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Feb. 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Revuelta

Court of Appeals of Utah

• Citations: 2026 UT App 21

• Docket Number: Case No. 20220357-CA

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (74)

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Combined Opinion

2026 UT App 21

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
SHADIA REVUELTA,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20220357-CA
Filed February 12, 2026

Second District Court, Farmington Department
The Honorable Ronald G. Russell
No. 191700938

Scott L Wiggins, Attorney for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Jeffrey D. Mann,
Attorneys for Appellee, assisted by law student
Rebecca Huber. 1

JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN
FORSTER concurred.

LUTHY, Judge:

¶1 Shadia Revuelta pled guilty to two counts of possession of
a controlled substance with intent to distribute in the presence of
a child. She now appeals, asserting that the magistrate who issued
the search warrant that was executed on her home erred in finding
probable cause. We reject Revuelta’s argument and affirm her
convictions.

1. See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 14-807 (governing law student practice in the courts of Utah). State v. Revuelta

BACKGROUND 2

¶2 Officers in the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force (the
Task Force) received an anonymous complaint that Revuelta was
“involved in the use and distribution of illegal narcotics.” Acting
on this tip, they conducted surveillance on Revuelta’s home in
North Salt Lake. The officers observed that Revuelta “didn’t leave
very often” and “that she was home during times when most
people were at work.” They also saw that “the residence had
several surveillance cameras.” Additionally, they noted that
Revuelta had two cars on her property, one with “a temporary
tag” and another with a license plate from another state.

¶3 The officers also observed that the trash can on the side
of Revuelta’s home was full, leading them to believe that
“trash day was soon,” and they learned “that trash day was
on Friday morning.” The officers arrived early that Friday
morning at Revuelta’s home. They saw that the trash can was
on the street, indicating that the trash inside had been
“abandon[ed] for pickup,” and they “took bags from the
trash can.” The officers then went to another location, emptied the
bags, and found “correspondence for [Revuelta],” “a glass jar
with high grade marijuana,” and “a pen used to smoke illegal
substances.” When they opened the jar, it had a “strong odor of
marijuana as well as a lot of marijuana shake still inside.” A field
test on the “green leafy . . . shake” yielded a positive result for
marijuana.

¶4 Five days after the trash pull, one of the officers (Detective)
submitted an affidavit for a search warrant for Revuelta’s home.
In that affidavit, Detective stated that he had received
“specialized training . . . specific to controlled substances” from

1. Because Revuelta pled guilty, there was no trial. We therefore recite the facts based on the search warrant and supporting affidavit, the charging document, the preliminary hearing, the motion to suppress, and the hearing on that motion.

20220357-CA 2 2026 UT App 21
State v. Revuelta

the police academy’s drug abuse recognition program, including
on “methods of use, sale, distribution, cultivation, manufacturing
. . . , [and] identification of controlled substances.” He noted that
he had just attended a week-long course conducted by the Drug
Enforcement Administration on “recent drug trends.” He also
recounted that he had “investigated numerous cases involving
the use, packaging and paraphernalia associated with controlled
substances.”

¶5 Detective explained that law enforcement had received
information that Revuelta was “involved in the use and
distribution of illegal controlled substances.” He outlined the
findings from the surveillance and trash pull at Revuelta’s home
as described above. He further indicated that Revuelta being
home when most people are at work is a pattern “common with
persons involved in the drug culture as they often don’t have jobs
other [than] selling illegal substances and are only gone short
periods of time.” Detective stated that the use of surveillance
cameras is “common with drug distributors,” who use them “to
keep constant watch . . . so they don’t get robbed.” Detective also
indicated that it is “common for people involved in the drug
culture to have vehicles with out-of-state plates as well as
temporary tags” so they cannot be “easily tracked by law
enforcement.”

¶6 A magistrate approved the requested warrant the same
day the affidavit was submitted. Nine days later, Detective and
other members of the Task Force executed the warrant. During
the resulting search, the Task Force found Revuelta counting cash
on her bed. Her four-year-old son “was located in his bedroom
inside the residence,” and her infant daughter was “in a bedroom
in her crib.” The Task Force also found more than $8,500 in cash,
a book containing names and debts, more than ten pounds of
methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia and packaging, a sawed-
off shotgun, and a substantial amount of marijuana, cocaine, and
heroin.

20220357-CA 3 2026 UT App 21
State v. Revuelta

¶7 Revuelta was charged with two counts of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute; two counts of
endangerment of a child; five counts of possession or use of a
controlled substance; one count of possession of drug
paraphernalia; and one count of purchase, transfer, possession or
use of a firearm by a restricted person. At her arraignment, she
pled not guilty to each of these charges.

¶8 Subsequently, Revuelta moved to suppress the evidence
obtained during the search. She argued that “the warrant was not
supported by probable cause”—in part because the information
in the affidavit was stale—and that “the officers who executed the
warrant did not have a good faith belief that there was probable
cause.” The State contended otherwise. Following oral argument,
the district court denied Revuelta’s motion to suppress.

¶9 The court determined that the items found in Revuelta’s
trash, “along with the officers’ additional observations, supported
a finding of probable cause and justified the search warrant.” The
court also determined that the information in the affidavit was not
stale. Finally, the court concluded that even if the information in
the affidavit did not provide probable cause, the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984), would apply and preclude suppression of the
evidence obtained during the search.

¶10 After the court denied Revuelta’s motion to suppress, she
entered a conditional guilty plea to two counts of possession of a
controlled substance with the intent to distribute in the presence
of a child. As part of her plea agreement, she reserved the right to
appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. Revuelta now
exercises that right and appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶11 On appeal, Revuelta asserts that the magistrate erred in
determining that the affidavit provided probable cause to issue

20220357-CA 4 2026 UT App 21
State v. Revuelta

the search warrant and, therefore, that the district court erred in
denying her motion to suppress. “We review a denial of a motion
to suppress as a mixed question of law and fact and will disturb
the district court’s factual findings only when they are clearly
erroneous, but we afford no deference to the district court’s
application of law to the underlying factual findings.” State v.
Hansen, 2025 UT App 121, ¶ 25, 576 P.3d 1160 (cleaned up).
Additionally,

where a search warrant supported by an affidavit is
challenged as having been issued without an
adequate showing of probable cause, our review
focuses on the magistrate’s probable cause
determination. In conducting this review, we assess
whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for
determining that probable cause existed. In making
this determination, we afford the magistrate’s
decision great deference and consider the affidavit
relied upon by the magistrate in its entirety and in a
common sense fashion. On appeal, we affirm a
magistrate’s finding of probable cause based upon
an affidavit only where the affidavit supports the
magistrate’s determination that there is probable
cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be
found in the place or places named in the warrant.

State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, ¶ 13, 267 P.3d 210 (cleaned up). 3

1. Revuelta also asserts that the district court erred in its determination that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied in this case. Given our determination that the magistrate did not err in finding probable cause, we need not address Revuelta’s argument regarding the good faith exception.

20220357-CA 5 2026 UT App 21
State v. Revuelta

ANALYSIS

¶12 The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches
and seizures,” and it mandates that “no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV. “The Fourth Amendment guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizures interposes a magistrate
between the investigating officer and the person who is the object
of the search, and requires the magistrate, before issuing a search
warrant, to review the affidavit submitted to determine whether
it establishes probable cause.” State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401,
¶ 11, 40 P.3d 1136 (cleaned up).

¶13 “Probable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—that is
not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.
Instead, probable cause determinations are governed by a totality-
of-the-circumstances analysis.” State v. Roberts, 2018 UT App 92,
¶ 8, 427 P.3d 416 (cleaned up). “The task of the issuing magistrate
is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether,
given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . , there is a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.” Id. (cleaned up). “Probable cause is a
low standard. Indeed, the probable cause standard requires only
a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an
actual showing of such activity.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶14 Revuelta contends that the warrant affidavit here did
not provide probable cause for a search of her home for two
reasons: (1) on its face, the information in the affidavit did not
support a finding of probable cause and (2) even if the
information in the affidavit otherwise supported a finding of
probable cause, it had grown stale by the time the warrant was
executed. To the contrary, and as explained more fully below, we
conclude that the information in the affidavit did support a
finding of probable cause and that it was not stale when the
warrant was executed.

20220357-CA 6 2026 UT App 21
State v. Revuelta

A. The Information in the Affidavit Supported a Finding of
Probable Cause.

¶15 The case of State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545 (Utah Ct. App.
1997), undergirds our conclusion that the information in the
affidavit supported a finding of probable cause. Like this case,
Jackson involved a search warrant issued on the basis of items
found in a trash pull at the subject residence. See id. at 546–48. A
police officer went to the home where the three defendants in the
case resided and “obtained two garbage cans that were sitting at
the side of the street in front of [the] home.” Id. at 546. The officer
“removed the two cans from the curb and took them to [another
location,] where the contents of the cans were inspected.” Id. “As
a result of his search of both garbage cans, [the officer] found
evidence of illegal drug use and possession, including marijuana
stems and seeds, a marijuana cigarette, a small amount of
marijuana indicative of personal use, and ‘Zig-Zag’ papers used
for rolling marijuana cigarettes.” Id. “These items were found
inside a garbage can containing, among other items, a utility bill
in the name of [one of the defendants] and a phone bill in the
names of both [that defendant and one other defendant].” Id.

¶16 “On the basis of this and other information, the police
sought a search warrant for [the] defendants’ home . . . .” Id. “The
requested warrant was issued,” and “[b]ased upon the evidence
of drugs and drug paraphernalia found during this search of their
residence, [the] defendants were charged with various drug-
related” crimes. Id. at 547. The defendants “moved to suppress the
evidence obtained from the search, which motion was denied.” Id.
They then each entered conditional guilty pleas to two class A
misdemeanors, “with each defendant reserving the right to
challenge the trial court’s ruling on the earlier suppression
motion.” Id.

¶17 In the resulting appeal, we “largely agree[d]” with the
defendants that the particular information other than that
obtained during the trash pull “should not have been considered

20220357-CA 7 2026 UT App 21
State v. Revuelta

by the magistrate in making his probable cause determination.” 4
Id. at 548. But we concluded that “even absent” that additional
information, “the affidavit contained sufficient facts to support
the magistrate’s determination of probable cause.” Id. In other
words, we determined that the presence of marijuana stems and
seeds, a marijuana cigarette, a small amount of marijuana
indicative of personal use, Zig-Zag papers used for rolling
marijuana cigarettes, and multiple bills addressed to one or more
of the defendants in the garbage can outside the defendants’
residence supported a finding of probable cause to search the
residence. See id.

¶18 In arguing against that conclusion, the Jackson defendants
asserted “that the facts set forth in the affidavit fail[ed] to dispel
the possibility that the contraband was placed in the garbage cans
by strangers or neighbors while the cans sat at the curb.” Id. at 547.
We rejected that argument by reasoning as follows:

[The officer] found the contraband amongst garbage
that included a utility bill in the name of [one
defendant] and a phone bill in the names of both
[that defendant and another defendant]. This fact
tends to suggest that the marijuana came from
inside [the] defendants’ home, and was discarded
by [the] defendants, along with other refuse from

1. The information that we largely agreed was “stale and irrelevant” in making a probable cause determination in State v. Jackson, 937 P.3d 545 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), was (1) a guilty plea by one of the defendants to possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia at a third party’s residence about a year and a half prior to issuance of the warrant and (2) an incident about a month and a half prior to issuance of the warrant where “several unidentified men entered [the] defendants’ home without permission and held [the] defendants captive for several hours demanding drugs and money.” Id. at 546–47.

20220357-CA 8 2026 UT App 21
State v. Revuelta

the home, rather than by some unknown passer-by
or neighbor.

Id.

¶19 We also rejected the argument that because “the affidavit
failed to indicate when the containers were taken to the street,”
“the contraband could have been in [the] defendants’ garbage can
for weeks or months before [the] defendants took the garbage to
the curb for collection,” thus “seriously undercut[ting] the
magistrate’s determination of probable cause.” Id. at 548. As to
this argument, we explained,

Although the affidavit does not state the specific
day of the week when the city’s garbage collectors
were scheduled to dispose of the garbage at the
residence, the magistrate could fairly infer, given
the fact of weekly collection, that the contraband
had not been lying around for longer than one week.
Such potential lapse of time was not significant
enough to bar the magistrate from concluding there
was probable cause to believe that drugs would be
found inside [the] defendants’ home.

Id.

¶20 Our conclusion in Jackson that the trash pull evidence there
supported a finding of probable cause to search the defendants’
home demands the same conclusion regarding the similar trash
pull evidence here and Revuelta’s home—namely, that the glass
jar with “a lot” of “high grade” marijuana shake inside, the “pen
used to smoke illegal substances,” and the correspondence
addressed to Revuelta that were all found in the garbage at
Revuelta’s residence adequately supported the magistrate’s
finding of probable cause to search Revuelta’s home.

20220357-CA 9 2026 UT App 21
State v. Revuelta

¶21 Revuelta makes seven arguments against the foregoing
conclusion. None of them are availing.

¶22 First, Revuelta argues that “[d]rugs by their very nature are
usually sold and consumed in a prompt fashion” and, thus, that
“a more probable inference” to be drawn from the presence of
drugs and drug paraphernalia in the garbage outside her home
was “that whatever drugs were previously in the residence had
been consumed and discarded.” But this argument is at odds with
our conclusion in Jackson that the presence of drugs and drug
paraphernalia in the garbage outside the defendants’ home gave
rise to a fair probability that similar contraband was still in the
home. Additionally, the magistrate here could fairly infer that a
glass jar with “a lot” of discarded marijuana shake still inside was
not indicative of isolated or sporadic use but, rather, ongoing
illegal possession.

¶23 Second, Revuelta argues that “it is impossible to tell when
the marijuana shake and pen were put into the garbage” outside
her home. “Depending on the household,” she says, “the trash
pull evidence could have been put in the garbage anywhere from
one day to several weeks earlier,” and “[t]he inability to tell when
drugs were last in the home diminishes any inference that drugs
were still in the home.” In support of this argument, Revuelta
asserts that the affidavit in this case “fail[ed] to provide any
information or evidence as to the garbage collection system
employed by the city in which [Revuelta] resided.” However,
contrary to Revuelta’s assertion, the affidavit stated that the Task
Force “found out that trash day was on Friday morning.” And the
magistrate could reasonably infer that this meant that trash
collection in Revuelta’s neighborhood normally occurred each
Friday morning. In Jackson, we reasoned that, “given the fact of
weekly collection,” a magistrate can “fairly infer” that contraband
found in a garbage can outside a home has “not been lying around
for longer than one week.” State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997). We then concluded that “[s]uch potential lapse of
time [is] not significant enough to bar” a finding of “probable

20220357-CA 10 2026 UT App 21
State v. Revuelta

cause to believe that drugs [will] be found inside” the subject
home. Id. In sum, Revuelta’s second argument falls flat in light of
our reasoning and conclusions in Jackson.

¶24 Third, Revuelta argues that her case is distinguishable
from Jackson on other grounds. Specifically, she contends, “[T]he
‘marijuana shake’ and pen obtained during the trash pull in this
case—unlike that in Jackson—do[] not demonstrate protracted and
continuous use, which militates against any ‘substantial basis’
determination as to probable cause.” Yet beyond that bare
assertion, Revuelta offers no explanation for why we should treat
the trash pull evidence in this case—which included marijuana
and paraphernalia to facilitate its use—any differently from how
we treated the trash pull evidence in Jackson—which also included
marijuana and paraphernalia to facilitate its use. Thus, Revuelta’s
argument in this regard fails.

¶25 Fourth, Revuelta contends that because the affidavit in this
case “provided no information as to whether the ‘pen’ . . . located
in the trash bags had been tested for . . . any residue of illegal
substances,” “it is reasonable to infer that the ‘pen’ did not contain
any such residue.” She then asserts that this “information would
have been important to a probable cause determination.” While
we agree that the mere presence of a potentially unused drug pen
in Revuelta’s trash likely would not have supported a finding of
probable cause to search her home, the fact that the pen had been
discarded and marijuana was found with it supports an inference
that marijuana was being used inside the home.

¶26 Fifth, Revuelta contends that United States v. McPhearson,
469 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2006), “is particularly instructive here.” In
McPhearson, the defendant was arrested on the porch outside his
residence for assault. See id. at 520. Incident to the arrest, the police
searched the defendant’s pants pockets and discovered a quantity
of cocaine. See id. Relying on the assault arrest and the cocaine in
the defendant’s pocket, the police obtained a warrant to search the
defendant’s home, where they found significant “quantities of

20220357-CA 11 2026 UT App 21
State v. Revuelta

crack cocaine and firearms.” Id. at 521–22. On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit held that the affidavit submitted with the warrant
application did not support a finding of probable cause because it
“did no more than state that [the defendant], who resided at 228
Shelby Street, was arrested for a non-drug offense with a quantity
of crack cocaine on his person.” Id. at 524–25. “These averments,”
the court explained, did “not establish the requisite nexus
between the place to be searched and the evidence to be sought.”
Id. at 524. The court concluded that “a suspect’s mere presence or
arrest at a residence is too insignificant a connection with that
residence to establish that relationship necessary to a finding of
probable cause.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶27 As an initial matter, we are not bound by Sixth Circuit
caselaw. Moreover, we believe that the inferences that can be
drawn from a drug-carrying suspect’s arrest outside a particular
residence are not coextensive with the inferences that can be
drawn from the presence of drugs inside a trash can outside a
particular residence, especially when the drugs in the trash can
are mingled with garbage—such as personal correspondence—
that appears to have been inside the home. For these reasons,
McPhearson does not affect our analysis here.

¶28 Sixth, Revuelta argues that in ruling on her motion to
suppress, the district court “failed to consider . . . that someone
other than [Revuelta] could have disposed of the items obtained
during the trash pull.” In this regard, Revuelta notes that the
affidavit “demonstrate[d] that the trash can was located on the
east side of the home ‘by the garage’—enabling anyone to access
it”—and that the affidavit did not “provide any information as to
whether the items located were found in the same trash bags or
whether there were other bags in which nothing was found.” We
addressed a similar argument in Jackson.

¶29 There, we determined that the fact that the officer “found
the contraband amongst garbage that included a utility bill . . . and
a phone bill” addressed to one or more of the defendants

20220357-CA 12 2026 UT App 21
State v. Revuelta

“tend[ed] to suggest that the marijuana came from inside [the]
defendants’ home, and was discarded by [the] defendants, along
with other refuse from the home, rather than by some unknown
passer-by or neighbor.” State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997). It is difficult for us to discern whether the contraband
in this case was “amongst” garbage that included the
correspondence addressed to Revuelta in the same way that the
contraband in Jackson was “amongst” garbage that included the
bills addressed to the defendants in that case. However, to the
extent that the contraband here may not have been “amongst” the
garbage containing the correspondence addressed to Revuelta in
the way we contemplated in Jackson, the affidavit in this case
included other evidence suggesting a tie between the contraband
and Revuelta.

¶30 Specifically, the affidavit contained a reference to the
anonymous complaint the officers received about Revuelta being
“involved in the use and distribution of illegal narcotics.” The
affidavit also noted that the surveillance cameras, the cars with
out-of-state and temporary tags, and Revuelta’s staying “home
during times when most people were at work” were all indicative
of drug activity. This information was sufficient to support an
inference that the drugs from the trash pull in this case came from
Revuelta’s home and not from an unknown passer-by or
neighbor. 5

1. The contribution toward probable cause made by the purported indicators of “drug culture” outlined by Detective was decidedly marginal. By itself, the fact that a parent of young children would be at home when most people are at work is unremarkable. Likewise, the use of security or surveillance cameras at personal residences is now commonplace. And any person who has recently relocated to Utah will likely have a vehicle or two with a temporary tag or an out-of-state license plate. Only the combination of these purported indicators (together with the (continued…)

20220357-CA 13 2026 UT App 21
State v. Revuelta

¶31 Finally, Revuelta argues that the affidavit “failed to
establish any independent police corroboration of the
[anonymous] complaint other than some vague references to
observed circumstances the [officers] believed to be consistent
with the ‘drug culture’” and that the circumstances Detective
identified as indicative of drug activity “would just as easily
apply, if not more so, to law-abiding individuals operating in
today’s world.” We agree that the anonymous complaint and the
identified circumstances indicative of drug activity may not have
been enough, on their own, to support a finding of probable cause.
But together they buttressed the finding of probable cause,
particularly by providing a basis to infer a connection between the
contraband in the trash and Revuelta, as opposed to some
unknown person. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237–38 (1983)
(“[Anonymous] tips, particularly when supplemented by
independent police investigation, frequently contribute to the
solution of otherwise ‘perfect crimes.’ While a conscientious
assessment of the basis for crediting such tips is required by the
Fourth Amendment, a standard that leaves virtually no place for
anonymous citizen informants is not.”).

¶32 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the warrant
affidavit in this case supported the magistrate’s finding of
probable cause to search Revuelta’s home.

B. The Information in the Affidavit Was Not Stale.

¶33 Revuelta asserts that by the time the warrant was executed,
the information in the affidavit had gone stale. We are not
persuaded.

anonymous complaint) makes them useful. Even then, their
utility here is limited to suggesting that the contraband in
Revuelta’s garbage can was not placed there by an unknown
passer-by.

20220357-CA 14 2026 UT App 21
State v. Revuelta

¶34 “Staleness issues usually arise when a significant lapse of
time occurs between the discovery of information suggesting that
evidence of the crime can be found at a particular locale and the
magistrate’s finding of probable cause or the execution of the
warrant.” State v. Ranquist, 2005 UT App 482, ¶ 11, 128 P.3d 1201
(cleaned up). However, “a mere passage of time does not
necessarily invalidate the supporting basis for the warrant.” Id.
(cleaned up). Rather, “the court must make an individual
determination based on the facts of the case and a variety of
factors, including the length of time, the nature of the suspected
crime (discrete crimes or ongoing conspiracy), habits of the
accused, character of the items sought, and nature and function of
the premises to be searched.” State v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, ¶ 33, 332
P.3d 937 (cleaned up).

¶35 In Ranquist, the trial court “suppressed evidence obtained
upon execution of a warrant issued on the basis of amphetamine
residue found in [the defendant’s] curbside garbage five days
before the warrant was issued.” 2005 UT App 482, ¶ 1. The
warrant was executed eight days after it was issued. See id. ¶ 3.
On appeal, we reversed, concluding that “[a]lthough the better
practice would have been to seek a search warrant immediately
upon the discovery of the amphetamine residue in [the
defendant’s] trash, . . . the passage of an additional five days [was]
not fatal to a finding of probable cause.” Id. ¶ 12. Given the
similarity between the trash pull evidence in Ranquist and the
trash pull evidence here, as well as the identical five-day lapse
between the trash pull and the warrant application, and the nearly
identical lapse—eight days in Ranquist and nine days here—
between issuance and execution of the warrant, we see no
principled basis upon which to distinguish this case and Ranquist
on this point. We therefore conclude here, as we did there, that
the passage of five days between the trash pull and the warrant
application did not render the information upon which the
warrant was based stale.

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State v. Revuelta

¶36 Revuelta pushes back by arguing that reliance on Ranquist
in this context would be “misplaced” because the Ranquist court
“did not address the entire period of time—from the search of the
trash until execution of the search warrant—in concluding there
was probable cause.” In Ranquist, that entire period was thirteen
days, see id.; here, it was fourteen days. Revuelta maintains that
“any drugs [that may have been in her home] as indicated by the
trash pull—by their very nature—would usually [have been] sold
and consumed in a prompt fashion,” thus rendering any probable
cause that existed when the warrant was issued stale by the time
the warrant was executed.

¶37 However, while the Ranquist court did not explicitly
analyze the eight days between issuance and execution of the
warrant in that case, the court’s opinion makes clear that it was at
least aware of that interval and still reversed the district court’s
grant of the motion to suppress. See id. ¶¶ 3, 13. Moreover, we
agree with the State that “[t]he mere passage of time of an
additional nine days . . . does not change the ‘fair probability’ that
drugs would be found in the home of an individual who [appears,
based upon probable cause, to be] using and distributing drugs.”

¶38 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the
information in the affidavit was not stale when the warrant was
issued or when it was executed.

CONCLUSION

¶39 The information in the search warrant affidavit submitted
by Detective supported the magistrate’s finding of probable cause
to search Revuelta’s home, and that information did not become
stale prior to execution of the warrant. We therefore affirm the
district court’s denial of Revuelta’s motion to suppress.

20220357-CA 16 2026 UT App 21