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Feb. 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Navigator Group v. Susan Davis Van Dyke

Texas Court of Appeals, 11th District (Eastland)

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 11-24-00007-CV
• Nature of Suit: Oil & Gas

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (28)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (19.5K)

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Disposition

Affirmed

Lead Opinion

Opinion filed February 27, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals

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No. 11-24-00007-CV

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THE NAVIGATOR GROUP ET AL., Appellants
V.
SUSAN DAVIS VAN DYKE ET AL., Appellees

On Appeal from the 118th District Court
Martin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 6668

OPINION
In this matter, we revisit a familiar dispute involving a 1924 deed in which
George H. Mulkey and Frances E. Mulkey conveyed property to G.R. White and
G.W. Tom while reserving to themselves “one-half of one-eighth” of the “minerals
and mineral rights” therein. The dispute centers on whether “one-half of one-eighth”
should be interpreted as a mathematical expression, reserving only one-sixteenth of
the minerals, or whether the true intent of the grantors was to reserve one-half of
their mineral interests in the 1924 deed.
The parties are divided into two sides. Appellants are the successors to G.R.
White and G.W. Tom (the White successors). 1 Appellees are the successors to the
Mulkeys (the Mulkey successors).2
We first addressed this case in 2020, erroneously holding that “by the plain
language of the reservation, the Mulkeys reserved a one-sixteenth interest in the
minerals and mineral rights.” Van Dyke v. Navigator Grp., 647 S.W.3d 901, 908
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2020) (Van Dyke I), rev’d, 668 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2023) (Van
Dyke II). Subsequently, however, the Texas Supreme Court determined that “the

1
Appellants are Blake Oil & Gas Corp.; Jack E. Blake, Jr.; Rick Ybarra, as Trustee of the Logan
Lee Blake Trust; Betty Lou Angelo; Ernest Angelo, Jr.; S. Javaid Anwar; Brendan J. Fikes Family P’ship,
Ltd.; Navigator Oil & Minerals, Inc.; Michael J. Daniel; Dingus Investments, Inc.; Discovery Exploration
P’ship; MTX Interests, L.P.; Kennedy Minerals, Ltd.; The Ninety-Six Corp.; Keith M. Skaar; Blake Wood
(the “Navigator Group”); and JPMorgan Chase, N.A., as Trustee of the G.R. White Charitable Trust and
the Joy Lina White Ubina Trust.
2
Appellees are Susan Davis Van Dyke; Estate of Stephen L. Davis, Deceased; Sheryl Ann Huttner,
f/k/a Ann Mulkey Bell; Estate of Kay Elaine Keys, Deceased; Jill Marie Stuckert, a/k/a Jill Marie Walker;
George Dan Mulkey and Thomas J. Mulkey, Trustees of the Mulkey Family Mineral Trust; Arthur B. Davis;
Boyd Enterprises, Inc.; The Huffington Foundation; Bishop-Windham Family Limited Partnership; The
Dillon Fund; Terry S. Key, Trustee of the Terry S. Key Non-Exempt Trust; Roger A. Key, Trustee of the
Roger A. Key Non- Exempt Trust; Pam Stribling and John V. Price as Heirs and Successors of Interest to
Noble H. Price; Preston Bridgewater, Jr.; James G. McClellan, Ind. Executor of Estate of Hayden J.
Upchurch, Deceased; Deborah L. Alexander, Trustee of the DLA Child’s Trust; Amanda Kay Livingston,
Trustee of the AKL Child’s Trust; Culley Ingram, Trustee of the CI Grandchild’s Trust; Kerry Kantman,
Trustee of the KK Grandchild’s Trust; McKenzie Ciliberto, Trustee of the MC Grandchild’s Trust; Ryedale,
LLC; Jane R. Lancaster; Raymond James Trust, N.A., Trustees of the Edith Elizabeth Brasher 1986
Management Trust; William Marsh Rice University; Howard W. Key, Trustee of the Howard W. Key Non-
Exempt Trust; Charles E. Key, Trustee of the Charles E. Key Non-Exempt Trust; G&R Carr Enterprises,
LLC; Dorchester Minerals, LP; Deutsche Bank Trust Company, N.A. and Irving Sitnick, Trustees of the
Lucy G. Moses 12/24/58 Trust; Deutsche Bank Trust Company, N.A., Trustee of the Henry & Lucy Moses
Foundation Trust; Deutsche Bank Trust Company, N.A. and William H. Hernstadt, Trustees of the William
H. Hernstadt Estate Trust; Deutsche Bank Trust Company, N.A., Trustee of the William L. Hernstadt 1937
Trust; Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas LLC; PXP Producing Company LLC; Renee Brunson; Gary
Covington; Kyle Covington; Lisa Graham; Kirk Covington; Earmark Enterprises; Dela Minerals, Inc. by
and through Covington Minerals, LP; Endeavor Energy Resources, LP; Dave Michael McCullar; Frederick
Bartlett Wulff, Sr.; Richard W. Winters, Jr.; and Kathleen M. Winters.

2
Mulkey parties hold title to 1/2 of the mineral estate.” Van Dyke v. Navigator Grp.,
668 S.W.3d 353, 368 (Tex. 2023). However, the Texas Supreme Court did not
render judgment. Id. Instead, it remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.3 Id. On remand, the trial court signed a judgment holding, among
other things, that “the Mulkeys reserved to themselves . . . an undivided 1/2 of the
entire mineral estate.”
In this appeal, the White successors argue that the trial court misapplied Van
Dyke II when it failed to distinguish the reservation of the Mulkey’s right to royalties
(which they argue is one-sixteenth) from their remaining mineral rights (which they
argue is one-half). Alternatively, the White successors urge us to disregard the
supreme court’s opinion in Van Dyke II and hold that the deed reserves “a fixed
1/16th royalty interest.”
We conclude that the trial court has correctly applied Van Dyke II in its
judgment and that we are obliged to adhere to Van Dyke II under the doctrines of
stare decisis and the law of the case. See Lubbock Cnty., Tex. v. Trammel’s Lubbock
Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 585 (Tex. 2002); Briscoe v. Goodmark Corp., 102
S.W.3d 714, 716 (Tex. 2003). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
Factual and Procedural Background
The reservation clause at issue involves the mineral rights to a ranch property
that is situated in Howard and Martin Counties. It provided as follows:
It is understood and agreed that one-half of one-eighth of all
minerals and mineral rights in said land are reserved in grantors, Geo.
H. Mulkey and Frances E. Mulkey, and are not conveyed herein.

The Texas Supreme Court noted that a remand was necessary because the Mulkey successors did
3

not have a motion for summary judgment before the trial court with respect to the construction of the 1924
deed. Van Dyke II, 668 S.W.3d at 368 n.12.
3
For the last twelve years, the parties have clashed over the question of whether the
language at issue reserved to the Mulkeys one-sixteenth or one-half of the mineral
rights in the property. See Van Dyke II, 668 S.W.3d at 357; Van Dyke I, 647 S.W.3d
at 905.
In 2018, the trial court issued an order holding that the language at issue
reserved a one-sixteenth interest in the mineral rights to the property. Several
months later, we affirmed. Van Dyke I, 647 S.W.3d at 913. However, the supreme
court subsequently reversed our judgment, holding that the deed reserved one-half
of the mineral estate and remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Van Dyke II, 668 S.W.3d at 368.
On remand, the trial court entered a final judgment, holding, among other
things, that the Mulkeys had reserved one-half of the entire mineral estate, and that
the successors-in-interest to the Mulkeys therefore held title to an undivided one-
half of the entire mineral estate.
The White successors now appeal from the trial court’s judgment on remand,
asserting that the trial court erred in holding that the deed reserved an undivided one-
half of the entire mineral estate (including one-half of the royalties). As set out
below, the White successors make a distinction between ownership of the relevant
royalty interest and ownership of the minerals and other mineral rights. They
contend that while the Mulkeys intended to reserve one-half of the minerals in the
1924 deed as per Van Dyke II, they also intended to reserve in the 1924 deed a fixed
one-sixteenth of the royalty interest.
The White Successors’ Challenge to the Trial Court’s Judgment
In their first issue, the White successors assert that the trial court erred when
it declared that the 1924 deed reserved “an undivided 1/2 of the entire mineral estate”
to the Mulkeys. In support of this claim, they argue that the trial court’s ruling is

4
inconsistent with the supreme court’s opinion in Van Dyke II. Alternatively, they
argue that, if we determine that the trial court’s judgment is consistent with Van
Dyke II, we should reverse the trial court’s ruling on the grounds that Van Dyke II
was wrongly decided.
Estate Misconception and Historical Standardization
The White successors’ first argument relies on the rules of interpretation for
antiquated deeds set forth in Van Dyke II. That case began with the well-established
premise that courts should adopt the ordinary meaning of a word “[u]nless otherwise
defined in the text.” Id. at 359. More specifically, courts should adhere to the
“meaning at the time of drafting.” Id. at 360; see also Hysaw v. Dawkins, 483
S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 78 (2012)). Thus, “[t]he test is what the text
reasonably meant to an ordinary speaker of the language who would have understood
the original text in its context.” Van Dyke II, 668 S.W.3d at 360.
With these principles in mind, the supreme court then examined the “Double-
Fraction Dilemma,” which it had previously visited in Hysaw. Id. at 362. When a
deed consistently uses single fractions to describe an interest, the determination of
the interest at issue will ordinarily be a simple matter. Id.; Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d at 9.
However, when a deed describes an interest as a double-fraction, it can “present
serious complications.” Van Dyke II, 668 S.W.3d at 362. Should the double-fraction
be treated as if it were a simple (but seemingly unnecessary) problem of arithmetic?
Or should we restrain our instincts to reduce the two fractions to a single numerical
expression and consider whether they might have a different meaning? In both
Hysaw and Van Dyke II, the supreme court took the latter path, finding that “[i]ntent
must be determined by a careful and detailed examination of the document in its
entirety, rather than by application of mechanical rules of construction that offer

5
certainty at the expense of effectuating intent.” Id. (quoting Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d at
16). Specifically, the court found that, in the context of antiquated deeds, there were
“two widespread and related faulty conceptual culprits . . . that worked in tandem to
lead parties to use the term ‘1/8’ to describe something other than a literal eighth.”
Id. at 363. Those concepts are the estate misconception theory and the historical
standardization of the term “1/8” (also sometimes described as “the legacy of the 1/8
royalty”). Id. at 363.
“The estate-misconception theory reflects the prevalent (but, as it turns out,
mistaken) belief that, in entering into an oil-and-gas lease, a lessor retained only a
1/8 interest in the minerals rather than the entire mineral estate in fee simple
determinable with the possibility of reverter of the entire estate.” Id. (citing Hysaw,
483 S.W.3d at 10). Thus, grantors often mistakenly used the term “1/8” to refer to
the entirety of their mineral interest. Id.
In a similar manner, the court found that the term “1/8” had acquired a special
meaning in the context of a standard royalty, since the use of a 1/8 royalty was “near
ubiquitous” at the time. Id. (quoting Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d at 9–10). Thus, “parties
would use the term 1/8 as a placeholder for future royalties generally—without
anyone understanding that reference to set an arithmetic value.” Id.
Based on these principles, the court determined in both Van Dyke II and
Hysaw that, under the facts presented in those cases, the term “1/8” was properly
understood as a description of the entire mineral estate. Id. at 364; Hysaw, 483
S.W.3d at 15–16. Furthermore, based on this determination, the court in Van Dyke II
concluded “that the Mulkey parties hold title to 1/2 of the mineral estate.” Van Dyke
II, 668 S.W.3d at 368.

6
Did the Mulkey’s Reserve Only a 1/16th fixed Royalty Interest?
In this appeal, the White successors argue that, in determining that “the
Mulkeys reserved . . . an undivided 1/2 of the entire mineral estate,” the trial court
erred in its implementation of Van Dyke II. Specifically, they contend that, to
maintain consistency with Van Dyke II, the trial court should have held that “the
Mulkeys reserved a 1/2 mineral interest (excepting as to royalties) and a fixed 1/16
royalty interest.” In this regard, the White successors contend that if the prevalent
belief at the time was that a royalty interest would aways be one-eighth, then it
“informs the quantum of royalty the Mulkeys actually intended to reserve” in the
1924 deed.4
We review a trial court’s construction of a deed de novo. See Piranha
Partners v. Neuhoff, 596 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Tex. 2020); Pacer Energy, Ltd. v.
Endeavor Energy Res., LP, 675 S.W.3d 390, 394 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet.
denied). An appellate court may only construe a deed as a matter of law if it is
unambiguous. ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmann, 547 S.W.3d 858, 874 (Tex. 2018)
(citing J. Hiram Moore, Ltd. v. Greer, 172 S.W.3d 609, 613 (Tex. 2005)). If a deed
is worded in such a way that it can be given a certain or definite legal meaning, then
the deed is not ambiguous. Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Discovery Operating,
Inc., 554 S.W.3d 586, 601 (Tex. 2018). Our task when construing an unambiguous
deed is to “ascertain the intent of the parties from all of the language in the deed” as

4
As asserted by the White successors in their brief:
If the Mulkeys believed future lease royalties would always be 1/8, they believed
they would always be entitled to a 1/8 payment on the leased minerals—no matter
how much of the minerals were actually leased therein (whether 1/2, 1/8, 1/16, or
some other fraction of the minerals). So, by contracting in a manner to reserve
only “one-half of one-eighth” of mineral rights, the legacy misconception informs
that the Mulkeys’ intent was to reserve a 1/16 payment on the leased minerals—
no matter how much of the minerals were ultimately leased.

7
expressed within the “four corners” of the instrument. Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d
459, 461 (Tex. 1991); Pacer, 675 S.W.3d at 394. The four-corners rule requires the
court to ascertain the intent of the parties solely from all of the language in the deed.
Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791, 794 (Tex. 2017) (citing Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at
461). The intent that governs is not the intent that the parties meant but failed to
express but, rather, the intent that is expressed. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462.
A mineral estate consists of five interests: “1) the right to develop, 2) the
right to lease, 3) the right to receive bonus payments, 4) the right to receive
delay rentals, and 5) the right to receive royalty payments.” Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d at
9 (quoting French v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 896 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex.1995)).
As noted by a legal commentator, of the five “sticks” in “the bundle” of
mineral interests, “[r]oyalty is likely the most litigated stick within the bundle.”
Christopher Kulander, “‘Fixed vs. Floating’ Mineral and Royalty Questions in
Texas: Is the End Any Nearer?” Law of Permian Basin Oil & Gas Development and
Operations 6B-1, 6B 1 (Found. for Nat. Res. & Energy L. 2023).
The nature of an interest conveyed or reserved by a deed is ascertained from
the language of the deed itself. See Pacer, 675 S.W.3d at 395 (citing Endeavor
Energy Res., LP v. Trudy Jane Anderson Testamentary Tr., by & Through Anderson,
644 S.W.3d 212, 223–24 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. denied)). Here, the
Mulkeys reserved to themselves “one-half of one-eighth” of the “minerals and
mineral rights” therein. Of course, our task of interpreting the 1924 deed is guided
by the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Van Dyke II wherein it determined that the
Mulkeys reserved “1/2 of the mineral estate” in the 1924 deed. 668 S.W.3d at 368.
The White successors’ argument on appeal goes one step further than the holding in
Van Dyke II. They assert that, in addition to reserving one-half of the mineral estate,
the Mulkeys also reserved a fixed one-sixteenth royalty interest. The White

8
successors contend that this additional reading of the 1924 deed is required by Van
Dyke II.
The White successors argue that the court in Van Dyke II was signaling that
the parties’ rights to royalties should be treated as a separate matter from the rights
to the remainder of the mineral estate. They base this argument on the assertion that
the Van Dyke II opinion treated the estate misconception theory and the historical
standardization of royalties as “distinct” and “separate” issues.
The White successors agree that, under the estate misconception theory,
landowners such as the Mulkeys might have erroneously believed that if the land
was leased for development in the future, they “retained only 1/8 of the minerals in
place . . . instead of a fee simple determinable with the possibility of reverter in the
entirety.” See Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d at 10. Thus, they concede that the trial court’s
judgment with respect to ownership of the mineral estate is consistent with the
portion of the Van Dyke II opinion that assesses the parties’ rights under the estate
misconception theory. However, they argue that the trial court’s judgment does not
correctly dispose of the parties’ royalty rights, which—according to the White
successors—the supreme court treated as a separate issue in its analysis of the legacy
of the 1/8 royalty.
The White successors assert that the estate misconception theory and the
legacy of the 1/8 royalty do not operate in the same manner. They argue that
“[u]nlike the estate misconception whereby the Mulkeys believed their actual
mineral ownership changed from 8/8 to 1/8, the royalty misconception presumes that
the Mulkeys believed the royalty was forever 1/8.” They maintain that “by laboring
under this royalty misconception, [they] know the Mulkeys’ actual intent was to
reserve a fixed 1/16 royalty” as a result of the 1924 deed.

9
Under the language of the 1924 deed, the Mulkeys reserved one-half of the
“minerals and mineral rights.” The Texas Supreme Court shortened the term to
“mineral estate” in its holding. Van Dyke II, 668 S.W.3d at 368. As we noted in
Pacer, the Texas Supreme Court recognized in the 1937 case of Schlittler v. Smith
that the terms “minerals” and “mineral rights” are synonymous as references to the
mineral estate, i.e. the minerals in place. Pacer, 675 S.W.3d at 395 (citing
Schlittler v. Smith, 101 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. 1937)). We also commented in Pacer
that the reservation in Van Dyke II was a reservation of a portion of the mineral
estate. Id. (citing Van Dyke II, 668 S.W.3d at 357–58).
“A royalty interest is an interest in land that is a part of the total mineral estate
. . . [that] derives from the grantor’s mineral interest.” Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 463
(citing State National Bank v. Morgan, 143 S.W.2d 757, 760 (Tex. 1940)).
“Generally, ‘the conveyance of an interest in the minerals in place carries with it by
operation of law the right to a corresponding interest in the royalty.’” Wenske, 521
S.W.3d at 797 (quoting Woods v. Sims, 273 S.W.2d 617, 621 (Tex. 1954)). Thus,
“when a deed conveys or reserves a 3/8ths interest in the minerals, the nature of that
interest, by operation of law, includes the right to receive 3/8ths of the royalties.”
Id. (citing Woods, 273 S.W.2d at 621).
The Texas Supreme Court determined in Van Dyke II that “the Mulkey parties
hold title to 1/2 of the mineral estate” without further qualification. 668 S.W.3d at
368. In doing so, the court was referring to the entire set of severable mineral rights
attributable to one-half of the mineral estate, including the corresponding right to
royalties, rather than (as the White successors contend) all of the mineral rights
except the royalties. See Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 797.
In the 1924 deed, the Mulkeys reserved one-half of the mineral estate. There
was no severance or “carve out” in the 1924 deed of their royalty interest or any

10
other party’s royalty interest from the mineral estate. Accordingly, the trial court
did not err by rejecting the White successors’ contention that the Mulkeys reserved
in the 1924 deed a fixed one-sixteenth royalty interest. Thus, the statement by the
trial court in its judgment that the Mulkeys reserved “an undivided 1/2 of the entire
mineral estate in, to and under the lands described in the 1924 Deed” merely
reiterates the supreme court’s holding in Van Dyke II in only slightly different
wording. Van Dyke II, 668 S.W.3d at 368.
The alternative reading proposed by the White successors is inconsistent with
the supreme court’s framing of the issues in Van Dyke II. When describing the issues
before it, the court indicated that “the ownership of past
royalties turns on which side correctly interprets the deed’s mineral reservation.” Id.
As such, it appears that the supreme court believed that its interpretation of the
mineral reservation in the 1924 deed would also be dispositive of the disposition of
the royalties. There is no explicit suggestion in Van Dyke II that the supreme court
somehow intended a result that treated the parties’ royalty rights in any way that was
distinct from the remaining mineral rights, and we do not believe that the court would
have merely inferred such a result, since it believed that the disposition of the
ownership of the royalty rights was the primary matter that was at stake. Id.
Moreover, contrary to Hysaw and Van Dyke II, the alternative reading
proposed by the White successors fails to harmonize the relationship between the
estate misconception theory and the legacy of the 1/8 royalty. In both cases, the
supreme court indicated that the estate misconception theory and the legacy of the
1/8 royalty are interrelated concepts that work together toward the same result.
Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d at 10 (“A related issue that may be implicated in double-fraction
cases is the theory of ‘estate misconception.’”); see Van Dyke II, 668 S.W.3d at 362
(In Hysaw, “[t]he court identified two related circumstances that explain why 1/8 in

11
such instruments did not typically bear its arithmetical meaning: the historical use
of 1/8 as the standard royalty and the estate-misconception theory.”). The White
successors’ suggestion that these two concepts somehow cut against each other,
producing different outcomes for different types of mineral interests, is inconsistent
with the supreme court’s more straightforward understanding.
The White successors’ interpretation of the reservation clause in light of Van
Dyke II invites us to read the phrase “one-eighth of all minerals and mineral rights
in said land” as carrying two different meanings at once. According to the White
successors’ interpretation, “one-eighth” is supposed to refer to the entire mineral
estate in a manner that is consistent with the estate misconception theory. However,
at the same time, it is supposed to refer to a fixed 1/8th of only the royalties. While
grantors are free to distinguish between their disposition of royalty interests and
other mineral interests, see Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d at 9, it is unreasonable to assume
that a grantor would attempt to do both within the same reservation clause, and we
do not believe that the supreme court intended such a result in Van Dyke II. The
supreme court has plainly stated that “this deed did not use 1/8 in its arithmetical
sense.” Van Dyke II, 368 S.W.3d at 366. As such, under Van Dyke II, the parties’
use of the phrase “one-eighth of all minerals and mineral rights in said land” did not
serve as a multiplier to be applied to the mineral rights as a whole for the creation of
a royalty interest. Simply put, the 1924 deed did not create a royalty interest.
For these reasons, we reject the White successors’ argument that, under the
principles enunciated in Van Dyke II, the 1924 deed reserved to the Mulkeys only
1/16th of the royalties.

12
Stare Decisis and the Law of the Case
As a part of their first issue, the White successors argue in the alternative that
Van Dyke II was wrongly decided and that we should therefore “right a wrongly-
decided case.” We decline to take this extraordinary step for two reasons.
A. Stare Decisis Compels Us to Honor Van Dyke II
“Adherence to precedent [is] the touchstone of a neutral legal system that
provides stability and reliability.” Mitschke v. Borromeo, 645 S.W.3d 251, 263
(Tex. 2022). For that reason, “[d]epartures from precedent must be carefully
considered and should be rare.” Id. Courts will therefore adhere to their precedents
for purposes of efficiency, fairness, and legitimacy. Id.
“[E]fficiency” is promoted when emerging disputes are clearly resolved by
the precedent. See id. If courts do not follow their own decisions, “no issue could
ever be considered resolved,” and “[t]he potential volume of speculative relitigation”
rises. Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. 1995).
In the context of precedent, “fairness” is promoted when parties can share
settled expectations and justifiably rely on the rulings of the court when they make
decisions about future courses of action. Weiner, 900 S.W.2d at 320; see also
Grapevine Excavation, Inc. v. Maryland Lloyds, 35 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. 2000) (Stare
decisis “results in predictability in the law, which allows people to rationally order
their conduct and affairs.”).
Finally, the purpose of “legitimacy” is served by a “stable and predictable
decisionmaking process” that contrasts with (and, to some degree, counterbalances)
the “political” branches of government, which are more appropriately prone to
change. See Weiner, 900 S.W.2d at 320 (“[Stare decisis] permits society to presume
that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of
individuals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of

13
government, both in appearance and in fact.” (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S.
254, 265–66 (1986))).
Stare decisis is the central pillar that supports our system of precedent. It
dictates that “once the supreme court announces a proposition of law, the decision
is considered binding.” Trammel’s, 80 S.W.3d at 585; see also Sw. Bell Tel. Co.,
L.P. v. Mitchell, 276 S.W.3d 443, 447 (Tex. 2008). Pursuant to the doctrine of stare
decisis, only the Texas Supreme Court can abrogate its established precedent.
Robinson v. Home Owners Mgmt. Enterprises, Inc., 590 S.W.3d 518, 528 (Tex.
2019). By contrast, “[i]t is not the function of a court of appeals to abrogate or
modify established precedent” of the Texas Supreme Court. Trammel’s, 80 S.W.3d
at 585; see Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964) (“After a principle,
rule or proposition of law has been squarely decided by the Supreme Court, or the
highest court of the State having jurisdiction of the particular case, the decision is
accepted as a binding precedent by the same court or other courts of lower rank when
the very point is again presented in a subsequent suit between different parties.”);
State v. Standard, 401 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1966), rev’d on other
grounds, 414 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. 1967) (quoting Swilley); see also In re State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 614 S.W.3d 316, 360 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2020, orig.
proceeding).
The White successors correctly point out that stare decisis is not an absolute
principle, and that courts can and should overrule precedent when it no longer serves
the purposes of efficiency, fairness, and legitimacy. See, e.g., Mitchell, 276 S.W.3d
at 448 (“[J]udicial adherence to the decision in the name of stare decisis may actually
disserve the interests of ‘efficiency, fairness, and legitimacy’ that support the
doctrine.”). However, the White successors’ request for this court to overturn Van
Dyke II in the face of stare decisis is misdirected. Van Dyke II is a decision that was

14
handed down by the Texas Supreme Court. As such, any decision to overrule it must
likewise be made by the Texas Supreme Court. See Robinson, 590 S.W.3d at 528.
Contrary to the White successors’ request, the doctrine of stare decisis compels us
to follow, rather than reject, Van Dyke II. See Trammel’s, 80 S.W.3d at 585.
B. The Law of the Case Compels us to Follow Van Dyke II
We are also compelled to follow Van Dyke II as law of the case.
The law of the case can be expressed as “that principle under which questions
of law decided on appeal to a court of last resort will govern the case throughout its
subsequent stages.” Briscoe, 102 S.W.3d at 716 (quoting Hudson v. Wakefield, 711
S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1986)). As such, “the issues decided on appeal will be
regarded as the law of the case and thus govern the case throughout its subsequent
stages.” Eriksen v. Nelson, 708 S.W.3d 302, 309 (Tex. App. —15th Dist. 2025, no
pet.).
Like stare decisis, the law of the case favors adherence to precedent. It
operates to “achieve uniformity of decision as well as judicial economy and
efficiency.” Hudson, 711 S.W.2d at 630; see also Deaton v. Law Offices of Steven
M. Johnson, P.C., 697 S.W.3d 676, 694 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). It
furthers such purposes by, among other things, encouraging an end to litigation that
might otherwise continue indefinitely. Id.
When a court of appeals makes a determination on a matter of law, its decision
is likewise binding on remand. See, e.g., Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating,
Inc., 372 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tex. 2012); Hjella v. Red McCombs Motors, Ltd.,
No. 04-23-00145-CV, 2024 WL 3954214, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 28,
2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (The doctrine of the law of the case “may apply even when
the appeal does not reach the court of last resort.”). However, this principle applies
only in situations where the Texas Supreme Court has not ruled on the matter at

15
issue. City of Houston v. Precast Structures, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 331, 338 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (“Where a losing party fails to avail itself of
an appeal in the court of last resort, but allows the case to be remanded for further
proceedings, the points decided by the court of appeals will be regarded as the law
of the case and will not be re-examined.”).
Although the law of the case doctrine provides us with discretion to reconsider
our own decisions on matters of law, see Briscoe, 102 S.W.3d at 716–17, we cannot
do so with respect to decisions that have been made by the supreme court. Such
decisions are binding on us, just as they are binding on the trial court. See Briscoe,
102 S.W.3d at 716 (“[Q]uestions of law decided on appeal to a court of last resort
will govern the case throughout its subsequent stages.” (quoting Hudson, 711
S.W.2d at 630)). Accordingly, in accordance with the doctrine of the law of the
case, we decline to reconsider the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Van Dyke II.
We overrule the White successors’ first issue.
The Presumed Grant Doctrine
In their second issue, the White successors argue that the Mulkey successors
are not entitled to receive more than a fixed one-sixteenth royalty under the
presumed grant doctrine. See Van Dyke II, 668 S.W.3d at 366–68 (discussion of the
applicability of the presumed-grant doctrine). As explained in Van Dyke II, the
presumed grant doctrine has been referred to as “title by circumstantial evidence”
and it has been described as “a common law form of adverse possession.” Id. at 366
(quoting Fair v. Arp Club Lake, Inc., 437 S.W.3d 619, 626 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2014,
no pet.)). As applied to the facts in this case, if the Mulkeys had only obtained a
one-sixteenth interest in the mineral estate by virtue of the 1924 deed, then they
subsequently acquired the remaining seven-sixteenth interest as evidenced by the
parties’ subsequent dealings. Id. The Texas Supreme Court concluded that the

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Mulkey successors also established title under the presumed grant doctrine to the
disputed seven-sixteenth interest in the mineral estate. Id. at 366–68.
The Mulkey successors included the presumed grant doctrine as a ground for
summary judgment. Because the trial court’s order does not specify the grounds for
its summary judgment, we must affirm the summary judgment if any of the theories
presented to the trial court and preserved for appellate review are meritorious. See
Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2003) (first citing
Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex. 1996); and then citing
Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989)). Accordingly, the White
successors challenge the summary judgment to the extent that it was granted under
the presumed grant doctrine. See Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473
(Tex. 1995) (“When the trial court does not specify the basis for its summary
judgment, the appealing party must show it is error to base it on any ground asserted
in the motion.”).
As set forth above, we have concluded that, under the express terms of the
1924 deed, the Mulkeys reserved a one-half interest in the mineral estate without
any reference to the creation or reservation of a royalty interest. Specifically, the
1924 deed did not reserve a fixed one-sixteenth royalty interest as asserted by the
White successors. In light of our conclusion that summary judgment was proper on
the ground that the Mulkeys reserved a one-half interest in the mineral estate under
the express terms of the 1924 deed, we need not address the alternative ground of
the presumed-grant doctrine. See State v. Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Thirty–
Five Dollars & No Cents in U.S. Currency ($90,235), 390 S.W.3d 289, 294 (Tex.
2013) (court of appeals did not need to discuss alternative grounds for summary
judgment after upholding summary judgment on one meritorious ground).
We overrule the White successors’ second issue.

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This Court’s Ruling
For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

February 27, 2026
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
and Marion, S.C.J.5

Trotter, J., and Williams, J., not participating.

5
Sandee B. Marion, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 4th District of Texas at
San Antonio, sitting by assignment.

At the time of submission on oral argument, Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court
of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland, sat on the panel by assignment. Unfortunately, he passed
away before the issuance of this opinion.

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