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March 3, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Rahman v. Ayoubi CA2/2

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B341516

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (8.4K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/3/26 Rahman v. Ayoubi CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

MOHAMMED REZMAR B341516
RAHMAN, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
Plaintiff and Respondent, No. 24WHRO00511)

v.

MOHAMMAD JOHN AYOUBI,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kelly D. Boyer, Judge. Affirmed.

Krane & Smith and Daniel L. Reback for Defendant and
Appellant.

The Westmoreland Law Firm, Dominique N. Westmoreland
and Yesha H. Patel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Mohammad John Ayoubi
(appellant) appeals from the order denying his special motion to
strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-
SLAPP motion) against plaintiff and respondent Mohammed
Rezmar Rahman (respondent). Appellant contends the trial court
mistakenly applied the Flatley rule1 and found respondent had a
probability of prevailing on his petition. We conclude sufficient
evidence shows respondent had a probability of prevailing on the
merits of his claim despite the incorrect application of the Flatley
rule. Thus, we affirm.

BACKGROUND
The petition
Respondent is 75 years old and the founder and president
of the La Mirada Masjid Mosque in La Mirada, California.
Appellant, whom respondent has known for over 20 years, was an
attendee at the mosque. Over the years, respondent and
appellant had strong disagreements over the mosque’s policies
that eventually led to appellant’s protests against respondent and
the mosque’s leadership.
On March 13, 2024, respondent filed a request for elder or
dependent adult abuse restraining order against appellant. The
petition included a declaration in which respondent describes
events of March 2024. Respondent maintained appellant arrived
at the mosque on March 12, 2024, around 8:20 p.m. and began
shouting at respondent, insulting him, engaging in intimidation,
and accusing him of corruption. Appellant used a bullhorn to
shout slogans and chants that disrupted the entire Muslim

1 Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299 (Flatley).

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congregation prayer services. Most of the attendees went outside
and asked appellant to leave. Some attendees left the prayer
services due to this disturbance. Respondent called the sheriff
and appellant left when the deputy arrived. The deputy filed an
incident report and advised respondent to go to court for a
restraining order.
Respondent averred appellant had obstructed prayer
services and engaged in vile attacks and harassment against him
earlier when the holy month of Ramadan began on March 10,
2024. To obstruct prayer services, appellant showed up daily at
the mosque at 8:20 p.m., stood at the entrance, and yelled with a
bullhorn for about an hour. Respondent claimed appellant’s
harassing conduct was recurring and continuing. Further,
respondent alleged he was involved in a prior violent incident in
the workplace with appellant in 2021 (21STRO03729).2
Respondent maintained he was afraid for his and his family’s
safety and expressed stress from the unnecessary abuse.
Respondent requested the court to order appellant to stay
at least 100 yards away from him, his family, and the mosque.
On March 14, 2024, the trial court granted a temporary
restraining order and set it to expire at the end of the hearing
scheduled on April 3, 2024. Respondent’s subsequent request to
continue the hearing, was granted by the court. The hearing was
rescheduled to May 8, 2024, and the restraining order was
extended to that date.
On May 8, 2024, appellant informed the trial court he
planned to file a motion and requested the court continue the

2 Respondent sought a temporary restraining order against
appellant in July 2021 in this matter. The request was denied
after a hearing.

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hearing on the petition. The court granted appellant’s request
and rescheduled the hearing to July 9, 2024. On the same day,
appellant filed an anti-SLAPP motion to the petition for
restraining order.
The anti-SLAPP motion
In the anti-SLAPP motion, appellant contended the petition
for restraining order arose from protected activity because it was
based entirely on appellant’s vocal criticisms of respondent and
the mosque. Appellant argued he was simply airing his
grievances and respondent sought to silence him. Appellant
asserted respondent tried to restrict his free speech in July 2021
in a prior case, 21STRO03729, by seeking a workplace violence
prevention restraining order, which was denied after a hearing
on the merits. Appellant maintained respondent could not
demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of his claim
because the allegations do not show any physical abuse, neglect,
financial abuse, abandonment, or isolation under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 15610.07, subdivision (a). Appellant
also posited there was no evidence showing how his speech
caused mental suffering to respondent.
In opposition, respondent contended appellant’s conduct
was not protected under Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th 299 because
appellant made death threats, which are illegal under Penal
Code section 422.3 Respondent argued appellant also obstructed
religious services, which is illegal under section 302. Further,
respondent asserted the mosque was not a public forum and
appellant’s speech did not concern a public interest. Respondent

3 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

4
maintained he could show a probability of prevailing on the
merits because appellant made credible threats of violence and
damaged respondent’s vehicle with a wooden sign, which caused
him stress and fear for his safety. Respondent indicated appellant
harassed him and subsequently violated the temporary
restraining order that was in effect.
The trial court’s ruling
The trial court issued its ruling on August 12, 2024,
denying the anti-SLAPP motion. The court found appellant made
threats of death and bodily harm against respondent. The court
also found appellant struck respondent’s vehicle with a wooden
sign. The court concluded this speech and conduct were not
protected under the anti-SLAPP statute because the actions
violated section 422 and were illegal as a matter of law.
The trial court went on to find, even if the conduct was
protected, there was sufficient evidence establishing respondent
had a probability of prevailing on the merits of the claim. The
court found the allegations in respondent’s declaration amounted
to a criminal threat in violation of section 422, and there was
evidence appellant’s conduct caused mental suffering to
respondent as he was in fear for his life and safety and had to
seek medical treatment. The court noted respondent needed only
to make a minimal showing of the claim’s merits to oppose the
anti-SLAPP motion.
Appellant timely appealed.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Appellant asserts three main arguments. First, appellant
contends the trial court erred in finding his conduct was
unprotected because it was not illegal as a matter of law. Second,

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appellant argues the court erroneously found respondent showed
a probability of prevailing on the merits on his elder abuse claim.
Finally, appellant asserts the court erred by failing to apply the
severance methodology required by Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1
Cal.5th 376 (Baral).

DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review and applicable law
“‘“We review de novo a ruling on a special motion to strike
under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 425.16. [Citation.] Thus,
we apply our independent judgment, both to the issue of whether
the cause of action arises from a protected activity and whether
the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing on the claim.”’”
(Balla v. Hall (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 652, 671 (Balla).) “An
appellant still bears the ‘“burden of affirmatively demonstrating
error.”’” (Ibid.)
“In evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion, courts conduct a
two-step analysis. First, the court decides whether a defendant
has met its ‘burden of establishing that the challenged
allegations or claims “aris[e] from” protected activity in which the
defendant has engaged.’” (Manlin v. Milner (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
1004, 1017–1018 (Manlin).) “For these purposes, protected
activity ‘includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing
made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any
other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial
body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any
written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the
public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public

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interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of
the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of
free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
interest.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (e).)” (Id. at p. 1018.)
“Second, if a defendant meets its burden on the threshold
showing, the court decides if the plaintiff ‘has established that
there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.’
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)” (Manlin, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1018.) “To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff ‘“must demonstrate
that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a
sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable
judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.”’”
(Ibid.) “At the second step, the court’s ‘inquiry is limited to
whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and
made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a
favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true,
and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it
defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. [Citations.]
“[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.”’”
(Balla, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 671.)
“‘Analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion is not confined to
evaluating whether an entire cause of action, as pleaded by the
plaintiff, arises from protected activity or has merit. Instead,
courts should analyze each claim for relief—each act or set of acts
supplying a basis for relief, of which there may be several in a
single pleaded cause of action—to determine whether the acts are
protected and, if so, whether the claim they give rise to has the
requisite degree of merit to survive the motion.’” (Manlin, supra,
82 Cal.App.5th at p. 1018.) “‘[T]o the extent any acts are
unprotected, the claims based on those acts will survive.’” (Ibid.)

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II. The anti-SLAPP motion was not erroneously denied
despite Flatley’s inapplicability because the evidence
shows respondent has a probability of prevailing on
his claim
A. The alleged conduct is not illegal as a matter of
law
Appellant asserts the conduct alleged is protected activity
and does not fall within the Flatley rule because the conduct is
not illegal as a matter of law. We agree.
Under the Flatley rule, “where a defendant brings a motion
to strike under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 425.16 based on
a claim that the plaintiff’s action arises from activity by the
defendant in furtherance of the defendant’s exercise of protected
speech or petition rights, but either the defendant concedes, or
the evidence conclusively establishes, that the assertedly
protected speech or petition activity was illegal as a matter of
law, the defendant is precluded from using the anti-SLAPP
statute to strike the plaintiff’s action.” (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th
at p. 320.)
Our Supreme Court “made it clear in Flatley that conduct
must be illegal as a matter of law to defeat a defendant’s showing
of protected activity. The defendant must concede the point, or
the evidence conclusively demonstrate it, for a claim of illegality
to defeat an anti-SLAPP motion at the first step.” (City of
Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 424.) “[T]he Supreme
Court’s use of the phrase ‘illegal’ was intended to mean criminal,
and not merely violative of a statute.” (Mendoza v. ADP
Screening & Selection Services, Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1644,
1654.)

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“Our Supreme Court has emphasized that the exception for
illegal activity is very narrow and applies only in undisputed
cases of illegality.” (Zucchet v. Galardi (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th
1466, 1478.) For example, “[t]he rare cases in which the exception
for illegal conduct has been applied include (1) a case in which
the plaintiff obtained a finding of factual innocence, which
conclusively established that the defendant made a false police
report, and the defendant did not contest that fact (Lefebvre v.
Lefebvre (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 696, 703) and (2) a case in which
the defendant conceded that its acts of vandalism in support of
animal rights issues were unlawful (Novartis Vaccines &
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc.
(2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1296). In contrast, courts deny anti-
SLAPP motions when it is not conclusively established or
conceded that unlawful protected activity occurred.” (Id. at
pp. 1478–1479.)
Here, the only evidence showing appellant engaged in
criminal threats in violation of section 422 is a declaration
submitted by respondent in which he attested appellant
threatened to kill and cause bodily harm to respondent and his
family.4 Nothing in the record shows appellant ever conceded to

4 Respondent contends appellant’s conduct was also illegal
under section 302, subdivision (a), which prohibits “intentionally
disturb[ing] or disquiet[ing] any assemblage of people met for
religious worship at a tax-exempt place of worship, by profane
discourse, rude or indecent behavior, or by any unnecessary
noise . . . .” While the trial court ultimately did not base its order
on section 302, nothing in the record shows appellant was guilty
of violating this statute as a matter of law. Appellant maintained
he engaged in peaceful protests and disputed taking part in any
wrongful acts disrupting the religious services at the mosque.

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making such criminal threats. Indeed, appellant entirely
disputed the allegation he threatened anyone associated with the
mosque or caused vandalism. Further, the record does not show
there was ever any legal finding or criminal conviction
establishing appellant was guilty of criminal conduct.
Accordingly, there is nothing to conclusively establish appellant
engaged in illegal conduct, in this entirely disputed matter.
Therefore, appellant’s conduct is protected under the anti-SLAPP
statute as the narrow Flatley exception is not applicable here.
While appellant’s conduct is protected given Flatley’s
inapplicability, the anti-SLAPP motion was nevertheless properly
denied because respondent satisfied the second prong of the
analysis: sufficiently demonstrating respondent has a probability
of prevailing on the merits of his claim.
B. The evidence shows respondent has a
probability of prevailing on his claim
Appellant argues the trial court erred in finding the second
prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis was satisfied because it
erroneously considered respondent’s new allegations of criminal
threat and his probability of prevailing on a claim under section
422. Further, appellant maintains respondent’s evidence is
insufficient to show the alleged conduct caused “mental suffering”
and is otherwise too vague to make a prima facie showing of elder
abuse.
“The Legislature enacted the Elder Abuse Act ‘to protect
elders by providing enhanced remedies which encourage private,
civil enforcement of laws against elder abuse and neglect.’” (Arace

There is no legal finding or criminal conviction establishing
appellant was guilty of violating this statute.

10
v. Medico Investments, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 977, 981.)
Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.07, subdivision
(a)(1), states in relevant part: “ ‘Abuse of an elder or a dependent
adult’ means . . . [¶] . . . Physical abuse, neglect, abandonment,
isolation, abduction, or other treatment with resulting physical
harm or pain or mental suffering.” “An ‘elder’ is defined as a
California resident, age 65 years or older. ([Welf. & Inst. Code,]
§ 15610.27.)” (Bookout v. Nielsen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1131,
1141.)
“The Elder Abuse Act defines ‘abuse’ broadly, including not
only physical abuse, neglect, abandonment, isolation or abduction
of a person age 65 or older, but also ‘other treatment,’ if that
treatment results in ‘physical harm or pain or mental suffering’
to the elder. ([Welf. & Inst. Code,] § 15610.07, subd. (a)(1).)”
(Darrin v. Miller (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 450, 454; see Tanguilig v.
Valdez (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 514, 526–527 [noting elder abuse is
defined, among other things, as any treatment resulting in
mental suffering].) “[U]nder [Welfare and Institutions Code]
section 15610.07, subdivision (a)(1), ‘treatment’ that is neither
physical abuse, neglect, abandonment, isolation nor abduction,
can constitute elder abuse if the treatment results in ‘physical
harm or pain or mental suffering’ even if the alleged abuser has
no responsibility to care for the elder and no control of the elder’s
property.” (Darrin, supra, at p. 456.) “‘Mental suffering’ means
fear, agitation, confusion, severe depression, or other forms of
serious emotional distress that is brought about by forms of
intimidating behavior, threats, [or] harassment . . . .” (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 15610.53.)
“An elder or dependent adult who has suffered abuse, as
defined in Section 15610.07, may seek protective orders . . . .”

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(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.03, subd. (a)(1).) Such “protective
order” includes a restraining order enjoining a party from
abusing, intimidating, molesting, attacking, striking, stalking,
threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing, or
telephoning the petitioner. (Id., § 15657.03, subd. (b)(5)(A).)
We conclude respondent’s claim meets the requisite
minimal merit to satisfy the second prong of the anti-SLAPP
analysis. Respondent presented evidence making a prima facie
showing of abusive “treatment” under the Elder Abuse Act.
Respondent attested, beginning on March 10, 2024, appellant
regularly obstructed the mosque’s prayer services by yelling
through a bullhorn at the entrance of the facility and engaging in
“vile attack and harassment” against respondent. Respondent
stated appellant used the bullhorn to shout at him and make loud
noises to intimidate him. Respondent maintained appellant’s acts
of harassment were recurring. Respondent presented evidence
showing appellant’s harassment included threatening respondent
and intentionally blocking the driveway into the mosque.
Respondent claims he called the police for help on March 12,
2024, after appellant arrived at the mosque again around
8:20 p.m. Respondent attested a deputy came, filed a report, and
advised him to contact the court for a restraining order.
Respondent averred this harassment continued afterwards, with
incidents against him and other mosque attendees as recently as
June 2024, violating the temporary restraining order in place.5

5 Appellant posits the trial court erred because it overlooked
his detailed declaration that denied all of threats, assault, and
vehicle damage allegations. However, in determining the second
prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, “we accept as true all evidence
favorable to the plaintiff and assess the defendant’s evidence only

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Further, respondent submitted evidence showing the
treatment resulted in his “mental suffering.” Respondent attested
he feared for the safety of himself and his family and underwent
stress from appellant’s unnecessary abuse. On multiple
occasions, respondent asked Robert “Bob” Arellano, a retired
peace officer for the Los Angeles Police Department, to determine
whether appellant was on the mosque property and if it was safe
for respondent to go outside the facility. Arellano escorted
respondent to and from his vehicle to protect him from appellant.
These facts meet the definition of “mental suffering” under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.53, as the evidence
shows appellant mentally suffered from stress, anxiety, and fear
for his safety caused by appellant’s alleged harassing conduct and
intimidating behavior.6

to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s submission as a matter of
law.” (Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc. (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 688, 699–700.) “We do not weigh credibility, nor do
we evaluate the weight of the evidence.” (Id. at p. 699.) Hence,
the mere fact appellant made statements disputing respondent’s
evidence is insufficient to show the second prong is not met.
6 Appellant contends the trial court erroneously relied on
respondent’s evidence regarding death threats and damages to
his vehicle because these facts were not in the petition. “[T]he
issues in an anti-SLAPP motion are framed by the pleadings.”
(Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 672.)
“Thus, the act or acts underlying a claim for purposes of an anti-
SLAPP statute is determined from the plaintiffs’ allegations.”
(Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 869, 883.) Even assuming arguendo the death
threats and vehicle damage allegations are outside the scope of
the petition, this is not dispositive because respondent’s
remaining facts and evidence discussed herein sufficiently

13
As discussed above, the Elder Abuse Act broadly defines
“abuse” to include any “treatment” resulting in “mental
suffering.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.07, subd. (a)(1).) While
appellant focuses on the allegations he engaged in criminal
threats and property damage, the statute encompasses
“intimidating behavior” and “harassment” causing “fear,
agitation, . . . or other forms of serious emotional distress.” (Id.,
§ 15610.53.) Respondent made the minimal showing that
appellant’s harassing and intimidating behavior caused
respondent stress, anxiety, and fear for his and his family’s
safety. Nothing shows respondent’s burden of proof was any
greater to satisfy the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis in
this matter.7 Accordingly, we conclude the anti-SLAPP motion
was properly denied.

support his claim. We note, while not specifically mentioned in
the petition’s attached declaration, respondent’s evidence
regarding appellant’s general threats and blocking of the
mosque’s driveway is within the scope of the petition because
such acts are examples of the alleged recurring harassment.
7 Appellant argues respondent’s 2021 failed petition for a
temporary restraining order in the workplace violence matter,
21STRO03729, should have a preclusive effect under collateral
estoppel principles because the allegations in that case were
similar to those here. But [i]n order for issue preclusion to
apply, . . . the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must
be identical to that decided in a former proceeding.” (Williams v.
Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
1117, 1131.) Issue preclusion is inapposite here because nothing
in the record shows the issues here are identical to those in
21STRO03729, which involved a different incident that occurred
three years prior to this case. Appellant only asserts the

14
C. The issue as to severing allegations is moot
Finally, appellant posits the trial court erred by failing to
sever the protected activities from the unprotected ones as
required under Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th 376. Because respondent
has shown a probability of prevailing on the merits of his claim,
this issue is moot. Thus, we need not consider the severance issue
here.

DISPOSITION
The August 12, 2024 order denying the special motion to
strike pursuant to section 425.16 is affirmed. Respondent is
awarded his costs on appeal.

CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

LUI, P. J.

SIGGINS, J.*

allegations in the two cases are similar, which does not establish
they have identical issues.
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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