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March 3, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Candler CA1/1

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A171363

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (4.5K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/3/26 P. v. Candler CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171363
v.
MARK ANTHONY CANDLER, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. 159964A)
Defendant and Appellant.

A jury convicted Mark Anthony Candler and his co-defendant of
attempted murder and other crimes. Later, Candler petitioned for
resentencing as to his attempted murder conviction under Penal Code section
1172.6.1 The trial court denied his petition, finding him ineligible for relief as
a matter of law, and Candler appealed. We shall affirm.
I. BACKGROUND2
A. Candler Is Convicted of Attempted Murder
An associate of Candler’s who belonged to a gang had a confrontation
with a member of a rival gang. Later that day, Candler and his co-defendant

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Our recitation of the underlying facts is based on our prior opinion

affirming Candler’s and his co-defendant’s convictions. (People v. Thomas
(May 22, 2012, A130350, A130494) [nonpub. opn.]). However, in resolving
this appeal, we rely on our independent review of the record of conviction, not
went to the rival’s location in two separate vehicles, each with a firearm.
Many shots were fired, and the rival gang member was injured by the
gunfire. Shell casings from two different weapons littered the scene and local
homes were “pock-marked,” but no witnesses would speak to the police at the
time. Two years later, witnesses including the victim identified Candler and
his co-defendant as the shooters.
Candler and his co-defendant were charged with attempted murder
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and other crimes. The attempted murder charges
were accompanied by allegations that each defendant acted in association
with a gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and personally discharged a firearm
causing great bodily injury (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), &
(d), 12022.5, subd. (a)). After a joint trial, the jury found each defendant
guilty and found the enhancement allegations true. Candler was sentenced
to 44 years to life in prison for attempted murder, plus concurrent and
consecutive terms for other crimes.
B. Petition for Resentencing
Candler filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 and the
trial court appointed counsel to represent him. The parties submitted
briefing and, after a hearing, the court found Candler failed to make a prima
facie showing and denied his petition. The court reasoned that section 1172.6
only applied to attempted murder convictions “under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine,” which the jury had not considered in
Candler’s case.

the factual background in our prior opinion. (See People v. Williams (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1247, fn. 3.)

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II. DISCUSSION
A. Relief Under Section 1172.6 for Attempted Murder Convictions
At the time of Candler’s trial, a defendant could be liable for attempted
murder for aiding and abetting a crime of which attempted murder was a
natural and probable consequence. (People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th
328, 336.) “Under the law at that time, it was not necessary to prove that the
defendant intended that the attempted murder be committed or even . . .
foresaw that attempted murder could result.” (Ibid.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015)
ended this form of liability for both murder and attempted murder by
amending section 188 to provide that “ ‘[m]alice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’ ” (People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 449 (Curiel); People v. Sanchez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
191, 196.) The legislation created a procedure (then embodied in section
1170.95) for those convicted of murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to seek relief. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449.)
Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551) clarified and
amended the statute, extending it to those convicted of attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)).
(People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 223, fn. 3 [former section 1170.95
was renumbered to section 1172.6].)
The statutory procedure “begins with a facially valid petition that
entitles petitioner to counsel, continues with asking whether petitioner has
made a prima facie case for relief, and, if so, proceeds to an evidentiary
hearing on the ultimate question of whether petitioner should be
resentenced.” (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 562 (Patton).) If a

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petitioner “fails, at the second step, to make a prima facie showing, then the
court denies the petition and provides no relief.” (Ibid.; § 1172.6, subd. (c).)
B. Prima Facie Determination
As relevant here, a petitioner is eligible to seek resentencing “when all
of the following conditions apply:” (1) a charging document “allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of . . . attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine” (2) the defendant was convicted
of attempted murder after trial, and (3) the defendant “could not presently be
convicted of . . . attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
A petition fails at the prima facie stage where “the record of conviction
‘establish[es] conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief.’ ” (Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 470.) That record “includes documents from the
petitioner’s jury trial like the jury instructions and verdict forms” (People v.
Gallardo (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 296, 301), as well as “the factual findings”
the verdicts “necessarily reflect” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 465). For
“individuals convicted following jury trials, the jury instructions [are]
critical.” (People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 731.) If the “jury
instructions foreclose th[e] possibility” that the petitioner is entitled to relief
“as a matter of law,” a prima facie case is not established. (Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 470.)
“We ‘review de novo whether the trial court conducted a proper [prima
facie] inquiry under section 1172.6, subdivision (c).’ ” (People v. Miller (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 508, 515.) “[A]t this preliminary juncture,” we do not
“engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972.) On the other hand,

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“speculative possibilities” do not create “[a] dispute regarding the basis of a
conviction” that warrants a hearing. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 567.)
C. Analysis
As the trial court observed, section 1172.6 by its terms applies to
murder convictions under any theory by which “malice is imputed to a person
based” on their “participation in a crime,” but only to “attempted murder
[convictions] under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).) Case authorities confirm the statute means what it
says: convictions based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine
are the only attempted murder convictions for which relief is available.
(People v. Muhammad (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 268, 276 (Muhammad) [“with
respect to attempted murder, section 1172.6 affords relief only to a person
convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine”]; People v.
Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 457 [same holding]; People v. Lovejoy
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860, 865 [same holding]; People v. Coley (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548 (Coley) [same holding].)
Candler does not claim he was convicted based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, but urges that section 1172.6 also applies to
attempted murder convictions based on any other theory of imputed malice—
and would violate equal protection if it did not. Accepting these propositions
for the sake of argument, and assuming there was some other theory of
imputed malice that might have supported an attempted murder conviction
under prior law, the record is clear that Candler was not convicted on such a
theory. The verdict reflects the jury’s express finding that Candler personally
acted “with malice aforethought” in committing attempted murder. And such
a finding was required by the jury instructions, which provided Candler could
be guilty of attempted murder in two ways: either “directly” or by “aid[ing]

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and abett[ing] a perpetrator, who directly committed the crime.” (CALCRIM
No. 400.)
To find Candler or his co-defendant directly perpetrated attempted
murder, the jury had to find either or both defendants (1) “took direct but
ineffective steps” to kill the victim and (2) specifically “intended to kill” him.
(CALCRIM No. 600.) Since the jury found that both Candler and his co-
defendant “personally and intentionally discharged a firearm” that injured
the victim, they likely found both were direct perpetrators. (See People v.
Morales (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1120, 1131–1132 [special circumstance
finding established that jury convicted defendant as the direct perpetrator of
attempted murder]; Muhammad, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at pp. 279–280
[while not dispositive on the record at issue, defendant’s admission that “he
personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim” tended to show he was
convicted as a direct perpetrator of attempted murder].)
Even if we assume Candler was convicted on an aiding and abetting
theory, the jury was instructed it must find he “knew that the perpetrator
intended to commit the crime” of attempted murder, “intended to aid and
abet the perpetrator in committing the crime,” and provided such assistance
in fact. (CALCRIM No. 401.) Again, the attempted murder instruction
required a finding that the perpetrator acted with specific “inten[t] to kill”
the victim. (CALCRIM No. 600.) Thus, to find him guilty as an aider and
abettor, the jury had to have found that Candler knew his codefendant
intended to kill the victim and intentionally aided him with knowledge of his
unlawful purpose—“the very definition of express malice.” (People v. Lee
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1191 (Lee) [aiding and abetting instructions
required jury to find the defendant harbored intent to kill].) This theory of
“[d]irect aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of attempted murder,”

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and a defendant convicted on this theory is ineligible for relief under section
1172.6. (Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548; accord Lee, supra,
95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1190–1191; People v. Ramos (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
460, 465 [defendant who “admitted he ‘aided/abetted [an attempted murder],
with the specific intent to kill’ ” was ineligible for resentencing relief]; cf.
Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 467–468 [petition improperly denied at prima
facie stage where jury did not “necessarily find the requisite mens rea for
direct aiding and abetting liability”].)
Candler cites People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi) and
People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257 to show the jury
instructions did not require a finding he intended to kill. But as more
apposite authorities have explained, those cases involved “instructions for
aiding and abetting second degree implied malice murder and first degree
lying-in-wait murder,” theories under which “the direct perpetrator . . . need
not harbor an intent to kill.” (Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1191.) That
concern is not present here, where the instructions required findings that the
perpetrator had the specific intent to kill and the aider and abettor knew of
and intended to aid this purpose. (See ibid.; Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
p. 547 [“Langi does not apply because that case involves implied malice.
Here, . . . appellant’s conviction for attempted murder demonstrates that he
was convicted of second degree murder with express rather than implied
malice”].)
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Candler’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.

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SMILEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUMES, P. J.

LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

People v. Candler / (A171363)

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