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Oct. 15, 2025 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Ball v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester

Supreme Court of New Hampshire

• Citations: 2025 N.H. 45

• Docket Number: Unknown

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (13.5K)

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Combined Opinion

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as
well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New
Hampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any
editorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes
to press. Errors may be reported by email at the following address:
reporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00
a.m. on the morning of their release. The direct address of the court’s home
page is: https://www.courts.nh.gov/our-courts/supreme-court

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

---

Belknap
Case No. 2024-0606
Citation: Ball v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester, 2025 N.H. 45

RANDY BALL

v.

ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF MANCHESTER & a.

Argued: June 18, 2025
Opinion Issued: October 15, 2025

McLane Middleton, Professional Association, of Manchester (Scott H.
Harris and Jesse J. O’Neill on the brief, and Scott H. Harris orally), and Seeger
Weiss LLP, of Ridgefield Park, New Jersey (Stephen A. Weiss on the brief), for
the plaintiff.

Shaheen & Gordon, P.A., of Concord (James J. Armillay, Jr. and Olivia F.
Bensinger on the brief, and Olivia F. Bensinger orally), for the defendants.

DONOVAN, J.
[¶1] The plaintiff, Randy Ball, appeals an order of the Superior Court
(Leonard, J.) dismissing his complaint against the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Manchester and Camp Bernadette and Camp Fatima, Inc. (collectively, the
defendants) that alleged negligent hiring, retention, and supervision of an
employee who sexually abused him when he attended camp in the 1970s. On
appeal, the plaintiff argues the trial court erred in: (1) determining that
applying RSA 508:4-g (Supp. 2024), which was amended in 2020 to remove the
statute of limitations defense in personal actions alleging sexual assault and
related offenses, to revive the plaintiff’s time-barred claim would be an
unconstitutional retrospective application of the law, see N.H. CONST. pt. I,
art. 23; and (2) concluding that, even if the constitutional protection against
retrospective laws were subject to a balancing test, the defendants’ vested right
in a statute of limitations defense outweighed the plaintiff’s right to recover.
See N.H. CONST. pt. I, arts. 14, 23. We affirm.

I. Facts

[¶2] The following facts are derived from the plaintiff’s complaint and are
assumed to be true for the purposes of this appeal. See Barufaldi v. City of
Dover, 175 N.H. 424, 425 (2022). The plaintiff attended Camp Fatima as a
child in the mid-1970s. Employees of the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Manchester managed, maintained, operated, and controlled the camp.1 A
priest, who served as the camp director, sexually abused the plaintiff.

[¶3] No party disputes the trial court’s conclusion that when these events
occurred, a generally applicable statute of limitations — establishing that a
minor has until two years after reaching the age of majority to bring a personal
action — provided the limitations period that governed the plaintiff’s claim. See
Norton v. Patten, 125 N.H. 413, 414 (1984). Nor do the parties dispute on
appeal that the plaintiff, born in 1966, did not file a complaint before the
limitations period expired in 1986.

[¶4] In 2005, the legislature enacted RSA 508:4-g, which set forth a
distinct limitations period for personal actions based upon sexual assault and
related offenses. Laws 2005, ch. 283. In 2008, the legislature amended RSA
508:4-g to extend this limitations period. Laws 2008, 193:1. Then, in 2020,
the legislature amended RSA 508:4-g to, as relevant to this appeal, remove the
limitations period. Laws 2020, 24:11; RSA 508:4-g.

[¶5] The current version of RSA 508:4-g provides that “[a] person, alleging
to have been subjected to any offense under RSA 632-A or an offense under
RSA 639:2 may commence a personal action at any time.” RSA 508:4-g
(emphasis added); see RSA ch. 632-A (2016 & Supp. 2024) (governing sexual
assault and related offenses); RSA 639:2 (2016) (defining incest). Except for its

1 At the time, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester conducted business as the Diocese of

Manchester. For ease of identification, this opinion uses the designation “Roman Catholic Bishop
of Manchester” to refer to this entity in the past and present.

2
effective date of September 18, 2020, RSA 508:4-g is silent as to whether it
applies prospectively or retrospectively. See RSA 508:4-g.

[¶6] On August 18, 2023, the plaintiff filed his complaint. The
defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations barred the
plaintiff’s claim. The plaintiff objected, arguing that the current version of RSA
508:4-g should apply retrospectively to revive his time-barred claim. Following
a hearing, the trial court issued an order granting the defendants’ motion,
ruling that the plaintiff failed to pursue his claim before the limitations period
expired in 1986 and that applying RSA 508:4-g to revive the plaintiff’s time-
barred claim would violate Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire
Constitution. The plaintiff moved to reconsider, and the trial court denied the
plaintiff’s motion. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

[¶7] When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss, we
generally consider whether the plaintiff’s allegations are reasonably susceptible
of a construction that would permit recovery. State v. Lake Winnipesaukee
Resort, 159 N.H. 42, 45 (2009). The defendants, however, moved to dismiss
based upon the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations is an
affirmative defense and the defendants bear the burden of proving that it
applies. Id. Because the trial court granted the motion upon finding that the
statute of limitations applied as a matter of law, our review is de novo. See id.

A. Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution & RSA 508:4-g

[¶8] Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution provides that
“[r]etrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive, and unjust. No such
laws, therefore, should be made, either for the decision of civil causes, or the
punishment of offenses.” When testing legislation against Part I, Article 23, we
conduct a two-part analysis to determine if it is unconstitutionally
retrospective. State v. Fournier, 158 N.H. 214, 218 (2009). First, we discern
whether the legislature intended the law to apply retroactively. Id. If so, we
then inquire whether such retroactive application is constitutionally
permissible. Id. A statute’s constitutionality is a question of law, which we
review de novo. Id.

[¶9] For purposes of this case, however, we assume without deciding in
the plaintiff’s favor that the legislature intended RSA 508:4-g to apply
retroactively, and we turn to the parties’ arguments regarding the
constitutionality of retroactively applying RSA 508:4-g to revive the plaintiff’s
time-barred claim. The plaintiff argues that applying RSA 508:4-g
retrospectively to revive his time-barred claim is a constitutional exercise of the
legislature’s police power. The defendants counter that applying RSA 508:4-g

3
to revive the plaintiff’s time-barred claim would be unconstitutional under Part
I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution. We agree with the defendants.

[¶10] When determining whether retroactive application of a statute is
constitutionally permissible, we consider whether the statute takes away or
impairs vested rights, acquired under existing laws, or creates a new
obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, with respect to
transactions or considerations already past. Fournier, 158 N.H. at 218-19. As
a guidepost, we inquire whether the statute affects substantive rights and
liabilities or solely affects procedures or remedies enforcing those rights. Id. at
219. Ultimately, we must discern the nature of the rights affected by the act to
assess whether its application to a particular matter offends the constitution.
Id.

[¶11] Generally, in the context of statutes of limitations, a statutory
provision that reduces or enlarges the time within which an action may be
brought has to do only with the remedy for existing rights, see Maplevale
Builders v. Town of Danville, 165 N.H. 99, 108 (2013), and there is no
constitutional bar to applying it retrospectively, see State v. Hamel, 138 N.H
392, 394 (1994). After the limitations period has run, however, it is a vested
right that cannot be taken away by legislative enactment. See id. at 395; see
also Willard v. Harvey, 24 N.H. 344, 353 (1852) (“[I]f a law, though in form
applying to the remedy only, practically deprives either party of any vested
right . . . it is unconstitutional and void.”).

[¶12] Here, the limitations period that originally governed the plaintiff’s
claim expired in 1986. At that point, the defendants’ right to rely upon the
statute of limitations defense vested. See Hamel, 138 N.H. at 395; Maplevale
Builders, 165 N.H. at 108. Applying RSA 508:4-g to revive the plaintiff’s time-
barred claim would interfere with this vested right and would therefore be
unconstitutional. See Gould v. Concord Hospital, 126 N.H. 405, 408 (1985)
(unconstitutional under Part I, Article 23 to retrospectively apply amendment
to statute of limitations when retrospective application would impair
defendants’ vested right to assert a limitations defense). Accordingly, the trial
court did not err in holding that RSA 508:4-g cannot operate retrospectively in
the case before us.

[¶13] The plaintiff nevertheless argues that under Hayes v. LeBlanc, 114
N.H. 141 (1974), the constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws must
yield because RSA 508:4-g is a reasonable exercise of the legislature’s police
power. Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that the proposition in Hayes, 114
N.H. at 145, that the prohibition in Part I, Article 23 against retrospective laws
“must yield where it is reasonable for [s]tate government to regulate activities in
the exercise of the police power” is not limited to cases where a retrospective
law impairs contractual rights and instead is applicable to all cases arising
under Part I, Article 23. We disagree.

4
[¶14] The Contract Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, declares that “[n]o state shall . . . pass any . . . law
impairing the obligation of contracts.” Although Part I, Article 23 of the New
Hampshire Constitution does not expressly reference existing contracts,
Fournier, 158 N.H. at 221, we have held that this provision offers equivalent
protections to Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution where a
law impairs a contract, or where a law abrogates an earlier statute that is itself
a contract. Opinion of the Justices (Furlough), 135 N.H. 625, 630 (1992). We
have thus designated the portion of Part I, Article 23 which duplicates the
protections found in the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution as
the “State Contract Clause[].” See Tuttle v. N.H. Med. Malpractice Joint
Underwriting Assoc., 159 N.H. 627, 641-42 (2010) (setting forth a distinct State
Contract Clause analysis applicable under Part I, Article 23 to determine
whether legislation impairs contract rights); Opinion of the Justices (Furlough),
135 N.H. at 630.

[¶15] In Hayes, we held that retrospectively applying a statutory
amendment that impaired contractual rights did not violate the Contract
Clause of the Federal Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, or Part I,
Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution. Hayes, 114 N.H. at 144-46. In
reaching this conclusion, we explained that “[a]lthough U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10
prohibits a [s]tate from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, it is
not an absolute bar to governmental regulation,” and that “this limitation must
yield where it is reasonable for [s]tate government to regulate activities in the
exercise of the police power.” Id. at 145. Next, we proceeded to explain that
“[t]his principle is also applicable to the general prohibition in N.H. CONST. pt.
I, art. 23 against retrospective laws.” Id. (emphasis added).

[¶16] When our statements from Hayes are read in context, the principle
that we extended to Part I, Article 23 is that — like Article I, Section 10 of the
United States Constitution — the protection against retrospective laws is not
an absolute bar to governmental regulation of contracts, and its limitation on
the legislature’s authority to regulate contracts must yield where the
legislature’s exercise of its police power is reasonable. See id. (“This
prohibition [in Part I, Article 23] was not intended to prevent the legislature
from amending laws which regulate contracts . . .” (emphasis added)).
Accordingly, the rule we set forth in Hayes is applicable only to cases where
retrospectively applying a law impairs contractual rights, see Opinion of the
Justices (Furlough), 135 N.H. at 630, and not, as the plaintiff argues, to all
cases arising under Part I, Article 23. This conclusion is consistent with our
State Contract Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Tuttle, 159 N.H. at 641-42
(articulating State Contract Clause analysis and explaining that “the core task
involved in resolving Contract Clause claims [is] striking a balance between
constitutionally protected contract rights and the [s]tate’s legitimate exercise of
its reserved police power”).

5
B. Stare Decisis

[¶17] Next, we address the plaintiff’s argument that we should overrule
our precedent establishing that a defendant has a vested right to rely upon a
statute of limitations defense once the limitations period has run. See Gould,
126 N.H. at 408; Maplevale Builders, 165 N.H. at 108. This rule derives from
Woart v. Winnick, 3 N.H. 473, 481-83 (1826). See, e.g., Willard, 24 N.H. at
354; Maplevale Builders, 165 N.H. at 108. The plaintiff argues that we should
overrule or, alternatively, limit this rule to recognize that “there can be no
vested right to a statute of limitations defense in actions based on sexual
assault.” For the following reasons, we decline to do so.

[¶18] The doctrine of stare decisis demands respect in a society governed
by the rule of law, for when governing legal standards are open to revision in
every case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial will with
arbitrary and unpredictable results. Appeal of N.H. Dep’t of Transp., 174 N.H.
610, 615 (2021). When we are asked to reconsider a holding, the question is
not whether we would decide the issue differently de novo, but whether the
ruling has come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that
very reason doomed. Id.

[¶19] Accordingly, we will overturn a decision only after considering
whether: (1) the rule has proven to be intolerable simply by defying practical
workability; (2) the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a
special hardship to the consequence of overruling; (3) related principles of law
have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of
abandoned doctrine; and (4) facts have so changed, or come to be seen so
differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application. Id.
Although these factors guide our judgment, no single factor is wholly
determinative, because the doctrine of stare decisis is not one to be either
rigidly applied or blindly followed. Id. at 616.

[¶20] The first stare decisis factor examines whether a rule has become
difficult or impractical for trial courts to apply. Id. This factor weighs against
overruling when a rule is easy to apply and understand. Id. The rule that a
defendant has a vested right in a statute of limitations defense once the
limitations period has run is simple to apply and understand. See id. In fact,
we have consistently and effectively applied this rule to resolve numerous cases
across multiple centuries. See, e.g., Woart, 3 N.H. at 482; Gould, 126 N.H. at
408. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the rule defies practical workability,
and this factor weighs against overruling Woart.

[¶21] The second stare decisis factor concerns situations in which
members of society may have developed operations or planned a course of
action in reliance upon the challenged decision and, therefore, overruling that
decision would create a special hardship for those affected. Appeal of N.H.

6
Dep’t of Transp., 174 N.H. at 616. We have recognized that reliance on the
unenforceability of a stale claim, which arises when a statute of limitations
period has run, removes the incentive to preserve evidence. See City of
Rochester v. Marcel A. Payeur, Inc., 169 N.H. 502, 508 (2016). Accordingly,
the right to rely upon a vested statute of limitations defense implicates
legitimate reliance interests, and this factor also weighs against overruling
Woart. See Appeal of N.H. Dep’t of Transp., 174 N.H. at 616.

[¶22] We consider the third and fourth factors together. Union Leader
Corp. v. Town of Salem, 173 N.H. 345, 353 (2020). The third factor concerns
whether the law has developed in such a manner as to undercut the prior rule.
Id. The fourth factor concerns whether facts have so changed, or come to be
seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or
justification. Id. “We are sometimes able to perceive significant facts or
understand principles of law that eluded our predecessor and justify
departures from existing decisions.” Id. (quotation and brackets omitted).

[¶23] The plaintiff points to no New Hampshire cases to suggest that the
law has developed in such a manner as to undercut the rule that a defendant
has a vested right in a statute of limitations defense once the limitations period
has run, nor do we find any upon our own review. He does, however, raise two
arguments with respect to the fourth factor, which we will address in turn.
First, the plaintiff argues that we should overturn Woart because that decision
“was likely informed by the very different ability that parties in 1826 had to
preserve evidence.” We disagree. Nothing in the language or reasoning of
Woart suggests that the court premised its holding on obstacles to evidence
preservation that no longer exist. See Woart, 3 N.H. at 481-83. Rather, the
Woart Court primarily based its determination on protecting the individual
against governmental overreach. Id. at 477, 481.

[¶24] Specifically, the Woart Court explained that “it is most manifestly
injurious, oppressive, and unjust, that after an individual has, upon the faith
of existing laws, brought his action, or prepared his defen[s]e, the legislature
should step in, and, without any examination of the circumstances of the
cause, arbitrarily repeal the law, upon which the action or the defen[s]e had
been rested.” Id. at 481-82. These underlying and fundamental concerns
about fair governance continue to exist today. See State v. Mack, 173 N.H.
793, 813 (2020) (observing that the New Hampshire Constitution is a
restraining document establishing that “we have majority rule with protection
for minority and individual rights” (quotation omitted)). Accordingly, we are not
persuaded that the advancements in evidence preservation that the plaintiff
relies upon justify departure from the rule we set forth in Woart.

[¶25] The plaintiff also argues that the factual understanding of the
issues of delayed disclosure that often accompany sexual assault has so
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of

7
significant application or justification in the context of sex-based offenses. We
disagree. The factors that we considered in setting forth the rule in Woart
included: (1) the explicit language in Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire
Constitution prohibiting the enactment of retrospective laws “for the decision of
civil causes,” N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 23; Woart, 3 N.H. at 474, 477; (2) the
appropriate balance of power between the government and the individual,
Woart, 3 N.H. at 481-82; Mack, 173 N.H. at 813; and (3) the right of members
of society to rely upon a defense based upon the existent laws. See Woart, 3
N.H. at 481-82; see also City of Rochester, 169 N.H. at 508.

[¶26] These legal principles remain deeply held today and are not altered
by the developments in societal understanding of delayed disclosure in sexual
assault cases. Accordingly, we hold that “significant application and
justification,” Appeal of N.H. Dep’t of Transp., 174 N.H. at 615 (quotation
omitted), for the rule recognizing a defendant’s vested right in a statute of
limitations defense continues to exist today. Based upon our review of the
stare decisis factors, we cannot conclude that the rule set forth in Woart and
its progeny “has come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was
for that very reason doomed.” Id. (quotation omitted).

[¶27] The plaintiff next argues that we should nevertheless follow the
Maryland Supreme Court’s decision in Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Washington v. Doe, 330 A.3d 1069 (Md. 2025), and determine that there is no
vested right to a statute of limitations defense in actions based on sexual
assault. In that case, the Maryland Supreme Court held that the enactment of
a law that abolished such statutes with respect to childhood sexual abuse
claims “did not retroactively abrogate vested rights in violation of the Maryland
Constitution and Declaration of Rights.” Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Washington, 330 A.3d at 1075, 1102.

[¶28] In reaching its conclusion, however, the Maryland Supreme Court
observed that it “has never squarely addressed whether reviving a claim that is
time-barred by an ordinary statute of limitations abrogates a vested right,” and
then determined that the expiration of an ordinary statute of limitations does
not create a vested right. Id. at 1085, 1087. We, conversely, have consistently
held that the expiration of a statute of limitations does create a vested right.
See, e.g., Willard, 24 N.H. at 354 (“It may be deemed settled, that a bar, under
the statute of limitations, once established, is a vested right, of which a party
cannot be deprived by legislation.”); Maplevale Builders, 165 N.H. at 108 (“The
right to rely upon a statute of limitations as a defense vests . . . after the
limitations period has run.”). Aside from urging us to adopt the reasoning of
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington, the plaintiff does not argue or
demonstrate that Woart and its progeny incorrectly concluded that an expired
statute of limitations creates a vested right in defense against enforcement of a
stale claim. Absent such a demonstration, stare decisis compels us to decline
the plaintiff’s invitation to overrule nearly two hundred years of precedent.

8
C. Part I, Article 23 & the Right to Recover

[¶29] Lastly, we consider the plaintiff’s argument that his right to recover
outweighs the defendants’ vested right in their statute of limitations defense.
The plaintiff contends that “[w]hen competing constitutional rights are in
conflict, courts must engage in a balancing test.” In making this argument,
however, the only support he relies upon is Sumner v. New Hampshire
Secretary of State, 168 N.H. 667 (2016). Sumner is inapposite here. That case
involved a conflict of distinct constitutional rights not at issue in the instant
case. See Sumner, 168 N.H. at 669-71 (weighing state constitutional interests
against constitutional right of access, N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 8, in public
records case). Thus, we are not persuaded that such balancing is applicable
here and, even assuming for the sake of argument that the constitutional
protection against retrospective laws is subject to a balancing test, we are
further not persuaded that such balancing would require the rights guaranteed
under Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution to yield to the
plaintiff’s right to recover. See N.H. CONST., pt. I, art. 14.

III. Conclusion

[¶30] We are acutely aware that victims of child sex abuse are some of
the most vulnerable victims who deserve all of the protections and remedies
available in our judicial system. See State v. Besk, 138 N.H. 412, 414 (1994).
Further, we recognize that the result here may prevent some victims who have
been impacted by sex abuse — during childhood or adulthood — from bringing
claims when the statute of limitations has expired before the effective date of
RSA 508:4-g. Our role, however, in our co-equal, tripartite form of government
is to interpret the constitution and resolve disputes arising under it. See
Monier v. Gallen, 122 N.H. 474, 476 (1982). We reiterate the words of this
court, from over a century ago:

[W]e recognize the doctrine, so often expressed, that we have nothing to
do with the propriety, expediency, or policy of any law; that these
considerations concern the legislature, and not us; that our sole duty,
when the validity of any statute is challenged, is to ascertain and declare
whether it conflicts with the constitution as the paramount law, leaving
all other considerations with the legislature and people, where they of
right belong.

State v. Express Co., 60 N.H. 219, 234 (1880).

[¶31] We hold that the trial court correctly ruled that Part I, Article 23
precludes application of RSA 508:4-g to revive the plaintiff’s time-barred claim.
Our determination, premised upon our long-standing precedent establishing
that a defendant has a vested right in a statute of limitations defense once the
limitations period has run, is grounded in principles of stare decisis. See, e.g.,

9
Gould, 126 N.H. at 408. We decline to overrule or limit this precedent here.
Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

COUNTWAY and GOULD, JJ., concurred; TEMPLE, J., superior court
justice, specially assigned under RSA 490:3, II, sat for oral argument but did
not participate in the final vote.

10