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March 2, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Bennett

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 698
• Docket Number: 25CA012228

• Judges: Hensal

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Syllabus

motion to suppress, consensual encounter, investigatory stop

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State v. Bennett, 2026-Ohio-698.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN )

STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 25CA012228

Appellant

v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
BRANDON BENNETT COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
Appellee CASE No. 24CR111458

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: March 2, 2026

HENSAL, Judge.

{¶1} The State of Ohio appeals an order of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas

that granted Brandon Bennett’s motion to suppress. For the following reasons, this Court reverses.

I.

{¶2} During the early hours of January 31, 2022, Sergeant Frank Goscewski was

speaking to other officers in a restaurant parking lot when he saw a white four-door pickup truck

with a red plow blade drop two men off in the driveway of a self-storage facility. The men were

wearing dark clothing, and one was carrying a black duffel bag. One of the men was also carrying

a walkie talkie. After the officers approached the men and discovered that one of them had an

outstanding warrant, they arrested him. A search of the duffel bag uncovered an electric saw, saw

blades, a pipe, and a crowbar.

{¶3} About an hour and a half later, Sergeant Goscewski was on patrol when he spotted

a truck in the parking lot of an apartment complex that matched the one he had seen earlier. There
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was a man sitting in the driver’s seat, but the truck was not running, which the sergeant thought

was unusual for the time of day and year. According to Sergeant Goscewski, he pulled his cruiser

near the truck, partially blocking it, but he did not activate the overhead lights or siren. He exited

his cruiser and approached the truck to ask the man, Mr. Bennett, about the reason he was sitting

in the truck. Mr. Bennett replied that he was helping a friend move and consented to a search of

the vehicle. The Grand Jury subsequently indicted Mr. Bennet for having weapons under

disability, breaking and entering, and possessing criminal tools.

{¶4} Mr. Bennett moved to suppress the evidence found during the search of the truck,

arguing that the sergeant did not have probable cause to stop his vehicle or reasonable, articulable

suspicion to search it. Following a hearing, the trial court found that Sergeant Goscewski did not

have probable cause to stop Mr. Bennett. The State has appealed, assigning as error that the trial

court applied the incorrect legal standard to the motion to suppress.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE INCORRECT LEGAL STANDARD AS
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND BRANDON
BENNETT WAS EITHER SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE
SUSPICION OR WAS VOLUNTARY.

{¶5} The State argues that the trial court incorrectly granted Mr. Bennett’s motion to

suppress. Specifically, it argues that the court incorrectly determined that Sergeant Goscewski

engaged in a traffic stop and that there was no probable cause for that stop. A motion to suppress

evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8.

“When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is

therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.”

Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366 (1992). Thus, a reviewing court “must accept the
3

trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id., citing

State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20 (1982). “Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court

must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether

the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d

706, 710 (4th Dist. 1997). This Court, therefore, grants deference to the trial court’s findings of

fact but conducts a de novo review of whether the trial court applied the appropriate legal standard

to those facts. State v. Booth, 2003-Ohio-829, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.).

{¶6} The State first argues that the trial court applied the incorrect standard because

Sergeant Goscewski’s interaction with Mr. Bennett was a consensual encounter. “There are three

distinct types of encounters between police officers and the public: (1) a consensual encounter,

(2) an investigatory stop, and (3) an arrest.” State v. Helmick, 2014-Ohio-4187, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.).

“Consensual encounters are not seizures and do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at ¶ 9.

“An investigatory stop is more intrusive than a consensual encounter but less intrusive than a

formal custodial arrest.” Id. at ¶ 10. “An officer must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of

criminal activity for an investigatory stop.” Id. “Finally, officers must have probable cause for

any seizure that ‘equivocates an arrest.’” Id., quoting State v. Llanderal-Raya, 2005-Ohio-3306,

¶ 20 (9th Dist.). “‘[T]he threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an

officer, some physical touching of the person . . . , or the use of language or tone of voice indicating

that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled’ can be indicative of a seizure.”

Id., quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).

{¶7} This Court also explained in Helmick that “[t]he mere approach and questioning of

persons seated within parked vehicles does not constitute a seizure so as to require reasonable

suspicion supported by specific articulable facts.” Id. at ¶ 11, quoting State v. McCray, 2000 WL
4

254909, *1 (9th Dist. Mar. 8, 2000). “But, ‘if an officer positions his vehicle so that a person

cannot exit a parking lot without asking the officer to move, the officer has exhibited a show of

authority constituting a seizure.’” Id., quoting State v. Maitland, 2011–Ohio–6244, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.).

{¶8} Sergeant Goscewski testified that, when he pulled his vehicle into the apartment

complex parking lot, he parked it in such a manner that it blocked Mr. Bennett’s truck. Although

the sergeant said that the truck was not completely blocked into its parking spot, he acknowledged

that it would have been difficult for Mr. Bennett to exit his parking space unless he asked the

sergeant to move his vehicle.

{¶9} The trial court found that Sergeant Goscewski partially blocked Mr. Bennett and

that he effectuated a stop of Mr. Bennett’s motor vehicle. Upon review of the record, we conclude

that the trial court’s finding that Mr. Bennett was stopped is supported by competent, credible

evidence. We, therefore, reject the State’s argument that the interaction between Sergeant

Goscewski and Mr. Bennett was a consensual encounter.

{¶10} Although the trial court found that Mr. Bennett’s interaction with Sergeant

Goscewski was not consensual, it immediately proceeded to examine whether the sergeant had

probable cause for the stop instead of considering whether it was an investigatory stop. As noted,

officers only require probable cause if a seizure “equivocates an arrest.” Helmick at ¶ 10, quoting

Llanderal-Raya at ¶ 20.

{¶11} The trial court found that Sergeant Goscewski partially blocked Mr. Bennett’s

vehicle and made initial contact with him but did not make any findings that would suggest the

interaction was anything more than an investigatory detention. The trial court, therefore, should

have examined whether the sergeant had “a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity
5

for an investigatory stop” instead of whether there was probable cause that Mr. Bennett had

committed a violation of any law. Id.

{¶12} The State requests that this Court determine that Sergeant Goscewski conducted a

legitimate investigatory stop of Mr. Bennett based on the similarities between Mr. Bennett’s truck

and the one he observed earlier that was connected with criminal activity. This Court, however,

“functions as a court of review and we exceed the scope of our authority when we analyze issues

in the first instance that have not first been addressed by the trial court.” Williams v. Kisling,

Nestico, & Redick, LLC, 2022-Ohio-1044, ¶ 37. Instead, we conclude that the trial court’s order

must be reversed, and this matter remanded for the trial court to determine whether Sergeant

Goscewski had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify his investigatory

detention of Mr. Bennett. The State’s assignment of error is sustained.

III.

{¶13} The State’s assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Lorain County

Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent

with this decision.

Judgment reversed,
and cause remanded.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
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Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellee.

JENNIFER HENSAL
FOR THE COURT

CARR, P. J.
SUTTON, J.
CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

ANTHONY CILLO, Prosecuting Attorney, and SPENCER J. LUCKWITZ, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellant.

KENNETH M. LIEUX, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.