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Feb. 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In the Matter of Holder

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1627/24

• Judges: Nazarian

• Opinion

• Authorities (16)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (645)

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Combined Opinion

In the Matter of Justin Holder, No. 1627, September Term, 2024. Opinion by Nazarian, J.

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL – ADMINISTRATIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL –
REGULATORY SCHEME UNDER THE INSURANCE ARTICLE

Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, final conclusions of law or findings of fact made
by an adjudicative body bind the parties to the proceeding in that or future proceedings.
This doctrine applies the same for administrative quasi-judicial proceedings as for full
judicial proceedings. A hearing under Md. Code (1997, 2017 Repl. Vol.), § 27-303 of the
Insurance Article (“IN”) can have collateral estoppel effects on later administrative or
judicial proceedings, because the General Assembly did not abrogate the common law rule
of collateral estoppel in relation to that section. The General Assembly has abrogated
collateral estoppel effects arising from proceedings under IN § 27-1001, but not for other
hearings under the Insurance Article.

INSURANCE CLAIMS-HANDLING – DENIAL NOT IN GOOD FAITH – LACK
OF COVERAGE BARS LIABILITY

Under IN § 27-1001 and Md. Code (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.), § 3-1701 of the Courts &
Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”), an insurer can be liable to an insured if it makes a
claims-handling decision “not in good faith.” The decision to deny a claim because the
claim is not covered cannot lack good faith.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – STRIKING CIVIL CLAIMS
FROM PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

It is not an abuse of discretion for a circuit court to strike an amended complaint that seeks
to add civil claims to a petition for judicial review of agency action. The differences
between the two types of proceedings, as established by the differing areas and
requirements of the Maryland Rules, make keeping the two types of proceedings together
in one case unduly burdensome. It is not an abuse of discretion for a circuit court to keep
them separate.
Circuit Court for Washington County
Case No. C–21–CV–23–000550
REPORTED

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 1627

September Term, 2024

---

IN THE MATTER OF JUSTIN HOLDER

---

Nazarian,
Albright,
Kenney, James A. III
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

---

Opinion by Nazarian, J.

---

Filed: February 5, 2026

• Judge Donald Beachley and Judge Kevin Arthur did not participate in the decision to report this opinion pursuant to Md. Rule 8-605.1. Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.

2026.02.05
14:53:37 -05'00'
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
The adage “if at first you don’t succeed, try try again” doesn’t apply in lawsuits. In

this appeal, Justin Holder seeks to challenge the ruling of the Maryland Insurance

Administration (“MIA”) that he was collaterally estopped from relitigating Erie Insurance

Exchange’s and Erie Insurance Company’s (collectively, “Erie”) duty to defend him in a

lawsuit filed against him by his neighbors. He also challenges the Circuit Court for

Washington County’s decision to strike his Second Amended Complaint when he tried to

add civil claims to his petition for judicial review. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Insurance Policies, The Underlying Lawsuit, And The Denial Of
Coverage

Erie sold Mr. Holder and his wife an ErieSecure Home Policy and a Personal

Catastrophe Liability Policy—homeowner’s insurance and an umbrella policy

(collectively, the “policies”). Both policies included a duty to defend insureds against

covered claims and excluded coverage for any injury expected or intended by the acts of

the policyholders.

After buying these policies, Mr. Holder and his wife got into a land dispute with

various parties, including his neighbors. This dispute eventually led to litigation styled

Estes v. Holder, Circuit Court for Washington County, Case No. C–21–CV–20–000430.

That case generated an unreported opinion of this Court, and we won’t recount the

background of the land dispute in full. See Holder v. Estes, No. 61, Sept. Term 2023 (Md.

App. May 3, 2024). The relevant part of the history is that the Estes family sued Mr. Holder

and his wife and asserted six counts, including trespass to land, a statutory natural resources
tort, private nuisance, aiding and abetting trespass to land, quiet title, and ejectment.

Importantly, all six of these counts either are for inherently intentional torts or only allege

injuries arising from intentional acts.

Mr. Holder asked Erie to provide coverage and a defense in connection with the

claims in the Estes suit. After reviewing the information Mr. Holder provided, Erie denied

coverage and declined to provide a defense because it believed that there was no coverage

under the policies for the claims alleged. Erie cited a variety of reasons for the denial,

among them the fact that the allegations in the Estes complaint alleged only intentional

injuries that are excluded from coverage.

B. The 303 Action

Mr. Holder disagreed with Erie’s analysis, and he filed an administrative complaint

with the MIA (the “303 Action”) alleging a violation of Md. Code (1997, 2017 Repl. Vol.),

§ 27-303 of the Insurance Article (“IN”). That provision forbids various “unfair claim

settlement practice[s],” including “refus[ing] to pay a claim for an arbitrary or capricious

reason based on all available information.” IN § 27-303(2). Mr. Holder asked the MIA to

punish Erie under IN § 4-113, which authorizes the Commissioner to suspend, revoke, or

refuse to renew an insurer’s certificate of authority for various violations of the Insurance

Article, including a violation of IN § 27-303. See IN § 4-113(b).

The Administration delegated the case to the Office of Administrative Hearings

(“OAH”), and OAH convened a contested hearing before an Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”). The ALJ took testimony and examined evidence from both Mr. Holder and Erie.

Mr. Holder represented himself and testified on his own behalf. After the hearing, the ALJ

2
issued a Proposed Decision and Proposed Order. Mr. Holder filed Exceptions, and, in

response to his objections, the MIA adopted OAH’s findings in a Final Order with minor

corrections. Altogether, the MIA found that Erie didn’t owe Mr. Holder coverage or a

defense for the Estes suit because the complaint solely alleged intentional injuries that were

not covered by the policies. The agency pointed out that the duty to defend, while broader

than the scope of coverage, is triggered only if the allegations on the face of a complaint

would be covered if proven true. Since the Estes allegations involved only excluded

intentional injuries, the duty to defend was not triggered and Erie could not have violated

IN § 27-303 when it denied both coverage and a defense. Mr. Holder did not appeal this

final agency action.

C. The 1001 Action

Instead, roughly ten months later, Mr. Holder filed a new administrative complaint

against Erie in the MIA (the “1001 Action”). His new line of attack alleged a violation of

IN § 27-1001 for denying coverage “not in good faith.” The MIA didn’t issue a decision

within 90 days, which denied the complaint by operation of law, and Mr. Holder requested

another hearing before OAH. Erie moved for summary decision 1 on administrative
0F

collateral estoppel grounds based on the unappealed decision in the 303 Action.

The ALJ granted Erie’s motion in a written decision. They said that an insurer

cannot be liable under IN § 27-1001 for denying coverage or a defense if it didn’t ultimately

owe coverage or a defense, regardless of how the insurer came to that decision. The ALJ

1
Summary decision is the agency equivalent of summary judgment.

3
also pointed out that they already had found that Erie owed Mr. Holder no coverage or

defense for the Estes suit and that the fully contested hearing in the 303 Action satisfied all

of the factors for administrative collateral estoppel on that issue. That decision served as

the final agency action in the 1001 Action.

D. Judicial Review In The Circuit Court And The Amended Complaint

Mr. Holder responded to the summary decision in the 1001 Action by filing a

petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Washington County. The petition

invoked Title 7 of the Maryland Rules—the rules governing judicial review of agency

action—explicitly. Mr. Holder also invoked the section of IN § 27-1001 that provides for

judicial review, IN § 27-1001(g). Everyone proceeded with the case on that posture. The

MIA sent out notices of the petition, the Court requested and received the administrative

record, the MIA declined to participate, and the parties submitted legal memoranda.

Before the circuit court could hold a hearing on the petition, Mr. Holder filed an

amended complaint that sought to add a host of civil claims under Md. Code (1974, 2020

Repl. Vol), § 3-1701 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”). This complaint

alleged a separate civil cause of action, the elements and contours of which are identical to

IN § 27-1001. Erie moved to strike the amended complaint on the ground that independent

civil claims cannot be heard in a case for judicial review of an administrative action.

At an omnibus hearing, the circuit court addressed the petition for judicial review

and affirmed the agency’s ruling. It also granted Erie’s motion and struck the amended

complaint. The court memorialized its oral orders in writing and Mr. Holder noted a timely

appeal.

4
II. DISCUSSION

Mr. Holder raises one question on appeal but argues two issues, which we rephrase

as follows: 2
1F

1. Did the MIA find correctly that Mr. Holder was collaterally estopped from

relitigating whether Erie owed him a duty to defend?

1. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion when it struck Mr. Holder’s Second

Amended Complaint?

We hold that the decision in the 303 Action collaterally estopped Mr. Holder from

relitigating the issue of whether Erie owed him a duty to defend and that the court didn’t

abuse its discretion when it struck Mr. Holder’s civil claim from his judicial review case.

First, “[i]n [an] appeal from the judgment of the circuit court on judicial review of

a final agency decision, we look ‘through’ the decision of the circuit court and review the

decision of the MIA.” People’s Ins. Counsel Div. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 214

Md. App. 438, 449 (2013). “We review purely legal decisions de novo.” Id. And we review

an agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. Culver v. Md. Ins.

Comm’r, 175 Md. App. 645, 653 (2007) (citation omitted). “‘In applying the substantial

evidence test, a reviewing court decides whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have

reached the factual conclusion the agency reached.’” Id. (quoting Maryland Aviation

Admin. v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 571 (2005)). “A reviewing court should defer to the

agency's fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by the record.” Id.

2
Mr. Holder phrased the Question Presented in his brief as: “Did the trial court abuse
its discretion or error [sic] when it struck Mr. Holder’s Amended Complaint?”

5
And where the legal issue under review is collateral estoppel, we don’t review the merits

decision in the prior action, but only whether estoppel bars the action that is before us. See

Md. Rule 8-131 (“Ordinarily, an appellate court will not decide . . . [an] issue unless it

plainly appears by the record to have been . . . decided by the trial court . . . .”). If we find

that collateral estoppel doesn’t apply, we vacate the agency’s decision and remand for

consideration of the merits of the new action rather than answering the question ourselves

in the first instance. See id. The effect in this case is that we need not, and will not, address

today whether Erie owed Mr. Holder a duty to defend him in Estes v. Holder.

Second, we review a circuit court’s decision to strike an amended pleading for abuse

of discretion. Bacon v. Arey, 203 Md. App. 606, 667 (2012). An abuse of discretion occurs

“‘where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court or when the

court acts without reference to any guiding principles, and the ruling under consideration

is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court or when the

ruling is violative of fact and logic.’” Id. (quoting Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Realtime Gaming

Holding Co., LLC, 388 Md. 1, 28 (2005) (cleaned up)).

A. The Administration Ruled Correctly That Mr. Holder Was
Collaterally Estopped By The 303 Action From Bringing The 1001
Action.

As the ALJ in the 1001 Action put it, “[t]he fate of [Mr. Holder’s 1001 Action] was

foreordained upon its arrival at the MIA.”

When an adjudicative body makes a finding of fact or conclusion of law, the parties

to that action are bound generally by that decision once it becomes final. Collateral estoppel

gives force to this principle: “‘when an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and

6
determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the

judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties,

whether on the same or a different claim.’” Cosby v. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 425 Md. 629, 639

(2012) (quoting Murray Int’l Freight Corp. v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 547 (1989) (cleaned

up)). Collateral estoppel requires us to address three sub-questions in this case: (1) when is

an administrative hearing capable of creating collateral estoppel and did the 303 Action

meet the test; (2) what are the elements of collateral estoppel and did the contested hearing

in the 303 Action satisfy them; and (3) if so, what effect does collateral estoppel have on

Mr. Holder’s 1001 Action?

The answers: (1) yes, the contested hearing in Mr. Holder’s 303 Action was capable

of creating a collateral estoppel effect; (2) yes, the final agency decision in the 303 Action

estopped Mr. Holder’s claim that Erie owed him a duty to defend; and (3) without a duty

to defend, Erie cannot be liable for not acting in good faith, and the MIA entered a summary

decision in Mr. Holder’s 1001 Action in favor of Erie correctly.

1. Contested administrative hearings under IN § 27-303 are capable of creating collateral estoppel

In Maryland, the keystone case on administrative collateral estoppel is Batson v.

Shiflett, 325 Md. 684 (1992). Batson adopted a three-part test for determining when

administrative hearings are capable of creating a collateral estoppel effect: (1) whether the

agency was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity; (2) whether the issue actually was litigated

before the agency; and (3) whether the resolution of that issue was necessary to the

agency’s decision. Id. at 701, 703–05. The contested hearing in Mr. Holder’s 303 Action

7
met all three elements.

First, an agency acts in a quasi-judicial capacity “by conducting a hearing, allowing

the parties to present evidence, and ruling on a dispute of law.” Batson, 325 Md. at 705

(cleaned up). Here, the agency held at least one fully contested hearing on October 13,

2021 that featured these three hallmarks of a quasi-judicial action. That satisfied the first

element of Batson.

Second, “[Mr. Holder’s] § 27-303 complaint squarely raised” the question of Erie’s

duty to defend him against the claims in the Estes action. In the 303 Action, the MIA

addressed the issue directly and found that Erie owed Mr. Holder no duty to defend against

Estes. That satisfied the second element of Batson.

Third, the absence of a duty to defend lay at the heart of the MIA’s decision in the

303 Action, especially when it found that “[a]s the Estes Complaint alleged only intentional

acts by [Mr. Holder] and his wife, there would be no coverage under the Policies that would

trigger the duty to defend as there was no potentiality of coverage.” The agency went on to

find that because there was no duty to defend, Erie’s denial of coverage “was not arbitrary

or capricious, and . . . [Erie] did not otherwise engage in an unfair claim settlement practice

under the Maryland Insurance Article” and, accordingly, it summarily decided the 303

Action in favor of Erie. And as such, all three Batson elements were met.

Citing Browne v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 258 Md. App. 452 (2023), Mr.

Holder argues that no agency hearing can estop a later statutory claim for bad faith

insurance claims handling under CJ § 3-1701. But although Browne recognizes one

statutory limit on collateral estoppel in the MIA context, that limitation doesn’t apply here.

8
We recognized in Browne that a damages claim under CJ § 3-1701 (which includes

a right to a jury trial) is independent from an administrative claim under IN § 27-1001 and

that under the plain meaning of the statutory text and structure the insured must receive a

final MIA decision under IN § 27-1001 before bringing a civil claim in circuit court under

CJ § 3-1701. Id. at 473-74; CJ § 3-1701(c)(1) (“. . . a party may not file an action under

this [provision] before the date of a final decision under [IN § 27-1001].”). The statute

requires the claims to proceed in that order. Browne, 258 Md. App. at 474. But we

recognized as well the express statutory availability of a CJ § 3-1701 claim after a final

agency decision on the IN § 27-1001 claim and that the availability of that claim precludes

the administrative claim from barring the civil claim. Id. at 479. Browne highlights a

narrow statutory exception to the general rule that collateral estoppel and res judicata apply

to agency proceedings. Id. at 474–75, 479. But that’s as far as the exception goes. Neither

CJ § 3-1701 nor IN § 27-1001 reference any other agency hearing, nor is there any other

textual hook to extend Browne to reach an administrative claim brought under IN § 27-303.

To bolster our point in Browne, we looked as well at the legislative history of these

twin provisions. Id. at 477–79. On the one hand, “IN § 27-1001 and CJ § 3-1701 were

enacted as part of the same session law and cross-reference each other.” Id. at 475 (citing

2007 Md. Laws, Chap. 150, at 1255–58, 1260–65). On the other, IN § 27-303 pre-dates

that session law by at least a decade. 1997 Md. Laws, Chap. 35, at 1222–23 (enacting IN

§ 27-303). It wasn’t part of the same legislative package as the other two provisions, which

came later. Compare id., with 2007 Md. Laws, Chap. 150, at 1255–1258 (enacting CJ

§ 3-1701), 1260–1265 (enacting IN § 27-1001). Moreover, as part of the same session law

9
that added IN § 27-1001 and CJ § 3-1701, the General Assembly amended IN § 27-303 in

2007 to include a cross-reference to the definition of “good faith” stated in IN § 27-1001.

2007 Md. Laws, Chap. 150, at 1259; IN § 27-303(9). But that cross-reference doesn’t

mention CJ § 3-1701. See id. And neither IN § 27-1001 nor CJ § 3-1701 mentions IN

§ 27-303. The General Assembly had contemplated IN § 27-303 actively while passing IN

§ 27-1001 and CJ § 3-1701 and didn’t tie the former provision into the administrative

exhaustion scheme of the latter two. Had the General Assembly wanted to modify the

operation of collateral estoppel as to IN § 27-303 claims, it could have done so, and it

didn’t.

Overall, then, Browne did not hold that a CJ § 3-1701 claim can never be collaterally

estopped by any agency decision. Browne, 258 Md. App. at 480. Rather, Browne held that

an IN § 27-1001 hearing cannot create a collateral estoppel effect as against a CJ § 3-1701

claim, based on the expressed and narrow legislative intent to abrogate the common law,

because a party can only file a CJ § 3-1701 claim after getting a final decision under IN

§ 27-1001. Id. at 478–79. Browne didn’t touch other administrative hearings and their

possible preclusive effect, including hearings on actions brought under IN § 27-303. Id.

And even if Browne did reach that far, which it doesn’t, it still wouldn’t support an

argument that a decided IN § 27-303 claim cannot collaterally estop an IN § 27-1001 claim.

In this case, Mr. Holder first filed (and lost) his administrative claim under IN

§ 27-303, then filed a separate administrative claim under IN § 27-1001, and now seeks to

avoid the former having any collateral estoppel effect on the latter (as well as his attempt

at the judicial review stage to add a new CJ § 3-1701 claim, see infra).

10
The procedural history is complicated enough that we have prepared a graphic to

illustrate how collateral estoppel works (and doesn’t) in this context:

IN § 27-303

IN § 27-
1001
CJ § 3-1701

Since Mr. Holder started with an IN § 27-303 claim, it’s possible that that agency

decision could estop a later claim under IN § 27-1001, and we address that next. From

there, whether or not a IN § 27-1001 claim could bar a CJ § 3-1701 claim doesn’t matter if

the IN § 27-1001 claim itself already is estopped.

11
2. Mr. Holder’s 303 Action created collateral estoppel on the
duty to defend issue.

The traditional test for collateral estoppel has four parts:

1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question?
2. Was there a final judgment on the merits?
3. Was the party against whom [collateral estoppel] is asserted a party . . . to the prior adjudication?
4. Was the party against whom [collateral estoppel] is asserted given a fair opportunity to be heard on the issue?

Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Community Ass’n, Inc., 361 Md. 371, 391 (2000) (quoting

Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. TKU Assoc., 281 Md. 1, 19 (1977)). That

standard is met easily here by Mr. Holder’s 303 Action.

First, the issue of whether Erie owed Mr. Holder a duty to defend is indeed identical

in the two proceedings. In the 303 Action, the MIA found that Erie didn’t owe Mr. Holder

a duty to defend because the Estes complaint on its face only alleged intentional acts which

were excluded from the insurance policies. This is the same issue the agency found

dispositive in the 1001 Action (the one before us now).

Second, the 303 Action reached a final agency decision on the merits in the Final

Order dated July 1, 2022. The MIA concluded that there was no duty to defend and that

without a duty to defend Erie could not be liable under IN § 27-303.

Third, the parties to the 303 Action are identical to the parties to the 1001 Action:

Mr. Holder and Erie.

Fourth, Mr. Holder received a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the duty to

defend issue in the 303 Action. He proceeded to a fully contested hearing at which he had

12
the right to retain counsel, to call witnesses to testify, and to offer evidence. He argued and

testified on his own behalf at the hearing. The MIA found that he addressed the issue

squarely, both in his paper filings and his oral arguments. He had the right to seek judicial

review of that decision, but opted not to. And he doesn’t claim that he was deprived of any

opportunity to present his claims in the 303 Action.

The MIA found correctly, then, that the 303 Action collaterally estopped Mr. Holder

from relitigating the duty to defend issue in the 1001 Action because it met all four

Colandrea elements.

1. Without a duty to defend, Erie could not have failed to act in good faith.

Because Erie owed Mr. Holder no duty to defend him against the claims in Estes v.

Holder, Erie cannot be liable for not acting in good faith here. The statutory definition of

“good faith” is “an informed judgment based on honesty and diligence supported by

evidence the insurer knew or should have known at the time the insurer made a decision

on a claim.” IN § 27-1001(a); CJ § 3-1701(a)(5) (identical definition). No Maryland

appellate court has interpreted or applied this definition in the context of a claim under IN

§ 27-1001 or CJ § 3-1701, perhaps because out-of-state insurers tend to remove CJ

§ 3-1701 claims to federal court under diversity jurisdiction. There are reported federal

cases on point, though, and the MIA relied on them as persuasive authority while deciding

the 1001 Action. These federal cases hold that an insurer cannot be liable for not acting in

good faith if they did not owe coverage to the policyholder. See, e.g., Dominant Inv. 113

v. United States Liability Ins. Co., 247 F. Supp. 3d 696, 704 (D. Md. 2017) (policyholder

13
“may only prevail on such a claim where the [policyholder] proves that it was entitled to

coverage under the policy”), aff’d, 707 Fed. App’x 155 (4th Cir. 2017). “This makes sense

as [CJ § 3-1701] only allows recovery of actual damages under the insurance policy, and

no actual damages under an insurance policy can be claimed by one who is not entitled to

coverage under the policy.” All Class Const., LLC v. Mutual Bens. Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 3d

409, 417 (D. Md. 2014). And we agree: an insurer can’t lack good faith by declining a

defense when it doesn’t owe coverage. It needs to make that coverage decision in good

faith, or at least not in bad faith, but that issue—the ultimate lack of coverage—has been

decided conclusively for the purposes of this appeal.

In sum, the MIA’s decision in the 303 Action collaterally estopped Mr. Holder from

relitigating his demand for a defense against the Estes claims under the policies. As a result,

the agency’s prior decision that those claims weren’t covered under the policies compelled

it to conclude that Erie didn’t act in bad faith in denying him coverage or defense and

therefore cannot be liable to Mr. Holder in the 1001 Action.

B. The Circuit Court Acted Within Its Discretion When It Struck Mr.
Holder’s Amended Complaint.

We conclude as well that an insured seeking to try a CJ § 3-1701 claim before a jury

in circuit court cannot do so alongside a petition for judicial review of an agency hearing.

The rules and factual record used for a judicial review case are different from those for a

civil case. The circuit court in this case struck Mr. Holder’s amended complaint correctly

because he needed to file his civil claim in a separate proceeding under the proper Rules.

The right to seek judicial review of an agency action generally must arise from

14
statute. Mayor and City Council of Balt. v. ProVen Mgmt., Inc., 472 Md. 642, 666 (2021).

In the context of an IN § 27-1001 claim, that authority resides in IN § 27-1001(g). This

subsection provides that judicial review proceedings in the circuit court must comply with

“Title 10, Subtitle 2 of the State Government Article.” IN § 27-1001(g)(1). Following the

cross reference, that statute provides that “[t]he court shall conduct a proceeding under this

section without a jury.” Md. Code (1984, 2021 Repl. Vol.) § 10-222(g)(1) of the State

Government Article (“SG”) (emphasis added). Reading these provisions together, they

mean, at a minimum, that if a litigant wishes to try their CJ § 3-1701 claim before a jury,

as Mr. Holder apparently does, it cannot happen in the same case as a petition for judicial

review of the pre-requisite IN § 27-1001 agency decision.

Although no other Maryland reported opinion makes this point, principles drawn

from Thompson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 196 Md. App. 235 (2010) support this

conclusion. There, we pointed to the same statutory cross-reference and read this twinned

construction to say that the claim created by CJ § 3-1701 is a separate civil claim from an

appeal of the pre-requisite IN § 27-1001 administrative action—and thus avoided a

constitutional question as to separation of powers. Id. at 246–47; see also Advice Letter

from Robert A. Zarnoch, Assistant Attorney General, to the Honorable Joseph F. Vallario,

Jr., Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee (2007 General Assembly) in legislative

files for House Bill 425 & Senate Bill 389 at 27–28 (advice to drafters of IN § 27-1001

about said constitutional question). This separation principle also requires separate circuit

court cases for IN § 27-1001(g) reviews and CJ § 3-1701 claims. See id.

The structure and contents of the Maryland Rules further support the decision to

15
strike the complaint. “Captioning a petition for judicial review in accordance with Md.

Rule 7-202 . . . has a number of domino-type consequences.” Thompson, 196 Md. App. at

250. Among other things, “the Clerk of Court will then send the petition to the

agency . . . and the agency will notify the parties.” Id. (citing Md. Rule 7-202(d)(1)).

Likewise, “[t]he time for filing a response to the petition is controlled by the date of such

notice.” Id. (citing Md. Rule 7-204(c)). Plus “[t]he time for the agency to transmit the

administrative record to the circuit court is triggered by the clerk’s mailing of the petition

. . . The deadline for filing memoranda runs thirty days from the date the clerk sends notice

of the filing of the administrative record.” Id. (citing Md. Rule 7-206(c), IN § 2-215(g),

and Md. Rule 7-207(a)). These rules differ from those governing normal civil claims,

which appear in Title 2 of the Maryland Rules. Md. Rules 2-101 et seq.

In Thompson, we highlighted these differences to disarm the appellant’s argument

that she had really filed a petition all along—not a civil complaint. 196 Md. App. at 249 -

1. We disagreed. Id. On appeal, Mr. Holder presses the opposite: he says he really was

filing a civil claim all along rather than a petition for judicial review. He, like the appellant

in Thompson, points to Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane v. Tornillo, 320 Md. 192, 195 (1990),

aff’d, 329 Md. 40 (1993). Tornillo is part of a line of cases that say we look through the

caption of a filing to its substance to determine its nature. Id. But the same way Tornillo

was unavailing to the appellant in Thompson, it is unavailing to Mr. Holder here. See

Thompson, 196 Md. App. at 250. Not only did Mr. Holder invoke the wrong section of the

Rules for a civil claim in the substantive body of his petition, see Thompson 196 Md. App.

at 250, he also invoked the subsection of IN § 27-1001 that provides for judicial review

16
and called his filing his “instant timely petition for judicial review” within the substantive

body. See IN § 27-1001(g) (providing for judicial review). And, notably, Mr. Holder didn’t

serve Erie as he would with a civil complaint. Instead, he left it to the circuit court to notify

the agency and Erie, as if filing a petition for judicial review. See Md. Rule 7-202(d)(1).

This is analogous to Thompson, where the manner of service determined whether a filing

was a civil complaint or a petition for judicial review. See Thompson, 196 Md. App. at 250

(“. . . not only did appellant not caption her pleading as a petition for judicial review, she

served it like a civil action against an insurer.”). And rather than let the initial filing sit and

wait for an answer from Erie, as one would with a complaint, Mr. Holder proceeded to file

an appellate-style memo—again, as he would with a judicial review proceeding. See Md.

Rule 7-207. Plus, he never propounded discovery, as one would expect with a civil

complaint. See Md. Rules 2-401 et seq. (a/k/a Chapter 400, on discovery).

All in all, Mr. Holder “did not comply with most of the procedural requirements

associated with” a civil complaint, but instead followed those for a petition for judicial

review. Thompson, 196 Md. App. at 249. Mr. Holder contends that because he prayed for

a jury trial at the end of his initial filing, his petition becomes a complaint. But the bulk of

his filing—two pages out of three—screams petition in both form and substance, because

that is what it is. Mr. Holder’s own writings and actions reveal his intent to petition for

judicial review, rather than complain civilly. This proceeding began as judicial review,

continued as judicial review, and ended as judicial review.

Moreover, the factual record and evidence used in civil claims proceedings and

judicial review proceedings are incompatible with each other. In a civil claim, the parties

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go through discovery, see Md. Rules 2-402–2-434, decide what evidence to submit, and

comply with the rules of evidence. The circuit court or the jury sits as trier of fact in the

first instance in a civil case. In contrast, the factual record in a petition for judicial review

is closed and the circuit court sits as a reviewing court. Nothing new comes in other than

the record developed before the agency. See Md. Rule 7-206(b); Md. Rule 7-208(c). To

merge the two species of proceedings in the same case would make docket management

unwieldy and unduly burdensome, and it was well within the circuit court’s discretion not

to join them.

Additionally, the briefing and motions deadlines are often different in judicial

review proceedings from those of a civil case. Compare, e.g., Md. Rules 7-203

(establishing thirty-day time-limit to petition for judicial review), 7-204 (providing thirty

days to respond to the petition), 7-207 (giving thirty days to file appellate memoranda,

thirty days to file counter memoranda, and fifteen days for reply memoranda) with Md.

Rules 2-321 (setting thirty days to answer a complaint) and 2-322 (requiring certain

preliminary motions before answer deadline). The format and contents of the filings differ

as well. Compare Md. Rule 7-207 (requiring only appellate memoranda) with Md. Rule

2-302 (only allowing certain pleadings), Md. Rules 2-311 and 2-322 (allowing various

motions).

When Mr. Holder brought this case to the circuit court, he filed a petition for judicial

review under Md. Rule 7-202. The essential nature of the case was locked in at this point

and it proceeded under Title 7 of the Maryland Rules. The MIA sent out notices of the

petition, the court requested and received the administrative record, the agency declined to

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participate, and the parties submitted appellate-style legal memoranda, all as the Rules

require. The issues presented and the scope of the proceeding were defined fully by the

nature of the proceeding itself. To allow an amended complaint—which, in reality,

functions as an initial complaint for the separate claims—to add a whole different species

of claims to judicial review of an administrative action would create chaos in the life of the

proceeding.

In the end, the circuit court’s decision to strike an amended, jury-requested CJ

§ 3-1701 claim from a petition for judicial review under IN § 27-1001(g) was not an abuse

of its discretion. As a procedural matter, the court’s decision to strike Mr. Holder’s

statutory claim from his administrative one—so as to keep the sequence of filings and

evidentiary record manageable and consistent with the Rules—is one a “reasonable

person [could] . . . [m]ake.” Bacon, 203 Md. App. at 667.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY
AFFIRMED. APPELLANT TO PAY
COSTS.

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