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Feb. 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Indiana Land Trust 3082 v. Hammond Redevelopment Commission

Indiana Supreme Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25S-PL-00141
• Panel: Mark S. Massa, Loretta H. Rush
• Judges: Molter, Rush, Massa, Slaughter, Goff

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.5K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Combined Opinion

                        by Justice Goff

IN THE

Indiana Supreme Court
Supreme Court Case No. 25S-PL-141
FILED
Indiana Land Trust #3082 and Omar and Haitham Feb 24 2026, 11:04 am

Abuzir as Trustees CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
Appellants (plaintiffs below) and Tax Court

–v–

Hammond Redevelopment Commission et al.
Appellees (defendants below)

Argued: September 4, 2025 | Decided: February 24, 2026

Appeal from the Lake Superior Court,
No. 45D11-2401-PL-1
The Honorable Bruce D. Parent, Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals,
No. 24A-PL-1284

Opinion by Justice Goff
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Molter concur.
Goff, Justice.

The Indiana Tort Claims Act, or ITCA, governs lawsuits against
political subdivisions and their employees. Relevant here are two
provisions of the ITCA: code subsection 34-13-3-3(a)(6), which immunizes
government entities and their employees if an alleged “loss results from”
the “initiation of a judicial . . . proceeding”; and code section 34-13-3-5,
which generally bars an action against an employee unless the alleged
tortious conduct falls “clearly outside the scope of the employee’s
employment.” Because the plaintiffs’ abuse-of-process claim directly
“result[ed] from” the defendants’ “initiation of” a condemnation action,
and because the defendants’ conduct in approving the condemnation
action clearly fell within the scope of their employment, we hold as a
matter of law that immunity applies. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court’s ruling on the defendants’ 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss.

Facts and Procedural History
Omar and Haitham Abuzir are beneficiaries of Indiana Land Trust

3082 (collectively, the Landowners). The trust owns property at 1318–

1320 Indianapolis Boulevard (the Property) in the City of Hammond on
which Omar and Haitham operate a fireworks and tobacco retail business.
In January 2018, the Hammond Redevelopment Commission (or HRC)
offered to buy the Property for $394,500, purportedly to develop a public
street connecting residents of a local neighborhood to an adjacent road.
Landowners declined the offer, so the HRC, in June 2019, filed a complaint
in the Lake Circuit Court seeking to condemn the Property (the
Condemnation Action). Landowners responded by alleging that the
HRC’s attempted taking was arbitrary and capricious, made in bad faith,
and based on “subterfuge” and “improper motives”; and pursued not for
a public purpose but, rather, for the “private benefit of the Mayor, his
campaigns,” and the Landowner’s business competitors. App. Vol. 2, p.
23. The Condemnation Action remains pending.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-PL-141 | February 24, 2026 Page 2 of 11
Two years later, Landowners filed a counterclaim and complaint
against the HRC and its individual members,1 the City of Hammond, and
Mayor Thomas McDermott, Jr. (collectively, the Defendants) in a separate
case, raising similar arguments and alleging abuse of process and various
constitutional-rights violations. The Defendants removed that case to
federal court.

Then, in the Condemnation Action, Landowners sought permission to
“intervene as Plaintiffs” and to file a counterclaim for abuse of process.
App. Vol. 3, p. 4; Motion for Leave at 1, 3. The trial court denied that
request, ruling that code subsection 32-24-1-8(c) prohibits counterclaims in
condemnation proceedings. Citing the “case pending in federal court
addressing the same issues,” the court explained that the Landowners
would “not be prejudiced” by its ruling. App. Vol. 3, p. 7. Ultimately,
though, the federal court dismissed the Landowners’ constitutional
claims, and it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their
abuse-of-process claim, which the court dismissed without prejudice so
Landowners could refile that claim in state court.

Landowners then filed another complaint in the Lake Superior Court
(the Underlying Cause), alleging, among other things, abuse of process by
the Defendants, arguing that Defendants lacked immunity, and seeking
damages (compensatory and punitive) and attorneys’ fees. Defendants
moved to dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(6), arguing (1) that the abuse-of-
process claim was an impermissible collateral attack on the pending
Condemnation Action; (2) that Landowners’ claims were objections and
defenses that must be addressed in the Condemnation Action; (3) that the
HRC used the proper statutory vehicle for bringing its Condemnation
Action, so Landowners’ claim necessarily fails; and (4) that all Defendants
enjoyed immunity under the ITCA. App. Vol. 2, pp. 162–63, 165, 167, 178,
182; App. Vol. 3, p. 42.

1The complaint named the following individual members: Tony Hauprich, Greg Myricks,
Dawn Tomich, Wally Kasprzycki, Miriam Soto-Pressley, and Anna Mamala.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-PL-141 | February 24, 2026 Page 3 of 11
The trial court granted Defendants’ motion. While acknowledging that
a defendant in a condemnation action may assert fraud or bad faith “to
show that the property taken will not be used for public purpose” or that
the proceedings are a “subterfuge to convey the property to a private
use,” the trial court concluded that the merits of Landowner’s abuse-of-
process claim would “be properly heard” in the pending Condemnation
Action. App. Vol. 3, pp. 61–62. To maintain the Underlying Cause, the
court reasoned, “would run the risk of subjecting the parties to different
orders on the same issues from two different [trial courts].” Id. at 62.

In a unanimous precedential opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed,
holding (1) that a landowner subject to a condemnation action can raise a
parallel abuse-of-process claim because the former proceeding limits the
full scope of damages otherwise available in the abuse-of-process tort
action; (2) that 12(B)(6) dismissal was improper because Landowners
raised a question and sufficiently alleged a claim “that is a proper subject
for judicial review”; and (3) that, given Landowner’s allegations that the
Defendants acted “outside the scope of their employment,” it’s disputable
whether the ITCA immunizes them and, thus, 12(B)(6) dismissal was
improper. Ind. Land Tr. #3082 v. Hammond Redevelopment Comm’n, 252
N.E.3d 931, 940–41, 944, 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

We granted the Defendants’ petition for transfer, thus vacating the
Court of Appeals’ decision. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review
On appeal from a trial court’s ruling on a 12(B)(6) motion, this Court
applies a de novo standard of review and examines the pleadings in a
light “most favorable to the nonmoving party, with every reasonable
inference construed in the nonmovant’s favor.” Charter One Mortg. Corp. v.
Condra, 865 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ind. 2007). “A complaint may not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
unless it is clear on the face of the complaint that the complaining party is
not entitled to relief” under any circumstances. Id. at 605. Whether a
government unit or its employee is entitled to immunity under the ITCA

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-PL-141 | February 24, 2026 Page 4 of 11
is a question of law likewise subject to de novo review. Mangold v. Ind.
Dep’t of Nat. Res., 756 N.E.2d 970, 975 (Ind. 2001).

Discussion and Decision
The dispute here centers on two principal issues: (1) whether a
landowner subject to a condemnation action can raise a parallel abuse-of-
process claim against the government for wrongfully bringing the
condemnation action; and (2) whether, as a matter of law, Defendants are
immune for their actions under the ITCA. Because we find the latter issue
dispositive, we decline to address the former.

---

Defendants and aligned amici argue that immunity applies under two
provisions of the ITCA: code section 34-13-3-5 and code subsection 34-13-
3-3(a)(6). We address each of these provisions in turn.

A. Immunity Under Code Section 34-13-3-5
The ITCA establishes “certain parameters to determine liability for
negligent acts or omissions on the part of government employees” and
grants “substantial immunity” for conduct that falls “within the scope of
the employee’s employment.” Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 852 (Ind.
2020) (quoting Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 472 (Ind. 2003)). To
sue a government employee personally, the plaintiff must allege that the
employee’s acts or omissions causing the loss are “(1) criminal; (2) clearly
outside the scope of the employee’s employment; (3) malicious; (4) willful
and wanton; or (5) calculated to benefit the employee personally.” Ind.
Code § 34-13-3-5 (c).2

2For purposes of code chapter 34-13-3, the terms “employee” and “public employee” refer to
“a person presently or formerly acting on behalf of a governmental entity,” which includes
“members of boards, committees, commissions, authorities, and other instrumentalities,” as
well as “elected public officials.” Ind. Code § 34-6-2.1 -54(a).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-PL-141 | February 24, 2026 Page 5 of 11
Landowners argue that the “inapplicability of [ITCA] immunity” to the
mayor and the individual HRC members “is plainly evident,” given the
“allegations of acts beyond the scope of employment.” Resp. to Pet. to
Trans. at 15. To conclude otherwise, Landowners insist, would “grossly
expand [ITCA] immunity to include any acts proclaimed by municipal
employees themselves to be within the scope of their own employment.”
Id. at 14.

We disagree.

An allegation that an individual defendant acted outside the scope of
employment necessarily fails when that conduct is “of the same general
nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized.”
Celebration Fireworks, Inc. v. Smith, 727 N.E.2d 450, 453 (Ind. 2000) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). “Even tortious acts may fall within
the scope of employment,” so long as the purpose of the employee’s
conduct “was, to an appreciable extent, to further his employer’s
business.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

In Celebration Fireworks, for example, this Court held that critical
comments made by a city fire chief about the plaintiff’s bill-paying history
while inspecting the business premises of the plaintiff’s prospective
landlord amounted to acts falling within the scope of his employment,
thus immunizing him from a defamation claim. Id. at 451, 454. The fire
chief, we reasoned, was “on public time” when he made the comments,
“performing a function that was central to the position he held.” Id. at 453.
In another case, Ball v. Jones, the Court of Appeals held that a detective’s
alleged falsification of a probable-cause affidavit was, “to an appreciable
extent to further his employer’s business.” 52 N.E.3d 813, 820–21 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2016) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, absent
evidence that he “acted on his own initiative or with no intention to
perform the service for which he was employed,” the detective’s actions
fell within the scope of his employment. Id. at 820. Cf. VanValkenburg v.
Warner, 602 N.E.2d 1046, 1048, 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the
ITCA did not bar a student’s suit against a professor for negligent
maintenance of his home because such maintenance fell beyond the scope
of his employment with the public university).

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Here, Landowners alleged that the mayor and individual HRC
members (1) either voted for or failed to stop the adoption of the
resolution approving the condemnation action, (2) failed to “conduct due
diligence” to ensure the condemnation action had a proper factual and
legal basis, (3) failed to ensure the condemnation action was for a public
purpose before voting for it, and/or (4) knew about the political/improper
purpose for the condemnation action. App. Vol. 2, pp. 37–39. Although
the scope-of-employment question is ordinarily reserved for the
factfinder, a court may resolve the issue as a matter of law when the
undisputed facts “would not allow a jury to find that the tortious acts
were within the scope of employment.” Burton, 140 N.E.3d at 852 (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). And here, the conduct of the
mayor and HRC members, as alleged by the Landowners, clearly reflects
“the same general nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct
authorized” by statute. See I.C. §§ 32-24-1-1 through -17 (setting forth
general procedures for the exercise of eminent domain); I.C. § 36-7-14-20
(specifying a local redevelopment commission’s eminent-domain powers);
I.C. § 36-7-14-16(b) (requiring approval of the commission’s resolution and
plan by the county executive). And the conduct of these individuals,
regardless of their intentions, “was, to an appreciable extent,” in
furtherance of their “employer’s business.” See Celebration Fireworks, 727
N.E.2d at 453 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).3

For these reasons, we hold that, as a matter of law, the mayor and the
individual HRC members are immune from liability under code section
34-13-3-5. To hold otherwise would undermine the purpose of
immunity—that is, “to ensure that public employees can exercise their
independent judgment necessary to carry out their duties without threat

3To be sure, there may be cases when an employee loses immunity by acting “so far out of the
scope of his or her employment as to amount to fraud or criminal conduct.” Celebration
Fireworks, Inc. v. Smith, 727 N.E.2d 450, 452 (Ind. 2000) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). But the Landowners’ complaint alleged neither fraud nor criminal conduct, and we
decline to characterize the mayor’s or HRC members’ conduct as so “outrageous as to be
incompatible with the performance of the duty undertaken.” See id. at 452–53 (internal citation
and quotation marks omitted).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-PL-141 | February 24, 2026 Page 7 of 11
of harassment by litigation or threats of litigation over decisions made
within the scope of their employment.” Celebration Fireworks, 727 N.E.2d at
452 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

B. Immunity Under Code Subsection 34-13-3-3(a)(6)

In their complaint, Landowners pled in the alternative that the
Defendants—collectively—acted “under color of law” and that the mayor
and the HRC members—individually—acted “within the scope of their
employment.” App. Vol. 2, p. 19 (emphasis added).

As for the mayor and individual HRC members, we first observe that a
“plaintiff cannot sue a governmental employee personally” when, like
here, “the complaint, on its face, alleges that the employee’s acts leading to
the claim occurred within the scope of his employment.” City of Gary v.
Conat, 810 N.E.2d 1112, 1118 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Bushong, 790
N.E.2d at 471). Even if Landowners didn’t plead themselves out of court
by raising these alternative allegations,4 immunity still applies to the
mayor and individual HRC members—indeed to all Defendants—under
code subsection 34-13-3-3(a)(6) (or just subsection (6)).

The ITCA immunizes a government entity, “or an employee acting
within the scope” of his or her employment, “if a loss results from” the
“initiation of a judicial … proceeding,” I.C. § 34-13-3-3(a)(6), i.e., the
initiation of “any proceeding for the purpose of obtaining such remedy as
the law allows,” Livingston v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 398 N.E.2d 1302,
1304 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Immunity under subsection (6) is “most commonly associated with suits
for malicious prosecution or abuse of process.” F.D. v. Ind. Dep’t. of Child
Servs., 1 N.E.3d 131, 137 (Ind. 2013).

4Our trial rules permit a litigant to set forth in a pleading “two [2] or more statements of a
claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one [1] count or defense or in
separate counts or defenses.” Ind. Trial Rule 8(E)(2). If one of these statements would suffice
on its own, “the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the
alternative statements.” Id.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-PL-141 | February 24, 2026 Page 8 of 11
In F.D., the plaintiff-parents informed DCS that their son had been
molested by their nephew, prompting DCS to investigate and refer the
matter to police, which in turn led the nephew to admit having molested
the parents’ daughter as well. Id. at 134. Police then referred the matter to
the juvenile court for possible delinquency proceedings, but neither police
nor DCS informed the parents of the nephew’s admissions. Id. After
independently learning of those admissions, the parents sued DCS,
alleging that the agency was negligent by failing to fulfill its statutory
duty to notify them. Id. DCS sought immunity under subsection (6),
arguing that its investigation and referral was “the catalyst for the judicial
proceeding against” the nephew. Id. at 137. This Court rejected that
argument (1) because the parents’ claim related not to an allegation that
resulted in the nephew’s delinquency adjudication but, rather, to DCS’s
failure to notify them of the molestation; and (2) because, rather than
asserting that any harm resulted from the initiation of judicial proceedings
against the nephew, the parents’ failure-to-notify claims against DCS
would have been the same had the prosecutor never initiated those
proceedings. Id. at 137–38.

Unlike in F.D., the Landowners’ abuse-of-process claim directly
“result[ed] from” the Defendants’ “initiation of a judicial proceeding.”
Indeed, in their complaint, the Landowners alleged that the Defendants
committed abuse of process by “[p]ursuing a taking” based on “false
rationales” and “misleading acts” for a private purpose rather than for
public interests. App. Vol. 2, p. 40. And the Defendants, whatever their
motive, initiated this judicial proceeding “for the purpose of obtaining
such remedy as the law allows,” see Livingston, 398 N.E.2d at 1304 (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted), i.e., for the purpose of
condemnation, see I.C. § 32-24-1-4.

Landowners offer no compelling argument for rejecting application of
subsection (6) immunity. Subsection (6), they insist, immunizes only the
“initiation” of judicial proceedings, “not their continuation after discovery
reveals their false bases.” Resp. to Pet. to Trans. at 17–18 (emphasis
added); see also Appellant’s Reply Br. at 9–10, 18 (raising the same
argument). But the simple act of filing a complaint (whether to condemn
property or pursue other claims) results in no “loss” to the defendant; it’s

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-PL-141 | February 24, 2026 Page 9 of 11
the initiation and prosecution of the government’s claim to its final
resolution that does. Accepting Landowners’ argument would effectively
dismantle subsection (6) immunity. What’s more, neither case on which
Landowners rely support their interpretation of subsection (6). See Ind.
Dep't of Fin. Insts. v. Worthington Bancshares, Inc., 728 N.E.2d 899, 902 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2000) (stressing that the provision ensures government actors are
“free from fear of liability for the initiation of [judicial] proceedings” but
otherwise making no distinction between the initiation of an action and
the continuation of an action), trans. denied; Clifford v. Marion Cnty.
Prosecuting Att'y, 654 N.E.2d 805, 808 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (same).

For these reasons, we hold that, as a matter of law, all Defendants—the
HRC, the City, the mayor, and the individual HRC members—are
immune from liability under code subsection 34-13-3-3(a)(6).

Conclusion
For the reasons above, we affirm the trial court’s ruling on Defendants’
12(B)(6) motion to dismiss.

Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Molter, J.J., concur.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
Greg A. Bouwer
Jeffrey R. Carroll
Karol A. Schwartz
Koransky, Bouwer & Poracky, P.C.
Dyer, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES CITY OF HAMMOND AND THOMAS
MCDERMOTT, JR.
Robert J. Feldt
Erika N. Helding
David C. Jensen

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-PL-141 | February 24, 2026 Page 10 of 11
Eichhorn & Eichhorn, LLP
Hammond, Indiana

Kevin C. Smith
Munster, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES HAMMOND REDEVELOPMENT
COMMISSION, TONY HAUPRICH, GREG MYRICKS, DAWN
TOMICH, WALLY KA SPRZYCKI, MIRIAM SOTO-PRESSLEY, AND
ANNA MAMALA
David W. Westland
Westland & Bennett, P.C.
Hammond, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
INDIANA
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana

Benjamin M. Jones
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE DEFENSE TRIAL COUNSEL OF
INDIANA
Lucy R. Dollens
Michalynn M. Miller
Quarles & Brady LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-PL-141 | February 24, 2026 Page 11 of 11