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June 13, 2025 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Thille

Supreme Court of Kansas

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: 124495

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (14.6K)

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Combined Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 124,495

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

MIKA LEE THILLE,
Appellant.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.
An imperfect self-defense instruction requires some evidence of a subjective belief
that lethal force was necessary.

2.
A voluntary manslaughter instruction under K.S.A. 21-5404(a)(1) for a killing
done upon a "sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion" requires some objective evidence
of sufficient provocation.

3.
Whether sufficient provocation exists requires an objective determination of
whether a reasonable person would lose self-control under the facts presented such that
the person acts from extreme emotion rather than reason, regardless of the subjective
belief of the defendant.

Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed August 25, 2023.
Appeal from Saline District Court; RENE S. YOUNG, judge. Oral argument held September 10, 2024.
Opinion filed June 13, 2025. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed.
Judgment of the district court is affirmed.

1
Ryan J. Eddinger, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief
for appellant.

Natalie Chalmers, assistant solicitor general, argued the cause, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney
general, was with her on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

STEGALL, J.: Mika Lee Thille was convicted of reckless second-degree murder.
Thille challenges his conviction on appeal and we affirm.

When Thille learned that his brother Max was at Justin Willingham's house, he left
in the middle of the night with three companions—Valerie Vogel, Kayla Sitton, and
Shannon Bryant—to go to the house. Max was using heroin at Willingham's house, and
the group believed Max had taken Vogel's handbags from her hotel room a few hours
earlier. In addition to being Thille's brother, Max had fathered children with Vogel. On
arrival, Vogel led the group to the door and Willingham answered their knocking. Vogel
yelled at Willingham, who was in the doorway, that she knew Max was inside and that he
needed to return her bags. From there, witness testimony diverges.

According to Thille, he pushed past Vogel and demanded that Willingham get
Max and return Vogel's belongings. Willingham reached for a gun at his hip, so Thille
pushed Willingham and struck him in the face. A struggle ensued and Willingham's gun
went off. Thille fell backwards and ultimately ran back out the front door. Vogel claimed
that she remained outside while the rest of the group went into the house. She heard a
scuffle and two gunshots before seeking refuge at a friend's house.

Sitton claimed she entered the home after Thille and Willingham engaged in a
fistfight. She heard a gun go off, and then witnessed Thille draw a gun and fire multiple
2
shots at Willingham. Sitton fled and asked a neighbor to call 911 after she saw Thille
drive away. For his part, Max claimed that Willingham drew a gun from his waistband
and fired two shots into the ground. Max hit the ground for cover, and two more shots
were fired, one of which killed Willingham.

Winnie Hogan, an occupant of the house, claimed that Willingham answered the
door, two shots were immediately fired, and Willingham fell to the ground. Hogan
claimed he stayed by Willingham's side until Willingham passed away and that there
were two bullet holes in Willingham's chest. Other occupants of the house did not witness
the shooting, only the aftermath. Justin Willingham died at approximately 3:41 a.m. from
a gunshot wound to the chest. Thille turned himself over to law enforcement later that
day and was taken into custody.

The State charged Thille with first-degree premeditated and felony murder,
attempted first-degree murder, aggravated burglary, and attempted aggravated robbery.
The district court also gave lesser included instructions for intentional and reckless
second-degree murder. The jury convicted Thille of reckless second-degree murder and
acquitted him of all other charges.

Thille raised challenges to the jury instructions before the Court of Appeals. He
argued that the district court erred in denying his request for a lesser included offense
instruction of voluntary manslaughter under both sudden quarrel and imperfect self-
defense theories. Thille also argued, for the first time on appeal, that the jury should have
received an involuntary manslaughter instruction as well.

The panel held that a voluntary manslaughter instruction was not factually
appropriate under either theory. It further held that though an involuntary manslaughter
instruction was factually appropriate, the district court's failure to give that instruction

3
was harmless. State v. Thille, No. 124,495, 2023 WL 5498984, at *10 (Kan. App. 2023)
(unpublished opinion). We granted Thille's petition for review of these instructional
issues, as well as the State's conditional cross-petition for review regarding the panel's
conclusion that an involuntary manslaughter instruction was factually appropriate.

DISCUSSION

Appellate courts follow a multi-step process when analyzing jury instruction
challenges: (1) determine whether the issue is preserved for appeal; (2) examine whether
the instruction was factually and legally appropriate; and, if the court finds error,
(3) conduct a reversibility inquiry. State v. Gentry, 310 Kan. 715, 720, 449 P.3d 429
(2019).

At the second step, we apply an unlimited standard of review of the entire record.
In determining whether an instruction was factually appropriate, courts must determine
whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant
or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction. State v. Holley, 313
Kan. 249, 254-55, 485 P.3d 614 (2021), on reh'g 315 Kan. 512, 509 P.3d 542 (2022). At
the final step, if the issue was preserved for appeal and we find the district court erred, we
apply either a constitutional or statutory harmless error test. Thille does not argue that a
constitutional right was violated and advocates for the statutory test. Under the statutory
test, a court assesses whether there is no reasonable probability any error affected the
trial's outcome in light of the entire record. 313 Kan. at 256-57.

Voluntary Manslaughter

Thille argues the district court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct
the jury on voluntary manslaughter under either his sudden quarrel or imperfect self-

4
defense theories. The State concedes that Thille preserved this argument for review, so
any error discovered by the court must have had no reasonable probability in affecting the
trial's outcome for the conviction to survive review. 313 Kan. at 256-57.

Under K.S.A. 22-3414(3), "[i]n cases where there is some evidence which would
reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser included crime . . . the judge shall instruct
the jury as to the crime charged and any such lesser included crime." Thus, a lesser
included crime is generally legally appropriate. Gentry, 310 Kan. at 721.

Here, voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of first-degree
premeditated murder—which Thille was charged with—and thus the voluntary
manslaughter instruction was legally appropriate. 310 Kan. at 721 ("Under this hierarchy,
second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter are lesser
included offenses of first-degree premeditated murder."). We must therefore determine
whether the instruction was factually appropriate under either Thille's sudden quarrel or
imperfect self-defense theories.

Under K.S.A. 21-5404(a)(2), voluntary manslaughter under an imperfect self-
defense theory occurs when an individual knowingly kills a human being "upon an
unreasonable but honest belief that circumstances existed that justified use of deadly
force." The panel below held that the imperfect self-defense instruction was not factually
appropriate because Thille was the initial aggressor and no exception allowing for initial
aggressor self-defense was available to Thille. Thille, 2023 WL 5498984, at *6. Thille
argues that, construing the facts in his favor, there is evidence to support he acted in self-
defense due to Willingham either going for his gun or shooting first. The State, for its
part, argues the court could affirm on alternative grounds. Namely, that Thille cannot
show evidence of a good faith subjective belief that lethal force was necessary because he
denied ever shooting Willingham.

5
We agree with the State. Thille points to no evidence indicating he had an honest
(albeit unreasonable) belief that circumstances justified the use of deadly force. Thille
denied ever using deadly force. Instead, he points to testimony from other individuals that
Willingham fired at him first. While this evidence may be relevant to the objective
circumstances facing Thille which may have informed his subjective beliefs about the
situation, it is extremely difficult—perhaps impossible—to show a subjective belief that
lethal force is justified when the defendant denies ever using lethal force. And here,
construing all the evidence in Thille's favor about his subjective state of mind, Thille
thought Willingham was reaching for a gun at his hip, and Thille responded with non-
lethal force. Because Thille fails to point to any evidence of an honest belief of the need
for lethal force, the district court correctly declined to give a voluntary manslaughter
instruction based on imperfect self-defense.

Examining Thille's alternative theory, Thille argues instructing on a sudden
quarrel theory was appropriate because the disparate testimonies show that there was
yelling, struggling, wrestling, and shots fired before the shot that killed Willingham was
fired. The State argues that Willingham was defending his home in response to a group
descending on his front door in the middle of the night.

Voluntary manslaughter encompasses knowingly killing a human being "[u]pon a
sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion." K.S.A. 21-5404(a)(1). We have previously
explained that a "sudden quarrel" is "one form of heat of passion." State v. Brownlee, 302
Kan. 491, 513, 354 P.3d 525 (2015). "'Heat of passion' is "any intense or vehement
emotional excitement of the kind prompting violent and aggressive action, such as rage,
anger, hatred, furious resentment, fright, or terror," based "on impulse without
reflection."'" Gentry, 310 Kan. at 722. A quarrel that arises as an "'unforeseen angry
altercation, dispute, taunt, or accusation could fall within th[e] definition [of heat of
passion] as sufficient provocation. [Citations omitted.]'" Brownlee, 302 Kan. at 513

6
(alterations in original). Here, Thille advances a theory akin to an "unforeseen angry
altercation" but we need not parse that claim too finely because all factual subsets of
"heat of passion" killings require a showing of sufficient provocation under an objective
standard—and that is where we focus our inquiry. Gentry, 310 Kan. at 722-23.

"'"[T]o reduce a homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter, there must be an
adequate provocation that deprives a reasonable person of self-control and causes that
person to act out of passion rather than reason. Mere words or gestures, however
offensive, do not constitute legally sufficient provocation for a finding of voluntary
manslaughter."'" 310 Kan. at 722.

A sampling of our precedent over the last several decades indicates that Thille
did not objectively have sufficient provocation to justify the instruction. In State v.
McDermott, 202 Kan. 399, 402-03, 449 P.2d 545 (1969), we held that evidence excluded
any heat of passion theory where the victim had "'reared back'" and "'almost threw [the
defendant] off [his] feet'" prior to starting to get into an automobile. The defendant then
shot and killed the victim. The defendant testified that he was not angry at the time he
shot the victim, but he was upset.

Likewise, in State v. Stafford, 213 Kan. 152, 515 P.2d 769 (1973), reh'g denied
and opinion modified 213 Kan. 585, 518 P.2d 136 (1974), we found insufficient
provocation where the victim had struck the first blow. There, the defendant's husband
initiated conflict by insulting the defendant's son-in-law, commenting that maybe the
defendant wanted to marry a friend of hers, and that she would not let her oldest son be
beaten when really she was the one who deserved a beating. The husband then struck the
defendant behind her left ear and knocked her glasses off. The blow did not bruise or
harm her. Her husband's statements made her "real" angry. She sprayed him in the face
with a paralyzing spray, and while he was dazed, she wrapped the cord from the tea kettle
around his neck and started choking him. She eventually threw him on the floor and

7
while she was astraddle her husband, he asked her why she was doing these things to
him, which really "pissed [her] off," so she hit him several times with a hammer. The
husband died of strangulation. We held "although there was some evidence of prior
quarreling and even of a blow being struck by the decedent, we believe insufficient
provocation existed to reduce to voluntary manslaughter the eventual strangulation of one
flat on his back in a disabled condition." 213 Kan. at 154-55, 166.

In State v. Coop, 223 Kan. 302, 302, 309, 573 P.2d 1017 (1978), we affirmed the
defendant's conviction for second-degree murder. In so doing, we affirmed the district
court's refusal to instruct on voluntary manslaughter. In that case, the defendant and his
wife were both heavy drinkers. The defendant testified that they got into an argument,
and that he hit his wife with a broom stick and a mop stick before stomping on her side
while she lay face down on the floor. The defendant's wife passed away the next day,
having never gotten up from the floor. After noting that a "sudden quarrel" is one form of
sufficient provocation, we held that there was no evidence of sufficient provocation to
warrant an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. 223 Kan. at 303-07. Similarly, in State
v. Guebara, 236 Kan. 791, 797, 696 P.2d 381 (1985), we affirmed the district court's
refusal to instruct on voluntary manslaughter due to insufficient provocation. The
"provocation" in that case was the defendant's estranged wife stating that she had tried to
drop misdemeanor criminal charges that she had filed against him, but the assistant
county attorney would not let her. 236 Kan. at 792-93.

In contrast, we held in State v. Hill, 242 Kan. 68, 76, 744 P.2d 1228 (1987), that
failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter was error when there was evidence that the
defendant had been assaulted and insulted by the victim immediately prior to the
shooting. More specifically, there was a lot of pushing and shoving initiated by the victim
against the defendant in a crowded hallway. The victim struck the defendant in the head
and later pushed the defendant from behind. Testimony from witnesses indicated that

8
right before the defendant shot the victim, the victim was running at the defendant with
her hand raised and something may have been in her hand. The defendant testified that
she could not see defendant's hands and was scared for her life. 242 Kan. at 72-73.

Fast forwarding to State v. Clark, 263 Kan. 370, 374, 949 P.2d 1099 (1997), we
again affirmed a trial court's denial of the voluntary manslaughter instruction. The
defendant argued that his companion had hit a third party, the third party reached for his
pocket, and the defendant shot the third party because he was reaching for a gun. But we
held there was no evidence of a sudden quarrel. The district court in that case did,
however, instruct on imperfect defense of another. 263 Kan. at 372-74.

Perhaps most similar to the current case is Brownlee, where we held that the
evidence was insufficient to show "'adequate provocation that deprives a reasonable
person of self-control and causes that person to act out of passion rather than reason.'"
302 Kan. at 514. There, as here, there were multiple accounts as to what happened the
night of the victim's death. The setting was a party hosted by John Doran and his
girlfriend, Brandie Brownlee. Among the guests were Brandie's brother, Gustin Brownlee
and her cousin Irvin. Police officers dispatched to the house at 2 a.m. found Irvin dead in
the driveway from gunshot wounds.

Brandie gave the following version of events in a recorded statement:

"Irvin touched her disrespectfully, and they had an argument. Brownlee and Doran
convinced her to calm down, and the men went outside. Brandie and Doran then went
upstairs but could hear Brownlee and Irvin arguing in the basement. Irvin left the house
but said he would be back to hurt Brownlee. Apparently Brownlee then also left the
house. When Brandie tried to bring Brownlee back inside, he pulled out a gun and fired
three shots into the ground. Brownlee and Irvin started arguing again, and Brownlee shot
Irvin multiple times." 302 Kan. at 493-94.

9
At trial, Brandie added that at some point during the night, Irvin said he would
"'snatch little niggas' guns and beat 'em with [them],'" and she thought that comment was
directed at Brownlee or one other party guest because they were smaller than Irvin.
However, other witnesses gave different accounts. One party attendee testified that a
different party attendee had fired three shots into the ground and told everyone to calm
down. She ran upstairs when she first heard shots, and when she looked outside again,
"Brownlee and Irvin [were] 'rassling'" and "Doran was trying to break them up." She
heard more shots before she ran to a car. 302 Kan. at 497-99.

Meanwhile, another attendee claimed she saw

"Irvin 'in [Brownlee]'s face' and said they were talking about a fight. In her police
statement, [the attendee] had said Brownlee was spitting on Irvin. Irvin said, 'Bro, can
you see or something,' and Brownlee responded, 'I'm not your bro or your cuz.'
Everybody was arguing, and she heard Irvin say that his 'daddy taught him to take
people's guns and beat them up or something.' [The attendee] said she was upstairs with
the children when she heard 'a lot of yelling.' Everything appeared to cool down; then she
heard gunshots." 302 Kan. at 499.

Doran testified Irvin had touched Brandie and another woman inappropriately, but
that he had talked to Irvin and was not mad at him. He further testified that Brownlee was
carrying a gun in the side of his pants, that Brownlee and Irvin had an argument, and that
Irvin had said "something about cowards having guns." Doran tried to split the men up,
but he was pushed or pulled away before Brownlee shot Irvin. 302 Kan. at 499.

We summarized the evidence as follows:

"Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defense, Irvin had
inappropriately touched Brandie, and they argued. At some point Irvin said he would
'smack' both Doran and Brandie. But this behavior and comment were not directed at

10
Brownlee. The only insulting or threatening language Irvin may have used toward
Brownlee at some point during the night were his comments that he would 'snatch little
niggas' guns and beat 'em with it' and that he would be back later to hurt Brownlee. Irvin
was unarmed, but Brownlee was carrying a gun. Irvin and Brownlee argued outside the
house, and one witness testified that they were 'rassling' before the shots were fired. But
no evidence was presented about who started the physical fight or what the two men were
arguing or fighting about. The dispute was not sudden; it merely simmered." 302 Kan. at
514.

These cases demonstrate the difference between a "sudden quarrel" and a
defendant who acts with an imperfect self-defense state of mind. The metric of sufficient
provocation is not the subjective belief of the defendant as to the danger facing him or
her. Whether sufficient provocation exists requires an objective determination of whether
a reasonable person would lose self-control under the facts presented such that the person
acts from extreme emotion rather than reason. The court must objectively examine
whether Thille's case fits the reasonable person rule. We are convinced that it does not.

Construing the facts in Thille's favor, he learned that his brother had taken Vogel's
bags and was now at a drug house. Thille went with three others to Willingham's house in
the middle of the night, and Vogel started yelling at Willingham to get Max and her bags.
Thille pushed past Vogel, got into a scuffle with Willingham, and Willingham either
reached for a potential gun or fired a gun at him. Thille points to no evidence that
Willingham said anything to provoke Thille. Rather, Thille approached Willingham and
the two got into a physical altercation. This situation is thus unlike Hill, where the victim
repeatedly antagonized the defendant before attacking her in a dark hallway. It seems that
here, like Brownlee, there was a simmering conflict brewing that was initially triggered
by Max absconding with Vogel's bags. But this background conflict does not provide a
basis for sufficient provocation. See State v. Wade, 295 Kan. 916, 926, 287 P.3d 237

11
(2012) ("A slow burn is not heat of passion."). And "ongoing and protracted interactions
do not usually provide factual support for a voluntary manslaughter instruction." State v.
Lowry, 317 Kan. 89, 95, 524 P.3d 416 (2023).

The district court was correct to deny a voluntary manslaughter instruction based
on sudden quarrel.

Involuntary Manslaughter

Finally, Thille argues the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on
involuntary manslaughter. Thille did not request this instruction before the district court.
The State argues that the instruction is not factually appropriate, and even if it was,
failing to give the instruction was not clear error.

This issue is likewise governed by our multi-step standard of review as set forth
above. Gentry, 310 Kan. at 720. But at the final step, since Thille did not request an
involuntary manslaughter instruction based on the killing of a human being committed
recklessly, we instead review for clear error. K.S.A. 22-3414(3). To show clear error, a
defendant must prove that the instruction was legally and factually appropriate, and the
court must be firmly convinced the jury would have reached a different verdict if the
district court had given the instruction. The party claiming clear error has the burden to
show both error and prejudice. State v. Crosby, 312 Kan. 630, 639, 479 P.3d 167 (2021).

Involuntary manslaughter is the killing of a human being committed, as relevant
here, recklessly. K.S.A. 21-5405. The jury convicted Thille of reckless second-degree
murder, which is the killing of a human being "unintentionally but recklessly under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." K.S.A. 21-
5403(a)(2). A person acts "recklessly" when he or she "consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, and
12
such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable
person would exercise in the situation." K.S.A. 21-5202(j). Thus, the distinction between
involuntary manslaughter and reckless murder in this case is the level of disregard for
human life.

Involuntary manslaughter is a lesser degree of first-degree murder and would have
been a legally appropriate instruction. State v. James, 309 Kan. 1280, 1298, 443 P.3d
1063 (2019). The State argues, however, that the instruction was not factually appropriate
because "[f]iring a gun twice in a house near a person, which then results in that person's
death, cannot be considered anything other than extreme indifference to the value of
human life." But this argument downplays our standard, which requires reviewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Thille. There is conflicting evidence as to who
fired weapons, when weapons were fired, and at whom weapons were fired. For instance,
Thille testified that Willingham's gun went off while they were struggling. If one accepts
that Thille did not intend to kill his victim, as the jury did in this case, the facts also
support a conclusion that Thille may have acted with mere recklessness. Failure to
instruct on involuntary manslaughter was error. See 309 Kan. at 1301 ("It was the jury's
task, not the district judge's, to consider the evidence and assess factors—such as the
number of people in the basement and James' reasons for shooting—before reaching a
conclusion on whether James' recklessness rose to the second-degree murder level of
extreme indifference to the value of human life.").

Nevertheless, the failure to instruct on involuntary manslaughter was not clear
error because Thille fails to firmly convince us that the jury would have reached a
different verdict had the instruction been given. Crosby, 312 Kan. at 639. The facts
demonstrate that Thille barged into someone's home in the middle of the night, got into a
physical fight with the victim, and then shot the victim during the course of the fight.
This evidence strongly supports the jury's conclusion that Thille acted with an extreme

13
indifference to human life. James, 309 Kan. at 1304 ("Despite the theoretical possibility
that the jury could have reached an involuntary manslaughter verdict . . . such a verdict
was highly improbable.").

While Thille does briefly mention the possibility of involuntary manslaughter via
imperfect self-defense, K.S.A. 21-5405(a)(4), he does not develop this argument and we
decline to consider it. State v. Allen, 314 Kan. 280, 283, 497 P.3d 566 (2021) (noting
issues inadequately briefed are considered abandoned).

Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed.
Judgment of the district court is affirmed.

---

BILES, J., concurring: I agree Thille's conviction should be affirmed but disagree
with the majority's analysis of the case's facts to reach that result. The majority
incorrectly frames the issue as one of adequate provocation when discussing voluntary
manslaughter, rather than focusing on the foreseeability element central to a sudden
quarrel theory. This makes a difference. The question before us is whether Thille was
entitled to an instruction on the sudden quarrel form of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser
included offense based on his defense theory. See K.S.A. 21-5404(a)(1) ("Voluntary
manslaughter is knowingly killing a human being committed . . . [u]pon a sudden quarrel
or in the heat of passion.").

But instead of directly answering whether the trial evidence supported a sudden
quarrel, the majority goes off on a tangent for reasons I do not understand by adopting a
broader "heat of passion" approach. The majority is apparently under the impression that
there cannot be a sudden quarrel if there is no heat of passion because heat of passion

14
may be caused during a sudden quarrel. Really? This logical fallacy does not follow from
its premise, but just as importantly, it effectively renders the statutory term "sudden
quarrel" in K.S.A. 21-5404(a)(1) meaningless. And we don't usually do that. See State v.
Sedillos, 279 Kan. 777, Syl. ¶ 3, 112 P.3d 854 (2005) ("[I]t is presumed that the
legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation. The court should
avoid interpreting a statute in such a way that part of it becomes surplusage.").

Regardless, by analyzing the issue as it does, the majority evades our applicable
standard, which requires an instruction on a lesser included offense whenever, viewed in
the light most favorable to the defendant, "some evidence" would reasonably justify it.
See K.S.A. 22-3414(3); State v. Berkstresser, 316 Kan. 597, 601, 520 P.3d 718 (2022).
And this is particularly puzzling here because the majority's statement of the facts
acknowledges there is at least some evidence Thille was provoked. It details Thille's
testimony that he "pushed past Vogel and demanded that Willingham get Max and return
Vogel's belongings. Willingham reached for a gun at his hip, so Thille pushed
Willingham and struck him in the face. A struggle ensued and Willingham's gun went
off." Slip op. at 2. And, as the majority continues, Max claimed, "Willingham drew a gun
from his waistband and fired two shots into the ground. Max hit the ground for cover, and
two more shots were fired, one of which killed Willingham." Slip op. at 3.

So why isn't testimony indicating an opponent drew a gun considered "some
evidence" of provocation when viewed in the light most favorable to Thille? I cannot
figure that part out when reading the majority decision.

With that disillusionment out of the way, let's consider how an analysis that
addresses what Thille argued gets us to the same place. It's straightforward, and in my
view, pretty obvious.

15
A sudden quarrel requires an "'altercation or angry dispute'" "happening or coming
unexpectedly." State v. Ruiz-Ascencio, 307 Kan. 138, 142, 406 P.3d 900 (2017);
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. And in this case, Thille fails to point to any
evidence Willingham's reaction at the door was unforeseeable. Cf. State v. Wilson, 308
Kan. 516, 526, 421 P.3d 742 (2018) ("Put simply, it is foreseeable that violence begets
violence."). I would hold the district court correctly denied a voluntary manslaughter
instruction based on sudden quarrel because Thille's trial offered no evidence on
foreseeability.

My bottom line is that the majority's dismissal of Thille's instructional error claim
using a heat-of-passion analysis inexplicitly ignores the sudden quarrel issue Thille
raised. Its motivation for insisting on its approach escapes me. I join with the majority on
the remaining issues.

WILSON, J., joins the foregoing concurring opinion.

16