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March 3, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Hopkins, M. v. Hopkins, R.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1036 WDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Bowes

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (32.2K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by [Mary Janes Bowes](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8225/mary-janes-bowes/)

J-S46001-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

MATTHEW JARED HOPKINS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
RACHEL HOPKINS AND PAUL J. : No. 1036 WDA 2025
JOSEPH :

Appeal from the Order Entered July 17, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at
No(s): FD-25-000269

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: March 3, 2026

Matthew Jared Hopkins (“Grandfather”) appeals pro se from the July 17,

2025 order that granted a motion filed by his daughter, Rachel Hopkins

(“Mother”) and dismissed his custody complaint with respect to Mother’s son,

S.H., born in June 2024.1 We affirm.

We gather the relevant factual and procedural history of this matter

from the certified record. The instant case stems from an acrimonious dispute

involving Mother and her immediate family. During Mother’s pregnancy with

S.H. and following his birth, several members of Mother’s family began living

in the Pittsburgh area, which included, inter alia, Grandfather and two of

---

1 Although he is listed as a party in this appeal, we also note that S.H.’s
biological father, Paul J. Joseph, was “not involved” with S.H. and did not
participate in these proceedings. N.T., 7/8/25, at 5. Accordingly, we will not
discuss him further in this writing.
J-S46001-25

Mother’s sisters: Krista Hopkins and Jessica Hopkins. See N.T., 7/8/25, at

1. Grandfather resided in a long-term rental residence, while Krista and

Jessica lived in Mother’s apartment. For the first six months of S.H.’s life,

Mother’s sisters played a role in providing day-to-day care for S.H.

By contrast, Grandfather had only sporadic contact with his grandson,

which consisted of FaceTime video calls and occasional in-person interactions.

Id. at 18-19, 82. There is no dispute that he never provided any direct care

for S.H. throughout this time period, nor did he spend any time alone with the

child. Id. at 19-20, 49-50, 97-98.

During this six-month interval, Mother’s family grew concerned about

her mental health and S.H.’s well-being. In text messages sent to other

members of Mother’s family, Krista referred to Mother as “unstable” and

speculated that she was “autistic” and “bipolar.”2 Id. at 56-59. Grandfather

similarly claimed that Mother exhibited “bizarre” and “erratic” behaviors,

although he offered few concrete examples. Id. at 100. He expressed his

belief that Mother was suffering from “postpartum depression.” Id. at 103.

Jessica likewise averred that Mother’s mental state was “deteriorating.” Id.

at 121. These same family members also opined that S.H. appeared

underweight. Id. at 60, 88, 123-26. As discussed further infra, Mother

disputed these allegations at trial.

---

2 We note that these text messages were obtained from Krista’s cell phone
by Grandfather without her consent. See N.T., 7/8/25, at 52-53.

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J-S46001-25

Between November and December of 2024, Mother ended all contact

with Grandfather and Jessica. Id. at 103. Jessica responded by submitting a

report to the Allegheny County Children & Youth Services (“CYS”) raising

concerns about S.H.’s welfare. Id. at 118-19. Following a home visit and a

brief investigation, CYS closed the referral as unfounded. Id. at 26-27. In

the aftermath of that decision, Grandfather appeared at Mother’s apartment

and threatened to take S.H. from her on at least two separate occasions. Id.

at 29-30.

On February 11, 2025, Mother filed a petition for protection from abuse

(“PFA”) against Grandfather on behalf of herself and S.H. Id. at 1-4. The

court granted the petition on the same day and entered a temporary PFA

order, which excluded Grandfather from Mother’s home and prohibited him

from contacting Mother or S.H.

On February 18, 2025, Grandfather filed through counsel a custody

complaint, which sought primary physical and shared legal custody of S.H.

Specifically, he alleged that Mother was suffering from an “untreated mental

health diagnosis” such that she “lacks the capacity to properly care for [S.H.],

and thus, the [c]hild is substantially at risk.” Custody Complaint, 2/18/25, at

¶¶ 18-20. On March 11, 2025, Mother voluntarily withdrew the temporary

PFA without prejudice in exchange for Grandfather agreeing to “not stalk,

harass, abuse, or threaten” her. See PFA Withdrawal Order, 3/11/25, at 1.

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J-S46001-25

The order also required that he continue to refrain from all “contact” with

Mother and stay away from her residence. Id.

On March 21, 2025, Mother filed a motion to dismiss the custody

complaint, arguing that Grandfather lacked standing. The trial court held a

hearing on July 8, 2025, wherein Mother and Grandfather were both

represented by counsel. The court heard testimony from, inter alia, Mother,

Grandfather, Krista, Jessica, and Mother’s friend Leah Clemmons, who

watched S.H. once a week. On July 17, 2025, the court entered an order

granting Mother’s motion and dismissing the custody complaint.3

On August 13, 2025, Grandfather, acting pro se, timely filed a notice of

appeal along with a concise statement of errors pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i).4 The trial court filed a responsive Rule 1925(a)(2)(ii) opinion.

Grandfather has raised the following issues for our consideration in his pro se

appellate brief:

1. Did the trial court’s comments and tone during the July 8, 2025 hearing create an appearance of bias and pre-judgment, violating [Grandfather’s] right to a fair and impartial tribunal?

---

3 Although this order was filed on July 14, 2025, the docket indicates that
notice pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 236 was not provided until July 17, 2025.

4 Until that point, Grandfather had been represented by Anthony Piccirilli,
Esquire. Although the certified record does not disclose that Attorney Piccirilli
ever formally withdrew from this case, we discern that he ceased representing
Grandfather shortly after the conclusion of the July 8 hearing.

-4-
J-S46001-25

1. Did the trial court’s evidentiary restrictions and counsel
   omissions deprive [Grandfather] of due process and a complete
   record for review?

2. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion by dismissing
   [Grandfather’s] custody complaint for lack of standing under 23
   Pa.C.S. § 5324(3) despite record evidence of consent-based
   caregiving and assumption of parental responsibility?

3. Did the trial court misapply the standard for evaluating
   consent and caregiving under T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa.
   2001), and related precedent?

Grandfather’s brief at 7 (issues reordered for ease of disposition).5

We begin with the well-established legal principles governing our review

of Grandfather’s appeal:

Our standard of review over a custody order is for a gross abuse
of discretion. Such an abuse of discretion will only be found if the
trial court, in reaching its conclusion, overrides or misapplies the
law, or exercises judgment which is manifestly unreasonable, or
reaches a conclusion that is the result of partiality, prejudice, bias,
or ill-will as shown by the evidence of record.

---

5 Although he lists only four issues in his statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
2116 (“Statement of Questions Involved”), we note that Grandfather has
included a fifth issue in the argument section of his brief generally challenging
the trial court’s credibility determinations. See Grandfather’s brief at 16-17.
Our Rules of Appellate Procedure provided that “[n]o question will be
considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly
suggested thereby.” Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2101. While we
cannot countenance Grandfather’s disordered brief, we find that this particular
issue is fairly suggested by his arguments concerning the trial court’s standing
ruling. Despite being poorly framed, this argument goes to the heart of the
litigation below. Furthermore, it was addressed by the trial court in its Rule
1925(a) opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/29/25, at 16. Thus, we decline
to find waiver and will address this fifth issue along with his other claims. See
Mazzarese v. Mazzarese, 319 A.3d 586, 589 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2024) (citing
Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a)).

-5-
J-S46001-25

In reviewing a custody order, we must accept findings of the trial
court that are supported by competent evidence of record, as our
role does not include making independent factual determinations.
In addition, with regard to issues of credibility and weight of the
evidence, we must defer to the trial court who viewed and
assessed the witnesses first-hand. However, we are not bound by
the trial court’s deductions or inferences from its factual findings.
Ultimately, the test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are
unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record. We may reject
the conclusions of the trial court only if they involve an error of
law, or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the
trial court.

Rogowski v. Kirven, 291 A.3d 50, 60-61 (Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned up).

Moreover, it is not our function “to determine whether the trial court reached

the right decision; rather, we must consider whether, based on the evidence

presented, given due deference to the trial court’s weight and credibility

determinations, the trial court erred or abused its discretion[.]” King v. King,

889 A.2d 630, 632 (Pa.Super. 2005) (cleaned up).

In Grandfather’s first claim for relief, he asserts that the trial judge

demonstrated bias, which he contends “undermined” confidence in the court’s

“neutrality.” Grandfather’s brief at 13-15. Our review of the certified record,

however, indicates that he never raised any claim of judicial bias in the trial

court, nor did he seek the recusal of the jurist assigned to this case.

Furthermore, this issue was omitted from Grandfather’s Rule 1925(a)(2)(i)

concise statement, thereby failing to give the court the opportunity to respond

to the allegation in its opinion. See Concise Statement, 8/13/25, at ¶¶ 1-11.

The failure to preserve this issue in his concise statement, alone, results

in waiver of the claim. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in

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J-S46001-25

the [s]tatement . . . are waived.”); see also U.S. Bank, N.A., et al. v. Hua,

193 A.3d 994, 996-97 (Pa.Super. 2018). It is also axiomatic that this Court

“presumes judges are fair and competent[.]” Lomas v. Kravitz, 170 A.3d

380, 389 (Pa.Super. 2017). Our Supreme Court has explained, “[o]nce the

trial is completed with the entry of a verdict, a party is deemed to have waived

his right to have a judge disqualified, and if he has waived that issue, he

cannot be heard to complain following an unreasonable result.” Reilly by

Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Trans. Authority, 489 A.2d 1291,

1300 (Pa. 1985). Based upon the foregoing, Grandfather has waived his

claims concerning alleged judicial bias. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); Reilly,

489 A.2d at 1300; U.S. Bank, 193 A.3d at 996-97.

In his second claim for relief, Grandfather asserts that his constitutional

due process rights were violated.6 See Grandfather’s brief at 24-26. He

invokes the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and Article I, § 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at 24.

Specifically, Grandfather sets forth two bases for the alleged violations: (1)

that the trial court imposed inappropriate restrictions on witness testimony;

and (2) that his trial counsel failed to admit “corroborating exhibits and

---

6 Many of the arguments presented in this section are duplicative of the claims
concerning judicial bias. See Grandfather’s brief at 26 (discussing allegations
of “judicial interference”). Since we have already concluded above that these
issues were waived, we will not discuss them further here.

-7-
J-S46001-25

communications” that would have supported his custody claims. Id. at 24-

26.

Grandfather, however, never raised any objections based upon these

constitutional grounds in the trial court, nor did he advance any arguments

concerning violations of his due process rights. As such, these claims are also

waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived

and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”); see also Pennsylvania

Bankers Ass’n v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Banking, 962 A.2d 609, 622 (Pa.

2008) (providing that constitutional due process rights are subject to waiver).

Even if not waived, we would find these issues to be unavailing. We

note that “[d]ue process requires nothing more than adequate notice, an

opportunity to be heard, and the chance to defend oneself in an impartial

tribunal having jurisdiction over the matter.” In re Adoption of J.N.F., 887

A.2d 775, 781 (Pa.Super. 2005). As evinced by his participation in the

underlying proceedings with the benefit of counsel, Grandfather was afforded

notice of the proceedings he initiated and an opportunity to be heard regarding

his custody complaint. See generally N.T., 7/8/25, at 56-138.

Although he argues the court “foreclosed testimony central to standing,”

our review reveals no corroboration for this claim in the pages cited by

Grandfather. Compare Grandfather’s brief at 24-25 (citing N.T., 7/8/25, at

103-09, 118-22) with N.T., 7/8/25, at 103-09 (testimony from Grandfather

regarding his living situation in Pittsburgh); id. at 118-22 (testimony from

-8-
J-S46001-25

Jessica regarding the CYS referral concerning Mother and S.H.). It is entirely

unclear why these particular passages were “central” to Grandfather’s

standing arguments. Furthermore, there is no indication therein that the trial

court prohibited or restricted witnesses from testifying. See N.T., 7/8/25, at

103-09, 118-22. Indeed, the court did not issue any evidentiary rulings on

the pages cited in this portion of his argument.

With respect to the merits of Grandfather’s related arguments

concerning counsel’s purported failure to admit certain exhibits, he neglects

to identify this evidence with specificity and particularity. Due to the paucity

of his arguments, we cannot discern what the “corroborating exhibits and

communications” referenced in his arguments may have been. See

Grandfather’s brief at 25. We can only speculate as to whether this evidence

was probative, admissible, or merely illusory. As such, even if not waived, no

relief would be merited.

Finally, we address Grandfather’s remaining issues collectively, as they

challenge the evidentiary basis of the trial court’s ruling on standing. See

Grandfather’s brief at 16-23. He asserts the court erred in holding that he

lacked standing pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(3).7 Id. Our review of

---

7 In his concise statement, Grandfather originally argued that he also had
standing to seek periods of partial physical custody pursuant to § 5325(2).
This section provides standing for grandparents in certain situations when the
parents of the subject grandchild have “commenced a proceeding for custody”
and “do not agree” as to whether grandparents should have custody. See 23
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

-9-
J-S46001-25

questions pertaining to a grandparent’s statutory standing to seek custody of

a grandchild is subject to a de novo standard and a plenary scope of review.

See G.A.P. v. J.M.W., 194 A.3d 614, 616 (Pa.Super. 2018). We also

emphasize from the outset that “standing is a conceptually distinct legal

question which has no bearing on the central issue within the custody action

– who is entitled to physical and legal custody of a child in light of his or her

best interests.” M.S. v. J.D., 215 A.3d 595, 602 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned

up).

This Court has explained: “In child custody cases, the concept of

standing is fluid and differs from the typical determination regarding whether

a party has a direct interest in the outcome of litigation.” E.A. v. E.C., 259

A.3d 497, 501 (Pa.Super. 2021). In addition to “assuring that actions are

litigated by appropriate parties,” standing principles in custody matters are

intended “to prevent intrusion into the protected domain of the family by those

who are merely strangers, however well-meaning.” Id. Absent an “applicable

statutory exception,” third parties generally lack standing to intervene in

custody cases. Id. In this context, “[p]ersons other than biological parents

---

Pa.C.S. § 5325(2). Grandfather, however, has completely abandoned this
claim in his brief. See Grandfather’s brief at 1-28. Even if he had not
abandoned this argument, we would readily dispose of it as he clearly is not
eligible for standing pursuant to § 5325(2) because S.H.’s parents did not
commence custody proceedings. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5325(2)(i).

• 10 - J-S46001-25

are ‘third parties’ for purposes of custody disputes.” T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d

913, 916 n.6 (Pa. 2001).

The Child Custody Act, however, provides several exceptions to this

general rule of exclusion, which apply primarily to grandparents and great-

grandparents. See M.W. v. S.T., 196 A.3d 1065, 1069 (Pa.Super. 2018).

Instantly, Grandfather argues that the trial court should have found he had

standing pursuant to § 5324(3), which provides as follows:

The following individuals may file an action under this chapter for
any form of physical custody or legal custody:

....

(3) A grandparent of the child who is not in loco parentis to
the child:

(i) whose relationship with the child began either with
the consent of a parent of the child or under a court
order;

(ii) who assumes or is willing to assume responsibility
for the child; and

(iii) when one of the following conditions is met:

(A) the child has been determined to be a
dependent child under 42 Pa.C.S. Ch. 63
(relating to juvenile matters);

(B) the child is substantially at risk due to
parental abuse, neglect, drug or alcohol abuse
or incapacity; or

(C) the child has, for a period of at least 12
consecutive months, resided with grandparent,
excluding brief temporary absences of the child
from the home, and is removed from the home
by the parents, in which case the action must

• 11 - J-S46001-25

be filed within six months after the removal of
the child from the home.

23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(3).

In considering Grandfather’s arguments, we note that much of his

discussion has misapprehended the legal basis for standing pursuant to

§ 5324(3). Specifically, he has cited a number of cases that discuss in loco

parentis standing to seek custody. See Grandfather’s brief at 18-23 (citing

T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001); K.W. v. S.L., 157 A.3d 498

(Pa.Super. 2017)). His arguments also contain language suggesting that he

is attempting to establish standing in loco parentis, which is governed by a

different paragraph of § 5324.8 Id. at 18 (utilizing terms such as “functional

parenthood based on consent and conduct”). For Grandfather’s benefit, we

note that § 5324(3) pertains to “[a] grandparent of the child who is not in

loco parentis to the child[.]” 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(3) (emphasis added). Thus,

his reliance upon this caselaw and related line of argument is inapposite here.

To the extent that Grandfather’s arguments invoke the appropriate legal

standard, he asserts, incorrectly, that standing pursuant to § 5324(3) may be

established by proving only that “an individual has assumed or is willing to

assume parental responsibilities with the consent of a parent.” Grandfather’s

brief at 18 (cleaned up). As detailed above, this is an incomplete statement

---

8 The term “in loco parentis” literally means “in place of a parent.” A.C. v.
E.K., 331 A.3d 939, 945-46 (Pa.Super. 2025).

• 12 - J-S46001-25

of the relevant statutory rubric. Specifically, standing pursuant to § 5324(3)

consists of three necessary elements, namely: (1) a relationship between the

child and the grandparent that began with the consent of a biological parent;

(2) the grandparent has, or is willing, to assume responsibility for the child;

and (3) the existence of one of the three conditions set forth at

§ 5324(3)(iii)(A)-(C). See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(3).

Assuming, arguendo, that Grandfather satisfied the first two statutory

elements at § 5324(3), the trial court concluded that he failed to establish the

existence of at least one of the three conditions set forth at § 5324(3)(iii)(A)-

(C), as follows:

As it relates to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(3), [S.H.] was not adjudicated
dependent. Moreover, [Grandfather] failed to demonstrate by
credible evidence that [S.H.] was substantially at risk due to
abuse or neglect or drug and alcohol abuse or incapacity. To the
contrary, this [c]ourt found that Mother is an exceptional parent.
Finally, [S.H.] certainly has not been residing with a grandparent
for a period of at least twelve months. This subsection is
inapplicable.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/29/25, at 15. Critically, Grandfather neither

acknowledged, nor discussed, this element in his brief. Upon review, we agree

with the trial court’s assessment.

With respect to § 5324(3)(iii)(A), the record clearly reflects that S.H.

was not declared dependent. The record similarly reveals S.H. has never lived

with Grandfather for any period of time, let alone twelve consecutive months.

See N.T., 7/8/25, at 6, 107, 115-16. Thus, § 5324(3)(iii)(C) is also

inapplicable. Based upon the foregoing, the only truly “disputed” standing

• 13 - J-S46001-25

subsection in this case was § 5324(3)(iii)(B), which “grants standing to

grandparents to file for any form of physical or legal custody when their

grandchild is substantially at risk due to parental abuse, neglect, drug or

alcohol abuse or incapacity[.]” G.A.P., 194 A.3d at 619.

The trial court found that the testimony and evidence pertaining to

Grandfather’s concerns about S.H.’s safety and Mother’s mental health lacked

credibility: “This [c]ourt considered all evidence presented at the hearing and

determined that no risk to [S.H.’s] welfare existed under [Mother’s] care.”

Trial Court Opinion, 9/29/25, at 16. Instead, the court credited testimony

indicating Mother was a “dedicated” and “concerned” parent. Id. It concluded

that no credible evidence “was introduced that [S.H.] was anything but happy,

healthy, well-cared for, and loved.” Id.

Our review of the certified record finds sufficient support for the trial

court’s evidentiary conclusions pursuant to § 5324(3)(iii)(B). In her

testimony, Mother averred that S.H. was “very healthy” and “happy” since his

birth. See N.T., 7/8/25, at 6-7. Mother also attested that S.H. has always

maintained a “normal” weight while in her care. Id. at 8. By way of

corroboration, Mother introduced over two dozen pictures of S.H., which

spanned from the time when her family members first began alleging that he

was underweight until a few weeks prior to the hearing. Id. at 6-17.

In reviewing these photographs, Grandfather and Jessica each conceded

that S.H. appeared to be a healthy, normal weight. Id. at 93-97, 140. Krista

• 14 - J-S46001-25

similarly testified that her earlier worry about S.H.’s weight had not been well-

founded. Id. at 60 (“[H]e is a good weight, and I have never had concerns

about his weight after that.”).

Grandfather, Jessica, and Krista each also expressed disquiet regarding

Mother’s mental health. Id. at 58-59, 100-03, 121. These allegations were

directly opposed by Mother’s testimony, wherein she denied having any

significant mental health issues. Id. at 21-22. Her friend, Ms. Clemmons,

testified along similar lines that Mother was “patient, loving, attentive, caring”

and showed no signs of suffering from a mental illness or incapacity. Id. at

43.

As this Court has explained, “a trial court has discretion to accept or

reject a witness’[s] testimony, . . . , and is free to believe all, part, or none of

the evidence presented.” In re G.M.S., 193 A.3d 395, 402 (Pa.Super. 2018).

The trial court was within its discretion to credit the testimony of Mother and

Ms. Clemmons and discount the testimony of Grandfather, Jessica, and Krista.

Overall, we find that Grandfather’s arguments pursuant to § 5324(3) amount

to little more than an invitation for this Court to substitute its credibility

determinations for that of the trial court. Our case law, however, prohibits us

from overriding the trial court’s findings in this fashion where, as here, they

are supported by the record. See Rogowski, 291 A.3d at 60-61.

Based upon the foregoing, we observe no abuse of discretion or error of

law in the trial court’s holding that Grandfather lacked standing pursuant to

• 15 - J-S46001-25

§ 5324(3). The trial court’s findings are well-supported by the certified

record. Accordingly, we affirm the order dismissing Grandfather’s complaint.

Order affirmed.

3/3/2026

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