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Feb. 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Funk v. Funk

Court of Appeals of Utah

• Citations: 2026 UT App 28

• Docket Number: Case No. 20251383-CA

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (14.8K)

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Combined Opinion

2026 UT App 28

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CAROL A. FUNK,
Appellant,
v.
SAMUEL S. FUNK,
Appellee.

Per Curiam Opinion
No. 20251383-CA
Filed February 26, 2026

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Laura Scott
No. 174905083

J. Ramzi Hamady and Kayla Hope Quam, Attorneys
for Appellant
Carol A. Funk, Appellant Pro Se
Daniel B. Garriott, Attorney for Appellee

Before JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN, RYAN M. HARRIS, and
AMY J. OLIVER.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Carol A. Funk appeals from the district court’s November
7, 2025, Ruling and Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to
Confirm Temporary Award Issued by Arbitrator. This matter is
before the court on its own motion for summary disposition based
on lack of jurisdiction due to the absence of a final, appealable
order.
Funk v. Funk

¶2 The parties to this case were divorced in 2017. On May 12,
2025, Carol 1 filed a petition to modify the divorce decree,
indicating her desire to relocate to California and requesting that
she be awarded sole physical custody and be made the sole
decision-maker concerning the schooling of her and Samuel’s two
minor children. Samuel filed a counterpetition to modify, also
seeking the sole custody of the children and decision-making
authority concerning the children’s schooling. The parties agreed
to submit their dispute to arbitration and entered into an
arbitration agreement on June 3, 2025. Among the issues the
parties agreed to have decided by the arbitrator was a temporary
decision concerning where one of the children would attend
school pending resolution of the petition and counterpetition.

¶3 On July 30, 2025, the parties participated in an evidentiary
hearing before the arbitrator on the specific issue of where that
child would attend school during the pendency of the case. The
hearing did not address issues of custody or parent-time. The
arbitrator ultimately determined that the child should remain at
his current school until resolution of the petitions.

¶4 Carol then returned to court and filed a motion for a
temporary restraining order and a temporary award of physical
custody. The domestic relations commissioner recommended that
the motion be denied, and Carol filed an objection with the district
court, which was overruled on October 22, 2025. Meanwhile,
Samuel filed a motion to confirm the temporary award of physical
custody issued by the arbitrator. The court issued an order on
November 7, 2025, granting Samuel’s motion, and Carol now
appeals from that order.

1. Because the parties share the same last name, we follow our normal practice and refer to them by their first names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality.

20251383-CA 2 2026 UT App 28
Funk v. Funk

¶5 Generally, this court does not have jurisdiction to consider
an appeal unless it is taken from a final judgment or order. E.g.,
Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97, ¶ 10, 37 P.3d 1070. An order is final
only if it disposes of the case as to all parties and “finally
dispose[s] of the subject-matter of the litigation on the merits of
the case.” Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, ¶ 9, 5 P.3d 649 (cleaned
up).

¶6 If the order Carol appeals from had been entered following
a court’s order on a motion for temporary orders pending the
outcome of domestic litigation, that order would not be
considered final and appealable because it would not have
disposed of all issues in the litigation. In this specific instance, the
arbitrator’s order resolved only where one of the couple’s children
“will go to school on a temporary basis until the custody
evaluation can be completed and the petitions to modify changing
custody can be decided.” Thus, the order was temporary in nature
and did not fully resolve all issues related to the competing
petitions to modify. Accordingly, numerous issues remain to be
resolved by the arbitrator.

¶7 Carol contends that despite the temporary nature of the
order, and despite the fact that other issues raised in the petitions
to modify have not yet been resolved, the district court’s order
confirming the arbitrator’s temporary award is final and
appealable under the Uniform Family Law Arbitration Act (the
Act). See Utah Code § 81-15-123(1)(c). As relevant here, the Act
states that “[a]n appeal may be taken under this chapter from . . .
an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award.” Id. But
contrary to Carol’s argument, this provision does not transform a
normally unappealable order into an appealable one when further
issues remain to be resolved pursuant to the arbitration
agreement.

¶8 To ascertain the meaning of the statute, we examine it “in
harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related

20251383-CA 3 2026 UT App 28
Funk v. Funk

chapters.” LPI Servs. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, ¶ 11, 215 P.3d 135
(cleaned up). Moreover, “effect must be given, if possible, to every
word, clause and sentence of a statute. No clause, sentence or
word shall be construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if the
construction can be found which will give force to and preserve
all the words of the statute.” Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd.,
2011 UT App 183, ¶ 9, 257 P.3d 1049 (cleaned up). “We therefore
seek to give effect to omissions in statutory language by
presuming all omissions to be purposeful.” Marion Energy, Inc. v.
KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863.

¶9 Here, the Act specifically discusses—in different sections—
both confirmation of “temporary award[s],” Utah Code § 81-15-
110, and confirmation of “award[s],” id. § 81-15-115. Thus,
because the statute differentiates between the two terms, we must
assume that the terms have different meanings. See Penunuri, 2011
UT App 183, ¶ 9. And under the Act, only orders “confirming or
denying confirmation of an award” are immediately appealable as
of right. See Utah Code § 81-15-123(1)(c) (emphasis added).
Indeed, the provision of the Act that governs appeals lists six
different categories of orders that are appealable as of right, and
orders confirming temporary awards are not on that list. Id. § 81-
15-123(1). We thus conclude that, under the governing statutory
text, orders confirming or denying confirmation of an award are
appealable, but orders confirming a temporary award pending
further arbitration are not. This conforms not only with practice
concerning similar orders issued by a district court, but it also
conforms with decisions from other jurisdictions interpreting
similar statutes. See, e.g., Kelm v. Kelm, 639 N.E.2d 842, 844–45
(Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing a lack of appellate jurisdiction
to review an order confirming an arbitration award for temporary
spousal and child support because the order was not final and
appealable even though the applicable statute stated that “an
appeal may be taken from an order confirming, modifying,
correcting, or vacating an award made in an arbitration

20251383-CA 4 2026 UT App 28
Funk v. Funk

proceeding or from judgment entered upon an award” (cleaned
up)).

¶10 Thus, because the Act does not allow for immediate
appeals of district court orders confirming a temporary award
made by an arbitrator pending resolution of all issues submitted
to the arbitrator, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear Carol’s appeal
and must therefore dismiss it. See Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97, ¶ 11,
37 P.3d 1070.

¶11 Accordingly, Carol’s appeal is dismissed without prejudice
to the filing of a subsequent appeal after the district court enters a
final, appealable order.

20251383-CA 5 2026 UT App 28