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March 2, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Chrystal Robinson v. Quicken Loans Inc

Michigan Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 365769
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Disposition: Reversed and Remanded

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (4.1K)

• PDF

Disposition

Reversed and Remanded

Lead Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

CHRYSTAL ROBINSON, UNPUBLISHED
March 02, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellant, 9:28 AM

v No. 365769
Wayne Circuit Court
QUICKEN LOANS INC, LC No. 21-008229-CD

Defendant-Appellee.

ON REMAND

Before: MALDONADO, P.J., and CAMERON and YOUNG, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This case returns to us on remand from our Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of
Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC, ___ Mich __; __ NW3d ___ (July 31, 2025)
(Docket No. 163989). Robinson v Quicken Loans Inc, ___ Mich ___ (2025) (Docket No. 168597)
(Robinson IV). For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary
disposition in part and remand for further proceedings.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The factual background of this case was set forth in our prior opinion, Robinson v Quicken
Loans Inc, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 22, 2025 (Docket
No. 365679) (Robinson III), pp 1-2:

Plaintiff is a 33-year-old Black woman. After defendant terminated her
employment, plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan alleging race and sex discrimination, hostile work
environment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 USC 2000e. She also alleged identical state-law claims, as well as a claim
of age discrimination, under Michigan’s Elliott Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA),
MCL 37.2101 et seq. The district court declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction and dismissed the ELCRA claims without prejudice.

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The district court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment and
dismissed all of plaintiff’s remaining claims on the basis that there were no genuine
issues of material fact. FR Civ P 56(a). Robinson v Quicken Loans LLC,
unpublished opinion of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, issued March 23, 2021 (Case No. 19-cv-13129) (Robinson I). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
ruling. Robinson v Quicken Loans LLC, unpublished opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, issued September 14, 2022 (Case No. 21-
1392) (Robinson II).

Plaintiff filed suit in state court alleging claims of race, sex, and age
discrimination; retaliation; and hostile work environment, in violation of the
ELCRA. Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7),
arguing that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. It
further argued that plaintiff’s age-discrimination claim was barred by the one-year
limitations period in her employment contract. According to plaintiff, the trial court
took a brief recess at the hearing on defendant’s motion to consider the applicability
of McMillon v Kalamazoo, 511 Mich 855 (2023), as to whether plaintiff’s age-
discrimination claim was barred by the contractual one-year limitations period. The
parties agree that the trial court then came back on the record and gave its ruling,
but the transcript for this ruling has not been provided to this Court. Plaintiff
contends that the trial court found McMillon inapplicable; defendant asserts it also
ruled plaintiff’s age-discrimination claim was barred by collateral estoppel.

On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court. We held that plaintiff’s race- and sex-
discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment claims were barred by collateral estoppel
because the district court made a final ruling on facts essential to plaintiff’s state-law claims. Id.
at 3-9. As for plaintiff’s age-discrimination claim, we held that she was barred by the contractual
limitations period in her employment contract. Id. at 9-11. Because plaintiff was barred by the
limitations period, this Court declined to address whether plaintiff’s age-discrimination claim was
barred by collateral estoppel. Id. at 11 n 3. Plaintiff appealed. Our Supreme Court vacated Part
IV of our opinion addressing plaintiff’s age-discrimination claim and remanded the case for
reconsideration of plaintiff’s age-discrimination claim in light of Rayford, ___ Mich at __.
Robinson IV, __ Mich at ___. It further ordered that this Court was permitted to consider whether
plaintiff’s age-discrimination claim was barred by collateral estoppel. Id.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“The applicability of legal doctrines such as res judicata and collateral estoppel are
questions of law to be reviewed de novo.” Allen Park Retirees Ass’n, Inc v Allen Park, 329 Mich
App 430, 443; 942 NW2d 618 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A trial court’s
decision on a motion for summary disposition is also reviewed de novo.” Id. “Summary
disposition may be granted under MCR 2.116(C)(7) when a claim is barred by . . . collateral
estoppel.” Allen Park Retirees Ass’n, 329 Mich App at 443.

A motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(7) “may be supported by affidavits,
depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence.” The contents of the

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complaint must be accepted as true unless contradicted by the documentary
evidence, which must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
If there is no factual dispute, the determination whether a plaintiff’s claim is barred
under a principle set forth in MCR 2.116(C)(7) is a question of law. [Id. at 444
(citations omitted).]

Under MCR 2.116(C)(10), “a party may move for dismissal of a claim on the ground that
there is no genuine issue with respect to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Dextrom v Wexford Co, 287 Mich App 406, 415; 789 NW2d 211
(2010).1 “The moving party must specifically identify the undisputed factual issues and support
its position with documentary evidence.” Id. The trial court “must examine the documentary
evidence presented and, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,
determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Id. at 415-416. “A question of fact
exists when reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.”
Id. at 416. Finally, contractual interpretation is a question of law which we review de novo. Wilkie
v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 469 Mich 41, 47; 664 NW2d 776 (2003).

III. RAYFORD

In Robinson III, this Court held that plaintiff’s age-discrimination claim was barred by the
one-year limitations period in her employment contract. Robinson III, unpub op at 10-11. Relying
on Clark v DaimlerChrylser Corp, 268 Mich App 138, 142; 706 NW2d 471 (2005), overruled by
Rayford, ___ Mich at ___, we concluded that the shortened limitations period was permissible and
served to bar plaintiff’s age-discrimination claim. At the time this Court issued its decision,
Rayford was pending before our Supreme Court. We held that Rayford’s pendency was irrelevant
because “[t]he filing of an application for leave to appeal or a Supreme Court order granting leave
to appeal does not diminish the precedential effect of a published opinion of the Court of Appeals.”
Robinson III, unpub op at 10, quoting MCR 7.215(C)(2). Because Rayford had not been decided,
Clark remained binding. Robinson III, unpub op at 10.

Following this Court’s decision in Robinson III, our Supreme Court decided Rayford.
Rayford overruled Clark and disavowed its extension of Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457;
703 NW2d 23 (2005), to employment contracts. Rayford, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 2, 18. It
emphasized that it had “never ruled on the application of Rory outside of insurance contracts[,]”
yet Clark impermissibly did so. Id. at 19. The Court explained that:

Rory involved a shortened limitations period in an insurance policy. Employment
disputes are wholly different. As Judge NEFF highlighted in her dissent: Unlike
other contracts contexts, an employer and employee often do not deal at arm’s

1
As this Court recognized in Robinson III, while defendant only moved for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(7), courts are “not bound by a party’s choice of labels.” Attorney General v
Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp, 292 Mich App 1, 9; 807 NW2d 343 (2011). The gravamen of
defendant’s limitations-period claim necessarily required the trial court to consider evidence
submitted beyond the pleadings. Thus, this issue is more properly evaluated through the lens of a
motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10).

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length when negotiating contract terms. An employee in plaintiff’s position has
only two options: (1) sign the employment contract as drafted by the employer or
(2) lose the job. The economic pressure exerted by employers on all but the most
sought-after employees may be particularly acute, for the inequitable term stands
between the employee and necessary employment, and few employees are in a
position to refuse a job because of such a term. [Id. at 20 (quotation marks,
brackets, and citations omitted).]

Rejecting the application of Rory in the employment context, the Rayford Court held that
the reasonableness test in Camelot Excavating Co, Inc v St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co, 410 Mich
118, 127; 301 NW2d 275 (1981), overruled by Rory, 473 Mich at 457, was the appropriate test to
determine whether a contractually shortened limitations period in an employment contract is
enforceable. Rayford, ___ Mich at __; slip op at 25. The Camelot test requires: “[1] that the
claimant have sufficient opportunity to investigate and file an action, [2] that the time not be so
short as to work a practical abrogation of the right of action, and [3] that the action not be barred
before the loss or damage can be ascertained.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted, brackets
in Rayford). Moreover, Rayford held that “[a]dhesion contracts with provisions shortening the
statute of limitations in the employment context are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny to
determine whether the provisions are reasonable.” Id. at _; slip op at 28. In sum, “courts must
now first determine whether a challenged employment agreement is adhesive and, if so, apply
Camelot to determine whether a shortened limitations period is reasonable.” Id. at __; slip op at
30.

IV. APPLICATION

An adhesion contract is a “standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by
another party in a weaker position, usu[ally] a consumer, who must essentially either accede
(adhere) to the terms or not have a contract at all.” Id. at __; slip op at 34, quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary (12th ed). Rayford recognized that the unequal bargaining power between an employer
and a potential employee can often result in the potential employee having to accept the
employment contract terms or not get the job. Rayford, __ Mich at __; slip op at 34. The
circumstances underlying this case do not suggest that plaintiff had the bargaining power limited
to “the most sought-after employees[.]” Id. at _; slip op at 20 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). There is no indication plaintiff had the power to push back against the terms imposed
by defendant. Accordingly, we conclude that the contract in this case qualifies as an adhesion
contract subject to close judicial scrutiny. Id. at __; slip op at 34.

As we noted in Robinson III, unpub op at 9, “[t]he record before us does not contain the
transcript of the trial court’s ultimate decision as to this issue[.]” Considering the trial court
rendered its decision before Rayford was decided, it is unlikely that the trial court engaged in the
requisite Camelot analysis regarding the enforceability of the shortened limitations period in
plaintiff’s employment contract. Furthermore, even if it had, we lack the record to review its
findings. Thus, remand is necessary for the trial court to properly evaluate whether the shortened
limitations period in this case is enforceable under Rayford.

As a final note, our Supreme Court permitted us to consider whether plaintiff’s age-
discrimination claim was nonetheless barred by collateral estoppel. But, as noted, we have no

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record of the trial court’s decision on this issue, if it rendered one at all. Id. We decline to reach
beyond our authority as a reviewing court to address this issue when we cannot discern whether
the trial court ever decided it in the first instance. Therefore, we instruct the trial court on remand
to consider the enforceability of the limitations provision under Rayford as well as whether
plaintiff’s age-discrimination claim is barred by collateral estoppel.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Adrienne N. Young

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