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Feb. 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Liberty Property v. Kendal Heaton Assoc.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: 2026 Pa. Super. 37
• Docket Number: 2947 EDA 2024

• Judges: Olson; Dubow

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (8.8K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

                        by [Judith Ference Olson](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8241/judith-ference-olson/)

J-A18033-25 2026 PA Super 37

LIBERTY PROPERTY LIMITED : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PARTNERSHIP : PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
: No. 2947 EDA 2024
KENDALL HEATON ASSOCIATES, :
INC., BALA CONSULTING :
ENGINEERS, INC., F+P ARCHITECTS :
NEW YORK, INC., ROTTET STUDIO, :
LLC AND ROTTET ARCHITECTURE :
AND DESIGN STUDIO NY, PLLC, :
METROPOLITAN ACOUSTICS, LLC, :
TILLOTSON DESIGN ASSOCIATES, :
INC. :

Appeal from the Order Entered October 17, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): 210901337

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and BECK, J.

OPINION BY OLSON, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 27, 2026

Appellant, Liberty Property Limited Partnership (“Liberty”), appeals from

the October 17, 2024 order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of

Philadelphia County that made final, as discussed more fully infra, the trial

court’s August 31, 2023 order, which granted the motion to enforce a

settlement agreement filed by Kendall Heaton Associates, Inc. (“Kendall

Heaton”) and denied Liberty’s cross-motion to enforce a competing settlement

agreement. Upon careful consideration, we affirm the trial court’s order

enforcing the settlement agreement proffered by Kendall Heaton.
J-A18033-25

Liberty was the fee developer in the construction of the Comcast

Technology Center (“the Center”), which is located in Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania. As the fee developer, Liberty contracted with, inter alia, Kendall

Heaton, Bala Consulting Engineers, Inc., F+P Architects, New York Inc., Rottet

Architecture and Design Studio, NY, PLLC, Rottet Studio, LLC, Metropolitan

Acoustics, LLC, and Tillotson Design Associates, Inc. (collectively, “Appellees”)

to provide construction services related to the Center. During construction of

the Center, certain design defects were discovered by Liberty, which resulted

in additional construction costs. The parties attempted to resolve their

disputes over the design defects and additional cost overages through

mediation but, ultimately, Liberty filed a complaint, on November 15, 2021,

asserting breach of contract and professional negligence claims.

Notwithstanding the commencement of its action, Liberty continued to

participate in mediation with Appellees.

On January 27, 2022, counsel for the parties participated in a mediation

session at which Christianne Chen, Esquire (“Attorney Chen”), Associate

General Counsel for Prologis, Inc. - Liberty’s parent company, was present as

a representative on behalf of Liberty and with the authority to bind Liberty to

a settlement agreement. Liberty was also represented at the mediation by its

outside counsel, Noah H. Charlson, Esquire (“Attorney Charlson”). At the

mediation, the parties reached a settlement agreement that resolved the

design defect disputes. Counsel for Kendall Heaton confirmed the settlement

agreement that was reached at the conclusion of the mediation in an electronic

-2-
J-A18033-25

mail (“email”) sent to the mediator and counsel for all parties later that same

day, January 27, 2022. In the email, Kendall Heaton’s counsel represented

that the parties agreed to, inter alia, “exchange mutual [r]eleases concerning

all known and unknown claims that were asserted or could have been asserted

in this matter concerning the project[.]” Kendall Heaton’s Motion to Enforce

Settlement Agreement, 11/15/22, at Exhibit 3 - ¶(h). The following day,

January 28, 2022, Attorney Charlson responded via email that the content of

the January 27, 2022 email prepared by counsel for Kendall Heaton

“represents our understanding” of the agreement. Id. at Exhibit 4 (emphasis

added). On February 3, 2022, Attorney Charlson stated, via email, that “I can

advise you that Liberty is in a position to accept the collective settlement

offer[.]” Id. at Exhibit 5. Thereafter, Attorney Charlson (as Liberty’s outside

counsel) prepared a draft of the settlement agreement, which stated, in

pertinent part, that Liberty released Appellees from

all manner of actions . . . whether or not heretofore known,
suspected or asserted, which it ever had, now has, or
hereafter may acquire, arising out of or relating to the [p]roject
. . . including without limitation all claims that were asserted or
could have been asserted in the [l]itigation.

Id. at Exhibit 6 (emphasis added). On March 9, 2022, counsel for Kendall

Heaton responded with a marked-up version of Liberty’s draft settlement

agreement that retained the language in Liberty’s proposed settlement

agreement, as set forth supra, and modified only items unrelated to the text

describing the scope of the release provision. Id. at Exhibit 11; see also

-3-
J-A18033-25

N.T., 6/26/23, at 28 (explaining that the marked-up version of Liberty’s draft

settlement agreement included the same language proposed by Liberty

regarding the release terms). Ultimately, the parties were unable to execute

a written settlement agreement because, at some point, Liberty requested

that the written agreement expressly exclude latent defects from those claims

included within the release provision of the original oral settlement agreement

that was confirmed in the email circulated by counsel for Kendall Heaton on

January 27, 2022, and substantively reaffirmed by Attorney Charlson on

January 28, 2022, and again on February 3, 2022. Kendall Heaton’s Motion

to Enforce Settlement Agreement, 11/15/22, at Exhibit 12.

On November 15, 2022, Kendall Heaton filed a motion to enforce the

settlement agreement that was reached at the conclusion of the January 27,

2022 mediation session. On December 15, 2022, Liberty filed a cross-motion

for enforcement of a version of the settlement agreement that excluded latent

defects. The trial court, on June 26, 2023, entertained argument on the

competing enforcement motions.

On August 22, 2023, the trial court granted Kendall Heaton’s motion to

enforce the settlement agreement and denied Liberty’s cross-motion seeking

enforcement of a settlement agreement that excluded latent defects. See

Trial Court Order, 8/22/23. On August 31, 2023, the trial court sua sponte

amended its August 22, 2023 order to include an opinion setting forth its

reasons for ordering enforcement of a settlement agreement on the terms

advanced by Kendall Heaton. See Trial Court Order, 8/31/23; see also 42

-4-
J-A18033-25

Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 (stating, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided or prescribed by

law, a court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within

30 days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior termination of any term of

court, if no appeal from such order has been taken or allowed”).

On September 28, 2023, Liberty filed a notice of appeal challenging the

August 31, 2023 order. In a March 22, 2024 per curiam order, this Court

quashed Liberty’s appeal on the ground that the August 31, 2023 order was

not a final, appealable order as contemplated by Pennsylvania Rule of

Appellate Procedure 341. Per Curiam Order (2503 EDA 2023), 3/22/24; see

also Pa.R.A.P. 341(a) and (b)(1) (stating that, “an appeal may be taken as of

right from any final order of a [] trial court” and defining a “final order” as,

inter alia, an order that “disposes of all clams and of all parties”).

On October 17, 2024, the trial court entered a final order that disposed

of all claims and all parties thereby permitting Liberty to challenge the August

31, 2023 order. Trial Court Order, 10/17/24. This appeal followed. 1

Liberty raises the following issues for our review:

1. Where both the client and its attorney have denied that the attorney had express authority to settle a matter on behalf of the client, can the attorney bind the client to a settlement by exchanging drafts of an agreement with opposing counsel that included terms to which the client had not agreed?

---

1 Liberty and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925.

-5-
J-A18033-25

1. Where the parties did not agree on a material term of a
   

   proposed settlement agreement - the claims [Liberty]
   would release in return for a payment - was there a meeting
   of the minds and an enforceable settlement agreement?

2. Could the [trial] court resolve a motion to enforce an alleged
   

   settlement without holding an evidentiary hearing on
   disputed issues of fact regarding the terms of the alleged
   agreement and counsel’s authority to enter into it on behalf
   of his client?

Liberty’s Brief at 2.

Collectively, Liberty’s issues challenge the trial court’s order granting

Kendall Heaton’s motion to enforce the January 27, 2022 oral settlement

agreement.

The enforceability of settlement agreements is determined
according to principles of contract law. Because contract
interpretation is a question of law, this Court is not bound by the
trial court’s interpretation. Our standard of review over questions
of law is de novo and to the extent necessary, the scope of our
review is plenary as [this Court] may review the entire record in
making its decision.

Ragnar Benson, Inc. v. Hempfield Twp. Mun. Auth., 916 A.2d 1183, 1188

(Pa. Super. 2007) (citations, quotation marks, and original brackets omitted).

“With respect to factual conclusions, we may reverse the trial court only if its

findings of fact are predicated on an error of law or are unsupported by

competent evidence in the record.” Mastroni-Mucker v. Allstate Insur.

Co., 976 A.2d 510, 518 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal denied, 991 A.2d 313 (Pa.

2010).

It is well-established that, in this Commonwealth, “an agreement to

settle legal disputes between parties is favored.” Mastroni-Mucker, 976

-6-
J-A18033-25

A.2d at 518. “Settlement agreements are enforced according to principles of

contract law,” which require there to be “an offer (the settlement figure),

acceptance, and consideration (in exchange for the plaintiff terminating his

[or her] lawsuit, the defendant will pay the plaintiff the agreed upon sum).”

Id.

Where a settlement agreement contains all of the requisites for a
valid contract, a [trial] court must enforce the terms of the
agreement. This is true even if the terms of the agreement are
not yet formalized in writing. Pursuant to well-settled
Pennsylvania law, oral agreements to settle are enforceable
without a writing.

Id. (citations omitted).

[E]ven the inability of the parties to an oral agreement to reduce
such agreement to writing after several attempts does not
necessarily preclude a finding that the oral agreement was
enforceable. A contract is formed if the parties agree on essential
terms and intend them to be binding even though they intend to
adopt a formal document with additional terms at a later date.

Id. at 522 (citations, quotation marks, and original brackets omitted), relying

in part on Mazzella v. Koken, 739 A.2d 531, 536 (Pa. 1999).

It is “well-settled that an attorney must have express authority in order

to bind a client to a settlement agreement.” Reutzel v. Douglas, 870 A.2d

787, 789-790 (Pa. 2005); see also King v. Driscoll, 296 A.3d 1178, 1184

(Pa. Super. 2023). “The rationale for this rule stems from the fact that parties

settling legal disputes forfeit substantial legal rights, and such rights should

only be forfeited knowingly.” Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 790; see also Starling

v. West Erie Ave. Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 3 A.2d 387, 388 (Pa. 1939) (stating,

-7-
J-A18033-25

an attorney’s actions on behalf of his or her client “[do] not extend to

unauthorized acts which will result in the surrender of any substantial right of

the client, or the imposition of new liabilities or burdens”). An attorney does,

however, have implied or apparent authority to conduct acts that are

incidental to the transaction, usually accompany that type of transaction, or

are reasonably necessary to accomplish the client’s goal in the transaction so

long as the attorney’s actions do not bind the client in such a way that the

client’s rights are forfeited without the client’s authorization. Starling, 3 A.2d

at 388; see also DiGiuseppe v. DiGiuseppe, 96 A.2d 874, 876 (Pa. 1953)

(stating, an attorney may take action “to effectuate the intention of his [or

her] client”).

Here, the trial court found, and the record supports, that the parties

reached an oral agreement on essential terms at the conclusion of the

mediation session on January 27, 2022, and that the subsequent inability to

reduce that oral agreement to writing, which involved Liberty’s unilateral

attempt to include additional terms, does not affect the validity, and

enforceability, of the oral agreement. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/8/25, at 18

(stating, “[t]he oral agreement to settle [reached] on January 27, 2022[,] was

complete and binding at that time, and the fact that [a written agreement

later tendered by Liberty] for signing might not have conformed to the oral

agreement would not in any way affect the validity of said oral agreement”).

Competent evidence within the record supports the trial court’s conclusion

that, at the January 27, 2022 mediation, a monetary offer to settle the

-8-
J-A18033-25

disputed claims was presented by Appellees and accepted by Liberty in

exchange for Liberty’s agreement to release Appellees from “all known and

unknown claims that were asserted or could have been asserted in this matter

concerning the project”, thereby terminating the lawsuit in exchange for

monetary payment. There is no dispute that the intent of the mediation was

to resolve the claims alleged in Liberty’s complaint and that, at the conclusion

of the January 27, 2022 mediation, the parties agreed to settle the claims for

a sum certain to be paid by Appellees in exchange for Liberty’s withdrawal of

the pending litigation. See N.T., 6/26/23, at 12 (Attorney Charlson arguing

that, “[w]e reached a financial settlement and it was for a portion of costs that

had actually been incurred by [Liberty] to remediate the effects of design

errors and omissions”); see also id. at 25-29 (Counsel for Kendall Heaton

explaining that an agreement to resolve the known and unknown claims in

exchange for mutual releases was reached at the conclusion of the January

27, 2022 mediation); Kendall Heaton’s Motion to Enforce Settlement

Agreement, 11/15/22, at Exhibit 3 (stating, “[t]he settlement of this matter

is a resolution of all claims and cross[-]claims, including counsel fees and

costs, for all claims that were or could have been asserted in the matter”). As

such, to the extent that the parties sought to resolve “all known and unknown

claims that were asserted or could have been asserted in this matter

concerning the project,” the parties mutually assented to the key terms of an

agreement, namely that in exchange for Liberty’s release of Appellees from

liability for the alleged claims (including – in the words of Liberty’s outside

-9-
J-A18033-25

counsel – known claims, unknown claims, and claims acquired in the future),

Appellees agreed to pay Liberty a sum certain and, upon payment, Liberty

agreed to terminate its lawsuit against Appellees. 2 The oral agreement

reached at the conclusion of the January 27, 2022 mediation was not

contingent upon the execution of a written settlement agreement but, rather,

as indicated in the settlement summary email sent by counsel for Kendall

Heaton and confirmed by Liberty’s outside counsel, the oral agreement was

the operative settlement agreement until such time as a written agreement

could be executed. Id. at Exhibit 11. Therefore, the trial court did not err in

enforcing the oral settlement agreement reached on January 27, 2022, as

subsequently set forth in the March 9, 2022 draft of the settlement agreement,

despite the fact that the parties were unable, ultimately, to reduce the oral

settlement agreement to writing.

Furthermore, the subsequent attempt by Liberty to exclude latent

defects from the alleged construction defect claims resolved by the settlement

agreement does not negate nor otherwise cause the oral settlement

agreement to become invalid or unenforceable. As the trial court notes, and

the parties agree, “latent defects” were not expressly discussed at the January

---

2 Attorney Charlson’s draft settlement agreement which provided that, in
exchange for monetary remuneration, Liberty released “all manner of actions
. . . whether or not heretofore known, suspected or asserted, which [Liberty]
ever had, now has, or hereafter may acquire, arising out of or relating to the
[p]roject, including without limitation all claims that were asserted or could
have been asserted in the [l]itigation”, comports with the oral settlement
agreement reached at the mediation and summarized in the confirmatory
email sent by counsel for Kendall Heaton on January 27, 2022.

• 10 - J-A18033-25

27, 2022 mediation. N.T., 6/26/23, at 13 (Attorney Charlson stating, “latent

defects were not part of the [oral] settlement [agreement]”); see also id. at

29 (Counsel for Kendall Heaton stating, “[w]e never discussed a carve out for

latent defects”); Kendall Heaton’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement,

11/15/22, at Exhibit 3; Liberty’s Cross-Motion to Enforce Settlement

Agreement, 12/15/22, at Declaration of Attorney Chen and Declaration of

Attorney Charlson. Because a provision excluding “latent defects” from the

types of claims resolved by the oral settlement agreement was not discussed,

and agreed upon, at the January 27, 2022 mediation, this exclusionary

provision is not part of the oral settlement agreement but, rather, was an

additional term Liberty attempted to insert into the oral settlement agreement

at a later date.3

---

3 As the parties agree, and the trial court notes, whether, or not, latent defects

are included within the phrase “known and unknown claims that were asserted
or could have been asserted in [Liberty’s complaint] concerning the project”
was not an issue presently before the trial court to resolve at this juncture.
N.T., 6/26/23, at 14-15 (Attorney Charlson stating, “if any new claims for
design errors or omissions arise in the future that are not currently known,
those would be subject to new claims by Liberty”); see also id. at 29 (Counsel
for Kendall Heaton stating, “[i]f something were to come up in the future that
[Liberty] claims is a latent defect, [it] can file a motion at that point in time,
and this release doesn’t bar [such a claim]”); Trial Court Opinion, 1/8/25, at
20 (stating, “[t]he issue before the [trial court] was not and is not whether or
not a latent defect qualifies as an unknown defect”). Instead, this issue,
should it arise in the future, is more aptly addressed in subsequent mediation
or litigation. To be clear, the oral settlement agreement reached at the
conclusion of the January 27, 2022 mediation constituted a mutual
understanding as to resolution of all known, unknown, and future claims as
presented in Liberty’s complaint, and the trial court did not err in enforcing
the oral settlement agreement as such, even if Liberty is free, in the future,

• 11 - J-A18033-25

Finally, Attorney Charlson did not act without the express authority of

Liberty. It is undisputed that Attorney Chen possessed the authority to enter

into an agreement to settle Liberty’s claims against Appellees. Attorney Chen

attended the January 27, 2022 mediation and was aware of the discussions

that took place, including the fact that latent defects were not mentioned and,

therefore, were not part of the terms of the oral settlement agreement.

Liberty’s Cross-Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, 12/15/22, at

Declaration of Attorney Chen. In responding to the settlement summary email

sent by Kendall Heaton’s counsel on January 27, 2022, Attorney Charlson

stated that the email represented “our understanding” of the agreement,

which indicates that the summary email comported with both Liberty’s outside

and its in-house counsel’s recollection of the terms of the settlement

agreement, as well as Liberty’s understanding of the terms of the settlement

agreement. The subsequent actions by Attorney Charlson in confirming that

the settlement summary email represented his client’s understanding of the

agreement and that Liberty accepted the agreement were incidental actions

performed in carrying out Liberty’s intent to settle the matter. 4

---

to assert that the language contained in the oral settlement agreement does
not bar “latent” claims.

4 To the extent that Liberty claims that the trial court erred in not conducting

an evidentiary hearing, this issue is waived for failure to raise the request for
an evidentiary hearing with the trial court. At the hearing on the competing
motions to enforce a settlement agreement, the trial court asked counsel for
all parties if they wished to proceed with oral argument via an internet-based

• 12 - J-A18033-25

Order affirmed.

Judge Beck joins this Opinion.

Judge Dubow files a Dissenting Opinion.

Date: 2/27/2026

---

communications platform, or if they were requesting an evidentiary hearing,
which the trial court indicated had to be held in-person. N.T., 6/26/23, at 5.
Counsel for Liberty, as well as counsel for Appellees, declined an evidentiary
hearing. Id.

• 13 -

  Dissent

                      by Dubow
  

J-A18033-25 2026 PA Super 37

LIBERTY PROPERTY LIMITED : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PARTNERSHIP : PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
: No. 2947 EDA 2024
KENDALL HEATON ASSOCIATES, :
INC., BALA CONSULTING :
ENGINEERS, INC., F+P ARCHITECTS :
NEW YORK, INC., ROTTET STUDIO, :
LLC AND ROTTET ARCHITECTURE :
AND DESIGN STUDIO NY, PLLC, :
METROPOLITAN ACOUSTICS, LLC, :
TILLOTSON DESIGN ASSOCIATES, :
INC. :

Appeal from the Order Entered October 17, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): 210901337

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and BECK, J.

DISSENTING OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 27, 2026

Because I disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that a provision

excluding latent defects from the types of claims resolved by the oral

settlement agreement was merely an “additional term Liberty attempted to

assert into the oral settlement agreement” 1 and that the parties had reached

an agreement on the terms of the settlement agreement, I respectfully

dissent. For the following reasons, I would instead hold that the parties had

not reached an agreement as to a material term, i.e., the scope of the release

---

1 Majority Op. at 11.
J-A18033-25

Liberty would give to Appellees, and, thus, the oral settlement agreement the

parties reached at the conclusion of the January 27, 2022 mediation was

unenforceable.

The trial court record reflects, and the parties do not dispute, that,

following the January 27, 2022 mediation, the parties intended to enter into

a written settlement agreement, but that they did not, in fact, do so. There

is no evidence in the record to suggest that the parties intended to resolve

the issues among them, including the scope of a release, through an oral

agreement. Notwithstanding the parties’ intent, however, in granting

Appellees’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement, the court enforced

purported oral agreement to settle.

This Court has held that that oral settlement agreements are

enforceable when the parties have failed to execute a written agreement only

if the parties have agreed on the essential terms of the agreement. See

Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pa., 893 A.2d 776, 783 (Pa. Super. 2006).

Here, the record reflects that the parties had not agreed on the scope of a

release of liability for latent defects, which is a material term.

The undisputed evidence shows that, following the January 27, 2022

mediation session, the parties exchanged numerous emails attached to which

were various drafts of a written settlement agreement. This course of conduct

reiterates the parties’ implied intent to enter into a written settlement

agreement and demonstrates that the parties were engaging in a pattern of

ongoing negotiations over the still-unsettled material terms of the agreement.

-2-
J-A18033-25

Accordingly, given the absence of an executed written settlement agreement

and the evidence of a monthslong period of negotiation of the material terms

of the agreement, I would conclude that the trial court erred in finding that

the parties had a meeting of the minds as to all material terms and, therefore,

that an enforceable oral settlement agreement existed.

-3-