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March 3, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Saucedo CA2/6

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B338747

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (5.8K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/3/26 P. v. Saucedo CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B338747
(Super. Ct. No. 23CR06498)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)

v.

MICHAEL ANGEL
SAUCEDO,

Defendant and Appellant.

Michael Angel Saucedo appeals a judgment following his
convictions for second degree robbery (Pen. Code,1 § 211; counts 1
and 3) and admissions that he used a dangerous or deadly
weapon in committing the offenses (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and
suffered a strike prior conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12,
subds. (a)–(d)). Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, the trial
court sentenced Saucedo to nine years and four months in state
prison.

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Saucedo contends the trial court erred in imposing a
$2,700 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) and identical parole
revocation fine (§ 1202.45, subd. (a)) without considering his
ability to pay. Because Saucedo requested the court impose the
minimum fine and the court did not consider his ability to pay
and imposed fines exceeding the statutory minimum, we reverse
and remand solely for reconsideration of imposition of the fines.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Saucedo was charged with two counts of second degree
robbery (§ 211; counts 1 and 3) and four counts of assault with a
deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); counts 2, 4, 5 & 6). He filed a
motion to reduce bail. The motion stated he “has been
unemployed and has no financial resources. He is a client of the
public defender and has been in custody on this case since
September.” At the bail hearing, Saucedo filed a confidential
financial affidavit.2 The court denied the motion to reduce bail.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Saucedo later pleaded guilty
to both robbery counts and admitted deadly weapon and strike
prior enhancements in exchange for a nine year and four month
state prison sentence and dismissal of the remaining counts and
enhancements. The parties agreed that any statutory fees and
assessments were “to be determined.”
The court did not direct probation to prepare a presentence
report (§ 1203.10, subd. (a)). At sentencing, the court reviewed
“the report prepared by probation in regards to firearms”
(§ 29810, subd. (c)(1)), which did not include information about
Saucedo’s financial condition. Saucedo’s counsel asked the trial
court “to reduce fines and fees to the statutory minimum.” The

2 The financial affidavit is not included in the record on
appeal.

2
court said it was “not going to exercise its discretion as to the
restitution fines in this case.” The court imposed a $2,700
restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) and stayed a $2,700 parole
revocation fine (§ 1202.45, subd. (a)).3 The court did not indicate
that it considered Saucedo’s prior bail motion or the financial
affidavit.
Saucedo’s counsel objected to the $2,700 fines, stating,
“[M]y client had no financial resources prior to this arrest. He
had been out of custody for a very brief period of time, had no
financial resources then, and now he’s going to be incarcerated.
He continues to have no financial resources.” Counsel asked the
court “to reconsider imposing that fine. It’s extremely high,
something that a public defender client who doesn’t have a
history of employment and has no assets cannot afford.”
The prosecutor requested the court impose the $2,700
“fines and fees” because there was no defense testimony or “any
evidence” about Saucedo’s “financial resources.” Although the
prosecutor had been present in the courtroom during the bail
hearing when the financial affidavit was submitted, he told the
sentencing judge there was no “evidence admitted indicating . . .
what his financial resources are,” and “there’s never been any
evidence presented in the case or in front of this Court as to what
the defendant can or cannot afford.”
The court said defense counsel’s “comments are noted for
the record.” It did not conduct an ability to pay hearing, and
imposed the dual $2,700 restitution and parole revocation fines

3 The court apparently calculated the fines by multiplying
the minimum fine of $300 times nine years of imprisonment.
(See § 1202.4, subd. (b)(2).)

3
and stipulated state prison sentence. The court also ordered
victim restitution of $542.65. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).)
DISCUSSION
Saucedo contends the trial court erred in imposing a
restitution fine and a parole revocation fine exceeding the
statutory minimum without considering his ability to pay. We
agree.
Section 1202.4, subdivision (b) requires trial courts to
impose a restitution fine when a defendant is convicted of a
felony “unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for
not doing so.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (b).) For felony convictions, the
required fine is not less than $300 and not more than $10,000.
(§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1).) “A defendant’s inability to pay shall not
be considered a compelling and extraordinary reason not to
impose a restitution fine. Inability to pay may be considered only
in increasing the amount of the restitution fine in excess of the
minimum fine” of $300. (§ 1202.4, subd. (c).) And for those
defendants whose sentence includes a period of parole, the trial
court must impose a “parole revocation restitution fine in the
same amount.” (§ 1202.45, subd. (a).) The latter fine shall be
suspended unless the person’s parole is revoked. (§ 1202.45,
subd. (c).)
Here, the trial court imposed restitution and parole
revocation fines of $2,700, exceeding the $300 minimum. The
court imposed the fines without conducting an ability to pay
hearing and over Saucedo’s objection that he could not afford to
pay.
In People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1 (Kopp), the California
Supreme Court recently considered whether a trial court could
impose restitution and parole revocation fines without

4
considering a defendant’s ability to pay. There, codefendant
Hernandez “asked the court to impose a minimum restitution
fine and stay any additional payment orders ‘due to
[Hernandez’s] inability to pay.’ ” (Id. at p. 10.) The trial court
denied the request and imposed the maximum restitution fine
without conducting an ability to pay hearing. (Id. at pp. 10, 13.)
Our high court reversed, holding that a trial court must conduct
an ability to pay hearing before imposing a restitution fine that
exceeds the statutory minimum of $300. (Id. at pp. 17, 30.) The
court held, “[T]he trial court did not consider defendant’s inability
to pay as a statutory factor in imposing a restitution fine above
the minimum amount. (See Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subds. (c), (d).)
Hernandez on remand may seek to contest his inability to pay the
amount exceeding the statutory minimum.” (Id. at pp. 23–24.)
Similarly here, Saucedo’s request that the court impose the
minimum restitution fine, and objection to the fine above the
minimum based on inability to pay, triggered the trial court’s
duty to consider his ability to pay. The defense’s request and
objection are sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.
Kopp also held that punitive criminal fines should be
reviewed under the excessive fines provisions of the United
States and California Constitutions.4 (Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at

4 The California Constitution states, “Cruel or unusual
punishment may not be inflicted or excessive fines imposed.”
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.) The Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution states, “Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.” (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) Under the excessive fines
clause, courts consider four factors in determining whether a fine
is disproportionate: “(1) the defendant’s culpability; (2) the
relationship between the harm and the penalty; (3) the penalties

5
p. 23.) Hernandez, like Saucedo, “did not invoke the excessive
fines clauses in the trial court.” (Ibid.) Because the trial court
did not impose the minimum fine requested by the defendant and
did not conduct an ability to pay hearing, our Supreme Court
vacated the fines and remanded to the trial court so that the
defendant could raise a claim under the excessive fines clause.
(Ibid.) And because the parole revocation fine mirrored the
restitution fine, remand was necessary to determine the amount
of the stayed parole revocation fine even though the high court
vacated the restitution fine pursuant to section 1465.9.5 (Kopp,
at p. 24.)
As in Kopp, the trial court here imposed restitution and
parole revocation fines exceeding $300 without conducting an
ability to pay hearing. And there is no “affirmative evidence
indicating that the trial court knew that defendant’s ability to
pay was a factor in determining the fine to be imposed.” (People
v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042 (Ramirez).)
Unlike Ramirez, the trial court here did not indicate it
considered a probation report or any information that shed light
on Saucedo’s financial condition. (Ramirez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
p. 1042.) Nor did the trial court indicate that it considered

imposed in similar statutes; and (4) the defendant’s ability to
pay.” (People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005)
37 Cal.4th 707, 728.)

5 Section 1465.9, subdivision (d) (added by Stats. 2024, ch.
805, § 1) states, “Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of
imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the
balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and
uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines
shall be vacated.”

6
counsel’s objection that Saucedo could not afford to pay fines
exceeding $300. (Ibid.) The trial court only stated that counsel’s
“comments are noted for the record.” Thus, we cannot conclude
the trial court considered Saucedo’s “financial wherewithal in
deciding to impose a [$2,700] fine.” (Ibid.) Kopp, supra, 19
Cal.5th 1, compels us to reverse and remand for the trial court to
conduct an ability to pay hearing because the imposed fines
exceeded the minimum. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) The Attorney General correctly
concedes that a remand is appropriate.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and remanded solely for further
proceedings regarding the restitution fine and parole revocation
fine consistent with this opinion and the California Supreme
Court’s opinion in People v. Kopp. We express no opinion as to
how the court should exercise its discretion on remand. If the
trial court imposes fines and fees that deviate from those
originally imposed, it shall prepare an amended abstract of
judgment and forward a copy to the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J. CODY, J.

7
Denise Hippach, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

---

Leonard J. Klaif, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Chelsea Zaragoza,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.