Jump To

Top Caption Disposition Lead Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

Feb. 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Jake Erin Taylor v. the State of Texas

Texas Court of Appeals, 11th District (Eastland)

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 11-24-00234-CR
• Nature of Suit: Murder

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (27)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (12.1K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Lead Opinion

Opinion filed February 27, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals

---

No. 11-24-00234-CR

---

JAKE ERIN TAYLOR, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 32nd District Court
Mitchell County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 8478

MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found Appellant, Jake Erin Taylor, guilty of murder and assessed his
punishment at imprisonment for seventy years in the Institutional Division of the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) and a $10,000 fine. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 12.32 (West 2019), § 19.02(b)(2) (West Supp. 2025). The trial court
sentenced Appellant accordingly.
In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the jury’s rejection of his claim of self-defense. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
On the morning of August 8, 2023, Michael Seth Molina and Christy
Vanderslice were at the home of an acquaintance, Kimberly Bynum. Appellant
arrived at Bynum’s residence between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., and Appellant and
Molina “talked.” At some point, Appellant’s and Molina’s conversation escalated
into a physical altercation, which resulted in Appellant stabbing Molina with a knife.
Appellant then fled the scene. Thereafter, emergency services arrived and rendered
aid to Molina, but Molina died from complications associated with the stabbing.
Law enforcement officers later located Appellant in his aunt’s apartment across town
and arrested him.
Police Chief Joseph Stephens with the Colorado City Police Department
testified to the circumstances of Appellant’s arrest and he stated that he observed
Appellant “limping” at that time. Chief Stephens, Officer Kimberly Curran with the
Colorado City Police Department, and Texas Ranger Philip Vandygriff interviewed
Appellant after his arrest. 1 Ranger Vandygriff described Appellant’s demeanor
during the interview as “pretty matter of fact.” He additionally noted that Appellant
(1) limped into the interview room, (2) had a swollen ankle, and (3) had minor
injuries to his head. Officer Curran also observed injuries to Appellant’s ankle.
In his recorded interview with law enforcement, Appellant stated that he knew
Molina wanted to fight him because of Appellant’s rejection of Molina’s
“advances.” Appellant also said that Molina sent threatening messages to his
workplace, and that he “tr[ied] to avoid [Molina]” because of this. As for the

1
Appellant was Mirandized prior to his interview. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45
(1966).
2
circumstances of the altercation, Appellant recalled that Vanderslice was in the
living room when he arrived, and he stated that he was unaware that Molina was at
Bynum’s residence at the time. Shortly after Appellant entered Bynum’s residence,
Molina “walk[ed] around the corner” and said, “what’s up.” According to
Appellant, the altercation began when he told Molina to “back up” during their
conversation. At some point, Molina pushed him.
Appellant recounted that they fought in the living room near the front door,
and that the front door was closed. Appellant further stated that he “got in a few
good hits” before he lost his footing and fell near the front door; he believed that he
was defenseless after he fell. Appellant said that (1) he attempted to swing his knife
at Molina’s legs, (2) Molina “stomped” on his ankle, (3) he “blacked out” while
Molina was hitting him, (4) “all bets were off” after he blacked out, and (5) he “got
back up” and stabbed Molina before he could “punch [Appellant] again.” Appellant
also admitted that he had sharpened the serrations on the back side of his knife.
Appellant panicked after the altercation and called his mother after he fled.
Appellant admitted that he tried to hide at a friend’s house, Claylene Meyer, while
he waited for his mother to pick him up, but Meyer “kicked him out” of the house.
Appellant made several inconsistent statements to law enforcement during the
interview regarding where he disposed of his knife after he fled, namely that: (1) he
disposed of the knife in a dumpster at Dollar General; (2) he threw the knife in an
open field behind Meyer’s house; and (3) after law enforcement told Appellant that
they were in possession of the knife, Appellant admitted that he gave Meyer the
knife and she “g[o]t rid of it” “on her own.” When law enforcement asked Appellant
if he needed medical attention, Appellant responded that he “want[ed] to go to bed.”
Francisco Atkinson, jail administrator with the Mitchell County Sheriff’s Office,
testified that Appellant received medical treatment on August 10.

3
A jail telephone call between Appellant and his mother, where he discussed
the circumstances of the altercation, was admitted at trial. In the recording,
Appellant told his mother that the altercation began after he arrived at Bynum’s
residence and Molina said, “what’s up?” Appellant recalled that he began laughing
and told Vanderslice that Molina was “not one for talking,” and Molina responded
“no.” Appellant told his mother that after Molina approached him he attempted to
leave, and Molina then pushed him into a door, shutting it in the process. Appellant
stated on the call that “they are gonna listen to this,” that Molina threw the first
punch, and that he tried to “go for an open palm” to Molina’s face, but Molina bit
him. Appellant stated that he fell to the floor, possibly with the “help[]” of
Vanderslice and attempted to “curl up into a ball.” Appellant stated that Molina hit
him, “stomped” on his ankle and fractured it, “stayed” on his ankle, and grabbed him
by the hair while he was on the floor. Appellant said that Molina was “beating the
f--k out of him” during the altercation; however, he also said that he “could have
beat [Molina’s] a-s.” Appellant told his mother that (1) Vanderslice said that “he
needed to go” after he stabbed Molina, (2) he did not dispose of his knife after he
fled, and (3) “someone” told him to hide from law enforcement.
Officer Shawn Curran with the Colorado City Police Department testified
about the evidence that law enforcement recovered during their investigation. He
testified that law enforcement officers found a syringe and suspected narcotics on
Molina’s person. Appellant’s knife was found at Meyer’s residence, which was
approximately one-hundred yards from Bynum’s home.
Chief Deputy Jeremiah Witte with the Mitchell County Sheriff’s Office
testified that he took photographs of Bynum’s home. He testified that Molina’s body
was found in a hallway of Bynum’s residence near a doorway between the kitchen
and the living room. The hallway near the kitchen led to a bathroom, a spare
bedroom, and a bedroom where Bynum and her dogs were located. Deputy Witte
4
also testified that “drops of blood” were present on the back of the front door, which
led into the living room, as well as “blood splatter” on a doorframe which led to the
kitchen.
Ranger Vandygriff made the following observations regarding his
investigation of the crime scene: (1) blood was present on a couch near the front
door and an “almost unnoticeable” amount of blood was present on the front
doorway; (2) large bloodstains were present on the floor in the hallway leading to
the kitchen; (3) bloodstains were present on the wall and floor near a doorway
leading from the kitchen into a hallway; and (4) there were two sofas in the living
room, one directly in front of the entryway door and another to the right of the front
or entryway door. Ranger Vandygriff testified that he interviewed Vanderslice and
she indicated that the altercation between Appellant and Molina occurred near the
front door; however, Ranger Vandygriff stated that there was a minimal amount of
blood near the front door where Vanderslice indicated the altercation occurred, and
he noted the presence of blood in the kitchen and hallway, near the area where
Molina’s body was recovered.
Regarding the statements made by Appellant during his interview, Ranger
Vandygriff testified that, based on his observations, if Appellant’s back had been
against the sofa when he fell, his back could not have been against the front door. 2
Ranger Vandygriff testified that local law enforcement knew that Appellant
regularly carried a knife on his person because of their previous interactions with
him, but he did not know why Appellant would sharpen the serrations on the back
of his knife. According to Ranger Vandygriff, when Appellant was asked where

2
The substance of Ranger Vandygriff’s testimony regarding Appellant’s statements were
corroborated by the video recording of Appellant’s interview with law enforcement.

5
Molina was stabbed, Appellant stated that “if [Molina is] dead, I stabbed him in his
chest.”
Ranger Vandygriff opined that Appellant’s statement that he had allegedly
“blacked out” during the altercation was an attempt by Appellant to “evad[e] trying
to say what happened” because Appellant’s other statements about the altercation
were very detailed. Ranger Vandygriff believed that (1) Appellant was conscious
enough to secure the knife when he attempted to discard it, (2) Appellant initiated
the altercation by telling Molina to “back up,” and (3) Appellant further “engaged”
Molina by failing to leave the home through the front door, thus creating a “mutual
combat” scenario between them. However, Ranger Vandygriff also stated that
individuals who tell law enforcement officers that they “blacked out” but still
remember certain details of an event are “[n]ot [lying] all the time.”
Ranger Vandygriff expressed that Appellant was dishonest during the
interview, and he did not know if Appellant was being truthful as to whether
(1) Appellant injured his ankle during the altercation, or (2) Appellant was “actually
pinned” by Molina during the fight. When asked about alternative explanations for
the cause of Appellant’s injured ankle, Ranger Vandygriff opined that Appellant
could have injured it when he “slipped and fell” in Bynum’s home during the fight,
or at some point after he left.
Ranger Vandygriff testified that Appellant’s perception of Molina’s actions
during the altercation—that Appellant was able to recognize an opportunity to
“counter” Molina’s punch—was an offensive movement as opposed to a defensive
one. Ranger Vandygriff believed that, if Appellant was standing near the front door,
then the “defensive move would be [to] get out of the way or to try to intercept
. . . the weapon or the hand or whatever is coming at you, not to counter with . . . an
offensive move . . . to induce some kind of injury.”

6
Ranger Vandygriff testified that Molina was stabbed in the rib cage under his
left arm. Based on the location of this injury, Ranger Vandygriff believed that
Molina’s arms were in an upward position and could indicate that Molina was
“throwing a punch” when he was stabbed. Ranger Vandygriff testified that, based
on his training and experience with knives, Appellant must have exerted a significant
amount of force to push a knife vertically into Molina’s ribcage, “go through two
horizontal ribs . . . break [Molina’s] bone[s] and still penetrate to six and a half
inches.” According to Ranger Vandygriff, an individual who is “on the ground,
pinned, and [unable to] swing [his arms],” as Appellant claims, could not inflict the
type of injury that Molina sustained. Therefore, based on his investigation, Ranger
Vandygriff believed that the stabbing occurred (1) when Molina “went to punch”
Appellant, and (2) while Appellant was standing.
Vanderslice was at Bynum’s home when the altercation occurred. She
testified that Appellant and Molina had been in a relationship at some point.
Vanderslice stated that she exchanged text messages with Appellant on the morning
of August 8, and she told Appellant where she was. However, Appellant did not
know that Molina was also at Bynum’s home. Appellant arrived later while
Vanderslice and Molina were “talking and laughing.” Vanderslice believed that
Appellant overheard Molina talking because Appellant asked “where is [Molina] at”
when she answered the door. Vanderslice testified that Molina responded to
Appellant’s question from a nearby bathroom, stating “I’m right here.” Appellant
then talked to Molina while Vanderslice sat on the couch playing a game.
Vanderslice heard Appellant and Molina saying, “what’s up” before they “ran
at each other.” Vanderslice recalled that by the time she got off the couch, Molina
had “pinned” Appellant against a door and began hitting him. Appellant was
“kneeling” on the floor and bleeding. Vanderslice yelled several times for the men
to stop fighting, but the fight continued. At some point, Molina “stopped, like, kind
7
of stepped back for a minute” and ceased hitting Appellant; Appellant then stabbed
Molina with a knife and fled. According to Vanderslice, the altercation occurred
“really quickly,” and she believed that the fight was mutual because Appellant and
Molina each said, “what’s up.”
During cross-examination, Vanderslice testified that she believed Molina “ran
at” Appellant first but clarified that “[t]hey ran at each other. . . . [And Molina] got
there before [Appellant].” However, Vanderslice did not see who threw the first
punch, nor did she witness some of the events that occurred because she had “turned”
and “concentrated [on getting] off the couch.”
Vanderslice observed that Molina had Appellant pinned on the floor, and
Appellant was on his knees between a closed door, a wall, and a couch. She recalled
that Appellant was not “hitting back” while Molina had him pinned. Vanderslice
testified that Molina was “pounding [Appellant] . . . over and over in the head,” and
she believed that Molina struck Appellant between twenty-five and thirty times with
his fists. Vanderslice stated that Appellant’s face was covered in blood. She also
recalled seeing blood “spurt[]” from Appellant’s face due to his face “hitting the
door.”
Vanderslice estimated that she yelled at Molina approximately ten times to
stop hitting Appellant, but he did not, so she called Molina “a bully.” Although
Molina “kind of stepped back” after she called him “a bully,” she did not know if
Molina intended to stop hitting Appellant or if her shouting the word “bully” caused
Appellant to move. Vanderslice testified that she did not see the stabbing occur;
however, she saw Appellant “jump[] up and step[] back” when Molina “slightly
moved back,” and that she “assume[d] that that’s when [Appellant] was able to move
a little bit and stab [Molina].” Vanderslice further testified that Appellant always
carried a “Bowie knife” on his person and that “[i]t was part of his outfit.”

8
Vanderslice recalled that Molina “stumble[d] back” after he was stabbed, and
that he asked her to call 9-1-1. Appellant then “turned and . . . tried to run,”
stumbling multiple times as he exited the house. Vanderslice testified that she did
not see: (1) Molina use his knee to “bang” Appellant’s head against the door;
(2) Molina step on Appellant’s ankle during the fight; or (3) any injuries to
Appellant’s body.
Meyer testified that Appellant had been at her home the morning of the
altercation, and that he left without telling her where he was going. Meyer stated
that, twenty to thirty minutes after Appellant left, Appellant returned and ran through
her back door holding a “big knife.” Meyer recalled that Appellant’s face was “all
beat up” when he entered her home, and that Appellant was limping and had marks
and blood on his face. She then asked Appellant, “who f----d you up?” Meyer stated
that Appellant was speechless and appeared “[l]ost, confused, dazed,” and “scared.”
Meyer further testified that Appellant’s face was emotionless when he admitted to
stabbing Molina. Appellant then left, and Meyer later found Appellant’s knife in a
brown paper bag at the bottom of her kitchen trash can.
Dr. Luisa Florez, a forensic pathologist, performed Molina’s autopsy.
Dr. Florez determined that Molina’s death was caused by blood loss from the stab
wound to the left side of his upper chest, which had pierced his left lung. Dr. Florez
opined that the trajectory of Appellant’s knife traveled from the “left to the right and
a little bit downward,” breaking two of Molina’s ribs in the process before piercing
his left lung. Dr. Florez did not observe any other injuries to Molina’s body.
Dr. Florez testified that she performed a urinary drug screen and collected a
sample of Molina’s blood, which confirmed the presence of amphetamine,
methamphetamine, and alcohol. According to Dr. Florez, an individual who uses
methamphetamine could suffer from hallucinations and aggressive, agitated, or
irrational behavior, such as “[w]anting to get in fights.”
9
Pursuant to Appellant’s request, the trial court submitted a self-defense
instruction in its charge. 3 After its deliberations, the jury found Appellant guilty of
murder as charged in Count One of the indictment.
II. Standard of Review
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of
whether it is framed as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the standard of
review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d
756, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010).
Similarly, when a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the rejection of a defensive theory asserted by him, such as self-defense, we
examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine
whether a rational jury could have found the defendant guilty of all essential
elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt and also could have
found against the defendant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt.
Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see also Braughton v.
State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (reaffirming Saxton).

3
In most scenarios, a defendant who uses deadly force against an unarmed victim is not entitled to
a self-defense instruction. See Luna v. State, 687 S.W.3d 79, 109 n.7 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, pet.
ref’d) (compiling cases involving unarmed victims where a defendant was not entitled to a deadly-force
self-defense instruction).
10
To support a claim of self-defense, the defendant bears the burden to produce
some evidence to support the defense; the State bears the burden of persuasion to
disprove it. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608 (citing Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589,
594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913–14). Once the defendant
produces that evidence, the State’s burden does not require the production of
additional evidence to disprove the defense; instead, it requires only that the State
prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594–
95. Furthermore, because the State must rebut a defensive issue by establishing the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we review sufficiency challenges to
the jury’s rejection of a defensive issue under the traditional legal sufficiency
standard. Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2011, pet. ref’d); see also Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914.
When a defendant raises a justification defense, such as self-defense, a
determination of guilt by the jury is an implicit rejection of the defensive theory.
Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594–95; Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914; see also Miller v. State,
712 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, pet. filed). As such, because a
claim of self-defense is a fact issue to be determined by the jury, the jury is free to
accept or reject the defensive theory, either version of the facts, and any part of a
witness’s testimony. Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018);
see Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 912 n.3.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict requires that
we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, including improperly admitted
evidence. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Brooks,
323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007);
Lee v. State, 676 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.). As such,
we defer to the factfinder’s credibility and weight determinations because the
factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their
11
testimony is to be afforded. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.13 (West
2007); Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762; Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d
at 899; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. This deference accounts for the factfinder’s
duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319;
Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 761; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. We may not reevaluate the
weight and credibility of the evidence to substitute our judgment for that of the
factfinder. Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762; Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Dewberry v.
State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Therefore, if the record supports
conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor
of the verdict, and we defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Garcia,
667 S.W.3d at 762; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
Because the standard of review is the same, we treat direct and circumstantial
evidence equally. Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper v.
State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). It is not necessary that the evidence
directly prove the defendant’s guilt. Rather, circumstantial evidence is as probative
as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor and can, without more, be
sufficient to establish his guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013) (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13); Lee, 676 S.W.3d at 915. A guilty
verdict does not require that every fact must directly and independently prove a
defendant’s guilt if the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is
sufficient to support the conviction. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Therefore, in
evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider the cumulative force of
all the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017);
Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

12
III. Analysis
In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support
the jury’s rejection of his claim of self-defense.
A person commits the offense of murder if he “intends to cause serious bodily
injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of
an individual.” PENAL § 19.02(b)(2). The indictment alleged that Appellant, “with
intent to cause serious bodily injury to [Molina], . . . commit[ed] an act clearly
dangerous to human life that caused the death of [Molina] by stabbing him.” It is
undisputed that Appellant murdered Molina, and Appellant concedes on appeal that
there is sufficient evidence for the jury to have found the essential elements of this
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, Appellant only challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s rejection of his claim of self-
defense.
Under appropriate circumstances, a defendant may affirmatively raise the
claim of self-defense to a prosecution for murder if the use of force is “justified.”
Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 606 (“It is a defense to prosecution that the conduct in
question is justified under this chapter.” (quoting PENAL § 9.02)); see also Gamino v.
State, 537 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Barron v. State, 630 S.W.3d
392, 403–04 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d). In asserting self-defense, the
use of force is justified “when and to the degree the [defendant] reasonably believes
the force is immediately necessary to protect the [defendant] against the other’s use
or attempted use of unlawful force.” PENAL § 9.31(a). Similarly, the use of deadly
force against another is justified under the above circumstances “if the [defendant]
would be justified in using force against the other” under Section 9.31, and “when
and to the degree the [defendant] reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately
necessary . . . to protect the [defendant] against the other’s use or attempted use of
unlawful deadly force.” Id. § 9.32(a).
13
“The reasonably believes language within these statutes contain subjective
and objective components.” Lozano v. State, 636 S.W.3d 25, 32 (Tex. Crim. App.
2021) (emphasis added). First, a “defendant must subjectively believe that another
person used or attempted to use unlawful force (Section 9.31) or deadly force
(Section 9.32) against the defendant and that the defendant’s use of unlawful or
deadly force in response was immediately necessary.” Id. “‘Deadly force’ means
force that is intended or known by the [defendant] to cause, or in the manner of its
use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury.” PENAL
§ 9.01(3) (emphasis added). Second, a defendant’s belief must be objectively
reasonable, because a reasonable belief is one that would be held by an ordinary and
prudent person in the same circumstances as the defendant. Id. § 1.07(a)(42). A
defendant’s belief that deadly force was immediately necessary is presumed to be
reasonable if (1) the defendant knows or has reason to believe that the person against
whom the deadly force was used was committing or attempting to commit an
enumerated offense as described by Section 9.32; (2) the defendant did not provoke
the person against whom the force was used; and (3) the defendant was “not
otherwise engaged in criminal activity, other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a
violation of a law or ordinance regulating traffic at the time the force was used.” See
id. § 9.32(b).
Evidence of self-defense may be raised by “other witnesses’ testimony about
the defendant’s acts and words at the time of the offense.” Lozano, 636 S.W.3d at
33 (citing Smith v. State, 676 S.W.2d 584, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)).
Appellant asserts that the evidence is insufficient for a rational jury to find
against him on the issue of self-defense because the evidence adduced at trial
established that (1) Molina was the initial aggressor, and (2) Appellant subjectively
believed that deadly force was immediately necessary to repel Molina’s unlawful
use or attempted use of deadly force against him.
14
At the outset, we note that the primary sources of evidence upon which
Appellant relies to support his claim of self-defense are derived from certain
statements that he made to law enforcement during his recorded interview, and other
statements that he made to his mother during a recorded jail telephone call. As such,
Appellant’s theory of self-defense was inherently a credibility determination for the
jury to resolve, and because it was, the jury was free to reject it. See Saxton, 804
S.W.2d at 914; see also Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 611–13; Barron, 630 S.W.3d at
404.
Additionally, and as we will explain, there is sufficient evidence to support
the jury’s rejection of Appellant’s claim of self-defense. First, a reasonable jury
could have logically concluded that Appellant provoked the altercation with Molina,
thus rebutting the presumption that Appellant’s belief that his use of deadly force
was reasonable under the circumstances. See PENAL § 9.32(b); see also Harrell v.
State, No. 11-22-00261-CR, 2024 WL 39936, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 4,
2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Second, the evidence also
supports the jury’s rejection of Appellant’s claim that he subjectively believed that
his use of deadly force was immediately necessary to protect him against Molina’s
use or attempted use of unlawful force, or that Molina attempted to commit or did
commit one of the offenses enumerated in Section 9.32(a), such as murder. See
PENAL §§ 9.31(a), 9.32(a)(2)(B); see also Lozano, 636 S.W.3d at 32–33.
Appellant argues that the following evidence demonstrates that Molina
provoked the altercation, and that the jury acted irrationally when it did not find in
favor of Appellant on his claim of self-defense: (1) Vanderslice’s testimony that
Molina was the initial aggressor; (2) the toxicology reports and Dr. Florez’s
testimony that Molina was intoxicated and under the influence of illegal drugs at the
time of the altercation, which could have contributed to any violent behavior

15
demonstrated by Molina that day; and (3) the statements Appellant made during his
interview with law enforcement and the recorded jail telephone call with his mother.
As for who provoked the altercation, Vanderslice testified that (1) the fight
appeared to be “mutual” based on Appellant’s and Molina’s interactions prior to the
fight, and (2) she did not observe who threw the first punch. Ranger Vandygriff
testified that, based on his investigation and the statements made by Appellant
during his recorded interview, he believed that Appellant initiated the altercation by
telling Molina to “back up” and that Appellant “engaged” Molina, which provoked
the altercation. Ranger Vandygriff also testified that the fight became “mutual
combat” when Appellant and Molina “got together [and] pushed.” During
Appellant’s recorded interview with law enforcement, he mimed a pushing motion
with his hands when recounting to law enforcement that he told Molina to “back up”
prior to the altercation. Appellant also stated during the interview that Molina
pushed him before the altercation started. In his recorded jail telephone call with his
mother, Appellant said that he “tried to leave” before Molina pushed him into a door
and began hitting him.
While some of Appellant’s statements regarding the circumstances of the
altercation were consistent with certain testimony and evidence adduced at trial and
may have, if believed, indicated that he did not provoke the altercation, the jury was
not required to accept Appellant’s version of events simply because some evidence
or witness testimony supported it. See Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 609; Saxton, 804
S.W.2d at 914. Further, when the record supports conflicting inferences, as it does
here, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762. The jury was free to assess
the credibility of the witnesses and determine, based on the evidence presented, that
Appellant provoked the altercation with Molina. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899;
Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; Barron, 630 S.W.3d at 404.
16
As such, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence, consistent with the jury’s
verdict, that the presumption of reasonableness in Section 9.32(b) does not apply.
See PENAL § 9.32(b); see also Harrell, 2024 WL 39936, at *5.
Appellant also asserts that he subjectively believed that his use of deadly force
was immediately necessary because: (1) Molina was “an intoxicated aggressor”;
(2) Molina used or attempted to use unlawful deadly force against Appellant during
the altercation; (3) Appellant sustained a fractured ankle during the altercation; and
(4) Vanderslice’s testimony showed that Molina “pinned” Appellant on the floor
where he could not move, struck Appellant several times on the head with his fists,
and did not stop hitting Appellant on the head until he used deadly force. Appellant
cites to decisions from this court and our sister courts to support his argument that
the use of an individual’s fists or feet may constitute a deadly weapon.4 However,
these decisions are distinguishable—in each case, the defendant used his hands or
fists to strike the victim—and do not support Appellant’s contention that the jury
acted irrationally when it rejected his claim of self-defense.

4
See Quincy v. State, 304 S.W.3d 489, 499–500 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, no pet.) (holding that
there was sufficient evidence to show that a “closed fist” was a deadly weapon where the defendant struck
a victim on the head with his closed fist and the victim sustained a serious bodily injury as a result);
Brooks v. State, 900 S.W.2d 468, 472–73 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, no pet.) (holding that sufficient
evidence existed to show that a defendant’s hands were a deadly weapon where “[the defendant] knocked
[the victim] unconscious with a single blow and then sat astride his chest and pounded his face and head
with both fists” and caused the victim to sustain a traumatic brain contusion); Clark v. State, 886 S.W.2d
844, 845 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1994, no pet.) (holding that sufficient evidence supported a jury’s finding
that a defendant used a deadly weapon—his hands or feet—where the defendant struck and kicked the two-
year-old child); Haney v. State, No. 06-21-00094-CR, 2022 WL 1546722, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
May 17, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that fists were used as deadly
weapons where the defendant hit his girlfriend in the face with his hands causing fatal injuries); White v.
State, No. 06-18-00205-CR, 2019 WL 2307360, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 31, 2019, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that fists were used as deadly weapons where
the defendant punched a correctional officer in the side of his head causing severe trauma); Rose v. State,
No. 05-94-01926-CR, 1996 WL 729922, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 5, 1996, pet. ref’d) (not
designated for publication) (holding that fists were used as deadly weapons where a defendant punched a
victim in the head).
17
We do not dispute the general rules or legal principles as stated in the cases
cited by Appellant, and we acknowledge that circumstances may arise where a
rational jury could determine that one’s hands or feet may be used as a deadly
weapon. See Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (stating
that a hand or a foot may be a deadly weapon “depending upon the evidence shown”
(quoting Turner v. State, 664 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983))). However,
these cases do not support Appellant’s contention that Molina’s use of his hands and
the alleged use of his feet “supports the [purported] reasonableness of [Appellant’s]
belief that Molina was using or attempting to use unlawful deadly force against him.”
Moreover, as it relates to Appellant’s injuries, while the evidence shows that several
individuals observed an injury to Appellant’s ankle, it is unclear when Appellant
injured his ankle or the severity of any head injuries he might have sustained because
of the altercation.
Here, it is undisputed that Molina was unarmed during the altercation.
Additionally, there is no evidence that Molina made any verbal threats of violence
toward Appellant during the altercation, nor is there any indication that Molina
intended to use unlawful deadly force against Appellant. See Hall v. State, 640
S.W.3d 333, 346 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d). Thus, the jury
could have rationally found that Appellant’s use of deadly force was neither
reasonable nor justified under the circumstances. See Bundy v. State, 280 S.W.3d
425, 434–35 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d) (defendant’s use of deadly
force was not a justifiable response to another’s attempt to punch the defendant);
Schiffert v. State, 257 S.W.3d 6, 14 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref’d) (A
punch to the defendant’s face did not sufficiently demonstrate an “attempt to use
deadly force” so as to justify the use of deadly force in response, and a reasonable
jury could not have found that the defendant’s use of deadly force was justified

18
where the defendant provoked the altercation and the victim did not use or attempt
to use deadly force against the defendant.); see also Hall, 640 S.W.3d at 346.
Further, even though there is some evidence that Molina was under the
influence of illegal drugs and alcohol, before and during the altercation, and that law
enforcement recovered a syringe and suspected narcotics on Molina’s person, there
is no evidence that Appellant was aware of Molina’s intoxicated state. As such,
merely because Molina was intoxicated at the time or because an intoxicated
individual can be aggressive or violent is alone insufficient to support Appellant’s
claimed subjective reasonable belief that his use of deadly force was immediately
necessary. See Bundy, 280 S.W.3d at 434–35.
Vanderslice testified that Molina took a step back; then, at some point,
Appellant stabbed Molina after Molina stopped hitting him. Ranger Vandygriff
indicated that, based on his investigation and observation of the crime scene, he
believed that the altercation occurred near the hallway and kitchen area as opposed
to the front door. Ranger Vandygriff also testified that he could not determine when
Appellant injured his ankle, and that Appellant’s injury could have occurred when
he “slipped and fell” in Bynum’s home while trying to flee, or at another point in
time after he left her home. Furthermore, Ranger Vandygriff testified that
Appellant’s injuries appeared to be minor when he observed Appellant during the
recorded interview, and that Appellant’s statements to law enforcement indicated
that the stabbing was an “offensive” movement by Appellant, as opposed to a
“defensive” one.
As we have said, Appellant’s claim of self-defense was inherently a credibility
determination for the jury to resolve. See Febus, 542 S.W.3d at 572; Barron, 630
S.W.3d at 404. The jury was free to disregard Appellant’s claim, and its
determination of Appellant’s guilt is tantamount to a rejection of his claim and
version of events. See Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 611–13; Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at
19
914; Barron, 630 S.W.3d at 404. As such, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the record contains sufficient
evidence from which a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt all
the essential elements of murder, and also could have found against Appellant on his
claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899;
Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.
IV. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

February 27, 2026
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

20