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March 2, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Mary Free Bed Rehabilitation Hosp v. Esurance Property & Casualty

Michigan Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 370846

• Disposition: Affirm in Part, Reverse in Part, Remanded

• Opinion

• Authorities (21)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (922)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirm in Part, Reverse in Part, Remanded

Lead Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

MARY FREE BED REHABILITATION FOR PUBLICATION
HOSPITAL, March 02, 2026
2:19 PM
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 370846
Kent Circuit Court
ESURANCE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY LC No. 22-008294-NF
INSURANCE COMPANY and UNITED
SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: CAMERON, P.J., and KOROBKIN and BAZZI, JJ.

KOROBKIN, J.

Under Michigan’s no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., a motorcyclist injured in a motor
vehicle accident must claim personal protection insurance (PIP) medical benefits from insurers in
a specified order of priority, and the insurers of the owner, registrant, or operator of the motor
vehicle involved in the accident are higher in priority than the motor vehicle insurers of the owner,
registrant, or operator of the motorcycle. MCL 500.3114(5). This case presents a question of first
impression: whether such an injured person or their treatment provider, once their expenses
exhaust and exceed a $250,000 coverage limit in the policy of a higher-priority insurer, may move
down the priority list and claim additional benefits from a lower-priority insurer that provides
unlimited coverage. The answer to that question, we hold today, is yes.

Plaintiff, Mary Free Bed Rehabilitation Hospital, appeals by right the trial court’s orders
granting summary disposition to defendants, Esurance Property and Casualty Insurance Company
(Esurance) and United Services Automobile Association (USAA). Plaintiff provided treatment to
the injured motorcyclist in this case, Esurance was the insurer of the motor vehicle involved in the
accident, and USAA was a motor vehicle insurer whose coverage included the motorcycle’s
operator. The trial court granted summary disposition to Esurance on grounds that its policy had
a $250,000 coverage limit (which had been exhausted), and to USAA on grounds that the no-fault
act did not allow plaintiff to seek further payments from a lower-priority insurer whose policy
provides unlimited coverage.

-1-
On appeal, plaintiff contends that the Esurance policy was unlimited—that is, not capped
at $250,000—because Esurance failed to demonstrate compliance with the statutory requirements
for the effective selection of coverage levels. Plaintiff also contends that even if the Esurance
policy is capped, USAA is liable for coverage beyond Esurance’s $250,000 limit. For the reasons
set forth in this opinion, we agree with the trial court that the Esurance policy had a $250,000
coverage limit, but we disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that the no-fault act does not allow
plaintiff to recover from USAA under its unlimited policy. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse
in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS

This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on November 12, 2020.
Aaron Slade rode a motorcycle belonging to his cousin the wrong way down Seaway Drive in
Muskegon. Slade was catastrophically injured when he collided head-on with a vehicle that was
owned and driven by Haley Tanner. Slade was treated at several medical facilities for multiple
serious injuries, including a severe traumatic brain injury, before being transferred to plaintiff’s
facility for inpatient rehabilitative care.

Tanner had insured her vehicle through Esurance effective September 15, 2020. Her policy
purportedly carried a coverage limit of $250,000. Meanwhile, Slade’s father maintained an
insurance policy through USAA on two motor vehicles driven by himself and Slade’s mother,
effective from October 15, 2020 to April 14, 2021, which included unlimited PIP medical-benefits
coverage. USAA does not contest that Slade is a covered person under his parents’ policy as a
relative domiciled in their household.1 See MCL 500.3114(1).

Plaintiff’s charges to Slade for medical treatment amounted to $1,183,565.59. Esurance
paid $113,307.30 to plaintiff but declined to make further payments on the basis that the policy’s
PIP medical-benefits limit had been exhausted. Plaintiff’s counsel then sent a letter to USAA
demanding that USAA pay for Slade’s PIP medical benefits under his parents’ policy. But USAA
denied plaintiff’s demand on the ground that Esurance was higher in priority and had already
provided coverage.

In September 2022, plaintiff filed suit against defendants Esurance and USAA, claiming
that defendants failed to pay certain PIP insurance benefits in violation of the no-fault act. Count
I of plaintiff’s second amended complaint asserted statutory claims for PIP medical benefits
against Esurance. Count II asserted statutory claims for PIP medical benefits against USAA.
Count III asserted a claim for declaratory relief against both Esurance and USAA, requesting a
declaration that they owed PIP coverage. And Count IV asserted a claim that USAA had breached
a contract of which plaintiff was an intended third-party beneficiary.

Plaintiff moved for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that
USAA’s policy applied to Slade because he was domiciled with his parents. Plaintiff’s motion

1
According to Slade’s mother, Slade had been living out of a travel trailer located on his parents’
property “off and on” for three years before the accident. Slade also received his mail at his
parents’ address.

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further asserted that the 2019 amendments to the no-fault act allowed plaintiff to “stack” Esurance
and USAA’s policies according to the order of priority in MCL 500.3114(5) such that USAA was
obligated to pay for PIP medical benefits after Esurance’s coverage limit was exhausted. USAA
disputed plaintiff’s ability to stack Esurance and USAA’s policies, arguing that only Esurance’s
policy applied. In a July 19, 2023 opinion and order, the trial court concluded that plaintiff was
not allowed to stack insurance policies, and granted summary disposition instead to USAA.2
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, but the trial court declined to revive Counts II and III against
USAA.3

Esurance moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10) on the
ground that Esurance had already paid out its policy maximum PIP medical-benefits coverage of
$250,000. In response, plaintiff argued that coverage under the Esurance policy should be deemed
unlimited, not capped at $250,000. Specifically, plaintiff argued that Tanner, in procuring
insurance coverage for her vehicle, had failed to make an “effective selection” of the $250,000
coverage limit as required under MCL 500.3107c. The trial court took the motion under
advisement and allowed Esurance to submit business records showing that Tanner had in fact paid
premiums under the policy. Following the submission of said records, the trial court issued an
opinion and order on March 13, 2024 granting Esurance’s motion for summary disposition,
concluding that Esurance was entitled to a presumption that the premiums paid accurately reflected
a $250,000 PIP medical-benefits coverage limit and that plaintiff could not rebut this presumption.
As a result, Counts I and III against Esurance were dismissed.

All plaintiff’s claims having been dismissed, plaintiff now appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s determination on a motion for summary
disposition. McMaster v DTE Energy Co, 509 Mich 423, 431; 984 NW2d 91 (2022). This Court
also reviews de novo issues of statutory interpretation. Id.

Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is proper when “[e]xcept as to the amount
of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.” MCR 2.116(C)(10). “On the other hand,
summary disposition is proper under MCR 2.116(I)(2) ‘if the court determines that the opposing
party, rather than the moving party, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Rataj v City of
Romulus, 306 Mich App 735, 746; 858 NW2d 116 (2014) (citation omitted).

A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the
factual sufficiency of a claim. The court must consider all evidence submitted by

2
Although it did not state so explicitly, the trial court effectively granted relief to USAA under
MCR 2.116(I)(2) (nonmoving party entitled to judgment).
3
The trial court agreed to reinstate Count IV on the basis that it was not the subject of plaintiff’s
motion for partial summary disposition and had been dismissed in error. The parties thereafter
stipulated to the dismissal of Count IV.

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the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary disposition.
Only when the record does not leave open an issue upon which reasonable minds
might differ may a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) be granted. [McMaster, 509
Mich at 431 (citations omitted).]

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that Slade is entitled to unlimited PIP benefits, either through Tanner’s
Esurance policy, or, should we hold that Esurance’s policy is capped at $250,000, through Slade’s
parents’ unlimited USAA policy. As explained below, we reject plaintiff’s position regarding the
Esurance policy, but agree with plaintiff as to the USAA policy.

The no-fault act became law in 1973, providing “an innovative social and legal response
to the long payment delays, inequitable payment structure, and high legal costs inherent in the tort
(or ‘fault’) liability system.” Shavers v Kelley, 402 Mich 554, 578; 267 NW2d 72 (1978). The act
sought “to provide victims of motor vehicle accidents assured, adequate, and prompt reparation
for certain economic losses.” Id. at 578-579. To do so, it required Michigan motorists to purchase
no-fault insurance to legally operate a motor vehicle. Id. at 579. “Under this system, victims of
motor vehicle accidents would receive insurance benefits for their injuries as a substitute for their
common-law remedy in tort.” Id.

MCL 500.3107(1)(a) requires that motor vehicle insurance policies provide, with some
exceptions, payment for “[a]llowable expenses consisting of reasonable charges incurred for
reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person’s care,
recovery, or rehabilitation.” MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Until 2019, individuals injured in motor
vehicle accidents were entitled to receive uncapped (that is, unlimited) lifetime PIP medical
benefits for allowable expenses. See Douglas v Allstate Ins Co, 492 Mich 241, 257; 821 NW2d
472 (2012), citing MCL 500.3107(1), as enacted by 1972 PA 294, as amended by 1991 PA 191.

“Unsurprisingly, Michigan’s no-fault automobile insurance system has been the subject of
continual debate, praise, criticism, amendment, and litigation since its creation . . . .” Andary v
USAA Cas Ins Co, 512 Mich 207, 217; 1 NW3d 186 (2023). And although “Michigan’s system
of no-fault insurance . . . succeeded in ensuring lifetime benefits for those who suffer catastrophic
injuries in an automobile accident, the issue of cost has been subject to ongoing debates for
decades.” Id. at 218. In its latest effort at reform, the Legislature in 2019 “made sweeping changes
to Michigan’s no-fault statutes when it enacted 2019 PA 21 and 2019 PA 22.” Id. In a seismic
shift, these amendments allowed those who procured insurance to limit or even decline PIP
medical benefits for policies issued or renewed after July 1, 2020. See 2019 PA 21; 2019 PA 22;
MCL 500.3107c (addressing the process for selecting limited coverage); MCL 500.3107d
(addressing the process for declining coverage); MCL 500.3109a (addressing the process for
exclusions from limited coverage). Especially relevant here, MCL 500.3107c(1)(b) allows a
person responsible for maintaining insurance to limit PIP medical benefits to $250,000. Those
willing to pay higher premiums in exchange for greater benefits may choose to maintain coverage
for unlimited lifetime PIP benefits. See MCL 500.3107c(1)(d).

-4-
As was the case before the 2019 amendments, individuals injured in motor vehicle
accidents must generally seek no-fault benefits from their own PIP policies (or that of a spouse or
relative domiciled in the same household), unless one of the exceptions in MCL 500.3114(2), (3),
or (5) applies. MCL 500.3114(1); Hmeidan v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 326 Mich App 467,
476-477; 928 NW2d 258 (2018). This case concerns the exception in MCL 500.3114(5), which
provides the “order of priority” by which an operator or passenger of a motorcycle injured in a
motor vehicle accident must claim no-fault benefits:

Subject to subsections (6)[4] and (7),[5][6] a person who suffers accidental
bodily injury arising from a motor vehicle accident that shows evidence of the
involvement of a motor vehicle while an operator or passenger of a motorcycle shall
claim personal protection insurance benefits from insurers in the following order of
priority:

(a) The insurer of the owner or registrant of the motor vehicle involved in
the accident.

(b) The insurer of the operator of the motor vehicle involved in the accident.

(c) The motor vehicle insurer of the operator of the motorcycle involved in
the accident.

(d) The motor vehicle insurer of the owner or registrant of the motorcycle
involved in the accident.

4
MCL 500.3114(6) provides as follows:
If an applicable insurance policy in an order of priority under subsection (5)
is a policy for which the person named in the policy has elected to not maintain
coverage for personal protection insurance benefits under section 3107d, or as to
which an exclusion under section 3109(2) applies, the injured person shall claim
benefits only under other policies, subject to subsection (7), in the same order of
priority for which no such election has been made. If there are no other policies for
which no such election has been made, the injured person shall claim benefits under
the next order of priority or, if there is not a next order of priority, under the
assigned claims plan under sections 3171 to 3175.
5
MCL 500.3114(7) provides as follows:
If personal protection insurance benefits are payable under subsection (5)
under 2 or more insurance policies in the same order of priority, the benefits are
only payable up to an aggregate coverage limit that equals the highest available
coverage limit under any 1 of the policies.
6
The limitations in Subsections (6) and (7) were added by the 2019 amendments. See 2019 PA
21.

-5-
Although motorcyclists are not legally obligated to purchase PIP insurance, MCL
500.3101(1); Perkins v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 301 Mich App 658, 665-666; 837 NW2d 32 (2013),
motorcyclists who are injured in accidents with motor vehicles may claim PIP benefits. See
Underhill v Safeco Ins Co, 407 Mich 175, 186; 284 NW2d 463 (1979). The priority scheme in
MCL 500.3114(5) aims to ensure that injured motorcyclists will be able to obtain no-fault benefits
from at least one no-fault insurer. See Hmeidan, 326 Mich App at 479-480; see also Underhill,
407 Mich at 188-189 (discussing policy reasons for the Legislature’s choice to allow motorcyclists
to obtain no-fault benefits). Usually—but not always—that is the insurer of the owner of the
involved motor vehicle, listed highest in priority under MCL 500.3114(5). See Griffin v Trumbull
Ins Co, 509 Mich 484, 498-499, 505-506; 983 NW2d 760 (2022). Following the 2019
amendments, the motorcycle accident scenario is the only remaining type of claim with an “order
of priority” for payment of PIP benefits. Compare MCL 500.3114(5) with former MCL
500.3114(4), as enacted by 1972 PA 294, as amended by 2016 PA 347 (providing order of priority
for injured occupants of motor vehicles), and former MCL 500.3115(1), as enacted by 1972 PA
294 (providing order of priority for injured non-occupants of motor vehicles).

In this case, it is undisputed that Slade was injured in a motor vehicle accident while
operating a motorcycle. It is also undisputed that Slade is covered under both Tanner’s Esurance
policy, which Esurance argues is limited to $250,000 in PIP medical-benefits coverage, and his
parents’ USAA motor vehicle policy, which carried unlimited PIP medical-benefits coverage.

Esurance’s policy is highest in priority under MCL 500.3114(5)(a) and (b) because Tanner
was the owner and operator of the motor vehicle in the accident. USAA’s unlimited policy is
lower in priority under MCL 500.3114(5)(c) because that subsection applies to any motor vehicle
policy that covers a motorcycle operator. See Hmeidan, 326 Mich App at 480-481. Esurance
asserts that its policy has been exhausted because its coverage is capped at $250,000. Plaintiff
disagrees and seeks recovery from Esurance for outstanding charges for Slade’s medical care that
exceed $1,000,000. Accordingly, we first determine what level of coverage applies to Esurance’s
policy as the highest-priority insurer.

A. ESURANCE

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition to Esurance and
that plaintiff was entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2). We disagree.

MCL 500.3107c provides detailed requirements for how the selection of coverage options
under the no-fault act is to be presented and effectuated. See generally Bronson Healthcare Group,
Inc v Esurance Prop and Cas Ins Group, 348 Mich App 428; 19 NW3d 151 (2023). If a
policyholder’s selection of coverage complies with the requirements of MCL 500.3107c(1), then
the selected coverage limits apply to their policy. If they have not made an “effective selection”
of coverage under Subsection (1), but the policy was issued or renewed and a premium or premium
installment has been paid, then under Subsection (3) the insurer is entitled to a rebuttable
presumption that the amount of the premium or installment accurately reflects the level of coverage
indicated. MCL 500.3107c(3). Finally, if there is no “effective selection” of coverage under
Subsection (1) and the presumption in Subsection (3) does not apply, then unlimited coverage will
apply to the policy. MCL 500.3107c(4).

-6-
Plaintiff argues that Tanner’s selection of limited coverage was not effective under
Subsection (1) and that the elements for the rebuttable presumption have not been satisfied under
Subsection (3), such that there is no coverage limit on Esurance’s policy.7 We consider each
requirement in turn.

1. EFFECTIVE SELECTION

Plaintiff first argues that Tanner failed to make an “effective selection” of coverage limited
to $250,000 under MCL 500.3107c(1) and MCL 500.3107e. We agree that Esurance has failed to
demonstrate that Tanner made an effective selection.

MCL 500.3107c(1) provides that an insured “shall” select a coverage option “in a way
required under” MCL 500.3107e. MCL 500.3107e states that “a person must make a selection”
in one of three ways, and pertinent here, one way to make an effective selection is by
“[e]lectronically marking the form and providing an electronic signature as provided in the uniform
electronic transactions act, 2000 PA 305, MCL 450.831 to 450.849 [UETA].” MCL
500.3107e(2)(c). As we explained in Bronson, 348 Mich App at 445, within the UETA,

MCL 450.832(h) defines “electronic signature,” in relevant part, as a symbol
executed or adopted by a person with intent to sign the record, and MCL 450.839(1)
provides that an electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was “the act of
the person.” MCL 450.839(1). MCL 450.839(1) and (2) then explain how a party
can show that a signature was “the act of the person.”

More specifically, MCL 450.839 provides as follows:

(1) . . . The act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a
showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person
to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.

7
We reject Esurance’s argument that plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the effectiveness of
Tanner’s selection because plaintiff is not an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract.
“Standing generally refers to the right of a plaintiff initially to invoke the power of a trial court to
adjudicate a claimed injury.” Pueblo v Haas, 511 Mich 345, 355; 999 NW2d 433 (2023)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] litigant has standing whenever there is a legal cause
of action.” C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive Mich Ins Co, ___ Mich __, _; __ NW3d
___ (2025) (Docket Nos. 165537, 165538, and 165964); slip op at 18 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). MCL 500.3112 expressly provides that healthcare treatment providers under the no-fault
act “may . . . assert a direct cause of action against an insurer . . . .” See C-Spine, ___ Mich at __;
slip op at 27-28. Plaintiff thus has standing to challenge the effectiveness of Tanner’s selection
because MCL 500.3112 gives it a legal cause of action. See id. at __; slip op at 18, 27-28.

-7-
(2) The effect of an electronic record or electronic signature attributed to a
person under subsection (1) is determined from the context and surrounding
circumstances at the time of its creation, execution, or adoption, including any
agreements of the parties, and otherwise as provided by law.

In support of its argument that Tanner signed the PIP selection form, Esurance provided
the PIP coverage form containing an “X” for “Option 4,” which limited coverage to $250,000 per
person.8 At the bottom of the form appeared the following:

[Image of 2-column table. Column 1, row 1 states: Applicant/Named Insured Signature (in bold
font.) Column 1, row 2 states: Haley Tanner. Column 2, row 1 states: Date (in bold font). Column
2, row 2 states: 09/15/2020.]

This PIP coverage document containing Tanner’s purported signature is Esurance’s only
evidence that the coverage selection was effective. Tanner testified at her deposition that although
she remembered selecting coverage online, she did not remember seeing the coverage limits form
in question. And she did not remember selecting a cap of $250,000 per person per accident with
exclusions or signing and dating the coverage limits form. Tanner’s name merely appearing on
the PIP coverage document, without more, does not “in and of itself suggest[] that it was executed
or adopted” by Tanner. Bronson, 348 Mich App at 445. As Esurance presented no other evidence
besides “merely offer[ing] a document with an electronically printed name and date,” it did not
demonstrate that the coverage selection was effective. See MCL 500.3107e; Bronson, 348 Mich
App at 445.

1. REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION

Given that there was no effective selection under MCL 500.3107c(1), we turn to whether
Esurance is entitled to the presumption under MCL 500.3107c(3). We conclude that it is.

MCL 500.3107c(3) states three preconditions for the rebuttable presumption as follows:

If an insurance policy is issued or renewed as described in subsection (1)
and the applicant or named insured has not made an effective selection under
subsection (1) but a premium or premium installment has been paid, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the amount of the premium or installment paid
accurately reflects the level of coverage applicable to the policy under subsection
(1).

8
The marked option also excluded Tanner herself from coverage, but according to Esurance,
Tanner did not provide proof of qualified health coverage. See MCL 500.3107d. Whether there
was an effective self-exclusion is not pertinent to this appeal.

-8-
In Bronson, we explained that this provision “provides that if (1) a policy is issued as described in
MCL 500.3107c(1), and (2) the insured did not make an effective selection for PIP coverage under
that subsection, but (3) the insured still made a premium payment, then there is a rebuttable
presumption that the level of coverage corresponds to the premium payment made.” Bronson, 348
Mich App at 447. We also stated that “this rebuttable presumption is not self-executing in the
sense that, for it to apply, the defendant must establish that the amount of the premium paid
accurately reflects the level of coverage.” Id. at 452.

Here, Esurance issued a policy to Tanner, Tanner did not make an effective selection of
coverage, and the record reflects that Tanner made premium payments to Esurance. The elements
of the rebuttable presumption have therefore been satisfied. See MCL 500.3107c(3). Plaintiff
does not offer evidence to rebut the presumption, but because the presumption “is not self-
executing,” Esurance must also “establish that the amount of the premium paid” by Tanner
“accurately reflects” a $250,000 limit for PIP coverage. Bronson, 348 Mich App at 452.

On this point, plaintiff argues that Esurance failed to do so because it did not provide an
affidavit or other evidence showing that the premium paid “accurately reflects” a $250,000 limit.
We disagree.

In Bronson, the defendant presented an affidavit by its underwriter, Stefanie Paradis, who
averred that the premium corresponded to the coverage selected. Id. at 436. The affidavit was
submitted after the close of discovery, two days before the trial court heard argument on competing
motions for summary disposition, and defendant never listed Paradis on its witness list. Id. at 436,
452. This Court reasoned that “(1) defendant’s untimely introduction of Paradis as a witness and
(2) the fact that Paradis’s affidavit is the only evidence explicitly stating that the premium paid by
Russell corresponded to a $250,000 limit for PIP coverage” warranted a remand to allow plaintiff
to perform additional discovery. Id. at 452-453.

This case is distinguishable. In support of the proposition that the premium paid by Tanner
“accurately reflects” a $250,000 limit for PIP coverage, Esurance points to the policy declarations
page for Tanner’s policy, which reflects a full-term total premium of $568, with $21 of the
premium allocated to PIP coverage and a note that refers to a supplemental policy declarations
page. The supplemental policy declarations page, in turn, states that Tanner’s coverage contains
a $250,000 limit for PIP medical. It adds that the PIP medical coverage limits will apply to future
renewals of the policy unless a new PIP coverage form is completed, and that making a full or
partial premium payment confirms “the accuracy of and desire to continue” the PIP coverage limit
selected. We conclude that this evidence sufficiently connects the dots between the amount of the
premium paid and the selection of limited PIP coverage such that Esurance has shown that the
premium paid “accurately reflects the level of coverage.” MCL 500.3107c(3); Bronson, 348 Mich
App at 452.

In Bronson, the untimely underwriter’s affidavit was the only evidence offered. See id.
at 452. Here, by contrast, the policy declarations page and supplemental policy declarations page
are complemented by other evidence. Esurance presented a policy dashboard document showing
premium payments made on the policy from October 2020 through February 2024, with the initial
premium aligning with the total premium amount stated in the policy declarations page. And
Tanner testified at her deposition that she sought coverage that met the minimum requirements for

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car insurance and that she switched from another insurer to obtain cheaper coverage with Esurance.
Tanner also acknowledged that she paid every month on the policy, renewing it several times.

The Bronson Court also based its decision in large part on the untimeliness of the submitted
affidavit. Although it is true here that Esurance submitted the payment ledger after the close of
discovery and after the hearing on Esurance’s motion for summary disposition, it was undisputed
that Tanner made premium payments. So the untimeliness of this evidence was not material.
Instead, the pertinent evidence demonstrating that the premium amount paid reflected the PIP
coverage limit (that is, the policy declarations page and the supplemental policy declarations page)
was timely disclosed during discovery. Therefore, unlike the plaintiff in Bronson, plaintiff was
not prejudiced. See id. at 453.

In short, Esurance established that its policy limit was $250,000. And plaintiff does not
dispute that Esurance paid benefits to the policy limit. See Love v Rudolph, ___ Mich App __,
_; __ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 369895); slip op at 15 (“The limit applies to anyone with
a right to claim PIP benefits under the policy. MCL 500.3107c(5).”) (emphasis omitted).
Accordingly, the trial court was correct to enter summary disposition in favor of Esurance.

B. USAA

Having determined that Esurance, the higher-priority insurer, was entitled to summary
disposition because its coverage limits were exhausted, we turn to whether plaintiff may also
recover PIP benefits from the unlimited policy issued by USAA, the lower-priority insurer.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by ruling that the no-fault act prohibits it from claiming
PIP medical benefits from USAA after Esurance’s policy coverage was exhausted. We agree.

Resolution of this issue requires us to examine MCL 500.3114(5) and other provisions of
the no-fault act. As stated above, MCL 500.3114(5) provides that an injured motorcyclist

shall claim personal protection insurance benefits from insurers in the following
order of priority:

(a) The insurer of the owner or registrant of the motor vehicle involved in
the accident.

(b) The insurer of the operator of the motor vehicle involved in the accident.

(c) The motor vehicle insurer of the operator of the motorcycle involved in
the accident.

(d) The motor vehicle insurer of the owner or registrant of the motorcycle
involved in the accident.

As discussed, before the 2019 amendments, PIP medical benefits for allowable expenses
were unlimited, see Douglas, 492 Mich at 257, so no-fault litigation generally centered on
identifying the highest-priority insurers for payment. Now that policyholders can choose no or

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limited coverage, identifying the highest-priority insurer will not necessarily result in the injured
motorcyclist or treating medical provider obtaining enough benefits to cover incurred medical
expenses. Whether an injured motorcyclist or treating medical provider may recover from lower-
priority insurers under MCL 500.3114(5) when the PIP benefits of higher-priority insurers are
exhausted is a novel issue.

When interpreting a statute, this Court’s goal is to “ascertain the legislative intent that may
reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute.” Douglas, 492 Mich at 256
(quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court must consider “the plain meaning of the critical
word or phrase as well as its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.” Id. (quotation marks
and citation omitted). “Courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute, and
must avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.”
Koontz v Ameritech Servs, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). Undefined statutory
terms are given their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. And although “we have long recognized
that when a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts must apply the statute as written, we have
also acknowledged that the no-fault act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in
favor of the persons who are intended to benefit from it.” Griffin, 509 Mich at 497 (cleaned up).

The relevant statute directs injured persons to claim benefits “from insurers in the following
order of priority.” MCL 500.3114(5). “Priority” is not defined in the no-fault act, but when
analyzing disputes that implicated priority rules under the former version of MCL 500.3114(5), as
added by 1980 PA 446, Michigan courts construed “order of priority” to mean the order of
preference or precedence for payment of benefits. See, e.g., Frierson v West American Ins Co,
261 Mich App 732, 735-738; 683 NW2d 695 (2004); Farmers Ins Exch v Farm Bureau Ins Co,
272 Mich App 106, 111-112; 24 NW2d 485 (2006). In the context of a priority dispute before the
2019 amendments, courts looked to the order of priority to determine which insurers had
precedence to pay. See Farmers Ins Exch, 272 Mich App at 111-112. To determine which insurer
or insurers were responsible for payment, one began at the top of the list and worked one’s way
down to identify insurers and determine which came first. See id. at 111-114. Once the court
located a first-in-priority insurer, that was the end of the inquiry—there was no need to look further
down the priority list. See id. at 114. But the fact that the inquiry ended when the first-in-priority
insurer was identified was a function not of the language of MCL 500.3114(5) itself—which
contains no limiting language in this regard—but that responsible insurers were required to provide
unlimited benefits under former MCL 500.3107(1).9 Accordingly, whether claimants were
precluded from going to the next insurer in the order of priority if benefits at a higher level were
exhausted was never at issue.

Turning to the current version of MCL 500.3114(5), we read “in the following order of
priority” to similarly mean that benefits must be claimed in the order of preference listed in the
statute from MCL 500.3114(5)(a) through (d). See Griffin, 509 Mich at 506-507 (“MCL
500.3114(5) provides that a person ‘shall claim personal protection insurance benefits from
insurers’ in a specified order.”) (emphasis added). But as this case shows, because the 2019
amendments allow policyholders to decline or limit PIP coverage, there may be circumstances in

9
As enacted by 1972 PA 294, as amended by 1991 PA 191, as amended by 2012 PA 542.

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which the benefits sought exceed the first-in-priority insurer’s policy limits. Under such
circumstances, and when a lower-priority insurer has a higher limit (or, as is the case here, no limit
at all), we hold that the plain language of MCL 500.3114(5) allows an injured motorcyclist or their
treating medical provider to recover from such lower-priority insurers once coverage by a higher-
priority insurer is exhausted. This is because nothing in the language of Section 3114(5), which
sets out a sequential list of insurers,10 prohibits continuing down the priority ladder to obtain
benefits if a higher-priority insurer’s policy is inadequate.

This reading is also consonant with the reform’s amendments that allow policyholders to
select from a menu of coverage levels at different price points, see MCL 500.3107c; MCL
500.3107d, paired with the no-fault act’s enduring principle that individuals injured in motor
vehicle accidents generally seek no-fault benefits under their own PIP policies that they or their
family members have paid for. See MCL 500.3114(1). The order of priority for injured
motorcyclists features not only the insurers of the owner, registrant, or operator of the involved
motor vehicle, MCL 500.3114(5)(a)-(b), but also the motor vehicle insurers of the operator, owner,
or registrant of the motorcycle, MCL 500.3114(5)(c)-(d). To deny an injured motorcyclist access
to their own unlimited-coverage policy, should a higher-in-priority policy associated with the
accident vehicle be capped, runs counter to the spirit of the no-fault act and its 2019 amendments
which prioritize personal choice in insurance policies.

Our reading also accords with the act’s purpose of providing those injured in car accidents
“assured, adequate, and prompt” coverage to which they have a claim, Shavers, 402 Mich at 578 -
579, by not limiting an injured person to an inadequate policy just because it happens to be higher
in priority when another policy provides more coverage. It is also consistent with the premise that
the no-fault act “is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed” to benefit those injured in
motor vehicle accidents. Griffin, 509 Mich at 497 (citation omitted); see also Shavers, 402 Mich
at 578-579.

Supporting this interpretation, as plaintiff points out, is our Supreme Court’s history of
indicating that whether an insurer is higher in priority is distinct from whether an injured person
is covered by that insurer’s policy. See Dye by Siporin & Assoc, Inc v Esurance Prop & Cas Ins
Co, 504 Mich 167, 191 n 61; 934 NW2d 674 (2019); Bosco v Bauermeister, 456 Mich 279, 301
n 7; 571 NW2d 509 (1997) (ascribing a rule of law to priority disputes, but not coverage disputes).
The no-fault act’s priority statutes “do not provide additional coverage; they merely dictate which
insurer will pay claims that have already been established.” Dye, 504 Mich at 191 n 61. Thus, the
fact that a lower-priority insurer need not pay benefits immediately does not mean that the injured
person no longer has coverage under that insurer’s policy.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Griffin is consistent with this theme. In that case, a
motorcyclist was seriously injured in an accident involving a truck but was unable to identify the

10
The Legislature’s use of the plural “insurers” rather than “insurer” in MCL 500.3114(5) has a
neutral effect on our interpretation. Although this language could be seen as not limiting the
number of insurers from which one can claim benefits, there can also be multiple insurers in the
same order of priority. See MCL 500.3114(7).

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truck’s insurer—which was highest in priority under MCL 500.3114(5)—despite acting with
diligence in an attempt to do so. Griffin, 509 Mich at 491, 498-499, 503. Although Griffin does
not answer the question of whether a lower-priority insurer can be liable once a higher-priority
insurer’s policy is exhausted, it does recognize that “when it would be practically impossible for a
party to learn the identity of the presumed highest-priority insurer, then an injured party should be
able to look to another insurer in the order of priority, such as their default PIP insurer . . . .” Id.
at 506. Griffin thus recognizes that, at least under some circumstances, being lower in priority
does not absolve an insurer from potential liability to pay benefits.

Surrounding statutory provisions provide additional context and support for our
interpretation. We begin with MCL 500.3114(6), which immediately follows the order of priority
for motorcyclist claims in MCL 500.3114(5), and excludes certain types of policies from the order
of priority:

If an applicable insurance policy in an order of priority under subsection (5)
is a policy for which the person named in the policy has elected to not maintain
coverage for personal protection insurance benefits under section 3107d, or as to
which an exclusion under section 3109a[11] applies, the injured person shall
claim benefits only under other policies, subject to subsection (7), in the same order
of priority for which no such election has been made. If there are no other policies
for which no such election has been made, the injured person shall claim benefits
under the next order of priority or, if there is not a next order of priority, under the
assigned claims plan [(MACP)] under sections 3171 to 3175.

The parties each argue that this provision supports their own position; plaintiff argues that it
addresses priority within a specific factual situation that may arise under the reform legislation,
whereas USAA argues that it provides the one and only mechanism by which an injured
motorcyclist can move down the order of priority to claim PIP benefits.

Plaintiff has the better argument. The plain language of MCL 500.3114(6) excludes from
the order of priority any insurance policies that do not maintain PIP medical coverage under
MCL 500.3107(1)(a) by operation of either the opt-out provision in MCL 500.3107d or the
exclusions in MCL 500.3109a(2). In other words, an injured motorcyclist can claim PIP benefits
only from those insurers in the order of priority whose policies include some PIP medical-benefits
coverage. If no such policy exists, Section 3114(6) directs claimants to proceed to the next order
of priority, or, as a last resort, to the MACP. This provision effectively eliminates the pro rata
sharing that would otherwise occur between two insurers in the same order of priority under MCL

11
Although MCL 500.3114(6) refers to “section 3109(2),” this is a typographical error. Love, ___
Mich App at __; slip op at 11. MCL 500.3109(2) merely defines “an injured person,” which is
irrelevant, while MCL 500.3109a(2) provides for exclusions from PIP medical coverage. As the
Compiler’s Notes to MCL 500.3114 states, “In subsections (4) and (6), the reference to ‘section
3109(2)’ evidently should read ‘section 3109a(2).’ ”

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500.3114(8)12 in cases in which one insurer provides no PIP benefits. But nothing in the language
of the provision prohibits an injured motorcyclist from looking to a lower-priority insurer if
benefits are capped at a higher order of priority. Instead, we agree with plaintiff that Section
3114(6) narrowly addresses a situation in which a claimant simply cannot access any PIP benefits
at a higher level of priority because of an elected exclusion or declined coverage. And Section
3114(6) is not implicated by these facts.

Another provision of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3107c(6), lends further support to our
conclusion that injured motorcyclists may recover PIP benefits from a lower-priority insurer with
unlimited coverage after exhausting the policy of a higher-priority insurer with limited coverage.
Recall that Section 3107c concerns the selection of coverage levels for PIP benefits and allows
policyholders to limit coverage. MCL 500.3107c(6) provides: “If benefits are payable under
section 3107(1)(a) under 2 or more insurance policies, the benefits are only payable up to an
aggregate coverage limit that equals the highest available coverage limit under any 1 of the
policies.” This provision anticipates that claimants can obtain benefits from more than one policy
and is silent as to whether those policies are in the same or a different level of priority. If more
than one policy is in play, Section 3107c(6) limits the total aggregate benefits to the highest limit
under any one policy. In other words, if a higher-priority policy and a lower-priority policy both
have $250,000 limits, the claimant cannot recover from the latter after exhausting the former; the
total recovery cannot exceed $250,000. But because Section 3107(c)(6) allows recovery “up to an
aggregate coverage limit that equals the highest available coverage limit” (emphasis added), this
statutory provision evinces an understanding that multiple policies can be accessed when one has
a higher limit than the other. Plaintiff’s claim against USAA fits within those parameters.

USAA argues that this provision does not support plaintiff’s position because yet a
different statutory provision, MCL 500.3114(7), which is specific to injured motorcyclists under
Section 3114(5), does not contemplate obtaining benefits from insurers in different orders of
priority. MCL 500.3114(7) provides: “If personal protection insurance benefits are payable under
subsection (5) under 2 or more insurance policies in the same order of priority, the benefits are
only payable up to an aggregate coverage limit that equals the highest available coverage limit
under any 1 of the policies.” Like Section 3107c(6), which more broadly covers PIP benefits
payable under Section 3107(1)(a), this provision sets an aggregate limit when two or more insurers
are responsible, but narrowly addresses policies falling within the same order of priority. But we
do not read MCR 500.3114(7)’s plain language as limiting plaintiff’s ability to recover PIP
benefits from lower-priority insurers; rather, it provides the rules for equitable distribution of the
loss between insurers within the same order of priority, alongside MCL 500.3114(8). In sum, the

12
MCL 500.3114(8) provides as follows:
Subject to subsections (6) and (7), if 2 or more insurers are in the same order of priority to
provide personal protection insurance benefits under subsection (5), an insurer that pays benefits
due is entitled to partial recoupment from the other insurers in the same order of priority, and a
reasonable amount of partial recoupment of the expense of processing the claim, in order to
accomplish equitable distribution of the loss among all of the insurers.

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plain language of MCL 500.3114(7) does not prohibit plaintiff from claiming PIP benefits from
USAA.

USAA’s interpretation effectively equates MCL 500.3107c(6), which addresses all types
of PIP claims, with MCL 500.3114(7), which is specific to injured motorcyclist claims. But
Section 3107c(6) does not mention order of priority, and Section 3114(7) only addresses the case
of insurers in the same order of priority. The Legislature knows how to say, “same order of
priority,” but did not do so in Section 3107c(6). Compare MCL 500.3114(6)-(8) (using the phrase
“same order of priority”). Further, if, as USAA argues, an injured motorcyclist may claim PIP
benefits from more than one insurer only if the insurers are within the same order of priority, then
Section 3114(7) would render Section 3107c(6) nugatory as to motorcyclist claims, contrary to the
rule against surplusage. See Koontz, 466 Mich at 312. Instead, we read Section 3114(7) as a more
specific rule than Section 3107c(6) only as between two insurers in the same “order of priority”—
a scenario that could only arise with injured motorcyclist claims under Section 3114(5), but does
not preclude USAA’s liability here.

Our interpretation is further bolstered by the fact that the 2019 legislative reforms paired
the addition of MCL 500.3107c(6) and MCL 500.3114(7) with the removal of former MCL
500.3115(3), as enacted by 1972 PA 294:

A limit upon the amount of personal protection insurance benefits available
because of accidental bodily injury to 1 person arising from 1 motor vehicle
accident shall be determined without regard to the number of policies applicable to
the accident.

This statutory subsection, known as an “antistacking” provision, O’Hannesian v Detroit Auto
Inter-Ins Exch, 110 Mich App 280, 284; 312 NW2d 229 (1981), prevented injured persons from
obtaining duplicate recovery by stacking policies, Beaver v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 93 Mich App
399, 401; 286 NW2d 884 (1979), or even attempting to recover actual losses by recovering more
than the maximum work-loss limits established by statute, O’Hannesian, 110 Mich App at 284 -
286. But the no-fault act no longer contains this bar on stacking coverage. The Legislature could
have chosen to retain an antistacking provision to prevent motorcyclists from stacking policies to
recover benefits from multiple insurers in different orders of priority, but it did not.

USAA argues that plaintiff cannot claim PIP benefits from USAA because Esurance could
not recoup payments from USAA under Auto Club Ins Ass’n v State Farm Ins Co, 221 Mich App
154; 561 NW2d 445 (1997), overruled on other grounds by CAM Constr v Lake Edgewood Condo
Ass’n, 465 Mich 549; 640 NW2d 256 (2002). USAA points to the proposition that an insurer may
not recoup benefits from another insurer in a lower-priority level. See id. at 164. As stated,
MCL 500.3114(8) permits recoupment between two or more insurers within the same order of
priority, which can occur in accidents involving multiple vehicles. See also Farmers Ins Exc v
Titan Ins Co, 251 Mich App 454, 458; 651 NW2d 428 (2002) (explaining that a substantively
identical statute, former MCL 500.3115(2), as enacted by 1972 PA 294, permitted an insurer who
has paid out benefits to recoup from another insurer in the same order of priority.) Additionally,
when an insurer pays benefits that a higher-priority insurer was responsible for, the lower-priority
insurer may sue for equitable subrogation. See Griffin, 509 Mich at 502. USAA argues that the
logic of preventing higher-priority insurers from recovering from lower-priority insurers should

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extend to claimants, barring them from recovering additional benefits from lower-priority insurers.
But we fail to see how this follows, as recoupment by insurers and recovery of benefits by
claimants are distinct concepts in the no-fault act. Setting aside the absence of statutory language
supporting this interpretation, this argument fails to consider the principle that we construe the act
liberally for the benefit of claimants, not insurers. See Griffin, 509 Mich at 497. Whether Esurance
could recoup benefits from USAA is of no moment and is not at issue here.

USAA also argues that the Michigan Department of Insurance and Financial Services
(DIFS) interprets the no-fault act in agreement with it position. We give agency interpretations of
statutes respectful consideration and do not overrule them without cogent reasons, but they are not
binding on courts and cannot conflict with the Legislature’s intent as expressed in the statute’s
language. In re Complaint of Rovas Against SBC Michigan, 482 Mich 90, 103; 754 NW2d 259
(2008). USAA cites a frequently-asked-questions webpage regarding the 2019 no-fault
amendments, which provides:

1. Under the new law, because some motor vehicle owner/registrants may have opted out of PIP or chosen a reduced limit, will motorcyclists be limited to recovering for their injuries from that policy?

Under the new law, a motorcyclist involved in an accident with a motor
vehicle would continue to seek PIP from the insurer of the motor vehicle but would
be subject to any PIP choice limits on the policy. If no PIP coverage is available in
the order of priority, a motorcyclist is eligible for up to $250,000 in PIP benefits
from the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan. [Michigan Department of Insurance and
Financial Services, Auto Insurance Reform FAQ
https://www.michigan.gov/difs/industry/insurance/faq/no-fault-faq (accessed
February 25, 2026).]

Although this statement does indicate that an injured motorcyclist’s recovery from the higher-
priority insurer would be subject to the applicable policy’s coverage limit, notably the statement
is silent as to whether the motorcyclist could seek additional payments from their own policy.
However, even if we were to construe DIFS’s statement as taking the position that the motorcyclist
could not recover from another insurer in the order of priority, as discussed above, we must reject
such a policy because it conflicts with our interpretation of the statute’s plain meaning. See In re
Rovas, 482 Mich at 103.

Nor does Love v Randolph, ___ Mich App __, a coverage and priority dispute among
multiple insurers regarding an accident involving a motorcycle and several motor vehicles, dictate
a different result. There, the motor vehicle insurer that would otherwise be the highest-priority
insurer under MCL 500.3114(5) argued that it was not in the order of priority to pay benefits for
the injured motorcyclist because the policyholder, who selected a policy with a $250,000 limit,
excluded herself from PIP coverage. See id. at _; slip op at 3-4, 8, 15. We rejected that argument
because under MCL 500.3109a(1), a policyholder can only exclude themselves, their spouse, or a
relative in the household from coverage—they cannot exclude a third-party accident victim. See
id. at __; slip op at 15. During the analysis, we stated that “the limit [on PIP coverage] applies
to anyone with a right to claim PIP benefits under the policy. MCL 500.3107c(5).” Id. In
isolation, this sentence could be read as supporting USAA’s position that coverage may not exceed

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the limit on the highest-priority policy. However, it was made in the context of discussing the
limits and exclusions applicable to only one policy. See id. Moreover, the quoted statute says that
the limit selected by the policyholder applies to anyone with a right to claim PIP benefits “under
the policy,” MCL 500.3107c(5) (emphasis added), meaning the particular policy at issue. The
question whether a claimant or provider can move down the list in the order of priority to claim
benefits from another insurer’s policy was not presented in Love.

For these reasons, MCL 500.3114(5) and the other provisions of the no-fault act allow
plaintiff to recover PIP payments from USAA after Esurance’s policy coverage has been
exhausted. The trial court therefore erred by granting summary disposition to USAA.13

IV. CONCLUSION

Because Esurance is entitled to the presumption of an effective selection under MCL
500.3107c(3) and its $250,000 policy has been exhausted, the trial court was correct to grant
summary disposition to Esurance. But because we hold that the no-fault act allows plaintiff to
recover payments from USAA, a lower-priority insurer under MCL 500.3114(5), the trial court
erred in granting summary disposition to USAA.

We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi

13
Having decided that plaintiff is entitled to PIP coverage, we need not address plaintiff’s
alternative argument that the language of USAA’s insurance policy entitles plaintiff to PIP
coverage. To the extent that USAA argues that its policy contains an antistacking provision that
prohibits coverage, because we have determined that the no-fault act allows plaintiff to proceed
down the order of priority, any antistacking provision in the USAA policy is void insofar as it
conflicts with the statute. See Corwin v DaimlerChrysler Ins Co, 296 Mich App 242, 256-257;
819 NW2d 68 (2012) (invalidating and reforming an insurance policy because it contravened the
no-fault act); Auto-Owners Ins Co v Martin, 284 Mich App 427, 434; 773 NW2d 29 (2009)
(“Insurance policy provisions that conflict with statutes are invalid . . . .”).

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