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March 3, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

John W. Myers v. Wronko Loewen Benucci

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-2507-24

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (57)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (4.4K)

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Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2507-24

JOHN W. MYERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WRONKO LOEWEN
BENUCCI,

Defendant-Respondent.

---

Argued January 27, 2026 – Decided March 3, 2026

Before Judges Firko and Perez Friscia.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Somerset County, Docket No. L-1145-24.

John W. Myers, self-represented appellant.

Ana Parikh argued the cause for respondent (Rivkin
Radler, LLP, attorneys; Deborah M. Isaacson and Ana
Parikh, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
In this legal malpractice action, plaintiff John W. Myers, the former client

of defendant Wronko Loewen Benucci (defendant or Benucci), appeals from a

March 12, 2025 order dismissing all of his claims without prejudice under Rule

4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim and denying his cross-motion for a stay as

moot. Unconvinced by Myers's arguments, we affirm.

I.

Factual Background

We summarize the following facts from the record and the allegations in

Myers's first and amended complaints, treating those allegations as true and

extending all favorable inferences to him. See Craig v. Suburban Cablevision,

Inc., 140 N.J. 623, 625-26 (1995).

Myers and his wife owned a condominium in Basking Ridge. Myers had

several altercations with the condominium's board members, including board

president Hilary Carmen and board member Bruce Stonely. Myers also had

interactions with the property manager, Terri Reddell. On January 28, 2016,

Carmen, Stonely, and Reddell filed a complaint alleging harassment against

Myers (the Stonely matter). On November 17, 2016, defendant began providing

legal services for Myers relative to various Bernards Township Municipal Court

summonses, which charged him with disrupting a meeting, trespassing, and

A-2507-24
2
resisting arrest. On December 2, 2016, the three individuals, along with

Nannette Carriere, Valerie Whyte, Taylor Management Company (Taylor), and

Bernards 1 Condominium Association (Association), filed a complaint and order

to show cause (OTSC) against Myers alleging intentional interference with

contractual relations, assault, and harassment and seeking restraints precluding

him from contacting any Board members or employees of Taylor. 1 The

complaint stemmed from an incident where Myers disrupted an annual Board

meeting, resulting in his arrest.

On December 5, 2016, Judge Robert A. Ballard, Jr. granted the OTSC with

restraints, which precluded Myers from having any contact or communication

with anyone at the Association, board members, or employees of Taylor. On

December 12, 2016, Myers retained defendant to represent him in the matter.

On January 20, 2017, defendant filed an answer and counterclaim on behalf of

Myers alleging breach of fiduciary duty, demanding an accounting, for breach

of contract, defamation, negligent misrepresentations, violations of the New

Jersey Condominium Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 46:8B-1 to -38, breach of the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, for appointment of a property manager,

and estoppel.

1
Stonely v. Myers, docket number SOM-L-1520-16.
A-2507-24
3
On February 13, 2018, defendant filed a first amended answer,

counterclaims, and a third-party complaint on behalf of Myers against the board

and board members Sandra Schaffer, Kathleen Crossan, and Zhempeng Zhao, in

their individual capacities. Myers contends he wanted to include Griffin &

Alexander, the Association's counsel, and Officer Michael Sweeney as parties,

but defendant refused his request. Myers later filed a lawsuit against these

parties separately as a self-represented litigant.

On May 18, 2018, the original parties and third parties moved for

summary judgment dismissal of Myers's counterclaims and third-party claims.

Defendant filed opposition and a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking

to dismiss the claims against Myers.

On July 20, 2018, Judge Ballard heard oral argument on the motions and

reserved decision. On August 3, 2018, the judge issued a seventy-six-page

written decision. The judge dismissed with prejudice Myers's counterclaims and

third-party claims for breach of fiduciary duty, his demand for an accounting as

premature, defamation, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment,

breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,

violations of the Act, estoppel, malicious prosecution, improper elections, and

A-2507-24
4
conspiracy. Myers's assault claim was not dismissed. A memorializing order

was entered.

Defendant moved for reconsideration. Before doing so, defendant

contends it reiterated to Myers that the motion was unlikely to be granted. By

October 2018, Myers failed to pay defendant's legal fees, which defendant

claimed caused the attorney-client relationship to irreparably breakdown. On

December 19, 2018, the judge denied Myers's motion for reconsideration.

Meanwhile, the plaintiffs in the Stonely matter filed an OTSC against

Myers to hold him in contempt for violating the court order precluding him from

having contact with them. On December 27, 2018, defendant moved to

withdraw as Myers's counsel. While the motion was pending, Myers repeatedly

requested defendant perform extensive legal work, including work beyond the

scope of the parties' retainer agreement. Despite the pending motion to

withdraw, defendant continued to represent Myers, including appearing at two

case management conferences with Judge Thomas C. Miller. Myers did not file

opposition to defendant's motion to withdraw.

On January 14, 2019, Judge Miller dismissed Myers's assault action and

referred the other claims to Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). Myers

continued to request that defendant represent him during the ADR proceedings

A-2507-24
5
even though he acknowledged in writing such representation was not included

in the retainer agreement. On January 25, 2019, defendant's motion to withdraw

was granted. Myers wrote a letter to the judge expressing his objection to

defendant's withdrawal. The judge declined to consider the letter because no

formal motion was filed.

On October 27, 2020, the plaintiffs in the Stonely matter filed a motion to

enforce litigant's rights based on Myers's continued violations of the restraints

pursuant to the December 5, 2016 order. Myers filed opposition as a self-

represented litigant. On November 20, 2020, Chris P. Corbitt, Esq., of the

Corbitt Law Firm, filed a notice of appearance to represent Myers, which was

partially granted, to allow Corbitt to represent Myers in opposition to the

plaintiff's motion to enforce litigants rights in the Stonely matter. After a

plenary hearing was conducted in the Stonely matter, Judge Miller granted the

Stonely plaintiffs' motion and ordered Myers to pay counsel fees due to his

violations of the restraints imposed.

Separately, on November 5, 2022, Myers filed a new action against the

Association, Taylor, Griffin & Alexander, and Stark & Stark. On January 20,

2023, Judge Ballard granted the motions to dismiss filed by defendants, the

Association, and Taylor. The judge ruled that Myers was "barred from bringing

A-2507-24
6
any subsequent litigation arising out of the same facts and circumstances set

forth in this as well as the various other Law Division and Chancery Court

complaints cited in the moving papers." On May 19, 2023, the judge also

dismissed Myers's claims against Griffin & Alexander and Stark & Stark

because the firms did not owe duties to Myers as he did not have attorney-client

relationships with the law firms. Myers has appealed from these rulings, which

are pending in Myers v. The Bd. of Trs. Soc'y Hill at Bernards I Condo. Ass'n,

Inc., A-3420-24.

After multiple years of inaction, Myers filed a motion as a self-represented

litigant seeking reconsideration of all previous orders in the Stonely matter. On

August 16, 2024, Judge Ballard again denied Myers's motion. Myers, for the

third time, filed a motion for reconsideration of the judge's prior decisions,

which were denied on November 8, 2024. On December 2, 2024, Myers moved

to vacate the restraining order. Following oral argument, Judge Ballard denied

the motion on February 3, 2025.

Separately, Myers also filed a declaratory judgment against the Greater

New York Insurance Company (GNY) and New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance

Company (NJM) alleging that they wrongfully denied Myers's liability coverage

and indemnification for the costs incurred in the Stonely matter. GNY and NJM

A-2507-24
7
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the Judge Ballard granted. Judge

Ballard found Myers was not entitled to insurance coverage for the Stonely

matter by either company and therefore was not entitled to defenses or

indemnification under the policies. Myers filed a motion for reconsideration,

which was denied.

The Present Litigation

On August 24, 2024, Myers filed a ten-count complaint against defendant

alleging: (1) legal malpractice; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of the covenant

of good faith and fair dealing; (4) breach of fiduciary duty; (5) intentional

infliction of emotional distress; (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (7)

negligence; (8) negligent misrepresentation; (9) promissory estoppel; and (10)

fraudulent misrepresentation or common law fraud. Over the course of

representation, Myers alleged he paid defendant $46,654.88.

On November 1, 2024, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint in lieu

of filing an answer. On November 26, 2024, Myers submitted a proposed first

amended complaint in opposition to the motion to dismiss. The record does not

indicate Myers filed a motion for leave to file and serve a first amended

complaint but simply included it in his opposing papers to defendant's motion

to dismiss. On January 27, 2025, Myers filed a cross-motion to stay the three

A-2507-24
8
pending actions arguing a stay was necessary until all underlying cases were

resolved. Defendant opposed Myers's cross-motion to stay.

On February 14, 2025, Judge Ballard heard oral argument on defendant's

motion to dismiss and Myers's cross-motion to stay. Defendant argued that

Myers failed to plead viable causes of action in both his complaint and his

proposed first amended complaint, which the judge addressed notwithstanding

its unfiled status.

Defendant argued that all of Myers's causes of action arose from the same

factual background and alleged breach of duty by defendant dating back to the

2016 underlying action. Defendant also argued many of Myers's claims were

barred by the statute of limitations. Specifically, defendant contended the

negligence-based claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations and

expired in 2021, and Myers failed to plead how his "cognitive impairments and

depressive disorder" prevented him from understanding his legal rights or when

a cause of action accrued. Defendant asserted Myers had no basis to toll the

statute of limitations as to any alleged counts.

Myers countered that his original and proposed first amended complaint

alleged specific factual allegations establishing the elements for each of the

claims and legal theories advanced. Regarding the statute of limitations, Myers

A-2507-24
9
argued if defendant's motion to dismiss was granted, he would be depr ived of

the right to pursue his claims, which "would be unfair." As to his cross-motion

for a stay, Myers asserted it was necessary for the underlying litigation to be

resolved first because certain "elements overlap," such as "legal expenses," with

the legal malpractice claim. Myers added the "interest of fairness" and

"avoiding unnecessary litigation" favored the entry of a stay.

Defendant responded that none of the three pending actions have any

bearing on Myers's claims against it. Defendant pointed out the underlying case

filed in 2016 had been adjudicated to finality, and Myers's untimely attempts to

file renewed motions for reconsideration did not resurrect any claims. In

addition, since all claims against defendant in those actions had already been

dismissed, there was no reason to grant a stay. The judge reserved decision on

the motion and cross-motion.

The Judge's Decision

On March 12, 2025, Judge Ballard granted defendant's motion to dismiss

the complaint and proposed first amended complaint without prejudice, and

denied Myers's cross-motion to stay the other proceedings.

In his comprehensive written statement of reasons, the judge determined

Myers failed to suggest a cause of action for legal malpractice against defendant

A-2507-24
10
because he failed to satisfy the proximate cause element and did not plead any

allegations as to how any "purported deviation from the standard of care"

resulted in any damages to him. The judge found Myers's allegation that

defendant violated multiple Rules of Professional Conduct (RPCs) alone did not

create a cause of action for legal malpractice, citing Meisels v. Fox Rothschild

LLP, 240 N.J. 286, 299 (2020).

As to Myers's breach of contract claim, the judge found Myers pled

conclusory allegations that defendant breached three items in the parties'

retainer agreement causing him to suffer "significant damages" as a result. The

judge dismissed the breach of contract count on the basis that it was

insufficiently pled to sustain a cause of action.

The breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cause of

action was dismissed because the judge reasoned Myers failed to set forth any

allegations that defendant acted in bad faith with the intent to deprive him of his

reasonable expectations under the retainer agreement. The judge noted Myers

failed to allege how attorney Marco M. Benucci's deciding to have another

attorney from defendant's firm appear at a hearing in his place constituted "bad

faith."

A-2507-24
11
The judge dismissed the fiduciary duty count because Myers "simply"

alleged defendant owed him a duty, it breached that duty, and he proximately

suffered damages as a result. The judge noted these conclusory allegations "do[]

nothing more than restate the language of a fiduciary duty cause of action."

The judge dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional distress count

on the basis Myers failed to plead the requisite facts to demonstrate "extreme or

outrageous conduct." Myers alleged he suffered "severe mental injuries,"

including "severe anxiety, [post-traumatic stress disorder], and depressive

disorders." The judge concluded Myers did not allege facts showing conduct

that "goes beyond all possible bounds of decency" to support an intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim, as required by Griffen v. Tops Appliance

City, Inc., 337 N.J. Super. 15, 22 (App. Div. 2001).

For similar reasons, the judge dismissed Myers's negligent infliction of

emotional distress count. The judge reiterated Myers simply recited the

elements of such a claim, which was insufficient to make out a claim for

negligent infliction of emotional distress.

As to the negligence count, the judge reasoned this count was "replete

with conclusory statements" that merely recited the elements of negligence

unsubstantiated with the requisite facts. The judge noted the standard of care in

A-2507-24
12
a negligence action is the reasonable person standard, which Myers failed to

establish. The judge found Myers also did not allege any facts which would

support a claim for injury or damages.

In dismissing Myers's negligent misrepresentation count, the judge found

Myers failed to comply with Rule 4:5-8(a), which requires in such cases

"particulars of the wrong, with dates and items if necessary," to be alleged with

particularity. The judge held Myers did not include the required specificity and

as pleaded, the elements of negligent misrepresentation were not met. Citing

our decision in Carroll v. Cellco P'ship, 313 N.J. Super. 488, 502-05 (App. Div.

1998), the judge explained what is required under New Jersey law to prove a

claim for negligent misrepresentation: (1) defendant negligently made an

incorrect statement; (2) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the defendant's

statement; and (3) the plaintiff was injured as a consequence of relying upon

that statement. Id. at 502. Given Myers pled nothing more than that

"defendant[] made numerous representations," which were "false" and relied

upon by Myers, the judge dismissed this count.

As to the promissory estoppel count, the judge ruled Myers failed to

establish he suffered a "definite and substantial detriment" by alleging Benucci

assured him that it was in his "best interest to accept a plea with [a] civil

A-2507-24
13
reservation instead of deal with the matter in civil court." The judge cited the

necessary requirements for stating a claim for promissory estoppel:

(1) a clear and definite promise by the promisor; (2) the
promise must be made with the expectation that the
promise[e] will rely thereon; (3) the promisee must in
fact reasonably rely on the promise; and (4) detriment
of a definite and substantial nature must be incurred in
reliance on the promise.

[Pop's Cones, Inc. v. Resorts Int'l. Hotel, Inc., 307 N.J.
Super. 461, 469 (App. Div. 1998) (quoting Malaker
Corp. Stockholders Protection Comm. v. First Jersey
Nat'l Bank, 163 N.J. Super. 463, 479 (App. Div.
1978)).]

The judge dismissed the fraudulent misrepresentation or common law

fraud count, noting Rule 4:5-8(a) applies as to this count as well. Myers alleged

Benucci "promised" to obtain discovery but "concealed and/or failed to disclose

the material fact that the discovery end date had expired." According to Myers,

he would "have taken a different action had he known the representation was

false," and he suffered "out-of-pocket damages, benefit-of-the-bargain damages,

lost profits, lost opportunities, [and] nominal damage" as a result.

The judge emphasized that in order to state a claim for fraud, a plaintiff

must demonstrate:

(1) a representation; (2) which is material to the
transaction at hand; (3) made falsely, with knowledge
as to whether it is true or false; (4) with the intention of

A-2507-24
14
misleading another party into relying on it; (5)
justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and (6) the
resulting injury was proximately caused by the reliance.

[Richie and Pat Bonvie Stables, Inc. v. Irving, 350 N.J.
Super. 579, 589 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting GMH
Assocs., Inc. v. The Prudential Realty Group, A.2d 889,
901 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)).]

The judge rejected Myers's argument that the applicable statutes of

limitations should be tolled due to his disabling mental conditions, the discovery

rule, and COVID-19. In his decision, the judge found Myers's tolling arguments,

based on COVID-19 and caring for his special needs family ostensibly with

inadequate support from the school district, made "little sense."

The judge denied Myers's cross-motion to stay this action as moot because

he failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted as to each cause of

action pled in his complaint and proposed first amended complaint. A

memorializing order was entered. This appeal followed.

Before us, Myers primarily reprises the arguments he made before the

judge. Myers argues the judge misapplied the legal standard under Rule 4:6-

2(e), and his complaint and proposed first amended complaint contain specific

facts to support each count alleged. Myers contends the proposed first amended

complaint "cures any defects," his claims are not time-barred, the judge

A-2507-24
15
misapplied the legal standard applicable for a stay and abused his discretion.

We are unpersuaded.

II.

A Rule 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted is reviewed de novo. Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC,

246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021) (citing Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley,

Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019)). In considering a Rule

4:6-2(e) motion, "[the] reviewing court must examine 'the legal sufficiency of

the facts alleged on the face of the complaint,' giving the plaintiff the benefit of

'every reasonable inference of fact." Ibid. (quoting Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J.

at 107). The test for determining the adequacy of pleading is "whether a cause

of action is 'suggested' by the facts." Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs.

Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (quoting Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,

109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)). The court must grant plaintiff "every reasonable

inference of fact." Ibid.

"[A] complaint should not be dismissed" if "a cause of action is suggested

by the facts." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 4.1.1 on R.

4:6-2(e) (2026). "[H]owever, if the complaint states no basis for relief and

discovery would not provide one, dismissal of the complaint is appropriate."

A-2507-24
16
Ibid. To that end, the complaint must have more than conclusory allegations

unsupported by facts. See Neuwirth v. State, 476 N.J. Super. 377, 390 (App.

Div. 2023). "When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e), we

assume that the allegations in the pleading are true and afforded the pleader all

reasonable inferences." Sparroween, LLC. v. Township of West Caldwell, 452

N.J. Super. 329, 339 (App. Div. 2017). "Where, however, it is clear that the

complaint states no basis for relief and that discovery would not provide one,

dismissal of the complaint is appropriate." Ibid. (quoting J.D. ex rel. Scipio-

Derrick v. Davy, 415 N.J. Super. 375, 397 (App. Div. 2010)).

"Dismissals under Rule 4:6-2(e) are ordinarily without prejudice." Mac

Prop. Grp. LLC v. Selective Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 473 N.J. Super. 1, 17 (App.

Div. 2022). However, "a dismissal with prejudice is 'mandated where the factual

allegations are palpably insufficient to support a claim upon which relief can be

granted,' . . . or if 'discovery will not give rise to such a claim.'" Ibid. (first

quoting Rieder v. State, 221 N.J. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987); then quoting

Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 107).2 We also conclude dismissal was warranted

because prosecution of either complaint would be futile.

2
Based on the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the order as final
and appealable as of right because it resolved all issues as to all parties. See

A-2507-24
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Rule 2:9-5(a) provides that "neither an appeal, nor motion for leave to

appeal, nor a proceeding for certification, nor any other proceeding in the matter

shall stay proceedings in any court in a civil action or summary contempt

proceeding, but a stay with or without terms may be ordered in any such action

or proceeding in accordance with [Rule] 2:9-5(b)." Garden State Equal. v. Dow,

216 N.J. 314, 320 (2013) ("To evaluate an application for a stay, this Court in

essence considers the soundness of the trial court's ruling and the effect of a stay

on the parties and the public.").

Applications for a stay in a civil matter are governed by the standard

outlined in Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126, 132-34 (1982), that is

[a] party seeking a stay must demonstrate that (1) relief
is needed to prevent irreparable harm; (2) the
applicant's claim rests on settled law and has a
reasonable probability of succeeding on the merits; and
(3) balancing the "relative hardships to the parties
reveals that greater harm would occur if a stay is not
granted than if it were."

Rubin v. Tress, 464 N.J. Super. 49, 56 n.3 (App. Div. 2020) (explaining an order
that "disposes of all issues as to all parties" may be appealable as of right,
"depending on the circumstances"); see also Morris County v. 8 Court St. Ltd.,
223 N.J. Super. 35, 38-39 (App. Div. 1988); R. 2:2-3(a). Although the March
12, 2025 order does not state it is a final order, it effectively dismissed all of
Myers's claims.

A-2507-24
18
[Garden State Equal., 216 N.J. at 320 (quoting McNeil
v. Legis. Apportionment Comm'n, 176 N.J. 484, 486
(2003) (LaVecchia, J., dissenting)).]

"When a case presents an issue of 'significant public importance,'" we must also

"consider the public interest in addition to the traditional Crowe factors." Id. at

321 (quoting McNeil, 176 N.J. at 484).

To sustain a cause of action for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must show

"(1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship creating a duty of care by

the defendant attorney, (2) the breach of that duty by the defendant, (3)

proximate causation of the damages claimed by the plaintiff." Jerista v. Murray,

185 N.J. 175, 190-91 (2005) (quoting McGrogan v. Till, 167 N.J. 414, 425

(2001)). In proving the first element of the attorney-client relationship, "the

grounds on which any plaintiff may pursue a malpractice claim against an

attorney with whom there was no attorney-client relationship are exceedingly

narrow" and do not extend to adverse parties. Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J.

431, 458 (2013).

In proving the second element that a defendant lawyer breached a duty,

plaintiff must set forth an affidavit of merit or expert testimony to establish the

standard of care "[a]s 'the duties a lawyer owes to his client are not know n by

the average juror,' expert testimony must necessarily set forth that duty and

A-2507-24
19
explain the breach." Buchanan v. Leonard, 428 N.J. Super. 277, 288 (App. Div.

2012) (quoting Carbis Sales, Inc. v. Eisenberg, 397 N.J. Super. 64, 78 (App.

Div. 2007)). In proving the third element, plaintiff must establish that

defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of the loss claimed. Conklin v.

Hannoch Weisman, 145 N.J. 395, 418 (1996).

While "the RPCs set forth 'the minimum standard of competence

governing the [legal] profession.'" Meisels, 240 N.J. at 299 (quoting Albright

v. Burns, 206 N.J. Super. 625, 634 (App. Div. 1986)). Merely alleging an RPC

violation, "standing alone, . . . does not create a cause of action for damages in

favor of a person allegedly aggrieved by that violation." Ibid.; see also Sommers

v. McKinney, 287 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 1996) ("Violation of the rules of

professional conduct do[es] not per se give rise to the cause of action in tort.").

In proving element three, plaintiff must establish that defendant's conduct

was a proximate cause of the loss claimed. Conklin, 145 N.J. at 418. Proximate

cause is defined as "any cause which in the natural and continuous sequence,

unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of

and without which the result would not have occurred." Ibid. (quoting

Fernandez v. Baruch, 96 N.J. Super. 125, 140 (App. Div. 1967)); see also 2175

Lemoine Ave. Corp. v. Finco, Inc., 272 N.J. Super. 478, 487 (App. Div. 1994).

A-2507-24
20
"[T]he client bears the burden of showing . . . 'what injuries were suffered as a

proximate consequence of the attorney's breach of duty.'" Cortez v. Gindhart,

435 N.J. Super. 589, 604 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting 2175 Lemoine Ave. Corp.,

272 N.J. Super. at 488).

A plaintiff must also prove damages, which requires that, "the client must

demonstrate that he or she would have prevailed, or would have won materially

more . . . but for the alleged substandard performance." Lerner v. Laufer, 359

N.J. Super. 201, 221 (App. Div. 2003). The measure of damages is ordinarily

what the client would have obtained without the attorney's negligence. Garcia

v. Kozlov, Seaton, Romanini & Brooks, P.C., 179 N.J. 343, 358 (2004). We

affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Ballard's statement of

reasons. We add the following comments.

III.

The judge dismissed Myers's legal malpractice claim because he did not

satisfy element three, proximate causation. Myers argues the proposed first

amended complaint satisfied all the elements of legal malpractice. First, he

maintains the proposed first amended complaint satisfies element one because

he entered into a written contract with defendant on December 12, 2016, to serve

A-2507-24
21
as counsel for the Stonely matter. Myers also contends he entered two oral

contracts with defendant regarding representation in municipal court matters.

Second, Myers alleges the proposed first amended complaint satisfies

element two because defendant committed numerous breaches of duty,

including: failing to investigate and present evidence at the municipal and civil

matters; failing to conduct discovery; filing a motion for reconsideration without

Myers's consent; failing to keep him informed of; and abandoning him less than

three weeks before trial. Finally, Myers alleges the amended complaint satisfies

element three because defendant's breaches directly caused the following

injuries: negative legal outcomes; financial losses; emotional distress; and lost

opportunities. We disagree.

Even accepting all of the allegations as true, Myers did not sufficiently

plead legal malpractice to survive a motion to dismiss. For example, Myers

failed to establish specific examples of alleged legal malpractice by defendant

and did not specify the proximate cause and resulting harm or damages suffered.

Myers failed to allege defendant committed an actual wrong and thus cannot

establish he sustained compensable harm. Therefore, we conclude the judge

properly dismissed the legal malpractice claim.

A-2507-24
22
IV.

We next address dismissal of Myers's breach of contract, breach of the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence

claims. Defendant points out these causes of action are redundant of Myers's

legal malpractice claim because these claims amount to "alleging the negligent

provision of legal services." Defendant's argument has merit.

In Charles A. Manganaro Consulting Eng'rs, Inc. v. Carneys Point Twp.

Sewerage Auth., 344 N.J. Super. 343 (App. Div. 2001) we affirmed the dismissal

of defendant's counterclaim when he attempted to raise a professional

malpractice claim as a breach of contract. Id. at 349. We held that defendant's

counterclaim rested on factual allegations that amounted to "professional

malpractice," which "will require expert testimony to prove." Ibid.

In Cortez, we affirmed the trial court chose not "substantively adjudicate"

plaintiff's claims of breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty because they

were subsumed by the legal malpractice claim. 435 N.J. Super. at 607. The

court found plaintiff failed to allege a claim of legal malpractice, and then he

attempted to raise the same underlying factual allegations to assert claims of

breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 600-07. Specifically,

plaintiff argued defendant "breached the contract by failing to provide

A-2507-24
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competent and effective legal services and breaching the covenant of good faith

and fair dealing" by "improperly bill[ing] plaintiff for legal services." Id. at

607.

We affirmed the trial court's denial of those claims holding "[e]ven if we

were to accept Cortez's characterization of these allegations as not being

subsumed in the legal malpractice claim, he nevertheless" failed "to demonstrate

that a genuine issue of fact existed as to his claims." Ibid. Therefore, we

affirmed the trial court's finding without entirely relying on the premise that the

remaining claims were subsumed into the legal malpractice claim. Ibid.

Based upon our de novo review, we conclude Myers's remaining claims

are subsumed into his legal malpractice claim because they all stem from the

underlying legal malpractice factual allegations. Id. at 597, 607. Therefore, on

this basis, we affirm dismissal of the complaint and proposed first amended

complaint. However, for the sake of completeness, we will address Myers's

other claims on their merits.

Breach of Contract

Myers further contends that his proposed first amended complaint

contained the specific facts which support a valid claim for breach of contract.

To sufficiently plead its breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must show (1) "the

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parties entered into a contract containing certain terms;" (2) "plaintiff[] did what

the contract required [it] to do;" (3) "defendant[] did not do what the contract

required [it] to do;" and (4) "defendant['s] breach, or failure to do what the

contract required, caused a loss to . . . plaintiff[]." Goldfarb v. Solimine, 245

N.J. 326, 338 (2021) (quoting Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 482

(2016)). To prevail on a breach of contract claim, the plaintiff must prove these

elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Globe Motor Co., 225 N.J. at 482.

In order to prove element one, plaintiff must prove the existence of a

contract. Goldfarb, 245 N.J. at 339. "'[T]he basic features of a contract' are

'offer, acceptance, consideration, and performance by both parties .'" Ibid.

(alteration in original) (quoting Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 214 N.J. 419,

439 (2013)). "Basic contract principles render a promise enforceable against the

promisor if the promisee gave some consideration for the promise." Martindale

v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 87 (2002). "The essential requirement of

consideration is a bargained-for exchange of promises or performance that may

consist of an act, a forbearance, or the creation, modification, or destruction of

a legal relation." Shebar v. Sanyo Bus. Sys. Corp., 111 N.J. 276, 289 (1988).

Myers argues element one, the existence of a contract, was satisfied in

three ways: a December 12, 2016 written agreement; a November 17, 2016 oral

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agreement with Kevin Hewitt, Jr., one of defendant's attorneys; and an April 24,

2017 oral agreement with Benucci. Myers argues that he performed the contract

by paying defendant for its legal services. Myers further alleges that defendant

breached the contract by its "failure to comply with a fee dispute clause,"

"failure to comply with a termination clause," "failure to comply with an

incapacitation/unavailability clause," and two failure "to fulfill the oral

contract." As a result, Myers alleges he "suffered significant damage," "mental

injuries," "financial losses," "emotional distress," "lost opportunities," and

"legal consequences."

Defendant counters that the judge properly dismissed Myers's breach of

contract claim because his "complaint fail[ed] to set forth any allegations as to

how the alleged breaches caused plaintiff's damages." Defendant maintains

Myers's claims are "unsupported conclusory allegations," which are "directly

refuted" by Benucci's certification in support of his motion to withdraw as

counsel, which explained that Benucci communicated to Myers his right to fee

arbitration. Benucci also certified he advised Myers of the

incapacity/unavailability provision in the contract, which provided a junior

attorney at defendant's firm could handle "critical proceedings," including the

July 20, 2018 summary judgment hearing plaintiff addresses.

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Based upon our de novo review, we conclude the judge properly dismissed

Myers's breach of contract claim, which relied on conclusory allegations. The

record supports that determination.

Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

All "contract[s] contain[] an implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing." Wade v. Kessler Inst., 172 N.J. 327, 340 (2002). The implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing signifies that "neither party shall do

anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the

other party to receive the fruits of the contract." Sons of Thunder, Inc. v.

Borden, Inc., 148 N.J. 396, 421 (1997) (quoting Palisades Props., Inc. v.

Brunetti, 44 N.J. 117, 130 (1965)).

"Although the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot

override an express term in a contract, a party's performance under a contract

may breach that implied covenant even though that performance does not violate

a pertinent express term." Wade, 172 N.J. at 341. "Bad motive or intention is

essential" to finding a breach of the covenant. Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp.,

168 N.J. 236, 251 (2001). But "an allegation of bad faith or unfair dealing

should not be permitted to be advanced in the abstract and absent an improper

motive." Wade, 172 N.J. at 341 (quoting Wilson, 168 N.J. at 251).

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In Wade, the plaintiff's termination was governed by an express term in

an employee manual, and the plaintiff's allegation that she was dismissed

without just cause "in effect rais[ed] the question whether defendant's firing of

plaintiff constituted a breach of the manual's discharge provision." Id. at 344.

The Court thus held that the "jury should have resolved that question within the

framework of an alleged breach of a literal term, not as a violation of the implied

covenant." Ibid.

Myers asserts defendant violated the implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing by "failing to keep [him] informed," "misrepresenting the terms of

the contract," "failing to order transcripts," "coercing [him] to accept a plea

agreement," "abandoning him as a client," "failing to expedite litigation," and

"failing to turn over case files." Myers also argues Benucci "evaded the terms

of the contract" and "failed to protect his client's interests." Finally, Mye rs

asserts these purported acts of bad faith caused him financial losses in the form

of his payment for "substandard" legal representation, "emotional distress," "lost

opportunities," and "legal consequences."

The judge properly dismissed Myers's claim for breach of covenant of

good faith and fair dealing because his reliance on the same conclusory

allegations as alleged in his breach of contract are similarly insufficient. Myers

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failed to establish that defendant "acted in bad faith with the intent to deprive

[him] of his reasonable expectation under the contract." See Wilson, 168 N.J.

at 251-52. As a result, the judge properly dismissed Myers's claim for breach

of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Myers next argues that he properly pled a claim of a breach of fiduciary

duty in his proposed first amended complaint.

Under New Jersey law, in order to establish a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must show that: (1)
the defendant had a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the duty
was breached; (3) injury to the plaintiff occurred as a
result of the breach; and (4) the defendant caused that
injury.

[Namerow v. PediatriCare Associates, LLC, 461 N.J.
Super. 133, 146 (Ch. Div. 2018).]

On appeal, Myers argues that defendant had a fiduciary duty to him

stemming from its legal representation and breached its duty by failing to

provide adequate legal services. Myers sets forth several allegations of

purported substandard legal services that he contends rise to the level of a breach

of fiduciary duty, including: a failure to expedite litigation, an improper "partial

motion to dismiss" on March 31, 2017, "coercing" Myers to accept a plea

agreement, withdrawing before trial, failing to notify him of a hearing, failing

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to turn over case files, making damaging statements to the court, neglecting

post-withdrawal duties, failing to advise him, and violating the duty of loyalty.

The judge properly found that Myers failed to plead more than

"conclusory allegations" and restatements of the elements of the cause of action

"with no factual support." Moreover, the pleadings are devoid of any allegations

regarding proximately caused damages. Thus, the judge properly dismissed the

breach of fiduciary duty claim.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To establish a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional

distress, a plaintiff must prove that: "(1) defendant acted intentionally or

recklessly; (2) the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the

conduct proximately caused plaintiff's emotional distress; and (4) the emotional

distress was 'so severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure

it.'" Johnson v. City of Hoboken, 476 N.J. Super. 361, 375 (App. Div. 2023)

(alteration in original) (quoting Ingraham v. Ortho-McNeil Pharm., 422 N.J.

Super. 12, 20 (App. Div. 2011)). A defendant acts intentionally when he or she

intends "both to do the act and to produce emotional distress." Ingraham, 422

N.J. Super. at 19 (quoting Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc'y, 111 N.J. 355,

366 (1988)). A defendant may also be liable when he or she "acts recklessly in

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deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that emotional distress will

follow." Ibid. (quoting Buckley, 111 N.J. at 366).

Myers argues that Benucci committed intentional or reckless conduct by:

withdrawing as counsel less than three weeks before trial, pressuring Myers

regarding fees, writing a letter to the judge on January 31, 2019, and responding

dismissively to his "suicidal thoughts." Myers further contends that Benucci

acted "extremely and outrageously" by failing to notify Myers of the January

25, 2019 hearing and providing the court with information about Myers that

"cast" him in a "negative light." Myers argues these acts resulted in his mental

distress, professional setbacks, strained family relationships, medical leave, and

outpatient treatment.

Giving Myers the benefit of "every reasonable inference of fact," we agree

with the judge that he has not sufficiently pled the requirements for a claim of

intentional infliction of emotional distress to survive a motion to dismiss.

Baskin, 246 N.J. at 171. Importantly, Myers has failed to allege conduct that

arises to "extreme and outrageous" level and also has failed to establish how

such conduct was the proximate cause of any damage he suffered.

Consequently, the judge properly dismissed Myers's claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress.

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Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Myers also contends that his proposed first amended complaint set forth

the specific facts which support a valid claim for negligent infliction of

emotional distress. To establish a claim of negligent infliction of emotional

distress, a plaintiff must prove that: "(1) defendant owed a duty to plaintiff; (2)

defendant breached that duty; (3) plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress;

and (4) defendant's breach proximately caused plaintiff's emotional distress."

Johnson, 476 N.J. Super. at 375-76 (citing Dello Russo v. Nagel, 358 N.J. Super.

254, 269 (App. Div. 2003)). "Whether the defendant has a duty of care to the

plaintiff depends on whether it was foreseeable that the plaintiff would be

seriously, mentally distressed." Dello Russo, 358 N.J. Super. at 269-70.

Myers argues that defendant is liable for negligent infliction of emotional

distress because Benucci owed him a duty as his attorney, breached this duty,

and thus is liable for any resulting damages. Similar to his previous arguments,

Myers avers that Benucci failed to expedite litigation, abandoned him as a client,

failed to notify him, failed to turn over files, and improperly withdrew from

litigation. As a result, Myers contends he suffered suicidal thoughts, long -term

psychological impact, exacerbation of mental health conditions, and legal

ramifications. Again, we are unpersuaded.

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We are convinced the judge properly dismissed Myers's negligent

infliction of emotional distress claim because he failed to demonstrate how the

purported damages were connected to the allegations. In short, Myers merely

alleged conclusory allegations and nothing to establish proximate cause,

warranting dismissal.

Negligence

To establish a claim for negligence, a plaintiff bears the burden of

establishing the four following elements: "(1) a duty of care; (2) a breach of

that duty; (3) actual and proximate causation; and (4) damages." Davis v.

Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 406 (2014) (quoting Jersey Cent.

Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Util. Co., 212 N.J. 576, 594 (2013)). "A 'plaintiff

bears the burden of establishing those elements by some competent proof.'"

Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 51 (2015) (quoting Davis, 219 N.J. at 406).

Myers alleges Benucci was negligent when he failed to act as a reasonable

attorney would under similar circumstances. Myers reiterates the same

allegations as in previous counts: Benucci failed to back-up client files, failed

to expedite litigation, missed deadlines, failed to notify Myers of a hearing, and

failed to turn over case files. Myers alleges that Benucci, as his attorney, had a

duty of care and these breaches establish "causation" in the form of delays and

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additional costs, negative legal outcomes, and an exacerbation of emotional

distress. As a direct result of these alleged breaches, Myers contends he suffered

financial losses, emotional distress and lost career advancement opportunities.

Again, we hold the judge did not err in dismissing Myers's negligence

claim because he failed to demonstrate a proximate causation between the

alleged breaches from the standard of care and damages. Myers conflates

additional damage claims with proximate cause and conclusory allegations. On

this record, we conclude the negligence claim was properly dismissed.

Negligent Misrepresentation

Under New Jersey law, a plaintiff asserting a cause of action for negligent

misrepresentation must show that (1) the defendant made a statement of a past

or existing fact that was incorrect; (2) the statement was made negligently; (3)

the statement was justifiably relied upon by the plaintiff; (4) the

misrepresentation must be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages; and

(5) plaintiff must have suffered actual losses as a result of plaintiff's reliance on

the misrepresentation. Mason v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 187 (App. Div.

2005) (citing Kaufman v. i-Stat Corp., 165 N.J. 94, 109 (2000)). Scienter, or

knowledge of the falsity of the representation, is not required as an element

of negligent misrepresentation. Kaufman, 165 N.J. at 110.

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There is overlap between negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent

misrepresentation, as an "[i]ncorrect statement and misstatement of fact are

elements of both common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation." Union

Ink Co. v. AT&T Corp., 352 N.J. Super. 617, 645 (App. Div. 2002) (citing

Kaufman, 165 N.J. at 109). Moreover, "[t]he element of reliance is the same for

fraud and negligent misrepresentation." Kaufman, 165 N.J. at 109. Under both,

a plaintiff's reliance on an alleged misrepresentation "must be actual, as well as

justifiable." Walid v. Yolanda for Irene Couture, Inc., 425 N.J. Super. 171, 181

(App. Div. 2012).

In Myers's negligent misrepresentation count, he alleges Benucci made

several false statements pertaining to his representation of Myers, including

promises to obtain discovery, misrepresentation of deadlines, misrepresentation

of legal strategy. Myers alleges these failures demonstrated failures to act with

reasonable care, which Myers relied upon, and caused Myers direct damages,

including financial losses as stated. But the record clearly shows again that

Myers merely recited the elements of negligent misrepresentation and failed to

allege which representations were made recklessly or knowingly. Further,

Myers failed to demonstrate how he relied on these representations or how they

were the proximate cause of any damages.

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The judge duly found that Myers failed to demonstrate negligent

misrepresentation because he failed to comply with Rule 4:5-8(a), and dismissal

of this count was appropriately granted.

Promissory Estoppel

Under New Jersey law, promissory estoppel requires a plaintiff to allege:

"(1) a clear and definite promise; (2) made with the expectation that the promisee

will rely on it; (3) reasonable reliance; and (4) definite and substantial

detriment." Goldfarb, 245 N.J. at 339-40 (quoting Toll Bros., Inc v. Bd. of

Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 194 N.J. 223, 253 (2008)). Promissory

estoppel is "'a departure from the classic doctrine of consideration that the

promise and the consideration must purport to be the motive each for the other,'

providing that the operative 'reliance is on a promise.'" Id. at 340 (quoting

Friedman v. Tappan Dev. Corp., 22 N.J. 523, 536 (1956)). Unlike a breach of

contract claim, a plaintiff need not prove the existence of an enforceable

contract. Id. at 341. "The essential justification for the promissory estoppel

doctrine is to avoid the substantial hardship or injustice which would result if a

clear and definite promise were not enforced." Pop's Cones, Inc., 307 N.J.

Super. at 469.

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Here, Myers contends that "Benucci promised to obtain discovery if

Myers accepted a plea [agreement,] but failed to do so," on May 12, 2017.

Further, Myers maintains that on July 17, 2017, Benucci "assured Myers of

continued support," but filed a motion to withdraw as counsel regardless on

December 27, 2018. Finally, Myers contends that "Benucci pledged to order

transcripts for reconsideration or appeal," yet failed to do so. Myers argues that

he relied on these promises and suffered financial losses, emotional distress, and

legal consequences as a result. The judge found Myers's allegations were devoid

of facts necessary to state a claim for promissory estoppel. We agree and note

Myers failed to allege any of the necessary reliance damages required to

prosecute a promissory estoppel claim.

Fraudulent Misrepresentation or Common Law Fraud

Myers further contends Benucci's conduct amounted to fraudulent

misrepresentation, or alternatively, common law fraud. Fraudulent

misrepresentation occurs when an individual purports to represent a fact when

it is in fact false. Jewish Ctr. of Sussex Cnty. v. Whale, 86 N.J. 619, 624 (1981).

To succeed "on a common law fraud claim, plaintiff must show that defendant:

(1) made a representation or omission of a material fact; (2) with knowledge of

its falsity; (3) intending that the representation or omission be relied upon; (4 )

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which resulted in reasonable reliance; and that (5) plaintiff suffered damages."

DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super.

325, 336 (App. Div. 2013); see also Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J.

582, 607 (1997).

"Equitable fraud is similar to legal fraud," but "the plaintiff need not

establish the defendant's scienter." Ibid. A "defendant's scienter" is the

"defendant's knowledge of the falsity and intent to obtain an undue advantage."

Ibid. "[P]laintiff must prove each element by 'clear and convincing evidence.'"

Ibid. (quoting Stochastic Decisions, Inc. v. DiDomenico, 236 N.J. Super. 388,

395 (App. Div. 1989)). Additionally, "Rule 4:5-8(a) requires that fraud be pled

in the particulars." Piscitelli v. Classic Residence by Hyatt, 408 N.J. Super. 83,

116 (App. Div. 2009). Rule 4:5-8(a) states "[i]n all allegations of

misrepresentation, fraud, mistake, breach of trust, willful default or undue

influence, particulars of the wrong, with dates and items if necessary, shall be

stated insofar as practicable."

Governed by these standards, the judge properly dismissed Myers's

fraudulent misrepresentation or common law fraud count. We have searched

Myers's complaint and proposed first amended complaint in depth and with

liberality and cannot glean the "fundament of a cause of action" on this count as

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mandated by the Printing Mart-Morristown Court, 116 N.J. at 746; see also R.

4:5-8(a). A claim for fraudulent misrepresentation or common law fraud is not

"suggested." Ibid. Therefore, Myers's fraudulent misrepresentation or common

law fraud count was duly dismissed.

V.

We reject Myers's contention that his claims are not time-barred. Myers

challenges the judge's decision finding the statute of limitations was not tolled

in light of his disabling mental condition, the discovery rule, and COVID -19.

Myers reprises these same arguments before us.

Contract claims, including legal malpractice, breach of contract,

fraudulent misrepresentation, and implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing, promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent

misrepresentation are governed by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1, which imposes a six-year

statute of limitations. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1; see McGrogan, 167 N.J. at 416-17; see

also Balliet v. Fennell, 368 N.J. Super. 15, 20 (App. Div. 2004). Personal injury

claims, however, have a two-year statute of limitations. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.

Therefore, Myers's negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, and negligence claims are governed by the two-

year statute of limitations. Ibid.

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Applying these principles to the matter before us, we agree with the judge

that Myers failed to set forth any factual allegations to support tolling the statute

of limitations. To carry out the Legislature's aims, courts enforce limitations

statutes in a strict manner. The statutes may be equitably tolled only in rare

situations, such as where a plaintiff lacked sufficient information to have reason

to know that he or she had a basis for a claim. See Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267,

274 (1973), or where a defendant is outside the jurisdiction of the New Jersey

courts or cannot be located with reasonable diligence. See Crespo v. Stapf, 128

N.J. 351, 363 (1992).

None of Myers's proffered reasons fall under the ambit of our

jurisprudence. Moreover, the judge dismissed Myers's negligence and contract-

based claims on substantive grounds. Therefore, the judge did not err in

rejecting Myers's tolling argument.

VI.

Finally, we address Myers's argument that the judge improperly denied

his cross-motion for a stay pending resolution of the underlying action.

According to Myers, the resolution of the underlying and related cases would

probably affect the outcome of the matter under review. Defendant counters

Myers's claims arise exclusively from the Stonely matter because it and Benucci

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did not represent Myers in the other two cases pending in the Law Division, and

therefore cannot be held liable.

Rule 2:9-5(a) provides that "neither an appeal, nor motion for leave to

appeal, nor a proceeding for certification, nor any other proceeding in the matter

shall stay proceedings in any court in a civil action or summary contempt

proceeding, but a stay with or without terms may be ordered in any such action

or proceeding in accordance with Rule 2:9-5(b)."

Myers failed to satisfy the Crowe factors. And, he has not demonstrated

a significant public interest—in addition to the traditional Crowe factors—is

presented. Garden State Equal., 216 N.J. at 321 (quoting McNeil, 176 N.J. at

484). Myers's argument on appeal that a stay is required to "avoid concurrent

piecemeal litigation" and "ensure judicial efficiency and fairness" is unavailing.

The judge made a sound ruling in denying Myers's cross-motion for a stay.

Finally, we discern no "extreme bias" or "significant legal errors" in Judge

Ballard's decision. Moreover, the judge did not violate any ethical standards in

adjudicating the motions.

We conclude Myers's remaining arguments—to the extent we have not

addressed them—lack sufficient merit to warrant any further discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

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Affirmed.

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