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March 2, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Keith Loftus v. Teresa Loftus

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-0911-24

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (17)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0911-24

KEITH LOFTUS,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TERESA LOFTUS,

Defendant-Appellant.

---

Submitted November 19, 2025 – Decided March 2, 2026

Before Judges Mayer and Jacobs.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket
No. FM-15-1611-01.

Hegge & Confusione, LLC, attorneys for appellant
(Michael Confusione, of counsel and on the brief).

Bronzino Law Firm, LLC, attorneys for respondent
(Peter J. Bronzino, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
Defendant Teresa Loftus 1 appeals a Family Part order enforcing a $14,200

court-imposed sanction payable to plaintiff Keith Loftus, temporarily reducing

plaintiff's $400-per-week permanent alimony obligation by $100 per week until

the sanction is paid in full. We affirm.

I.

The parties were married in 1982 and have two emancipated children.

They divorced in 2002. In February 2004, the parties entered into a consent

order delineating their future obligations. Among other things, the order

amended terms of the parties' property settlement agreement related to the sale

of their former marital residence. Paragraph three of the consent order allowed

defendant to remain in the residence subject to payment of $45,539.00 to

plaintiff. The paragraph provides:

The [d]efendant's buy-out of $45,539.00 shall be
accomplished as follows:

a. Lisa E. Halpern, Esquire, currently has
$36,312.35 in her trust account from the
sale of the parties' rental properties. From
that account, Lisa E. Halpern, Esquire,
shall disburse payment to Dr. Sherman in
the amount of $773.35 for the parties'
minor child, Keith.

1
We note that although defendant's name is listed as "Theresa" in the trial
court's order, the record shows the correct spelling of her name is "Teresa," and
we refer to her accordingly.
A-0911-24
2
b. After payment to Dr. Sherman, the
balance remaining in the trust account of
Lisa E. Halpern, Esquire, will be
$35,539.00. That amount shall be paid to
Lisa E. Halpern, Esquire, on behalf of the
[p]laintiff. The [d]efendant shall be
entitled to credit in the aforementioned
amount toward the settlement described
above.

c. The [d]efendant shall effectuate a
refinance of the former marital residence
within twelve (12) months. The
[d]efendant shall work diligently to
effectuate said refinance. Joseph Gunteski
is hereby authorized to contact all
professionals involved in the refinance,
including but not limited to the mortgage
broker, attorney, etc. From the proceeds of
the refinance, the [d]efendant shall pay
$10,000.00 to Lisa E. Halpern, Esquire, for
the [p]laintiff, as the final payment of the
settlement described above. This payment
shall be full satisfaction of the [p]laintiff's
interest in the former marital residence and
rental properties . . . .

In September 2022, pursuant to terms of the 2004 consent order, plaintiff

moved to compel defendant to refinance or sell the former marital residence to

effectuate the buy-out of the marital home. In their pleadings, the parties

informed the motion court that the mortgage on the former marital home was

paid off and plaintiff had received $36,000, leaving a $10,000 balance. The

motion court issued an order on April 14, 2023, requiring defendant to pay

A-0911-24
3
plaintiff the money owed for the buy-out, noting that because the mortgage had

recently been satisfied, there was no need to refinance.

Defendant subsequently filed a motion for various forms of relief not

pertinent to this appeal, and plaintiff cross-moved, seeking to suspend his

alimony obligation until defendant's $10,000 obligation was paid. In a July 7,

2023 order, the court denied plaintiff's request without prejudice for failure "to

provide sufficient detail for the [c]ourt to determine the nature of this alleged

debt sufficient to enforce it . . . ."

In July 2023, plaintiff again moved to enforce defendant's obligation for

the buy-out, providing additional details. Defendant cross-moved to compel

plaintiff to provide proof of life insurance. On November 17, 2023, the court

ordered defendant to pay the outstanding $10,000 sum owed to plaintiff within

ten days of the order's entry. The order also granted defendant's requested relief,

compelling plaintiff to provide proof he maintained a $100,000.00 life insurance

policy for defendant's benefit. The order expressly provided that either party

would be subject to sanction for failing to meet their respective obligations.

Specifically, defendant would be entitled to "$100 per day from November 27,

2023 . . . to the date of [court-mandated] mediation," April 17, 2024. Plaintiff

would be entitled to "'cross sanctions' of $100 per day for every day past

A-0911-24
4
November 27, 2023 to the first day of mediation that [d]efendant fails to pay

[plaintiff] the $10,000 for the buyout of the marital property."

Defendant sought reconsideration of the November 17, 2023 order, which

the court denied. Plaintiff provided proof of his life insurance policy on

November 29, 2023, two days after the court-ordered deadline. Defendant

submitted to plaintiff's attorney a cashier's check for $10,000 post-dated May 1,

2024, rendering her subject to sanction for the 142 days from November 28,

2023, to April 17, 2024 mediation date.

On April 30, 2024, defendant again moved for various relief not at issue

on appeal, and plaintiff cross-moved to enforce the sanctions in the November

17, 2023 order. On July 26, 2024, the court granted plaintiff's request to enforce

the sanctions defendant owed to plaintiff. The court imposed sanctions of

$14,200 on defendant, who was ordered to pay plaintiff $100 per week directly

until the sanction sum was paid in full.

Defendant again sought reconsideration and requested sanctions against

plaintiff. Plaintiff cross-moved for enforcement of sanctions against defendant.

On November 8, 2024, the court denied defendant's requests but granted

plaintiff's cross-motion, ordering defendant to pay $14,200 in sanctions directly

A-0911-24
5
to plaintiff in the amount of $100 per week until satisfaction of the $14,200

sanction ordered in its July 26 order.

Defendant timely appealed. She contends the court applied the wrong

standard of review—using the standard for reconsideration of a final order—

arguing it should have applied the more flexible "interest of justice" standard

applicable to interlocutory orders. Defendant also argues she was deprived of a

hearing before the motion court imposed sanctions against her and that in

fashioning a remedy to ensure payment of the sanctions, the court erred in

reducing plaintiff's alimony obligation.

II.

A.

Sanctions are a tool utilized to deter litigants from failing to comply with

court orders. See Holtham v. Lucas, 460 N.J. Super. 308, 322-25 (2019)

(affirming a $150 per diem penalty for failure to comply with a marital

settlement agreement). They are also a remedy to provide relief to a litigant to

enforce compliance with an order. R. 1:10-3.

Rule 5:3-7(b) specifically addresses the use of sanctions in Family Part

matters for a party who "has violated an alimony or child support order . . . ."

However, the general rule applies to all other violations, where

A-0911-24
6
"[n]otwithstanding that an act or omission may also constitute a contempt of

court, a litigant in any action may seek relief by application in the action ." R.

1:10-3. Furthermore, there is no restriction on who orders the relief: "[a] judge

shall not be disqualified because he or she signed the order sought to be

enforced." Ibid. The Rule even extends to allow a court discretion to "make an

allowance for counsel fees to be paid by any party to the action to a party

accorded relief under this rule." Ibid. "In family actions, the court may also

grant additional remedies as provided by R[ule] 5:3-7." Ibid.

"The scope of relief in a motion in aid of litigant's rights is limited to

remediation of the violation of a court order." Abbott v. Burke, 206 N.J. 332,

371 (2011). Sanctions are intended to be coercive, not punitive, and Rule 1:10-

3 authorizes the court to create and enforce sanctions. See Milne v. Goldenberg,

428 N.J. Super. 184, 198 (App. Div. 2012); P.T. v. M.S., 325 N.J. Super. 193,

220 (App. Div. 1999). "[A] monetary sanction imposed pursuant to R[ule] 1:10-

3 is a proper tool to compel compliance with a court order." Ridley v. Dennison,

298 N.J. Super. 373, 381 (App. Div. 1997). The amount of a sanction may vary,

relying on the specifics of the individual situation: "[w]hile a monetary sanction

payable to the aggrieved party is not necessarily limited to the amount of the

aggrieved party's actual damage, it must nevertheless be rationally related to the

A-0911-24
7
desideratum of imposing a 'sting' on the offending party within its reasonable

economic means." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 4.4.3 to

R. 1:10-3 (2025).

"We review a trial court's order enforcing litigant's rights pursuant

to Rule 1:10-3 under an abuse of discretion standard." Wear v. Selective Ins.

Co., 455 N.J. Super. 440, 458-59 (App. Div. 2018) (citing Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J.

Super. 18, 46 (App. Div. 2011)). "An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision

was 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from

established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Ibid. (quoting Flagg

v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).

The imposition of sanctions, whether through an interlocutory order or a

final order, are subject to reconsideration. To be considered final, an order must

dispose of all issues as to all parties. Kattoura v. Patel, 262 N.J. Super. 34, 40

(App. Div. 1993). Any order that does not dispose of all issues is interlocutory

and is "subject to revision at any time before the entry of final judgment in the

sound discretion of the court in the interest of justice." Lawson v. Dewar, 468

N.J. Super. 128, 134 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting R. 4:42-2).

However, an order that disposes of all issues is final, Kattoura, 262 N.J.

Super. at 40, and a request for reconsideration of a final order requires analysis

A-0911-24
8
under Rule 4:49-2. A motion for reconsideration of a final order "shall state

with specificity the basis on which it is made." R. 4:49-2. To succeed on a

reconsideration motion, a party must show either "1) the [c]ourt has expressed

its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious

that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance

of probative, competent evidence." D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401

(Ch. Div. 1990).

Defendant's initial reconsideration motion challenged the November 17,

2023 order, which had resolved all claims. The court thus properly treated that

application as one for reconsideration of a final order. The court addressed and

rejected defendant's assertions that she was denied due process, that court staff

destroyed her submissions, and that the sanction constituted cruel and unusual

punishment or an excessive fine. The court found no due process violation

because, although defendant experienced technical difficulties attending the

hearing by Zoom, she was represented by counsel who appeared and

participated. It also found no evidence supporting her claim that court staff

destroyed filings. As to the sanction itself, the court explained it was coercive,

intended to compel compliance in a matter that had spanned twenty-two years.

Applying Rule 4:49-2, the court denied reconsideration.

A-0911-24
9
In a subsequent motion, defendant again did not seek reconsideration of

the ordered sanctions. Plaintiff, however, moved to enforce them. After the

court ordered defendant to pay $100 per week until the $14,200 sanction was

satisfied, defendant filed yet another motion to seek "reverse sanctions" against

plaintiff. The court denied that request.

Defendant's notice of appeal lists only the November 8, 2024 order. That

order did not seek reconsideration of the sanctions imposed against defendant.

To the extent defendant's argument may be read to challenge an unspecified

prior order, we conclude the motion court applied the appropriate standard of

analysis for reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2 regarding defendant's requests to

revisit the sanctions. See Fusco v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 349 N.J. Super.

455, 461-62 (App. Div. 2002) ("it is clear that it is only the judgments or orders

or parts thereof designated in the notice of appeal which are subject to the

appeal process and review" (quoting Pressler, Current N.J. Court

Rules, comment 6 on R. 2:5-1(f)(3)(i) (2002))).

Moreover, the court acted within its discretion in imposing sanctions,

relying on credible evidence of the parties' extensive post-judgment motion

practice. Based on the extensive motion practice in this case, the amount of the

sanction was reasonable. Notably, when plaintiff first sought sanctions,

A-0911-24
10
defendant requested that plaintiff be sanctioned in the same amount—$100 per

day—for failing to provide proof of life insurance. See Innes v. Carrascosa, 391

N.J. Super. 453, 498 (App. Div. 2007) (affirming a per diem sanction increase

from $100 to $500 due to the defendant's continued non-compliance with court

orders pertaining to custody and return of the parties' child).

The November 17, 2023 order notified the parties that if either failed to

comply with their court-ordered obligations, they would both be subject to

sanctions. Plaintiff complied with his obligation and was not sanctioned.

Defendant, by contrast, failed to act despite the court's warning that sanctions

would be imposed.

Defendant's argument that she was denied a hearing on sanctions lacks

merit. Defendant was represented by counsel at the November 17, 2023 hearing,

where the court expressly warned noncompliance with its order would result in

sanctions. She was also represented at the July 26, 2024 hearing. The motion

included in the appendix does not seek reconsideration or assert an inability to

pay as a basis for relief from sanctions. After retaining counsel, defendant

submitted a reply certification that likewise did not claim inability to pay and

instead requested only that the court deny plaintiff's request for sanctions.

Although no hearing was held on November 8, 2024, defendant made no request

A-0911-24
11
concerning the sanctions imposed and did not seek oral argument. We thus

perceive no error in the motion court's action.

B.

Defendant argues the motion court erred in granting plaintiff's application

to reduce the amount of weekly alimony payable to defendant. Defendant's

argument focuses on a purported absence of a "substantial change in

circumstances" to warrant modification of alimony.

Defendant correctly notes that a "change in circumstances" is needed to

warrant modification of an alimony obligation. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 153

(1980). However, her argument mischaracterizes both the nature of plaintiff's

application and the motion court's ruling. Plaintiff did not seek a modification

of his alimony obligation. Instead, he requested permission to offset the

sanctions defendant owed him against his existing alimony payments. The court

implemented a temporary remedy to enforce defendant's obligation to pay

sanctions for her noncompliance with a prior order.

Judicial discretion "is not and cannot be governed by any fixed principles

and definite rules because the possible eventualities to be dealt with in the

exercise of that power cannot be specifically catalogued." Smith v. Smith, 17

N.J. Super. 128, 132 (App. Div. 1951). Furthermore, Rule 1:10-3 does not limit

A-0911-24
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the relief the court may grant: "[t]he Family [Part] possesses broad equitable

powers to accomplish substantial justice." Finger v. Zenn, 335 N.J. Super. 438,

446 (App. Div. 2000) (citing Weitzman v. Weitzman, 228 N.J. Super. 346, 358

(App. Div. 1988)).

The court's warning regarding the imposition of sanctions did not deter

defendant, leading her to accumulate $14,200 in sanctions. The court thus acted

within its discretion to order her to pay those sanctions. When defendant failed

to make timely sanction payments, the court created a remedy to ensure a "just

result in the light of the particular circumstances of the case." Slutsky v. Slutsky,

451 N.J. Super. 332, 356 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Smith, 17 N.J. Super. at

132).

Further, the modification ordered is a temporary remedy within the sound

discretion of the motion court. In Milne, for example, the trial court initially

imposed sanctions for failure to comply with orders. But after holding an

ability-to-pay hearing, the court eliminated the financial penalty in favor of 120

hours of community service. 428 N.J. Super. at 198-199; see also Brennan v.

Brennan, 187 N.J. Super. 351, 353-54 (App. Div. 1982) (affirming the trial

court's forgiveness of the defendant-father's child support arrearages as a means

to compel plaintiff-mother to comply with defendant's visitation). Moreover,

A-0911-24
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we consider that defendant's full alimony will be restored upon the satisfaction

of the sanction.

In sum, we conclude the motion court did not abuse its discretion by

temporarily reducing plaintiff's alimony obligation. Instead, the court crafted

an appropriate remedy by temporarily reducing plaintiff's alimony obligation,

thereby offsetting the defendant's sanction obligation based on sufficient and

credible evidence of defendant's noncompliance with the court's orders.

Affirmed.

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