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Dec. 23, 2025 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

IN RE: GUARDIANSHIP OF A.L.R.-Q., A.R.W. AND A.M.W. (CHILD CUSTODY)

Court of Appeals of Nevada

• Citations: 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 66

• Docket Number: 89623-COA

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (10.3K)

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Combined Opinion

141 Nev., Advance Opinion CO&

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE No. 89623-COA
GUARDIANSHIP OF A.L.R.-Q., A.R.W.,
AND A.M.W., MINOR PROTECTED
PERSONS.

KELLY MICHELLE RUCKLE AND FILED
EDWARD GORDON RUCKLE,
Appellants, DEC 23 2025
vs.
SARA Q. AND A.L.R.-Q., A.R.W., AND BY
A.M.W., MINOR PROTECTED
PERSONS,
Respondents.

Kelly Michelle Ruckle and Edward Gordon Ruckle appeal from
a district court order terminating a guardianship of minor children. Eighth
Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark County; Stacy M. Rocheleau,
Judge.
Vacated and remanded.

Hutchison & Steffen, PLLC, and Joseph C. Reynolds and Ramez A. Ghally,
Reno,
for Appellants Kelly Michelle Ruckle and Edward Gordon Ruckle.

Srnith Legal Group and Kurt A. Smith, Henderson,
for Respondent Sara Q.

Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP, and Royi Moas, Las Vegas,
for Respondents A.L.R.-Q., A.R.W., and A.M.W.

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BEFORE BULLA, C.J., and GIBBONS and WESTBROOK, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, WESTBROOK, J.:
In In re Guardianship of D.M.F., 139 Nev. 342, 357-58, 535 P.3d
1154, 1167 (2023), the Nevada Supreme Court held that a protected minor
has a procedural due process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard
before the district court could sua sponte remove that minor's guardian and
terminate the guardianship. In reaching that conclusion, the supreme court
observed, in dicta, that this right to procedural due process also applies to
the protected minor's guardian. Id. at 351 n.6, 535 P.3d at 1163 n.6.
Because we agree with the supreme court that a custodial relative who
serves as a guardian has a liberty interest in the care, custody, and
management of a child under their protection, we now expressly hold that
such a guardian is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before
a district court may sua sponte remove that guardian and terminate the
guardianship.
In the proceeding below, the district court terminated the
appellants' guardianship over their minor granddaughters, without
adequate notice or any opportunity to be heard, after receiving two
confidential reports from a reunification therapist pursuant to the Nevada
Statewide Rules for Guardianship (NSRG), Rule 5. Although the district
court scheduled an NSRG 5 hearing to address one of those reports, it failed
to notify the parties that it was contemplating removal or termination of
the guardianship, and it denied appellants any opportunity to respond to
the allegations in the reports at the hearing. Because the district court
violated the appellants' rights to procedural due process, we vacate the

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district court's order and remand for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellants Kelly and Edward Ruckle are the maternal
grandmother and step-grandfather of the protected minors, respondents
A.L.R.-Q., born in March 2007, A.R.W, born in August 2008, and A.M.W.,
born in May 2010. Ms. Ruckle is also the mother of respondent Sara Q.,
who is the mother of the protected minors. For most of their lives, the
protected minors have alternated between living with Sara, in Pahrump,
and the Ruckles, in Las Vegas.
In 2013, with Sara's consent, the Ruckles adopted Sara's eldest
child, the protected minors' older sister, A.A.Q., born in December 2005.
Sara also consented to the Ruckles having temporary guardianship over the
protected minors at various points in time. Then, in October 2018, Sara
allowed the children to move in with the Ruckles on a full-time basis.
In 2021, the Ruckles petitioned for guardianship over the
children, contending that Sara lacked financial, housing, and employment
stability and was unable to care for her children. Although Sara opposed
the guardianship, she nevertheless wished for the children to continue
living with the Ruckles. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court
found that the evidence demonstrated that the protected minors had been
living with Sara in squalid conditions without regular 'access to food, clean
clothes, or working bathroom facilities. By contrast, the court found that
the children were thriving under the Ruckles' care and that the children
expressed a strong desire to remain with the Ruckles on a permanent basis.
Thus, in January 2022, the district court granted the Ruckles' petition for
guardianship over their three granddaughters.

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Just two months later, Sara petitioned the district court for
reunification therapy and a modification of the existing visitation schedule.
In her moving papers, Sara explained that she wanted to repair her
relationship with her children. Although the Ruckles and the protected
minors both opposed this petition, the district court issued an order in May
2022, stating that the children needed to be assessed by therapist Nick
Ponzo before it could render a decision.
A year later, in May 2023, while her 2022 petition was still
pending, Sara again petitioned for reunification therapy. In this petition,
Sara advised the court that Ponzo had recommended reunification therapy.
The Ruckles opposed this petition as well. After a hearing in July 2023, the
district court granted Sara's request for reunification therapy, to include
family therapy for the Ruckles, Sara, and the protected minors. Because
the parties were unable to agree on a neutral family therapist, the district
court chose a therapist proposed by Sara, Dr. Stephanie Holland. In August
2023, the court entered a minute order directing the parties to meet with
Dr. Holland "within the next 30 days or as soon thereafter" as possible. The
parties stipulated that Sara would bear the full cost of the therapy, Dr.
Holland would provide both reunification therapy and family therapy, and
the parties would participate in such therapy in good faith.
In December 2023, the district court received a letter from Dr.
Holland indicating that the court-ordered therapy still had not yet begun.'
According to Dr. Holland, there were ongoing disagreements between her

INSRG 5(A) allows a district court presiding over guardianship
proceedings to receive and review communications that "might otherwise be
considered ex parte communications ... if such communications raise a
significant concern about a guardian's compliance with his or her statutory
duties and responsibilities, or the protected person's welfare."
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and the Ruckles regarding language in her informed consent agreement.
Thus, Dr. Holland sought guidance from the court on how to proceed.
In January 2024, the district court issued an order pursuant to
NSRG 5, disclosing Dr. Holland's letter to the parties.2 Because Dr.
Holland's letter "raise[d] concerns regarding Guardians' and Guardians'
Counsel's non-compliance with the Court's directive on this matter," the
court scheduled an NSRG 5 hearing to obtain the Ruckles' response.
At the NSRG 5 hearing in February 2024, the Ruckles clarified
that they wanted to proceed with therapy but that they had concerns with
the wording of the informed consent agreement, which they believed would
allow Dr. Holland to "control" visitation, rather than simply make
recommendations. The Ruckles also "worried that the therapist [was]
tainted against them because of the process" and requested a different
therapist. The district court advised that it would not remove Dr. Holland,
clarified that Dr. Holland would only be permitted to guide and recommend
visitation, and ordered the Ruckles to sign the consent agreement and begin
reunification and family therapy.
From the record, it appears that A.L.R.-Q. went to live with
Sara on a full-time basis in either April or May 2024, leaving only A.R.W.
and A.M.W. in the Ruckles' care. Thereafter, pursuant to NSRG 5(A), Dr.
Holland sent the district court a status report dated May 22, 2024.
Although this confidential report was not made part of the official court

2NSRG 5(D) requires the court to "disclose any ex parte
communication reviewed under subsection A of this rule, and any action
taken by the court under subsection B, to the guardian, guardian ad litem,
the protected person, the protected person's attorney, and all parties of
record and their attorneys."
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record below, nor transmitted to this court on appeal, the district court
discussed the contents of the report in an order issued July 13, 2024.
In that order, the district court advised the parties that Dr.
Holland's report raised a "significant concern about [the Ruckles']
compliance with their statutory duties and responsibilities to the welfare of
[A.R.W. and A.M.W.], including their educational progress, relationship and
reunification with their mother and sibling, and their treatment in the care
of the guardians." The district court found that, because A.R.W. and
A.M.W. were homeschooled, there were no objective reports available to
evaluate their educational performance. Yet, the Ruckles had not
responded to Dr. Holland's requests to schedule psychoeducational testing
to assess A.R.W. and A.M.W. academically. The district court also found
that Dr. Holland reported there were "strong indications that Ms. Ruckle's
influence over the girls [was] negatively affecting their positive relationship
with their mother, and that without direct orders from the Court, there will
be continued roadblocks to this family's progress."
Given these findings, the district court ordered that A.R.W. and
A.M.W. undergo psychoeducational testing to assess their academic
progress, that they spend one weekend each month at Sara's house, that
Sara would have a four-hour visit once per week, and that A.R.W. and
A.M.W. would visit Sara's home for a six-hour period on the second and
fourth weekends of the month. The district court also scheduled an NSRG
5 hearing3 on July 25 to address Dr. Holland's May report.

3Although the order did not citeNSRG 5, the contents of the order
demonstrate that it was entered pursuant to that rule because it referenced
the language used in the rule.
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One day before the scheduled hearing, Sara filed a petition to
terminate the guardianship and remove the Ruckles as guardians. The
petition requested both oral argument and a hearing. In particular, Sara
claimed that, on July 15, 2024, Dr. Holland "filed an update"4 with the
district court advising that the Ruckles had "completely disregard[ed] the
Reunification Therapist's Recommendations" and the children still had not
yet participated in the court-ordered psychoeducational testing. According
to Sara's petition, Dr. Holland noted "extreme concern regarding the
educational environment" at the Ruckles' home and the children's academic
performance. Further, Dr. Holland reported that A.L.R.-Q. was "severely
behind in math and science" and had allegedly "left the Guardians' home
due to a long history of alleged and documented chronic emotional and
psychological abuse coupled with intermittent physical abuse at the hand
of The Guardians." According to Sara, Dr. Holland also reported that
"Reunification Therapy had been successful," that there was "no evidence of
any concerns" regarding Sara's home environment, and that the court
should "consider removing the Guardianship altogether."
Sara argued that the district court should remove the Ruckles
as guardians and terminate the guardianship "[b]ased on the [Ruckles]
complete disregard for the Reunification Therapist's recommendations,
refusal to timely follow the Court's Orders, emotional abuse, psychological
abuse, physical abuse, and educational neglect." There is no indication that
this petition was ever set for a hearing, and the court did not issue or serve

4 Although Sara's petition stated that this report was "filed" with the
district court, the parties agree that Dr. Holland's July report was not made
a part of the official court record below and, like the May report, it has not
been provided to this court on appeal.
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any citation requiring all interested parties to appear and show cause why
the petition should not be granted. Cf. NRS 159A.1905(4); NRS
159A.1855(1)-(2).
The next day, the parties appeared for the previously scheduled
NSRG 5 hearing on Dr. Holland's May report. At the beginning of the
hearing, the protected minors' counsel noted a conflict of interest, but the
district court indicated that such a conflict might be moot after the hearing.
The district court advised that it was "very concerned about what's going on
in this case" and referenced the two reports from Dr. Holland showing that
"the Ruckles are not complying with their duties as guardians." In
particular, the district court noted that the Ruckles were interfering in the
children's relationship with Sara and their siblings, were not providing for
the children's educational, physical, and emotional needs, and were
ignoring Dr. Holland's recommendations. The district court further found
that the children were safe with Sara and she was able to care for them.
Based on these findings, and without giving the Ruckles or the
minors an opportunity to respond orally or in writing, the district court
removed the Ruckles as guardians and terminated the guardianship. In
doing so, the court noted it had the authority to remove the Ruckles as
guardians pursuant to NRS 159A.185(1) because it found they
"intentionally failed to perform any duty as provided by law or by any lawful
order of the Court." And the court summarily found that Sara had been
"restored to suitability" and that it was in the minors' best interests to
terminate the guardianship.
Immediately after making these findings, the district court told
counsel for the Ruckles, "I understand you've stood up, but I've made my
orders. I am terminating the guardianship today." After ordering the

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Ruckles to return various items to Sara, the district court asked the
Ruckles' counsel if there was anything he "wanted to add," and counsel
stated the Ruckles had a lot of concerns about Dr. Holland because she was
"clearly biased throughout the case." The district court told the Ruckles'
counsel that if he had any objections or concerns, he could file a motion for
reconsideration but that the court was terminating the guardianship. All
told, the hearing lasted only seven minutes from start to finish.
Eventually, on October 8, the district court issued its written
order terminating the guardianship. The court's four-page order5
referenced the two reports submitted by Dr. Holland and repeated its oral
findings based on those reports but did not reference the relevant statutes
or rules applicable to either removal of a guardian or termination of a minor
guardianship. The order then instructed that the guardianship be
terminated and that the letters of guardianship be revoked. This appeal
followed.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, the Ruckles primarily argue that their procedural
due process rights were violated because they did not receive adequate
notice that their guardianship could be terminated at the NSRG 5 hearing
in July, nor were they given an opportunity to argue, present evidence, or
be heard on the issue. The protected minors respond that Sara repeatedly
sought reunification with her children over a period of years, such that the
Ruckles were sufficiently placed on notice that both removal and

5Neither the district court nor the parties mentioned Sara's petition
to terminate the guardianship during the hearing. The district court's order
likewise did not identify Sara's petition as one of the matters before the
court at the July 25 hearing or otherwise reference the petition.
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termination were possible and they had numerous opportunities to object to
the reunification between Sara and the protected minors. Sara largely joins
and adopts the minors' arguments and contends that the district court's
July 13 order put the Ruckles on notice that they could be removed as
guardians and their guardianship could be terminated. Further, Sara
disagrees that the Ruckles had any right to procedural due process. For the
reasons set forth below, we conclude that the Ruckles had a procedural due
process right to notice and an opportunity to respond before removal or
termination of their guardianship, and the district court v olated that
right."
This court will not disturb a guardianship determination absent
an abuse of discretion. In re Guardianship of D.M.F., 139 Nev. 342, 348,
535 P.3d 1154, 1161 (2023). "An abuse of discretion occurs where the
district court fails to supply appropriate reasons to support the
determination, 'exceeds the bounds of law or reason,' or makes an 'arbitrary
or capricious' decision." Id. at 348-49, 535 P.3d at 1161 (internal citation
omitted) (quoting In re Eric A.L., 123 Nev. 26, 33, 153 P.3d 32, 36-37 (2007)).
However, whether the district court violated a party's procedural due
process rights in terminating a guardianship is a question of law that this
court reviews de novo. Id. at 349, 535 P.3d at 1161.

"The parties agree on appeal that A.L.R.-Q. is now 18 years old and is
no longer a minor. See NRS 159A.023(1). Thus, the minor guardianship
matter is moot as to A.L.R.-Q. See Personhood Neu. u. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599,
602, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010); see also NRS 159A.191(1)(d) (stating that a
guardianship is terminated "[o]n the date on which the protected minor
reaches 18 years of age").
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The Ruckles were entitled to procedural due process before their remoual or
the termination of their guardianship ouer the minor children
Both the United States and Nevada Constitutions guarantee
that no person shall be deprived of a protected life, liberty, or property
interest without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Nev.
Const. art. 1, § 8(2). Thus, for the Ruckles to be entitled to procedural due
process, they must first have a protected life, liberty, or property interest in
their guardianship over their minor grandchildren.
In D.M.F., the Nevada Supreme Court held that a protected
minor had several protected interests that would be affected by a district
court's decision to sua sponte remove their guardian. 139 Nev. at 350-51,
535 P.3d at 1162. Those interests include the minor's interests in
autonomy, familial companionship, a parent-child relationship with a
parent who consented to the guardianship, and the guardian-child
relationship with a custodial relative. Id.
Although the supreme court primarily addressed the due
process rights of the protected minor in D.M.F., the court also observed in
dicta that "a guardian has a liberty interest in the care, custody, and
management of a child under their protection akin to, but not entirely
coextensive with, the rights of a parent." Id. at 351, 535 P.3d at 1162. For
support, the court relied on Simuro u. Shedd, 176 F. Supp. 3d 358, 384 (D.
Vt. 2016), where the United States District Court for the District of Vermont
observed that both "parents and guardians of minor children have protected
interests in the care, control, and custody of those children." See D.M.F.,
139 Nev. at 351, 535 P.3d at 1162.
The supreme court also relied on Riuera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d
1016, 1024-25 (2d Cir. 1982), which recognized that custodial relatives have
a "liberty interest in preserving the integrity and stability" of the family and
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are "entitled to due process protections when the state decides to remove a
dependent relative from the family environment." See D.M.F., 139 Nev. at
351, 535 P.3d at 1162. As a result, the court opined that the protected
minor's grandmother, who had served as her guardian from birth, also had
a liberty interest in the minor's guardianship and care such that the
grandmother's procedural due process rights were impacted when the court
removed her as guardian and terminated the guardianship. Id. at 351 n.6,
535 P.3d at 1163 n.6. Guided by the supreme court's analysis in D.M.F, we
conclude that the Ruckles, in their capacity as both custodial relatives and
guardians, also had a procedural due process right to notice and an
opportunity to be heard in connection with the district court's decision to
terminate the guardianship.7
The Buckles were not provided adequate notice that removal or termination
would be considered at the July 25 hearing
Having concluded that the Ruckles were entitled to procedural
due process, we must now determine whether the Ruckles received
adequate notice and an opportunity to respond. We address notice first.
"Notice is sufficient to satisfy due process where it is 'reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."
Id. at 351, 535 P.3d at 1163 (quoting Mullane u. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr.
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). "Generally, notice must be given before a
party's substantive rights are affected." Id. at 351-52, 535 P.3d at 1163.

7We express no opinion as to the extent of any substantive due process
rights available to guardians in these circumstances, only that the potential
of their substantive rights being affected necessitates notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
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In both D.M.F. and In re Guardianship of Jones, 139 Nev. 139,
147-48, 531 P.3d 1236, 1244-45 (2023), the Nevada Supreme Court
evaluated the sufficiency of notice where district courts sua sponte removed
court-appointed guardians. In D.M.F., the supreme court concluded that a
district court's order setting an NSRG 5 hearing "did not give proper notice
that it was contemplating removal and termination [of a minor
guardianship] such that the parties had a meaningful opportunity to be
heard on the issue." 139 Nev. at 342, 535 P.3d at 1157. However, in Jones,
the supreme court reached the opposite conclusion, determining that an
adult protected person had ample notice that her guardian of choice could
be removed and had multiple opportunities to respond based on the nature
of the filings and arguments made in the district court. 139 Nev. at 147-48,
531 P.3d at 1244-45. The Ruckles argue that this case is analogous to
D.M.F., whereas Sara and the protected minors contend that this case is
more akin to Jones.
After reviewing both decisions, we conclude that this case is
more like D.M.F. than Jones because the district court's NSRG 5 order did
not give a clear indication that removal or termination would be considered
at the July 25 hearing. Although the district court's July 13 order noted
"significant concern" about the Ruckles' compliance with their statutory
duties and responsibilities to the minors, it did not signal the serious step
of removal and termination such as directions to investigate potential
substitute guardians or the necessity for the guardianship. The order
identified several concerns raised by Dr. Holland, including that A.L.R.-Q.
had made statements "regarding the educational environment in the
Ruckles' home" that necessitated psychoeducational testing; that the
Ruckles were not cooperating with Dr. Holland's efforts to conduct that

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testing; and that "Ms. Ruckle's influence over the girls [was] negatively
affecting [the protected minors'] positive relationship with their mother."
But instead of advising the Ruckles that it was considering removal or
termination to address these concerns, the district court merely directed the
Ruckles to schedule A.R.W. and A.M.W. for psychoeducational testing with
Dr. Holland, provided Sara with additional parenting time with the girls,
and set an NSRG 5 hearing "concerning the issues raised by Dr. Holland's
report." Thus, as in D.M.F., the district court's notice was insufficient to
satisfy procedural due process.
Nevertheless, Sara and the protected minors urge this court to
look beyond the deficient July 13 order and find the Ruckles had notice that
removal and termination were on the table because there had been years of
reunification efforts and because the Ruckles were aware of, objected to, and
obstructed reunification. Sara and the protected minors argue that, as in
Jones, the nature of the district court filings and arguments regarding
reunification sufficed to place the Ruckles on notice they could be removed
and the guardianship terminated. We disagree.
In Jones, the respondents filed two petitions seeking visitation
with their mother, an adult protected person who was under the
guardianship of their sister. 139 Nev. at 140, 531 P.3d at 1240. In the first
petition, the respondents raised concerns that their sister was improperly
restricting access to their mother; and in the second petition, respondents
sought additional visitation and asked the district court to consider
"removing [their sister] as guardian if she disobeyed any court-ordered"
visitation. /c/. Thereafter, the district court entered an order that
referenced the respondents' allegations and advised that "[i]f access has
been restricted, a relative may ask the court for access to the protected

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person or to remove the guardian." Id. at 141, 531 P.3d at 1240 (emphasis
added). The court also directed the parties to file pretrial memoranda
addressing, among other statutes, NRS 159.335, which "warns that a
guardian who improperly restricts communications and access to the
protected person 'is subject to removal." Id. at 147, 531 P.3d at 1244
(quoting NRS 159.335(2)) (emphasis added); accord id. at 140-41, 531 P.3d
at 1240.
Thereafter, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing
where five witnesses testified about how the guardian was restricting access
to the adult protected person. Id. at 141, 531 P.3d at 1240-41. Both at the
hearing and in a post-hearing brief, the respondents again asked for their
sister to be removed as guardian. Id. at 148, 531 P.3d at 1245. Then, while
awaiting the district court's decision, the respondents objected to an
accounting filed by the guardian and again asked the court to "sua sponte
remove" their sister as guardian. Id. at 142, 531 P.3d at 1241. On that
record, the supreme court determined that the "cumulative effect of these
multiple references, coupled with the district court's own statements, leaves
little doubt that [the adult protected person] had notice that the removal of
[her daughter] as guardian was open for consideration by the court." Id. at
147, 531 P.3d at 1244.
This case is nothing like Jones. Although Sara petitioned twice
for reunification therapy8—once in 2022 and again in 2023—nowhere in

8 Reunification therapy is intended to repair damaged relationships
between parents and children. See, e.g., Jan B. Gilman-Tepper & Sandra
Morgan Little, Children Who "Lose" a Parent: Advice from the Experts on
Successful Reunification, 38 Fam. Advoc. 32, 34 (Summer 2015) (explaining
that the "definition of reunification therapy is to help reconnect parents and
children, often ordered by the family court after a parent asks for court
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those petitions did she allude to or request that the Ruckles' guardianship
be terminated, nor allege facts regarding the Ruckles' conduct as guardians
that could justify removing them as guardians. To the contrary, when
arguing in favor of reunification therapy at a hearing in July 2023, Sara
told the district court, "we're not asking to put the girls back in Pahrump
with mom. We're asking for reunification therapy." Sara explained that
her goal in requesting reunification therapy was to "normalize [her]
relationships" with her children and have "some expanded visitation, if
appropriate." Further, unlike in Jones, none of the district court's prior
orders contained any language that referenced the possibility of the
Ruckles' removal or termination as guardians. The first time the district
court ever mentioned the possibility of removal or termination was at the
July 25 hearing where the final decision was made.
While Sara did ultimately file a petition to remove the Ruckles
and terminate the guardianship on July 24, her belated filing did not
provide the Ruckles with adequate notice that removal and termination of
the guardianship would be considered at the July 25 hearing. Sara filed her
petition just one day prior to the scheduled hearing, and the district court
did not issue the required citations directing the Ruckles and all interested
parties to show cause why the court should not remove them as guardians
and terminate the guardianship. See NRS 159A.1855(1)-(2) (requiring the
court to issue a citation upon the filing of a petition for removal of a
guardian that requires that the guardian "appear and show cause why the

assistance to reestablish a relationship with their children"); Lanzana v.
Duplan, No. A-2183-15T2, 2017 WL 1166451, at *10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Mar. 29, 2017) (explaining that "reunification therapy is designed to
treat a psychological condition or dysfunctional family relationship, such as
those which arise from parental alienation or abuse").
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court should not remove the guardian"); NRS 159A.1905(4) (requiring the
court to issue a citation upon the filing of a petition for termination of a
guardianship "requiring all interested persons to appear and show cause
why termination or modification of the guardianship should not be
granted").
Had the court issued the requisite citations, the Ruckles would
have been apprised of the possibility of removal and termination of the
guardianship. Yet, there is no indication in the record that the Ruckles
were notified that Sara's petition or the specific claims raised therein would
be considered at the hearing.9 As a result, we cannot say that the Ruckles
received sufficient notice in advance of the hearing to satisfy procedural due
process.
The Ruchles were not provided a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior
to their removal and the termination of the guardianship
Furthermore, even if the Ruckles had received adequate notice
that both removal and termination of the guardianship would be considered
at the July 25 hearing, they were not provided with a meaningful
opportunity to be heard on those issues. As the supreme court explained in
D.M.F., when the court is considering removal of a minor's guardian and
termination of the guardianship, "[a] full and fair hearing requires that the
change in custody be supported by factual evidence and the party
threatened with the loss of parental rights must be given the opportunity to

9As noted previously, there is nothing in the hearing transcript or the
district court's order terminating the guardianship to suggest that the court
considered or otherwise relied on Sara's petition in making its decision.
Instead, the record demonstrates that the district court decided, sua sponte,
to terminate the Ruckles' guardianship at the July 25 hearing.
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rebut the evidence presented against them." m Id. at 353, 535 P.3d at 1164.
Unlike in Jones, where the district court permitted briefing and an
evidentiary hearing before removing the guardian, the district court here
did not direct any briefing and did not hold any evidentiary hearing.
Moreover, the district court did not request or allow any argument before
making its ruling at the hearing. Instead, the district court began the
hearing by informing the protected minors' counsel that his services may
not be needed going forward and ordering that the Ruckles be removed as
guardians and that the guardianship be terminated; when the Ruckles'
counsel attempted to interject, the district court abruptly stated, "I
understand you've stood up, bat I've already rnade my orders. I am
terminating the guardianship today." (Emphasis added.) And even if the
district court had heard argument or taken evidence, the district court's
failure to provide adequate notice of the purpose of the hearing impaired
the Ruckles' ability to address the district court's concerns in a meaningful
manner. See D.M.F., 139 Nev. at 354, 535 P.3d at 1165 (explaining that
procedural due process requires an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful

1
mAt oral argument, Sara argued that under Deegan u. Deegan, 22
Nev. 185, 37 P. 60 (1894), a minor guardianship can be terminated without
an evidentiary hearing. Because this argument was raised for the first time
at oral argument, we need not consider it. See Rives v. Ferris, 138 Nev. 138,
146 n.6, 506 P.3d 1064, 1071 n.6 (2022). Nevertheless, we note that Deegan,
which was decided more than a century prior to the supreme court's decision
in D.M.F., did not address whether procedural due process required an
evidentiary hearing before the termination of a minor guardianship; rather,
the court merely "held that a guardian statute provided the court with sua
sponte authority to remove a guardian, without notice, after the district
court asked for corrected accounting, but none was provided." Jones, 139
Nev. at 144 n.3, 531 P.3d at 1242 n.3 (discussing the court's holding in
Deegan).
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manner and stating, "the parties could not appropriately address the issues
of removal and termination" given the lack of clarity as to the purpose of
the hearing).
Although we conclude that the Ruckles were not provided
adequate notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the issues of
removal and termination, we note that this case differs from D.M.F. in two
crucial respects that impact the relief we provide in resolving this matter.
First, the district court had access to two confidential reports that appear
to contain recommendations and conclusions regarding the Ruckles'
suitability as guardians, the children's health and welfare, and Sara's
suitability as a parent. Cf. D.M.F., 139 Nev. at 353-54, 535 P.3d at 1164
(noting that the investigator's report "provided no recommendations or
conclusions regarding [the guardian's] suitability or [the protected minor's]
health and welfare, thus giving no indication of the case . . regarding the
need to remove [the grandmother] as guardian and terminate [the]
guardianship"). And while the district court relied on these reports in
terminating the guardianship, the Ruckles failed to ensure these reports
were included as part of the record on appeal." Thus, we presume for

"The parties agree that Dr. Holland's confidential reports were never
made part of the official district court record below and may instead have
been "left-side filed" with the court to maintain their confidentiality. While
the Ruckles contend that they were unable to include those reports in the
record on appeal, we disagree. As recently amended, NRAP 10(c)(2) now
allows litigants to correct or modify the district court record to include
"anything material to either party [that] is omitted from or misstated from
the record" in three instances: "(A) on stipulation of the parties; (B) on order
of the district court; or (C) on order of the Supreme Court or Court of
Appeals." Without question, Dr. Holland's reports were material to all
parties, and the Ruckles could have utilized NRAP 10(c) to modify the
record to include them.
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purposes of this appeal that the representations contained in the record
concerning the contents of those reports are accurate. Cf. Cuzze v. Univ. &
Cinty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007) ("When
an appellant fails to include necessary documentation in the record, we
necessarily presume that the missing portion supports the district court's
decision.").
Second, unlike in D.M.F., the record contains Sara's petition for
removal and termination of the guardianship, which relied on those
reports.'2 As noted above, Sara's petition referenced several concerning
findings that Dr. Holland allegedly made in her second report, including
that A.L.R.-Q. left the Ruckles' home "due to a long history of alleged and
documented chronic emotional and psychological abuse coupled with
intermittent physical abuse" and that Ms. Ruckle "acknowledged on
May 3, 2024, that she has engaged in physical acts of maltreatment abuse
of the Children." Sara's petition represented that Dr. Holland found
A.L.R.-Q. to be "severely behind in math and science" and had "extreme
concern regarding the educational environment at the Guardians' Home."
According to the petition, Dr. Holland also reported that the Ruckles were
not complying with the district court's orders. Finally, Dr. Holland
reportedly found that "[r]eunification [t]herapy has been successful" and
"[t]here is no evidence of any concerns regarding Mom, Mom's home
environment, or the person living in Mom's home." If true, these allegations
could support both removal and termination of the minor guardianship.

' 2While the district court terrninated the guardianship sua sponte,
given the absence of Dr. Holland's reports from the record on appeal, Sara's
petition is nonetheless pertinent to our review of this matter to the extent
that it references the evidence the court seemingly had before it in making
its decision.
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See, e.g., NRS 159A.185(1)(f) (stating that a court may remove a guardian
if the court determines "Whe guardian has intentionally failed to perform
any duty as provided by law or by any lawful order of the court, regardless
of injury"); NRS 159A.191(1)(c) (stating that a court may terminate a
guardianship "[u]pon order of the court, if the court determines that the
guardianship is no longer necessary"). In light of these important
distinctions and the unique circumstances of this case, we decline to simply
reverse and remand the district court's order terminating the guardianship
as was done in D.M.F.
Instead, to remedy the district court's violation of the Ruckles'
due process rights, we vacate the district court's order and remand this
matter to the district court for further proceedings. On remand, we direct
the court to permit briefing and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether removal or termination are appropriate in light of Dr. Holland's
confidential reports. Cf. Goad v. State, 137 Nev. 167, 185, 488 P.3d 646, 662
(Ct. App. 2021) (vacating a judgment of conviction and remanding for a
retrospective competency hearing where the district court violated the
defendant's procedural due process right to a competency hearing before
standing trial). Further, because more than a year has passed since the
district court's decision, and circumstances may have changed, the court
may consider facts and evidence that post-date the decision on appeal.
Finally, in light of the concerning allegations raised in Sara's petition for
removal and termination, we elect to maintain the current custodial
arrangement, such that Sara will retain both physical and legal custody of
the minor children pending a final decision by the district court on

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remand.13 See Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 455, 352 P.3d 1139, 1146
(2015) (leaving certain provisions of a custody order in place pending further
proceedings on remand).
We also note that the district court's order did not contain the
specific findings necessary to support either removal or termination of the
guardianship in response to Dr. Holland's NSRG 5 communications. As
explained in D.M.F., before a district court may sua sponte remove a
guardian based on an NSRG 5 communication, the court must "first
determine whether one of the enumerated conditions for removal under
NRS 159A.185(1) exists and, if so, conduct a best-interests-of-the-child
analysis" by addressing the mandatory best interest factors in NRS
159A.186(2). 139 Nev. at 355-56, 535 P.3d at 1165-66. Likewise, under
NSRG 10(A), a district court "shall not terminate the
guardianship . . . without making specific findings as to: 1. [t]he protected
person's current health and welfare; 2. [t]he reasons a guardianship does or
does not remain necessary, including identifying the existence of less-
restrictive alternatives; and 3. [w]hether maintaining the guardianship
would serve the protected person's best interests." Should the district court,
after briefing and a hearing, conclude that removal or termination is
appropriate, the court must make the necessary findings and address the
mandatory factors set forth in the applicable statutes and rules.14

"Nothing in this decision prohibits the district court from entering
temporary or emergency orders or otherwise modifying the current custody
arrangement as needed "to comport with current circumstances." See
Dauis, 131 Nev. at 455, 352 P.3d at 1146.
Insofar as the parties have raised other arguments not specifically
14
addressed in this order, we have considered the same and conclude that
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CONCLUSION
As custodial relatives who served as guardians to their minor
grandchildren, the Ruckles had a liberty interest in the care, custody, and
management of those children. In that capacity, they were entitled to notice
and an opportunity to be heard before the district court could sua sponte
remove them as guardians and terminate their guardianship. In the
proceedings below, the district court violated the Ruckles' procedural due
process rights when it terminated their minor guardianship without
adequate notice or any meaningful opportunity to be heard. Accordingly,
we vacate the district court's order and remand for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

Westbrook

We concur:

il eomoassos , C.J.
Bulla

J.
Gibbons

they do not present a basis for relief or need not be reached given the
disposition of this appeal.
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cez,