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March 2, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Slepsky

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 709
• Docket Number: 2025-G-0014

• Judges: Patton

• Opinion

• Authorities (31)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (28.7K)

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Syllabus

CRIMINAL LAW - motion in limine; no contest plea; explanation of circumstances; factual basis; Crim.R. 11; effect of the plea; aggravated vehicular homicide; R.C. 2903.06(A)(2); aggravated vehicular assault; R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a); marijuana metabolite; urine; blood; abuse of discretion; factual basis as presented did not negate any element of the charged offense; plain error; bill of particulars; trial court complied with Crim.R. 11; written plea agreement.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State v. Slepsky, 2026-Ohio-709.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
GEAUGA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2025-G-0014

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas

JASON A. SLEPSKY,
Trial Court No. 2023 C 000156
Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Decided: March 2, 2026
Judgment: Affirmed

James R. Flaiz, Geauga County Prosecutor, and Nicholas A. Burling, Assistant
Prosecutor, Courthouse Annex, 231 Main Street, Suite 3A, Chardon, OH 44024 (For
Plaintiff-Appellee).

Catherine R. Meehan, Patituce & Associates, L.L.C., 16855 Foltz Industrial Parkway,
Suite 1, Strongsville, OH 44149 (For Defendant-Appellant).

ROBERT J. PATTON, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Jason A. Slepsky (“Slepsky”), appeals from the

judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to an aggregate

mandatory prison term of 48 months as a result of his convictions of aggravated vehicular

homicide, a felony of the third degree, and two counts of aggravated vehicular assault,

third-degree felonies. Slepsky also appeals the trial court’s ruling granting appellee, the

State of Ohio’s (“State”), motion in limine. For the following reasons, we affirm.

{¶2} Slepsky presents three assignments of error for review. In his first

assignment of error, Slepsky asserts that the trial court erred when it granted the State’s
motion in limine. Generally, a no contest plea waives appellate review of a ruling on a

motion in limine. State v. Engle, 1996-Ohio-179, ¶ 16 (Resnick, J., concurring). However,

it is apparent from the record that the State and Slepsky intended to preserve this issue

on appeal. Moreover, the trial court’s decision precluding defense counsel from calling an

expert to testify about the absence of marijuana metabolite in Slepsky’s blood and any

lack of impairment was more akin to a decision on a motion to suppress, insofar as

the evidence and testimony would not have become relevant and admissible at trial under

the circumstances. Thus, the trial court’s decision was final and the issue was preserved

for appeal. Upon review of the limited record, this court concludes that the trial court did

not err, or otherwise abuse its discretion, when it granted the State’s motion in limine.

{¶3} Next, Slepsky contends that the trial court erred when it accepted his no

contest plea where the State’s explanation of circumstances was insufficient to support

the convictions. We conclude that the indictment, bill of particulars, and the State’s

recitation of the facts were sufficient to support Slepsky’s convictions in this case.

Additionally, the State’s explanation of circumstances did not negate any element of the

offenses.

{¶4} In his final assignment of error, Slepsky contends that the trial court failed

to comply with Crim.R. 11 by failing to advise him of the effect of his no contest plea. The

record indicates otherwise. Specifically, the transcript of the hearing in conjunction with

the signed, written plea agreement, illustrate that Slepsky was advised of and understood

the effect of his plea.

{¶5} As none of Slepsky’s assignments of error are meritorious, the judgment of

the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

PAGE 2 OF 23

Case No. 2025-G-0014
Substantive and Procedural Facts

{¶6} On December 18, 2023, the Geauga County Grand Jury, in a six-count

indictment, charged Slepsky with: aggravated vehicular homicide, a second-degree

felony, in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a) (“Count 1”); aggravated vehicular assault, a

third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a) (“Count 2”); aggravated vehicular

assault, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C, 2903.08(A)(1)(a) (“Count 3”); operating

a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them, a first-

degree misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) (“Count 4”); operating a

vehicle under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them, a first-

degree misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(j)(viii) (“Count 5”); and failure to

stop at a stop sign, a minor misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 4511.43(A) (“Count 6”).1

{¶7} On January 18, 2024, Slepsky pleaded not guilty at arraignment. On April

11, 2024, at Slepsky’s request, the trial court modified his bond conditions and removed

the requirement that Slepsky wear a Secure Continuous Remote Alcohol Monitor

(“SCRAM”) ankle bracelet. As a condition of his bond, the trial court ordered Slepsky to

submit to random drug screening.

{¶8} On October 23, 2024, the State filed a bill of particulars and filed a motion

to amend the indictment. The motion to amend the indictment sought to dismiss Count 4.

The trial court granted the State’s motion to amend the indictment on October 25, 2024.

{¶9} On October 28, 2024, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude

testimony or other evidence regarding: 1) the testing of Slepsky’s blood; 2) the effect

marijuana metabolite may or may not have on the impairment of an individual; 3) how

1. The charges were originally filed in the Chardon Municipal Court on September 26, 2023 and were bound over to the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas on October 11, 2023. PAGE 3 OF 23

Case No. 2025-G-0014
long a metabolite remains in a person's urine after use; and 4) when Slepsky last used

marijuana prior to the incident. Slepsky opposed the motion. On January 21, 2025, the

trial court granted the State’s motion in limine. Specifically, the trial court stated, “[g]iven

the wording of [R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)], taken in conjunction with [this court]’s holding in State

v. Naylor, 2024-Ohio-1648” the evidence would be excluded. The court below also

indicated that the order did not “interfere with Defense counsel’s ability to argue against

the results of the urine analysis” regarding whether the marijuana metabolite in Slepsky’s

urine exceeded the statutory limit.

{¶10} On February 2, 2025, Slepsky pleaded no contest to aggravated vehicular

homicide, a violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2), which the parties described as a lesser

included offense to the offense originally charged in the indictment (“Amended Count 1”),

a felony of the third degree; aggravated vehicular assault, a third-degree felony (“Count

2”), and aggravated vehicular assault, a third-degree felony (“Count 3”). The State agreed

to dismiss Counts 5 and 6 of the indictment.

{¶11} The State offered the following factual basis at the plea hearing:

We would have shown that on September 26th of 2023, Mr.
Slepsky was operating a vehicle. During the operation of that
vehicle, he struck the side of an ambulance, flipping it over
that caused the death of the patient who was in the back of
the ambulance, and also caused serious physical harm to the
driver and the EMT who was in the back with the patient.
An accident reconstruction determined that he was traveling
at a speed that would have been consistent with going through
the stop sign instead of stopping at it.

And then the Troopers obtained a urine sample from him, sent
it out for testing, and it came back with the presence of
approximately 52 nanograms per millimeter of marijuana
metabolite in his urine at the time of the crash.

PAGE 4 OF 23

Case No. 2025-G-0014
Dkt. 195, T.p. Plea Hearing Transcript, p. 16. There was no objection to the factual basis.

The trial court ordered a presentence investigation (“PSI”).

{¶12} On April 14, 2025, the trial court sentenced Slepsky to a prison term of 48

months on Count 1; a mandatory prison term of 48 months on Count 2; and a mandatory

prison term of 36 months on Count 3.The trial court also suspended Slepsky’s driver’s

license for 6 years.2 The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently to each other.

At the sentencing hearing, the State asked for $20,412.46 in restitution to South Central

Ambulance District for equipment costs not covered through insurance. Slepsky objected

to the specific amount. The trial court did not impose restitution. The State was also

granted leave to dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment, Counts 4, 5 and 6, at the

sentencing hearing.3 Slepsky’s counsel orally moved for stay of execution of his sentence.

While the State did not oppose the stay, the trial court required a written motion to be filed

with the notice of appeal.

{¶13} Two days later, on April 16, 2025, Slepsky filed his notice of appeal and the

trial court granted the motion to stay Slepsky’s sentence pending appeal.

The Appeal

{¶14} Slepsky raises three assignments of error for review:

“[1.] The trial court erred in granting the State’s motion in
limine.”

“[2.] The trial court erred in finding appellant guilty, after
accepting a no contest plea when the facts did not support the
conviction.”

1. The trial court imposed a mandatory Class 2 suspension on Count 1 and mandatory Class 3 suspensions on Counts 3 and 4.
2. Count 4 was previously dismissed on October 25, 2024, when the trial court granted the State’s motion for leave to amend the indictment. PAGE 5 OF 23

Case No. 2025-G-0014
“[3.] The trial court erred in accepting appellant’s plea when
it failed to comply with Crim.R. 11.”

State’s Motion in Limine

{¶15} In his first assignment of error, Slepsky asserts that the trial court erred

when it granted the State’s motion in limine prohibiting the defense from introducing

evidence or testimony regarding the accuracy of the urine results.

{¶16} “[A] motion in limine, if granted, is a tentative, interlocutory, precautionary

ruling by the trial court reflecting its anticipatory treatment of the evidentiary issue. In

virtually all circumstances finality does not attach when the motion is granted. Therefore,

should circumstances subsequently develop at trial, the trial court is certainly at liberty . .

. to consider the admissibility of the disputed evidence in its actual context.” State v.

Grubb, 28 Ohio St.3d 199, 201-202 (1986), citing State v. White, 6 Ohio App.3d 1, 4 (8th

Dist. 1982).

{¶17} The Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Grubb further stated:

The effect of the granting of a motion in limine in favor
of the state in a criminal proceeding is to temporarily
prohibit the defendant from making reference to
evidence which is the subject of the motion. At trial it is
incumbent upon a defendant, who has been
temporarily restricted from introducing evidence by
virtue of a motion in limine, to seek the introduction of
the evidence by proffer or otherwise in order to enable
the court to make a final determination as to its
admissibility and to preserve any objection on the
record for purposes of appeal. In the case at bar,
appellant failed to make any such proffer and therefore
we conclude, consistent with Evid.R. 103, that he
waived his right to object to the evidentiary issue on
appeal.

PAGE 6 OF 23

Case No. 2025-G-0014
(Citation and footnote omitted.) Id. at 203. Therefore, when a motion in limine is granted

in favor of the State, a defendant must preserve an objection to a trial court’s ruling by

proffering the disputed evidence.

{¶18} “The established rule in Ohio is that the grant or denial of a motion in limine

is not a ruling on the evidence.” State v. Thompson, 2005-Ohio-2053, ¶ 26 (3d Dist.),

citing Grubb at 200-201 (1986). Thus, as the trial court can change its decision at trial,

“[f]inality does not attach when [a motion in limine] is granted.” Grubb at 201-202.

{¶19} In the court below, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to limit the

introduction of any evidence or testimony by the defense at trial related to the following:

the testing of the Slepsky’s blood; the effect of marijuana metabolite including any

impairment of an individual as a result of marijuana metabolite; the length of time that

marijuana metabolite remains in a person's urine after use; and the last known use of

marijuana by Slepsky prior to the underlying incident.

{¶20} According to the State’s motion, defense counsel indicated that it planned

to call Lindsie Mayfield (“Mayfield”), the lab analyst that had tested Slepsky’s blood, to

discuss the absence of marijuana metabolite in his blood. Defense counsel wanted to

introduce the evidence in an effort to refute or otherwise call into question the accuracy

of Deborah Lindstrom’s (“Lindstrom”) report, which determined that Slepsky’s urine

contained marijuana metabolite.

{¶21} The trial court, in granting the State’s motion, precluded Slepsky from

eliciting testimony regarding the levels of marijuana metabolite, or lack thereof, in

Slepsky’s blood. The court below also excluded any testimony or other evidence

regarding any impairment, or lack thereof, as a result of the presence of the marijuana

PAGE 7 OF 23

Case No. 2025-G-0014
metabolite. However, the trial court explicitly stated that defense counsel was permitted

to cross-examine the State’s expert regarding the marijuana metabolite and the veracity

of the urine test results.

{¶22} Instead of proceeding to a trial or proffering testimony, Slepsky opted to

enter a plea of no contest. “By entering a plea of no contest * * *, the defendant voluntarily

waives the right to appeal the ruling on the motion [in limine].” Engle, 1996-Ohio-179 at ¶

16 (Resnick, J., concurring). See State v. Guth, 2016-Ohio-8221, ¶ 15 (11th Dist.).

However, when a ruling on a motion in limine is the functional equivalent of a suppression

ruling, or where the parties intend to preserve the issue for appeal as a basis of a no-

contest plea, the plea does not operate as a waiver. See State v. Walters, 2023-Ohio-

2701, ¶ 25 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Napier, 2017-Ohio-246, ¶ 18-20 (12th Dist.); see

also State v. Johnston, 2015-Ohio-450, ¶ 23-25 (2d Dist.).

{¶23} Here, the trial court's ruling on the motion in limine was not a preliminary

determination regarding the evidence which could be revisited at trial. Instead, the trial

court conclusively determined that defense counsel would not be allowed to elicit

testimony regarding the absence of marijuana metabolite in Slepsky’s blood or whether

the marijuana metabolite caused impairment. Further, it is apparent from the record on

appeal that the parties intended to preserve this issue for appeal.

{¶24} A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion in limine is reviewed under

an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Coxwell, 2012-Ohio-6215 ¶ 19 (11th Dist.), citing

State v. Lemons, 2010-Ohio-3807, ¶ 37 (11th Dist.). “‘[W]hen the trial court determines

that certain evidence will be * * * excluded from trial, it is well established that the order

or ruling of the court will not be reversed unless there has been a clear and prejudicial

PAGE 8 OF 23

Case No. 2025-G-0014
abuse of discretion.’” State v. Fast, 2021-Ohio-2548, ¶ 73 (11th Dist.), quoting O'Brien v.

Angley, 63 Ohio St.2d 159, 163 (1980). An abuse of discretion is the trial court's “‘failure

to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.’” State v. Beechler, 2010-

Ohio-1900, ¶ 62 (2d Dist.), quoting Black's Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004). Therefore, upon

review of an issue which is confided to the discretion of the trial court, the mere fact that

a reviewing court would have reached a different result, without more, is not enough, to

find error. Id.

{¶25} In Slepsky’s response in opposition to the State’s motion in limine,

Slepsky asserted that he intended “to attach the specific urine result . . . as being

inaccurate as permitted by Supreme Court [of Ohio] precedent” in State v. Vega, 12 Ohio

St.3d 185, 465 N.E. 2d 1303 (1984). The trial court, in granting the State’s motion in

limine, determined that R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(j)(viii)(II) was a per se violation, which required

proof of marijuana metabolite in the blood or the urine in excess of a specific

concentration.

{¶26} R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(j)(viii)(II) states:

(A)(1) No person shall operate any vehicle, streetcar, or
trackless trolley within this state, if, at the time of the
operation, any of the following apply:

...

The person has a concentration of marihuana metabolite in
the person's urine of at least thirty-five nanograms of
marihuana metabolite per milliliter of the person's urine or has
a concentration of marihuana metabolite in the person's whole
blood or blood serum or plasma of at least fifty nanograms of
marihuana metabolite per milliliter of the person's whole blood
or blood serum or plasma.

PAGE 9 OF 23

Case No. 2025-G-0014
{¶27} The trial court determined: “[g]iven the use of the word ‘or’ in the statutory

language, the court agrees that the evidence of the testing of Defendant's blood may

serve to confuse or mislead the jury and said evidence would not be relevant.”

Additionally, the charged offense did not require the State to prove any level of

impairment. As such, the trial court excluded any testimony or evidence regarding

impairment and the duration of the effects of the marijuana metabolite, as well as the

length of time between last usage and the accident.

{¶28} Upon review, this court concludes that the trial court did not err or otherwise

abuse its discretion when it granted the State’s motion in limine. Neither Slepsky nor his

counsel proffered the testimony or otherwise provided the court below with any indication

of the scope of the witness’s testimony and how such testimony was relevant to the

charges. It is clear from the record that the State was pursuing a conviction pursuant to

R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(j)(viii)(II), a per se violation, based on the amount of marijuana

metabolite in Slepsky’s urine. Therefore, any testimony regarding the concentration of

marijuana metabolite discovered in Slepsky’s blood was inconsequential. Moreover, the

trial court’s ruling did not prohibit Slepsky from inquiring about the veracity of the results

of Slepsky’s urine. The State only had to prove the defendant had a proscribed amount

of marijuana metabolite in his system. Naylor, 2024-Ohio-1648, at ¶ 49 (11th Dist), citing

State v. Whalen, 2013-Ohio-1861, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.). Thus, any “proposed testimony that

[the defendant] was not impaired was irrelevant, and the trial court properly excluded it.”

Id.

{¶29} With the limited facts in the record, we conclude that the trial court did not

err or otherwise abuse its discretion when it granted the State’s motion in limine. The trial

PAGE 10 OF 23

Case No. 2025-G-0014
court’s ruling did not prohibit Slepsky’s ability to challenge the accuracy of the urine

results; instead, he was prevented from using the separate blood results as a method of

discrediting the urine results. The effects of the marijuana metabolite, any impairment or

lack thereof, and a concentration of marijuana metabolite in other bodily fluids were not

relevant and were appropriately excluded by the trial court.

{¶30} Accordingly, Slepsky’s first assignment of error is without merit.

Sufficiency of Evidence

{¶31} In his second assignment of error, Slepsky argues that the trial court erred

in finding him guilty of the offenses where the facts did not support the convictions.

Specifically, Slepsky contends that the State failed to provide sufficient facts to support

his convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide, pursuant to R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a), and

two counts of aggravated vehicular assault, pursuant to R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a).

{¶32} When a defendant enters a no contest plea to a felony, an explanation of

circumstances is not required under Crim.R. 11 before a trial court accepts the plea. State

v. Wilson, 2018-Ohio-902, ¶ 46 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Williams, 2016-Ohio-7777, ¶ 5

(8th Dist.), citing State v. Magnone, 2016-Ohio-7100, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.). Generally, “[a]ll that

is required is that the indictment, information, or complaint contain allegations sufficient

to state a felony offense; if it does, the trial court must find the defendant guilty.” State v.

Bird, 81 Ohio St.3d 582, 584 (1998), citing Crim.R. 11(B)(2); and State ex rel. Stern v.

Mascio, 1996-Ohio-93, ¶ 7. See State v. Singleton, 2024-Ohio-5033, ¶ 13 (6th Dist.).

Even though an explanation of circumstances is not required under Crim.R. 11, the trial

court may request one prior to accepting a no contest plea to a felony. Wilson at ¶ 46,

citing Williams at ¶ 8.

PAGE 11 OF 23

Case No. 2025-G-0014
{¶33} As this court noted in Wilson:

The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that “where the
indictment * * * contains sufficient allegations to state a
felony offense and the defendant pleads no contest,
the court must find the defendant guilty of the charged
offense.” State v. Bird, 81 Ohio St.3d 582, 584, (1998).
An exception to this rule provides that when the trial
court asks for an explanation of circumstances and that
explanation negates the existence of an element of the
offense, the trial court errs in finding the defendant
guilty. Williams, supra.

Further, “by pleading no contest to the indictment,” a
defendant “is foreclosed from challenging the factual
merits of the underlying charge.” Bird, supra. The
essence of the no contest plea is that the defendant
cannot be heard in defense. Mascio, supra, at 424, 662
N.E.2d 370. “[T]he defendant who pleads no contest
waives the right to present additional affirmative factual
allegations to prove that he is not guilty of the charged
offense.” Id.

Wilson at ¶ 47-48. The foregoing case law appears to restrict a defendant’s ability to

challenge the sufficiency of the facts on a plea when there is no objection and he or she

proceeds forward with a plea to the charges.

{¶34} We note at the outset, that Slepsky did not object to the sufficiency of the

indictment, the bill of particulars, or to the State’s explanation of circumstances at the time

of his plea, therefore he has waived all but plain error. “Plain errors or defects affecting

substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the

court.” Crim.R. 52(B). However, “[n]otice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken

with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest

miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph three of the

syllabus.

PAGE 12 OF 23

Case No. 2025-G-0014
{¶35} The Supreme Court of Ohio set forth limitations on what constitutes plain

error. “First, there must be an error, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule. Second, the error

must be plain, i.e., the error must be an ‘obvious’ defect in the proceedings. Third, the

error must have affected ‘substantial rights.’ This means that the trial court's error must

have affected the outcome of the trial or prejudiced the defendant.” State v. Dundics,

2016-Ohio-1368, ¶ 19 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002).

“The test for prejudice in the context of a guilty or no contest plea is ‘whether the plea

would have otherwise been made.’” Id., quoting State v. Griggs 2004-Ohio-4415, ¶12,

citing State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 107 (1990).

{¶36} We find no plain error in this case. In the case sub judice, Slepsky was

initially charged with aggravated vehicular homicide pursuant to R.C. 2903.06(A)(1) which

provides that “[n]o person, while operating . . . a motor vehicle . . . shall cause the death

of another . . . as the proximate result of committing a violation of division (A) of section

4511.19 of the Revised Code . . . .” Slepsky was also charged and convicted of the two

remaining aggravated vehicular assault, Counts 2 and 3, pursuant to R.C.

2903.08(A)(1)(a) which provides in relevant part:

No person, while operating or participating in the operation of
a motor vehicle . . . shall cause serious physical harm to
another person or another's unborn in any of the following
ways:

(1)(a) As the proximate result of committing a violation of
division (A) of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code or of a
substantially equivalent municipal ordinance.

{¶37} The indictment provided that the grand jurors found, in relevant part that:

[O]n or about the 26th day of September 2023, in Geauga
County, Ohio, Jason A. Slepsky . . . while operating or
participating in the operation of a motor vehicle, did cause the

PAGE 13 OF 23

Case No. 2025-G-0014
death of another as the proximate result of committing a
violation of division (A) of section 4511.19 of the Revised
Code or of a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance,
contrary to and in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a),
Aggravated Vehicular Homicide, a felony of the second
degree.

{¶38} In regards to the aggravated vehicular assault charges in Counts 2 and 3,

the indictment specifically provided:

The Grand Jurors further find and present that JASON A.
SLEPSKY on or about September 26, 2023 in Geauga
County, Ohio, while operating or participating in the operation
of a motor vehicle, did cause serious physical harm to another
person as the proximate result of committing a violation of
division (A)(1)(a) and/or (A)(1)(j)(viii)(II) of section 4511.19 of
the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent municipal
ordinance, contrary to and in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)
(1)(a), Aggravated Vehicular Assault, a felony of the third
degree.

The Grand Jurors further find and present that JASON A.
SLEPSKY on or about September 26, 2023 in Geauga
County, Ohio, while operating or participating in the operation
of a motor vehicle, did cause serious physical harm to another
person as the proximate result of committing a violation of
division (A)(1)(a) and/or (A)(1)(j)(viii)(II) of section 4511.19 of
the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent municipal
ordinance, contrary to and in violation of R.C.
2903.08(A)(1)(a), Aggravated Vehicular Assault, a felony of
the third degree.

(Emphasis added).

{¶39} Additionally, upon Slepsky’s request, the State filed a bill of particulars

which provided the following explanation of the aggravated vehicular homicide as initially

charged:

It is alleged that on or about September 26, 2025, in Geauga
County, Ohio, the Defendant was driving east in a vehicle on
Chardon Windsor Road. As he approached the intersection
with State Route 528, he failed to stop at the stop sign and
drove into the side of an ambulance that was traveling south

PAGE 14 OF 23

Case No. 2025-G-0014
on Route 528 and which had the right of way. The crash
caused by the Defendant resulted in the death of the patient
in the back of the ambulance, W.M. At the time of the crash,
the Defendant had 52.39 ng/ml of 11-nor-9-Carboxy-
Tetrahydrocannabinol (a THC metabolite) in his urine, in
violation of R.C.4511.19(A)(1)(j)(viii)(II). This conduct
constitutes a violation of R.C. § 2903.06(A)(1)(a), Aggravated
Vehicular Homicide, a felony of the second degree.

{¶40} In regards to the aggravated vehicular assault charges, the bill of particulars

further provided:

It is alleged that on or about September 26, 2025, in Geauga
County, Ohio, the Defendant was driving east in a vehicle on
Chardon Windsor Road. As he approached the intersection
with State Route 528, he failed to stop at the stop sign and
drove into the side of an ambulance that was traveling south
on Route 528 and which had the right of way. The crash
caused by the Defendant resulted in the significant injury of
the driver of the ambulance, T.K. At the time of the crash, the
Defendant had 52.39 ng/ml of 11-nor-9-Carboxy-
Tetrahydrocannabinol (a THC metabolite) in his urine, in
violation of R.C.4511.19(A)(1)(j)(viii)(II). This conduct
constitutes a violation of R.C. § 2903.08(A)(1)(a), Aggravated
Vehicular Assault a felony of the third degree.

{¶41} As to the second count of aggravated vehicular assault, charged in Count

3 of the indictment, the bill of particulars contained the identical language as above, with

the exception that Count 3 related to the significant injury to J.S., the EMT in the back of

the ambulance.

{¶42} The indictment in conjunction with the bill of particulars is sufficient to

support the charges contained in the indictment. These facts were reiterated by the State

in its explanation of circumstances or factual basis for the offenses at Slepsky’s plea

hearing.

PAGE 15 OF 23

Case No. 2025-G-0014
Aggravated Vehicular Homicide—R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a).

{¶43} Slepsky asserts that because he entered a plea of no contest to “a lesser

included offense” of aggravated vehicular homicide, the explanation of circumstances

provided by the State was insufficient. It appears from the record, as part of the plea

negotiations, Slepsky agreed to enter a no contest plea to the “lesser included offense,”

also aggravated vehicular homicide, pursuant to R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a).

{¶44} R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a) provides that “[n]o person, while operating or

participating in the operation of a motor vehicle . . . shall cause the death of another . . .

in any of the following ways: . . . [r]ecklessly.” Slepsky contends that the recitation of the

facts did not support a conclusion that Slepsky caused the death of another recklessly.

We disagree.

{¶45} The State’s explanation of circumstances did not negate any element of the

offense. Slepsky entered a plea of no contest to an offense of a lesser degree as

negotiated with the State. “[A] defendant waives any objection to an amendment where,

as here, it is the result of plea negotiations relating to a no-contest plea.” Singleton, 2024-

Ohio-5033, at ¶ 16 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Mosely, 2003-Ohio-2398, ¶ 4 (2d Dist.); see

State v. Rohrbaugh, 2010-Ohio-3286, ¶ 10 (defendant's objection to an amendment is

waived where he negotiated for the amended indictment and agreed to plead guilty to the

amended charge).

{¶46} The failure of the State to explicitly label Slepsky’s actions, i.e., running a

stop sign and operating a vehicle under the influence, as reckless actions, would not have

changed the outcome of the proceedings. In other words, there is nothing in the record to

support that Slepsky would not have otherwise chosen to plead no contest to the charges

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Case No. 2025-G-0014
had the State included the language that his actions were reckless. Therefore, we find no

plain error. See Singleton at ¶ 19.

Aggravated Vehicular Assault—R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a)

{¶47} In addition, Slepsky argues that the State failed to prove that the accident

was a proximate result of operating a vehicle with a prohibited concentration of marijuana

metabolite in his system. Slepsky relied upon State v. Balmert, 2024-Ohio-1207 (9th

Dist.), which presented a similar proposition of law.

{¶48} At the time of briefing and oral arguments, Balmert remained pending before

the Supreme Court of Ohio. However, shortly after oral arguments were held in this case,

the Court decided Balmert. State v. Balmert, 2025-Ohio-5588.

{¶49} In Balmert, the defendant argued that a conviction for aggravated vehicular

assault under R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a) requires a showing that the harm was proximately

caused by a predicate offense as a separate and distinct element. Id. at ¶ 17. While the

Supreme Court of Ohio agreed, it affirmed Balmert’s conviction based on the evidence

that was presented at the bench trial. Id. at ¶ 1. At Balmert’s trial, the State presented

testimony “that marijuana depresses a user’s reflexes and slows reaction time, which can

impair the user’s ability to drive, especially in a situation calling for greater attentiveness”

and “that marijuana use affects a user’s depth and space perception as well as the user’s

ability to concentrate.” Id. at ¶ 16. Testimony was also presented that officers suspected

that Balmert was under the influence of marijuana based on the field sobriety tests

administered at the scene. Id. The Supreme Court of Ohio concluded: “when viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable trier of fact could

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Case No. 2025-G-0014
have found that Balmert striking C.G. with his car was a foreseeable consequence of—

and therefore was proximately caused by—his marijuana (or hemp) use.” Id. at ¶ 17.

{¶50} The Supreme Court of Ohio further explained:

Our conclusion is not meant to construe aggravated vehicular
assault as a strict-liability offense once it has been established
that the defendant had a concentration of marijuana
metabolites in his or her urine that exceeds the amount
proscribed in R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(j)(viii)(II). Nor does our
conclusion foreclose the possibility that a defendant driving
with a prohibited concentration of marijuana metabolites in
violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(j)(viii)(II) could cause serious
physical harm to another person in a way that is entirely
unforeseeable, thus breaking the chain of proximate
causation required for a conviction for aggravated vehicular
assault under R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a). However, that is not the
case here. Based on the testimony provided about the effects
of marijuana use on one’s ability to drive, the officers’
observations of Balmert at the scene, and the circumstances
of the accident, proximate causation was well within the
boundaries of what a reasonable trier of fact could have found
when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution.

Id. at ¶ 18.
{¶51} Balmert is factually distinguishable from the instant case where through plea

negotiations, a defendant entered a no contest plea to the offenses. The indictment in this

case specifically provided that Slepsky caused “serious physical harm to another person

as the proximate result of committing a violation of division (A)(1)(a) and/or (A)(1)(j)(viii)(II)

of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code.” The indictment in conjunction with the

information provided by the State in the bill of particulars is sufficient to support the

charges contained in the indictment. Therefore, we find no plain error. See Singleton at ¶

19.

{¶52} Accordingly, Slepsky’s second assignment of error is without merit.

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Case No. 2025-G-0014
Compliance with Crim.R. 11

{¶53} In his third assignment of error, Slepsky asserts that the trial court failed to

comply with Crim.R.11(B) and (C)(2)(b) when it failed to explain the effect of the no

contest plea. We disagree.

{¶54} This court reviews whether the trial court accepted a plea in compliance

with Crim.R. 11 de novo. State v. Willard, 2021-Ohio-2552, ¶ 51 (11th Dist.); State v.

Dundics, 2016-Ohio-1368, ¶ 10 (11th Dist.). When reviewing a plea colloquy, “the focus

is not ‘on whether the trial judge has “[incanted] the precise verbiage” of the rule, State v.

Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 92 . . . (1977), but on whether the dialogue between the court

and the defendant demonstrates that the defendant understood the consequences of his

plea.’ State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 12.” State v. Sanchez, 2024-Ohio-5868, ¶ 20

(11th Dist.).

{¶55} “When a criminal defendant seeks to have his conviction reversed on

appeal, the traditional rule is that he must establish that an error occurred in the trial-court

proceedings and that he was prejudiced by that error.” Dangler at ¶ 13, citing State v.

Perry, 2004-Ohio-297, ¶ 14-15; Stewart at 93; Crim.R. 52.

{¶56} There are limited exceptions to the prejudice component. We presume a

plea was entered involuntarily and unknowingly when a trial court fails to explain the

constitutional rights a defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest as set forth in

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c); thus, no showing of prejudice is required. Dangler at ¶ 14, citing State

v. Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 31; State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, syllabus.

{¶57} Additionally, a defendant's burden to show prejudice is also eliminated if

there is a complete failure to comply with a portion of Crim.R. 11. Dangler at ¶ 15, citing

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Case No. 2025-G-0014
State v. Sarkozy, 2008-Ohio-509, ¶ 22. See Sanchez, 2024-Ohio-5868 at ¶ 20 (11th

Dist.). “A ‘complete failure to comply’ with a non-constitutional requirement of Crim.R. 11

occurs when the court makes ‘no mention’ of the requirement.” Sanchez at ¶ 22, citing

Dangler at ¶ 15.

{¶58} “Aside from these two exceptions, the traditional rule continues to apply: a

defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he demonstrates he was

prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C).”

Dangler at ¶ 16. When analyzing these cases, “the questions to be answered are simply:

(1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has

not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant

from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required,

has the defendant met that burden?” Dangler at ¶ 17.

{¶59} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) provides:

In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty
or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or
no contest without first addressing the defendant personally
either in-person or by remote contemporaneous video in
conformity with Crim.R. 43(A) and doing all of the following:

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea
voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges
and of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that
the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition
of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the
defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no
contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may
proceed with judgment and sentence.

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the
defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is
waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against

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Case No. 2025-G-0014
him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in the defendant's favor, and to require the state to
prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a
trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify
against himself or herself.

{¶60} Slepsky contends that the trial court failed to inform him of the effect of his

plea. Specifically, that the trial court failed to advise him that a “plea of no contest is not

an admission of defendant's guilt, but is an admission of the truth of the facts alleged in

the indictment, information, or complaint, and the plea or admission shall not be used

against the defendant in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding.” Crim.R. 11(B).

{¶61} Upon review of the transcript of the plea hearing, the trial court did not orally

explain the effect of Slepsky’s no contest plea. However, the trial court explicitly asked if

Slepsky read the written plea agreement, to which Slepsky stated that he had read the

agreement and understood it. The written plea agreement contained the following

language:

By pleading “No Contest” I am admitting the truth of the facts
alleged in the indictment and understand the Court can find
me guilty of the charges. I understand my plea of “No Contest”
cannot be used against me in any subsequent civil or criminal
proceeding.

{¶62} Therefore, while the trial court did not orally repeat the language in the

written plea regarding the effect of Slepsky’s plea, the language was contained in the

written plea agreement which Slepsky signed and acknowledged. Thus, the trial court did

not completely fail to comply with the Crim.R. 11(C)(2) provision.

{¶63} Slepsky fails to demonstrate any resulting prejudice from the trial court’s

lack of an oral recitation of the language contained in the written plea agreement. See

State v. McKenzie, 2023-Ohio-1178, ¶ 11 (3d Dist.). From a review of the record, including

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Case No. 2025-G-0014
the written plea agreement, the totality of the circumstances indicate that Slepsky

understood the effect of his no contest plea.

{¶64} As such, Slepsky’s third assignment of error is without merit.

Conclusion

{¶65} None of Slepsky’s assignments of error are meritorious. Accordingly, for the

reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common

Pleas.

JOHN J. EKLUND, J., concurs,

SCOTT LYNCH, J., concurs in judgment only.

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Case No. 2025-G-0014
JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignments of error

are without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the

Geauga County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Costs to be taxed against appellant.

JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON

JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND,
concurs

JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH,
concurs in judgment only

THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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Case No. 2025-G-0014