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Feb. 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

McManus v. Foster

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 671
• Docket Number: 30591

• Judges: Epley

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.9K)

• PDF

Syllabus

On appeal from default judgment on a tax foreclosure claim, appellant cannot raise issues and present evidence that he did not previously provide to the trial court. Trial court did not deny appellant adequate time and opportunity to respond to the complaint. Judgment affirmed.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as McManus v. Foster, 2026-Ohio-671.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY

JOHN MCMANUS, :
AS TREASURER OF MONTGOMERY : C.A. No. 30591
COUNTY, OHIO :
: Trial Court Case No. 2025 CV 1933
Appellees :
: (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas
v. : Court)
:
IRVIN P. FOSTER, ET AL. : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY &
: OPINION
Appellant
...........

Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on February 27, 2026, the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

CHRISTOPHER B. EPLEY, JUDGE

LEWIS, P.J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.
OPINION
MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30591

QUINN RYAN FOSTER, Appellant, Pro Se
ANDREW T. FRENCH, Attorney for Appellee Montgomery County Treasurer John
McManus

EPLEY, J.

{¶ 1} Quinn Ryan Foster, aka Hashim Ali Jabar (“Jabar”), pro se, appeals from a

default judgment in favor of Montgomery County Treasurer John McManus on the

treasurer’s tax foreclosure claim regarding the property located at 2426 Jerome Avenue in

Dayton. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} Thelma Foster formerly owned the property located at 2426 Jerome Avenue.

On February 14, 2004, she conveyed a life estate to Irvin Foster with remainder interests to

four individuals, including Jabar. The deed was recorded in May 2004. After the change

of ownership, one tax payment was made in 2007.

{¶ 3} On March 28, 2025, McManus, in his official capacity as the county treasurer,

filed a complaint for foreclosure of delinquent real estate taxes against Irvin Foster, the four

remaindermen, and various unknown individuals, alleging that the residential property

located at 2426 Jerome Avenue had delinquent taxes in the amount of $54,504.93.

According to the complaint, real estate taxes for the property were certified as delinquent in

August 2005, and the Montgomery County Auditor had included the property on a master

tax list of delinquent tracts. The fair market value of the property was allegedly $33,120.

{¶ 4} Jabar and two other remaindermen were successfully served with the complaint

and summons by certified mail in April 2025. Certified mail service on Irvin Foster, the

fourth remainderman, and several unknown defendants was unsuccessful, and the trial court

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authorized service by publication, which was completed in June 2025. None of the

defendants filed an answer to the complaint. On July 15, 2025, the trial court ordered

McManus to file a motion for default judgment within 14 days. McManus filed his motion

for default judgment on July 30, 2025.

{¶ 5} On August 1, 2025, the trial court entered a default judgment and decree of

foreclosure against Jabar and the other defendants. It stated that $54,628.93 in taxes,

assessments, interest, charges, and penalties (the amount shown on Exhibit 2 to the

treasurer’s motion) were due and owing and that the costs of the action were estimated to

be $2,000. It found that the treasurer had the first and best lien on the Jerome Avenue

property in the amount of $56,628.93. The court ordered the property sold for an amount

not less than $35,120.

{¶ 6} The judgment was served on Jabar and the two remaindermen who had been

served with the complaint by certified mail. Jabar sought a stay of the sheriff’s sale pending

appeal. The trial court granted the motion.

{¶ 7} Jabar appeals from the trial court’s default judgment and decree of foreclosure,

raising six assignments of error. McManus did not file an appellee’s brief.

II. Analysis

{¶ 8} Jabar’s assignments of error state:

1. The trial court erred by exercising jurisdiction over property protected by

ecclesiastical and treaty law, in violation of Article VI of the United States

Constitution (Supremacy Clause), which establishes treaties as the supreme

law of the land.

1. The trial court erred by granting foreclosure without considering unrefuted

affidavits from Case No. 2020 BR 00024, which establish that 2426 Jerome

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Avenue functions as a family temple, school and burial site, violating the First

Amendment.

1. The trial court erred by disregarding evidence that the property contains a

nine-foot Obelisk/Tekken, a sacred religious landmark visibly seen from the

street, violating both constitutional protections and Ohio law.

1. The trial court erred by failing to apply Ohio Revised Code § 5709.07, which

exempts property used exclusively for public worship and religious instruction

from taxation.

1. The trial court erred by denying Appellant adequate time and opportunity to

respond, violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

1. The trial court erred by authorizing the removal or sale of a religious site in

contravention of biblical law (Proverbs 22:28; Proverbs 23:10; Deuteronomy

19:14; Deuteronomy 27:17).

{¶ 9} In his appellate brief, Jabar claims that the property located at 2426 Jerome

Avenue is a religious site, which “serves as a family temple, religious and educational center,

and indigenous burial site under the Priesthood of Rev. Dr. Isaiah Henri Harrison Moore and

Elizabeth B. Ervin (est. 1880).” He indicates that the property includes a nine-foot obelisk

that marks the boundary of the sacred site. In essence, Jabar asserts that the real estate,

as religious property, was not subject to taxation and, therefore, the trial court erred in

granting a tax foreclosure due to nonpayment of taxes.

{¶ 10} Jabar attached numerous exhibits to his appellate brief. They include: (1) an

unsigned and unnotarized purported “affidavit of fact” regarding the religious use of the

property; (2) the 2004 deed creating the life estate and remainder interests; (3) a document

that appears to appoint Jabar as Irvin Foster’s attorney-in-fact; (4) a certificate that Jabar

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has been ordained as a minister by the Moorish Temple of New Kemit; (5) a document

signed by Jabar declaring himself the custodian of records for the Bishop John Jamison

Moor Zion Family Library; (6) a certificate from the commonwealth of Pennsylvania that the

Zion Church of the Evangelical Association was registered as a non-profit entity; (7) a

certificate from the Ohio secretary of state showing the filing of an unincorporated nonprofit

association agent appointment by the Zion Church of the Evangelical Association; (8) a

Maryland death certification for Irvin Foster, indicating that he died on September 5, 2021;

(9) a Tennessee order showing the change of Quinn Ryan Foster’s legal name to Hashim

Ali Jabar; (10) a handwritten three-generation ancestor chart for Jabar; (11) a written

statement about Irvin Foster; (12) a handwritten diagram of the 4246 Jerome Avenue

property; (13) another ancestor chart for Jabar; (14) a photograph of a couple; (15) a

purported indigenous Moor baptismal record for Jabar; (16) a copy of an August 12, 2025

letter from Jabar to the Montgomery County commissioners about the Jerome Avenue

property; (17) a portion of a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary

injunction for this case (there is no signature page nor any indication it was filed in the trial

court); (18) a copy of a 1787 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Morocco and the

United States; and (19) purported Moorish American travel documents for Jabar.

{¶ 11} Jabar did not file an answer or any other response to the treasurer’s complaint.

He did not present any legal arguments to the trial court regarding the treasurer’s right to

foreclose on the Jerome Avenue property due to nonpayment of property taxes, and none

of the exhibits attached to Jabar’s appellate brief were presented to the trial court.

{¶ 12} “Parties may not raise any new issues or legal theories for the first time on

appeal that were not raised in the lower court.” Edwards v. Galluzzo, 2024-Ohio-2005, ¶ 22

(2d Dist.), citing Independence v. Office of the Cuyahoga Cty. Executive, 2014-Ohio-4650,

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¶ 30. Issues or arguments that are not raised in the trial court are deemed forfeited or

waived for purposes of appeal. State ex rel. Internatl. Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 1536,

AFL-CIO v. Sakacs, 2023-Ohio-2976, ¶ 23; see, e.g., Bank of Am., N.A. v. Thompson, 2015-

Ohio-456, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.) (homeowner’s grounds for challenging summary judgment in

foreclosure action “are waived, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal,” when not

previously raised in the trial court); State v. Shutway, 2015-Ohio-2432, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.) (issues

not raised in the trial court were waived for purposes of appeal).

{¶ 13} Because Jabar did not respond to the complaint in any fashion, he cannot raise

on appeal that the Jerome Avenue property constituted religious property or that the tax

foreclosure was barred under the federal constitution, a treaty, Ohio law, or any other

authority. Jabar’s first, fourth, and sixth assignments of error are overruled.

{¶ 14} We also cannot consider the evidence attached to Jabar’s appellate brief. In

reviewing the trial court’s judgment, we are limited to the record before the trial court. E.g.,

Bank of Am., N.A. v. Shailer, 2021-Ohio-3939, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). An appellant may not present

new evidence on appeal. Prestige Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Baldwin, 2025-Ohio-1395, ¶ 11

(2d Dist.). “‘An exhibit merely appended to an appellate brief is not part of the record, and

we may not consider it in determining the appeal.’” Williams v. Pioneer Credit Recovery,

Inc., 2020-Ohio-397, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Grant, 2013-Ohio-2981, ¶ 12

(10th Dist.).

{¶ 15} In this case, none of the evidence upon which Jabar relies was provided to the

trial court. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in entering a judgment and decree of

foreclosure without considering his evidence. Jabar’s second and third assignments of

error are overruled.

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{¶ 16} Finally, Jabar claims that he was not given adequate time to respond, in

violation of his due process rights. Under Civ.R. 12(A)(1), a defendant generally has

28 days after service of the summons and complaint to file an answer. In the answer, the

defendant must “state in short and plain terms” the defendant’s defenses to the plaintiff’s

claims and either admit or deny the averments upon which the plaintiff relied. See

Civ.R. 8(B). If the defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to

the truth of an averment, the defendant must state that fact in the answer, and the response

has the effect of a denial. Id. Affirmative defenses must be raised in the answer.

Civ.R. 8(C). Civ.R. 8(E) makes clear that “[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple,

concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are required.”

{¶ 17} In general, a party does not need to attach evidentiary support to a pleading.

But see Civ.R. 10(D) (specifying the circumstances where supporting documents must be

attached to the pleading).

{¶ 18} Civ.R. 12(B) enumerates seven bases for dismissal that may be raised by

motion prior to filing an answer. Before responding to a complaint, a defendant may also

file a motion for definite statement or motion to strike, if appropriate. Civ.R. 12(E) and (F).

{¶ 19} Jabar was served with the complaint and summons by certified mail on April 7,

2025, and he had 28 days to either file his answer or respond with an appropriate motion.

The 28-day period provided by Civ.R. 12(A)(1) constituted an adequate period for Jabar to

respond with his admissions, denials, and/or defenses to the treasurer’s allegations.

Moreover, the trial court did not grant a default judgment until August 1, 2025. Until that

time, Jabar could have moved for permission to file an untimely answer. See Civ.R. 6(B).

Jabar did not attempt that remedy. The record does not support Jabar’s claim that the trial

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court violated his due process rights by denying him adequate time and opportunity to

respond. Jabar’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 20} The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

.............

LEWIS, P.J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.

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