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March 2, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Shefbuch

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 708
• Docket Number: 17-25-08

• Judges: Miller

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (4.8K)

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Syllabus

Felony sentencing review; R.C. 2953.08; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12. Defendant-appellant's prison sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State v. Shefbuch, 2026-Ohio-708.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
SHELBY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 17-25-08
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

JOSHUA L. SHEFBUCH, OPINION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Shelby County Common Pleas Court
Criminal Division
Trial Court No. 24CR000295

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: March 2, 2026

APPEARANCES:

Eric J. Ambos for Appellant

Heath H. Hegemann for Appellee
Case No. 17-25-08

MILLER, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Joshua L. Shefbuch (“Shefbuch”), appeals the judgment

of sentence entered against him in the Shelby County Court of Common Pleas on July 9,

1. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} This case originated on December 19, 2024, when a Shelby County grand jury

indicted Shefbuch on four counts: Count One of possession of drugs in violation of R.C.

2925.11(A), a third-degree felony; Count Two of possessing criminal tools in violation of

R.C. 2923.24, a fifth-degree felony; Count Three of operating a motor vehicle while under

the influence of alcohol or drugs of abuse in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a first-

degree misdemeanor; and Count Four of operating a motor vehicle with a specified

concentration of a controlled substance in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(f), a first-degree

misdemeanor.

{¶3} Pursuant to a negotiated-plea agreement, on June 9, 2025, Shefbuch entered

guilty pleas to an amended Count One, possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A),

a fourth-degree felony, and Count Four of the indictment as charged. That same day, the

trial court accepted Shefbuch’s guilty pleas, found him guilty of the two offenses, and

ordered a presentence investigation (“PSI”). At the State’s request, the trial court dismissed

Counts Two and Three.

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Case No. 17-25-08

{¶4} On July 9, 2025, a sentencing hearing was held and Shefbuch was sentenced

to a term of 12 months in prison for the drug possession charge. The court imposed three

days in jail for operating a vehicle under the influence. In addition, the trial court

suspended Shefbuch’s driver’s license for one year and ordered Shefbuch to pay a $375

fine and court costs. On July 14, 2025, the trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence.

{¶5} Shefbuch filed a notice of appeal on July 15, 2025. He raises a single

assignment of error.

Assignment of Error

The trial court’s decision to sentence Appellant to 12 months in prison
instead of community control sanctions is clearly and convincingly
unsupported by the record.

{¶6} In his assignment of error, Shefbuch asserts that the trial court erred in ordering

him to serve a sentence of 12 months in prison. Shefbuch contends the trial court failed to

fully consider, or improperly weighed, all the purposes of felony sentencing and all the

seriousness and recidivism factors a court shall consider when imposing a felony sentence

before determining that he was not amenable to community control. Specifically, Shefbuch

argues that when considering the statutory felony sentencing factors, the trial court failed

to weigh his ongoing drug rehabilitation and placed undue emphasis on his prior violations

of community control. Shefbuch also contends that because he acknowledged his pattern

of drug use at the sentencing hearing, the trial court erred in imposing a prison sentence

rather than community control. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.

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Case No. 17-25-08

Standard of Review

{¶7} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may reverse a sentence “only if

it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial

court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.”

State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. Clear and convincing evidence is that “‘which will

produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to

be established.’” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph

three of the syllabus.

Relevant Authority

{¶8} “‘Trial courts have full discretion to impose any sentence within the statutory

range.’” State v. Smith, 2015-Ohio-4225, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Noble, 2014-Ohio-

5485, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.). A sentence imposed within the statutory range is generally valid so

long as the trial court considered the applicable sentencing policies that apply to every

felony sentencing, including those contained in R.C. 2929.11, and the sentencing factors

of 2929.12. See State v. Watts, 2020-Ohio-5572, ¶ 10 and 14 (3d Dist.); State v. Maggette,

2016-Ohio-5554, ¶ 30-31 (3d Dist.).

{¶9} R.C. 2929.11 provides, in pertinent part, that the “overriding purposes of

felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others, to

punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the offender using the

minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes without imposing

an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources.” R.C. 2929.11(A). To

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Case No. 17-25-08

achieve the overriding purposes of felony sentencing, R.C. 2929.11 directs courts to

“consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from

future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense,

the public, or both.” Id. In addition, R.C. 2929.11(B) instructs that a sentence imposed for

a felony “shall be reasonably calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony

sentencing . . ., commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender’s

conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar

crimes committed by similar offenders.”

{¶10} “In accordance with these principles, the trial court must consider the factors

set forth in R.C. 2929.12(B)-(E) relating to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and

the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism.” Smith at ¶ 10, citing R.C. 2929.12(A). In

addition, the trial court must consider “the factors set forth in [R.C. 2929.12(F)] pertaining

to the offender’s service in the armed forces of the United States.” R.C. 2929.12(A). “‘A

sentencing court has broad discretion to determine the relative weight to assign the

sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12.’” Smith at ¶ 15, quoting State v. Brimacombe, 2011-

Ohio-5032, ¶ 18 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215 (2000). Neither

statute “requires a trial court to make any specific factual findings on the record.” State v.

Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 20; see also R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

{¶11} In considering R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 as they relate to felony-sentencing

appeals, the Supreme Court of Ohio has further limited appellate review by holding that

“R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) clearly does not provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or

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Case No. 17-25-08

vacate a sentence if it concludes that the record does not support the sentence under R.C.

2929.11 and 2929.12,” and subdivision (b) “does not provide a basis for an appellate court

to modify or vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence is not supported by the

record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Jones at ¶ 31, 34, 39 (“an appellate court’s

conclusion that the record does not support a sentence under R.C. 2929.11 or 2929.12 is

not the equivalent of a conclusion that the sentence is ‘otherwise contrary to law’ as the

term is used in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b)”). Thus, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not allow “an

appellate court to independently weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its

judgment for that of the trial court concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance

with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Id. at 42; see also State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-1878, ¶

22. However, “when a trial court imposes a sentence based on factors or considerations

that are extraneous to those that are permitted by R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, that sentence

is contrary to law,” and claims that raise those “types of issues are therefore reviewable.”

Bryant at ¶ 22 (finding the trial court increased the sentence based on an impermissible

consideration).

Analysis

{¶12} Shefbuch does not assert that the sentence imposed was outside the statutory

range nor do we find that to be the case. Nor has Shefbuch argued that the trial court erred

regarding any of the procedural aspects of his sentencing. Instead, Shefbuch contends the

trial court’s analysis unduly focused on his prior violations of community control, instead

of whether he had overcome his demonstrated pattern of alcohol or drug abuse.

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Case No. 17-25-08

{¶13} Shefbuch argues that the trial court’s decision to impose a 12-month prison

sentence instead of community control sanctions is clearly and convincingly not supported

by the record, because the trial court improperly considered and applied the purposes of

felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11, as well as the seriousness and recidivism

factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12. However, the record clearly indicates the trial court

appropriately considered the overriding purposes of felony sentencing as well as the

seriousness and recidivism factors. Both at the sentencing hearing and in its corresponding

judgment entry, the trial court stated it had considered the purposes and principles set forth

in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12, in addition

to the oral statements of the parties at the sentencing hearing and the PSI.

{¶14} As explained above, neither statute requires a trial court to make any specific

factual findings on the record regarding R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Furthermore, we are

not allowed to independently review the record to determine whether the trial court chose

an appropriate sentence based on R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 when the record reveals that

such purposes and factors were, in fact, considered. Shefbuch argues that “[s]ince

Appellant acknowledged his pattern of drug abuse at the sentencing hearing, the trial court

erred in considering that the recidivism factor set forth in R.C. 2929.12(D)(4) indicated

that Appellant is likely to commit future crimes.” (Appellant’s Brief at 6). However, we

note that “it is ‘the trial court [that] determines the weight afforded to any particular

statutory factors, mitigating grounds, or other relevant circumstances.’” State v.

McKennelly, 2017-Ohio-9092, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Steger, 2016-Ohio-7908,

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Case No. 17-25-08

¶ 18 (12th Dist.). “The fact that the trial court chose to weigh various sentencing factors

differently than how [Shefbuch] would have weighed them does not mean the trial court

erred in imposing [Shefbuch’s] sentence.” Id.

{¶15} Despite Shefbuch’s claim to the contrary, we note that the PSI in this case

more than adequately supports the trial court’s finding that Shefbuch is not amenable to

community control. Specifically, the PSI reflects that Shefbuch’s adult criminal history

includes a prior misdemeanor conviction; prior felony convictions for forgery and

attempted trafficking in drugs; and two probation violations. The trial court particularly

noted that Shefbuch has failed to complete multiple court mandated drug and alcohol

rehabilitation treatments. After his first probation violation, Shefbuch was ordered to

complete one such drug and alcohol treatment program. However, Shefbuch failed to

complete the program, his community control sanctions were revoked, and he was

sentenced to 12 months in prison. Further, the instant offense was committed just six

months after Shefbuch completed probation in Miami County. Given these events, we do

not find the trial court erred by weighing the statutory factors against imposing community

control sanctions.

{¶16} The record before us confirms that the trial court gave consideration to the

overriding purposes of felony sentencing outlined in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and

recidivism factors described in R.C. 2929.12. Consideration of these factors supports the

trial court’s conclusion that Shefbuch is not amenable to community control. The prison

term imposed by the trial court was within the statutory range allowed for the offenses

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Case No. 17-25-08

committed. Accordingly, there is no clear and convincing evidence to support that the

sentence imposed by the trial court on Shefbuch is unsupported by findings under the

relevant statutes or is contrary to the law.

Conclusion

{¶17} For the foregoing reasons, appellant’s assignment of error is overruled.

Having found no error prejudicial to the defendant-appellant in the particulars assigned and

argued, the judgment of the Shelby County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Judgment Affirmed

WILLAMOWSKI, and WALDICK, J.J., concur.

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Case No. 17-25-08

JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is

overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial court

is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby rendered. The

cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the judgment for costs.

It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R. 27; and

serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the proceedings

and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.

Mark C. Miller, Judge

John R. Willamowski, Judge

Juergen A. Waldick, Judge

DATED:
/jlm

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