionally, in crafting a sentence, courts are directed to consider “the

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact

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on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs

of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).

Here, Appellant challenges whether the sentence imposed was “harsh

and excessive and an abuse of discretion[,] since the [trial] court failed to

properly consider all of the sentencing factors of 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9721(b) or

any mitigating evidence….” Appellant’s Brief at 24. Appellant argues “the

[trial] court, in essence, only considered the seriousness of the offenses

without addressing any … mitigating factors when it imposed an aggravated

range sentence.” Id. at 27 (citation omitted). Specifically, she avers “the

[trial] court, in its discretion, failed to consider [Appellant’s] criminal history,

age, employment, mental health, dysfunctional upbringing, and/or other

personal characteristics.” Id. at 27-28.

A thorough review of the record reveals the court considered the

mitigating and statutory factors set forth by Appellant. Notably, the court had

and reviewed a PSI. Thus, we “presume[] the court was aware of and weighed

all relevant information contained [in the report] along with any mitigating

sentencing factors.” Commonwealth v. Velez, 273 A.3d 6, 10 (Pa. Super.

2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, prior to sentencing

Appellant, the trial court set forth its reasoning as follows:

[Appellant], you had no business being on the road. You didn’t
have a valid license[]. You’ve had a substantial period of time of
not having a valid license[] and you’re repeatedly telling this
[c]ourt that you didn’t do wrong that day, that you stayed, you
called 911, you were the upright citizen and that this [c]ourt is so
wrong for finding you guilty. I know that’s what you’re saying[,]
and you have that right to [say] that to me, and I know you’re

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protesting your innocence and that’s perfectly fine. But that’s
what I have to deal with when … I have a perpetual person who’s
been driving on the roads in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
and causing a substantial accident to another person. She didn’t
do anything wrong that day[,] other than just crossing the street.

And I am remembering exactly how every[one] gasped when they
saw how fast you were going down on that Ring camera. You
were going so fast, anybody backing down a residential street
using any care knows go as slow as possible. You zipped like you
didn’t want to be bothered and … then subsequently watching you
trying to get her up, trying to get her up, trying to get her up.

And then you told me repeatedly that the daughter was
intimidating you and you were afraid and didn’t want to be there
anymore because you were so scared for yourself. I didn’t see
that body language. I didn’t see her doing anything to you.

And then the wors[t] part is when the police confront you, you
give a false name, still not taking the responsibility[, and] … you
want to tell this [c]ourt that you didn’t do anything wrong that
day, and you were such a responsible person because you called
911, [but] it’s hard for me to find that to be true because the
evidence says something totally different.

So[,] I mean, I know you don’t think you did anything, and again
that’s your right and you have every right to protest your
innocence. You obviously have convinced your family because I
hear that from all of them in the letters, just as the
Commonwealth has pointed out, they feel that [an] injustice was
done, that this [c]ourt rendered an invalid verdict, and again,
that’s your prerogative. But I heard the testimony.

I saw what you did, and again I know for a fact [that,] but for that
Ring camera[,] she would never have got[ten] her day in court,
she would have never had justice. It was just sheer luck that
somebody happened to have a Ring camera that pointed out onto
[that] street, not everybody does that. And you should thank that
neighbor. Thank that neighbor, ma’am.

But [defense counsel], you make very good points because I do
know that there is mitigation here. And I mention that because
as far as I’m concerned right now[,] I think there are a lot of
aggravated factors that the Commonwealth has pointed out, but
there is a lot of mitigation.

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I see a substantial work history, and I agree with you, that is a
phenomenal thing that I don’t want to take away. Regardless [of]
whether or not [Appellant] has dependents, there’s a lot of people
who are obviously relying on her and also[,] that just shows her
character. I am a big advocate for people who work. I think that
says everything about somebody’s character.

I do find the fact that her family is here does mean something,
absolutely. They are here standing with her and that does mean
that, as you were saying, there is something to be said about[,]
obviously she has character in the community. Not everybody
shows up for sentencing like this. So[,] we are in a balance. How
do I address all of this.

Now one of the first things I will mention is I had already thought
about community service being part of this because, [Appellant],
you need to learn what community really means. Community is
not just your family. It’s your whole neighborhood. It’s the people
you work with, the people we live near. I don’t even care if you
get to know them or not. They’re part of your community. What
you did that day is you violated that trust in that community.
So[,] I had already considered part of the sentence to have
community service.

I do believe that there should be some type of confinement[,] but
I think house arrest would address it, only because I do believe
that there should be some ramifications for somebody driving
after how many periods of years not … having a valid license and
causing this accident. I’m assuming house arrest would not be an
issue for her because verified work[ would be] perfectly
permissible.

N.T. Sentencing, 2/28/25, at 53-58.

Here, it is clear from the record that the court considered the statutory

requirements and all the mitigating factors listed by Appellant. It is also clear

the court balanced the mitigating factors with the aggravating ones prior to

imposing a sentence. Based upon all the evidence before it, the court imposed

a sentence of 6 to 23 months’ incarceration to be served on house arrest,

followed by 5 years’ reporting probation and 40 hours of community service,

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a sentence falling within the standard range of the guidelines. We conclude

the record supports the sentencing court’s reasoning and its decision conforms

to the applicable law. As such, even if Appellant’s claim was not waived, we

would discern no abuse of discretion, as Appellant has not established “the

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for

reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill will,” or “arrived at a manifestly

unreasonable decision.” Shugars, 895 A.2d at 1275.

For these reasons, we conclude Appellant’s claims are waived and/or

meritless. As she is not entitled to relief, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 3/2/2026

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