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March 3, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re Renteria CA2/7

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B337330

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (36)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/3/26 In re Renteria CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re B337330

(Los Angeles County
LUIS RENTERIA, Super. Ct. No. 1PH00766)

On Habeas Corpus.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING on petition for writ of habeas
corpus. James D. Otto, Judge. Petition denied.
Rich Pfeiffer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Petitioner.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Sara J. Romano, Assistant
Attorney General, Julie A. Malone, Viet Nguyen and Jennifer O.
Cano, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.

---

INTRODUCTION

Luis Renteria was convicted of second degree murder and
conspiracy to commit murder in 1990 and sentenced to a total
prison term of 16 years to life. Renteria was paroled in 2019 but
his parole was revoked for a parole violation in 2021. Renteria
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, raising two claims. First, he
argues his reincarceration for what was charged as a simple
battery violates the cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the
federal and state constitutions. Second, he argues the Board of
Parole Hearings (the Board) denied him due process by failing to
consider youth offender and elderly parole factors at the initial
hearing reconsidering his parole under Penal Code
section 3000.1, subdivision (d), and California Code of
Regulations, title 15, section 2275, subdivision (c).1
At oral argument, Renteria conceded both issues. Indeed,
under existing law, Renteria’s reincarceration is deemed a
continuation of his sentence for his original offense, rather than a
new sentence, and Renteria has not met the high burden of
demonstrating the 32 years he has served on his life-maximum
sentence is disproportionate to his second degree murder and
conspiracy convictions. As to Renteria’s due process claim, in
light of his concession, we also conclude he is not entitled to relief
on this claim. Accordingly, we deny the petition.

1 Undesignated statutory references (e.g., section 3000.1 or
statutory section 3000.1) are to the Penal Code. Undesignated
regulatory provisions (e.g., regulatory section 2275) are to
Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations.

2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Offense, Conviction, and Sentence
Renteria’s cousin died in a gang shooting on August 27,
1988.2 The following day, Renteria joined some friends, including
Augustine Rosas, to retaliate against the Harbor City gang they
believed was responsible. Renteria was reluctant to participate,
but Rosas convinced him. Renteria and Rosas drove to Harbor
City in separate cars and spotted gang members in a parking lot
with a white van they believed was involved in the shooting.
Renteria’s group, including Rosas, fired shots from their vehicles,
killing Andy Velasquez. Renteria was 21 years old at the time of
the crime.
On December 13, 1988, an information charged Renteria
and Rosas with murder (§ 187). The information specially
alleged, as to Rosas, the personal discharge of a firearm from a
vehicle causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.55) and, as
to Renteria, that a principal to the crime was armed with a
firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)).
Rosas pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter, admitting
the section 12022.55 firearm allegation. After Rosas’s plea, the
People amended the information to charge Renteria with
conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182, subd. (1)) and second degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), with the special allegation that a
principal was armed with a firearm. The amended information
alleged three overt acts as part of the conspiracy: (1) Renteria

2 We provide the underlying facts and procedural history
from this court’s unpublished opinion affirming the denial of
Renteria’s section 1172.6 petition (formerly section 1170.95).
(See People v. Renteria (Sept. 20, 2021), B304530 [nonpub. opn.].)

3
himself was armed; (2) Renteria drove to Harbor City; and
(3) Renteria or a coconspirator shot and killed Velasquez.
Renteria proceeded to trial on the amended information. In
1990, a jury convicted Renteria on both charges. The jury found
true that a principal was armed with a firearm during the
offense, but found not true the overt act allegation that Renteria
himself was armed.
The trial court sentenced Renteria to a total prison term of
16 years to life.

B. Parole and Revocation
After he had served approximately 29 years of his sentence,
the Board paroled Renteria on November 22, 2019.
In February 2021, Renteria was living at a transitional
living facility in Los Angeles. On February 1, 2021, police
responded to a report that Renteria had “touched” a
developmentally disabled woman, Yennifer D., who lived next
door to the transitional living facility in the care of family
members. Renteria was arrested and charged with sexual
battery, later reduced to simple battery. The District Attorney
ultimately declined to prosecute because Yennifer was “nonverbal
and couldn’t adequately testify.”
On February 8, 2021, the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) petitioned to revoke
Renteria’s parole. Consistent with the criminal charges, the
petition initially alleged Renteria committed a sexual battery on
Yennifer, but this allegation was amended to simple battery.
The superior court held a parole revocation hearing on
November 29, 2021, where it heard testimony from Yennifer’s
sister-in-law, Silvia Bello Odeja (Bello); Yennifer’s mother,

4
Manuela Garza; and responding Los Angeles police officer
Christina Oka. The court also viewed a body camera video of
Yennifer’s interview with police.
Bello testified that Yennifer was sitting outside in the yard
when Bello saw Renteria touching Yennifer’s hair and shoulder
through the fence. When Bello called Yennifer to come inside,
Renteria “grabbed her shoulder and said, ‘Don’t leave, don’t go.’ ”
Yennifer moved her shoulder away from Renteria. Garza
testified that Yennifer had the mental capacity of a four-year-old
child, and that after the incident she appeared frightened and
started sleeping a lot and wetting herself.
The superior court revoked Renteria’s parole and remanded
him to CDCR custody, finding that Renteria had committed a
simple battery on Yennifer and thus violated the conditions of his
parole. This court affirmed the parole revocation order on appeal.
(People v. Renteria (May 17, 2023), B316446 [nonpub. opn.].) The
California Supreme Court denied Renteria’s petition for review
on July 26, 2023.

C. The Initial Parole Reconsideration Hearing
On September 28, 2022, the Board conducted an initial
parole reconsideration hearing to determine whether Renteria
should be paroled or remain in custody. Renteria appeared at the
hearing, represented by counsel.
Renteria testified he never touched Yennifer and that her
family “fabricate[d] the story” because he complained to them
about loud music and threatened to report the presence of
undocumented immigrants in their home. The Board noted
Renteria’s parole officer reported Renteria refused housing
programming, failed to attend support meetings regularly, and

5
was unable to maintain residence with family members because
he “failed to follow [their] house rules.” Renteria was also
removed from a reentry housing program for having sex with his
fiancée in a public area. When the Board raised concerns about
Renteria’s unemployment during the parole term, Renteria
explained that he was unemployed because he was awaiting
approval of disability benefits. Renteria testified that he used a
walker and a wheelchair due to back pain and it was “very
difficult to try to get any job” in his condition.
After deliberation, the Board denied Renteria parole,
determining that “the circumstances and the gravity of the
violation,” in the context of Renteria’s underlying conviction and
“all relevant suitability factors[,] are such that consideration of
public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration.”
The Board concluded Renteria had “poor[]” overall performance
on parole and “a developing pattern” of “inappropriate[]”
behavior. The Board stated Renteria “did not use [his] coping
skills or his support system” and “it doesn’t seem that he had
complete control over his emotions when he was in the
community.” Further, the Board noted Renteria “indicates that
everyone has lied[:] the victim, the witness, the Parole Agent.”
Finally, the Board’s presiding commissioner remarked, “The
gravity of this offense may seem minor to you. . . . [I]t’s not
minor. . . . [T]he incident was a threat to somebody that was not
able to take full care of themselves, and we find it to be . . . a
serious offense.” The Board did not consider elderly parole or
youth offender parole factors.

6
D. Habeas Corpus Petition and Subsequent Parole
Reconsideration Proceedings
On July 27, 2023, Renteria filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the superior court. Renteria alleged the Board’s
decision lacked an evidentiary basis, that the Board failed to
consider youth offender and elderly parole suitability, and that
“his placement in custody has become constitutionally excessive.”
After Renteria filed his petition, the Board held an annual
parole reconsideration hearing on January 10, 2024, which
Renteria and his counsel attended. The Board discussed
Renteria’s behavior in prison, including a recent fight with
another inmate in self-defense, an incident of fentanyl use in
June 2023, and a disciplinary write-up for possessing cell-phone-
related contraband. Renteria’s most recent risk assessment, from
October 2023, indicated “a moderate [risk for violence] on the
higher end of th[e] continuum.”
After deliberation, the Board denied Renteria parole. It
based the denial on Renteria’s “recent behavioral instability,”
“limited coping tools,” and “lack of self-awareness as to his past
criminal behavior.” The Board stated it “gave special
consideration to [Renteria’s] elderly offender factors” because
Renteria was 56 years old. And although the Board “did not see
any evidence of [Renteria’s] qualification as a youth [of]fender,”
the Board afforded “great weight to his youth [of]fender factors”
out of “caution.”
The trial court denied Renteria’s habeas petition on
March 19, 2024. The court found “some evidence” supporting the
Board’s denial of parole and held the Board was not required to
consider youth offender and elderly parole suitability factors at
an initial parole reconsideration hearing. The court also held

7
Renteria’s continued incarceration did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment, because he “planned and carried out a
murder under the belief that he was exacting revenge” and
equally culpable defendants had received similar sentences.
On May 6, 2024, Renteria filed a habeas petition in this
court, alleging the same three claims he presented to the trial
court. We denied the petition.
Renteria petitioned for review in the California Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court granted review and directed this
court to vacate its denial and issue an order to show cause “why
relief should not be granted on the grounds petitioner’s
reincarceration for his 2021 parole violation amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment under the state and federal Constitutions
and that the Board of Parole Hearings erred by failing to consider
youth offender and elderly parole suitability factors at
petitioner’s initial parole reconsideration hearing.”
We ordered the People to show cause, and appointed
counsel for Renteria. The People filed a return, and Renteria,
through counsel, filed a traverse. We also asked the parties to
file supplemental briefing as further noted in the Discussion
below.

DISCUSSION

A. Renteria’s Burden on His Habeas Petition
When a superior court denies a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in a noncapital case, the petitioner may not appeal and
“must file a new, original [habeas] petition, generally in the
Court of Appeal.” (Robinson v. Lewis (2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, 895;
see Cal. Const. art. 6, § 10 [original habeas jurisdiction also

8
vested in courts of appeal].) The issuance of an order to show
cause signifies a preliminary determination that the petitioner
has sufficiently alleged a prima facie case, but “ ‘[this]
determination, it must be emphasized, is truly “preliminary”: it
is only initial and tentative, and not final and binding.’ ” (In re
Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 549; see In re Serrano (1995)
10 Cal.4th 447, 454-455.) Ultimately, “ ‘ “[a] habeas corpus
petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the judgment
under which he or she is restrained is invalid. [Citation.] To do
so, he or she must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
facts that establish a basis for relief on habeas corpus.” ’ ” (In re
Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 694; accord, In re Cox (2003)
30 Cal.4th 974, 997-998.) This burden is “heavy,” because “ ‘[f]or
purposes of collateral attack, all presumptions favor the truth,
accuracy, and fairness of the conviction and sentence.’ ” (People
v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (Duvall).)

B. Renteria Has Not Demonstrated His Sentence or
Reincarceration Are Constitutionally Excessive
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” (U.S. Const.,
8th Amend.) A sentence violates the Eighth Amendment when
the sentence is “ ‘ “grossly disproportionate” ’ ” to the offense.
(Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 23; accord, In re Coley
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 558-559.) The California Constitution
similarly provides that “[c]ruel or unusual punishment may not
be inflicted.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.) Under our state
constitution, a punishment is unconstitutional if “ ‘it is so
disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it
shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human

9
dignity.’ ” (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478; accord, In
re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th 959, 972 (Palmer).) Renteria focuses
his arguments on the state constitutional provision and does not
“contend that the federal Constitution offers him any additional
protection beyond that afforded by the state Constitution,” so “no
separate analysis of his federal claim is necessary.” (Palmer, at
p. 968, fn. 2 [analyzing petitioner’s claims “exclusively under the
California Constitution”].)
An indeterminate life prisoner who has been denied parole
may bring a claim under the California Constitution alleging
that, given the “particular circumstances” of his crime, his
confinement has “become constitutionally excessive.” (In re
Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1098 (Dannenberg); see
Palmer, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 968.) A reviewing court, however,
must bear in mind “the Legislature’s broad discretion over the
types and limits of punishment,” including its choice of “an
indeterminate term where the Board has authority to order
release.” (Palmer, at p. 971.) For this reason, “[a] claim of
excessive punishment must overcome a ‘considerable burden’
[citation], and courts should give ‘ “the broadest discretion
possible” ’ [citation] to the legislative judgment respecting
appropriate punishment.” (Id. at p. 972.) “ ‘ “[O]nly in the rarest
of cases could a court declare that the length of a sentence
mandated by the Legislature is unconstitutionally excessive.” ’ ”
(People v. Reyes (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 62, 86; accord, People v.
Meneses (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1087, 1093; see Lockyer v.
Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 73 [gross disproportionality
“applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case”];
Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1071 [life-maximum

10
imprisonment for “serious offenses” is “rarely” constitutionally
disproportionate].)
Three considerations guide our review of excessive sentence
claims: “(1) an examination of the nature of the offense and the
offender, with particular attention to the degree of danger both
pose to society; (2) a comparison of the punishment with the
punishment California imposes for more serious offenses; and
(3) a comparison of the punishment with that prescribed in other
jurisdictions for the same offense.” (Palmer, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
p. 973, citing In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 425-428.)
In his petition, Renteria challenges both his preparole
incarceration (“the 30-years he served for second-degree murder”)
and his reincarceration (“Renteria has served another one and a
half years in prison for a simple battery”), arguing they are
grossly disproportionate to his offense. He contends first that he
was less culpable in the underlying murder: he did not carry a
firearm and was not the actual killer; he was pressured by Rosas
into going to the shooting; he was 21 years old at the time; and
his prior criminal history was minor. By contrast, Renteria
observes, Rosas pleaded guilty to manslaughter, received a
sentence of 13 years, and was released after six and a half years.
Based on Rosas’s plea, Renteria contends his crime “was actually
a manslaughter” and his sentence exceeds the sentences that
other jurisdictions impose for manslaughter. And as to his
reincarceration, he argues “other non-lifers on parole get a ‘flash
incarceration’ of 1-10-days or a maximum of 180-days.
[Citations.] That means a non-lifer on a parole violation for
simple battery are released between 1-180-days with no public

11
safety requirement but lifers on a parole violation for simple
battery are treated differently.”3
As stated, Renteria conceded there was no constitutional
violation at oral argument. And in his briefing, Renteria did not
establish that the time he served preparole or the total time he
served after he was reincarcerated for a parole violation is
constitutionally disproportionate. We first consider the nature of
Renteria’s underlying offense of second degree murder and
conspiracy to commit murder and his 16 years to life sentence.
(See Palmer, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 973.) Even if Renteria’s
codefendant may have been more culpable, Renteria’s
participation in a fatal, gang-related, drive-by shooting was
undoubtedly serious. (See People v. Rhodes (2005)
126 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1391 (Rhodes) [mitigating factors were
outweighed by seriousness of the second degree murder offense
such that life without parole was not constitutionally excessive];
People v. Gonzales (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1, 17 [same, for
sentence of 50 years to life, despite defendant’s “youth and
incidental criminal history”], overruled on another ground by
People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, as stated in In re Johnson
(2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1406; People v. Mora (1995)
39 Cal.App.4th 607, 617–618 [life without parole sentence not
constitutionally excessive for murder even though defendant was
not “actual shooter”]; People v. Eshelman (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d
1513, 1524 [“Murder, even without the use of a firearm, is a
serious felony.”].)

3 The California Supreme Court’s order did not grant review
or direct us to issue an order to show cause based on Renteria’s
equal protection claim.

12
The California Supreme Court has cautioned that
constitutional disproportionality “will rarely apply to those
serious offenses and offenders currently subject by statute to life-
maximum imprisonment.” (Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at
p. 1071; see People v. Em (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 964, 972-973
[“Life sentences pass constitutional muster for those convicted of
aiding and abetting murder, and for those guilty of felony murder
who did not intend to kill.”].) Indeed, by convicting Renteria of
conspiracy to commit murder, the jury found that Renteria had
the intent to kill. (See People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 607
[“a conviction of conspiracy to commit murder requires a finding
of intent to kill”].)
Renteria’s petition also argued his sentence is greater than
the sentences authorized in California for “more serious” or more
“dangerous[]” crimes, including assault, poisoning, and rape.
(See Palmer, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 973.) While these crimes are
also undoubtedly serious, “[t]here is a line ‘between homicide and
other serious violent offenses against the individual.’ ” (Graham
v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 69 [nonhomicide crimes “ ‘cannot be
compared to murder in their “severity and irrevocability” ’ ” for
Eighth Amendment purposes]; accord, People v. Williams (2024)
17 Cal.5th 99, 132.)
The lesser sentence served by Rosas does not establish that
Renteria’s own sentence is constitutionally excessive. (See
People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 476 [“disparity in
sentencing imposed on defendant and [codefendant] does not
establish that defendant’s sentence is grossly disproportionate to
the offense he committed”]; accord, People v. Ramos (1997)
15 Cal.4th 1133, 1181-1182 [rejecting claim of disproportionate
sentence where defendant argued that codefendant was “morally

13
more culpable” and received a lesser sentence].) “This is
particularly true where the disposition of the codefendant’s case
was based on plea negotiations,” as was Rosas’s sentence.
(People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1159; accord, People v.
Wilson (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 128, 169-170 (Wilson).) Rosas’s
plea to manslaughter also does not demonstrate that Renteria’s
sentence should be compared to the sentence for manslaughter in
California or in other jurisdictions (see Palmer, supra, 10 Cal.5th
at p. 973), because Renteria was convicted of second degree
murder. (See People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 229-
230 [rejecting excessiveness comparison to voluntary
manslaughter because jury convicted defendant of second degree
murder].) Accordingly, Renteria has not demonstrated the
29 years he served before he was paroled was constitutionally
excessive.
We next consider Renteria’s contention his reincarceration
after his parole revocation for simple battery was itself
constitutionally excessive. (See Palmer, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
p. 970 [“life-top inmates denied release on parole may bring their
constitutional challenges directly to court. . . . inmates . . . are not
limited to challenging only the statutory life maximum” and may
“challenge their continued incarceration” including “their years
served under” the indeterminate and determinate sentencing
laws].) In his petition, Renteria cites Justice Liu’s concurring
opinion in Palmer, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pages 980 to 982. In
Palmer, after the appellate court determined the defendant had
served a constitutionally excessive prison sentence, the California
Supreme Court held that a finding of excessiveness did not
automatically require termination of the defendant’s remaining
parole term. (Id. at p. 980.) While the Palmer majority declined

14
to address the consequences of any future parole violations (see
id. at p. 978), Justice Liu separately expressed his view that if a
defendant has already served a constitutionally excessive prison
term, that defendant “may not be reincarcerated for violating
parole” (id. at p. 981 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.)). On this basis,
Renteria argued in his petition that he could not be
constitutionally reincarcerated for his parole violation. But
Renteria, unlike the defendant in Palmer, has not demonstrated
the 29-year sentence he served for second degree murder and
conspiracy to commit murder is constitutionally excessive such
that his reincarceration for a parole violation would violate the
state constitution. (See id. at p. 974 [declining to review the
Court of Appeal’s determination that Palmer’s punishment was
disproportionate].)
Although we appointed counsel to represent Renteria and
counsel filed a traverse, Renteria does not meaningfully respond
to the People’s arguments that he has not served a
constitutionally excessive sentence.4 And he conceded the issue

4 Renteria instead raises several new and primarily
statutory arguments in the traverse: (1) at his initial parole
reconsideration hearing, the Board failed to consider
intermediate sanctions short of continued incarceration; (2) that
he is no longer subject to an indeterminate life term after the
passage of Senate Bill No. 118 in 2020, which capped the parole
term for life prisoners paroled after July 1, 2020, to three years;
and (3) that, although he was paroled before this date, the
changes made by Senate Bill No. 118 apply to him as a matter of
equal protection. We do not reach these additional claims
because they were not raised in Renteria’s petition and they
exceed the scope of our order to show cause. “‘[A]ttempts to
introduce additional claims . . . in a traverse do not expand the

15
at oral argument. Renteria argued in supplemental briefing that
he “faces a potential new life sentence” because of his simple
battery parole violation, and “[t]his disproportionate penalty is
cruel and unusual punishment.” There are several problems with
this argument.
First, it fails to acknowledge Renteria is serving a life-
maximum sentence for second degree murder and conspiracy to
commit murder, rather than for simple battery. As Justice Liu’s
concurrence in Palmer, supra, 10 Cal.5th at page 971 explained,
reincarceration after a parole violation is “a resumption of
precisely the same imprisonment” for the underlying crime. (See
People v. Nuckles (2013) 56 Cal.4th 601, 609 [parole “is a form of
punishment accruing directly from the underlying conviction”
and “is a direct consequence of a felony conviction and prison
term”; if a parolee violates a parole condition, the state may “
‘return the individual to imprisonment without the burden of a
new adversary criminal trial’ ”].) This means Renteria’s
reincarceration is a resumption of his original sentence, rather
than a new sentence for his parole violation. And Renteria
conceded at oral argument that the analysis of “the cruel and
unusual punishment goes to the original sentence.”

scope of the proceeding[,] which is limited to the claims which the
court initially determined stated a prima facie case for relief.’”
(Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 478; accord, In re Lawley (2008)
42 Cal.4th 1231, 1248; In re Lugo (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1522,
1542; Board of Prison Terms v. Superior Court (2005)
130 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1235 [“[A] habeas corpus petitioner may
not raise additional issues in the traverse.”].) Renteria may
choose to present these claims in a future habeas petition.

16
Second, Renteria does not cite any authority that parole
revocation and reincarceration pursuant to a lawful life-
maximum sentence itself constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. “‘We are not required to examine undeveloped
claims or to supply arguments for the litigants.’” (People v.
Baugh (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 739, 750; accord, People v. Abarca
(2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 475, 480; see also Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th
at p. 474 [“the burden is on the [habeas] petitioner to establish
grounds for his release”].) Indeed, courts have rejected similar
claims in the past. (Cf. In re Johnson (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th
160, 173 [rejecting argument that “reimprisonment after
13 months of [parole] release constitutes cruel or unusual
punishment” and noting “Johnson readily concedes that he can
find no case supporting his claim”].)
Third, to the extent Renteria challenges his total sentence
served (29 years plus reincarceration), as Renteria concedes, our
disproportionality analysis is with reference to his underlying
crime rather than the parole violation leading to reincarceration.
And the approximately 32 years Renteria had served at the time
he filed his petition is not grossly disproportionate to his
involvement in the underlying murder of Velasquez, which
resulted in a conviction for second degree murder and conspiracy
to commit murder, for the same reasons explained above.
Further, although not dispositive, the Board deemed Renteria’s
simple battery parole violation to be a “serious offense,” because
it “threat[ened] somebody that was not able to take full care of
themselves,” and Renteria did not accept responsibility for the
incident. These additional circumstances support the Board’s
finding that Renteria’s conduct was a threat to society and that
Renteria’s reincarceration is not grossly disproportionate to his

17
offense. (Cf. People v. Romero (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1432
[recidivist behavior, including parole violations, supported
proportionality of 25-years-to-life sentence]; accord, People v.
Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354, 366-367; People v. Cooper
(1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 815, 825-826.)
For all these reasons, Renteria has not met his burden to
demonstrate his sentence or reincarceration were constitutionally
excessive. (See Rhodes, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1391
[denying claim because “defendant has made no showing that the
challenged penalty is far in excess of that imposed in California
for [more] serious crimes or for the same offense in other
jurisdictions”]; accord, Wilson, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 170.)

C. Renteria Concedes the Parole Board Was Not Required To
Consider Youth Offender or Elderly Parole Suitability at the
Initial Parole Reconsideration Hearing
We now examine Renteria’s due process claim that elderly
and youth offender parole considerations apply to a parole
reconsideration initial hearing. Although Renteria raised this
claim in his original habeas corpus petition, Renteria
subsequently abandoned it in his traverse. At oral argument,
Renteria expressly conceded that the youth offender and elderly
parole factors do not apply to an initial parole reconsideration
hearing. As Renteria has abandoned and conceded the issue, we
conclude Renteria has not met his burden to demonstrate
entitlement to relief. (Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 474 [habeas
corpus petitioner bears “heavy burden” to prove grounds for
relief]; In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 [“To
demonstrate error, [a party] must present meaningful legal
analysis”].)

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DISPOSITION

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J. STONE, J.

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