Thomas King v McLaren Health Corporation - Case Vacated and Remanded

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• Lead Opinion from the Court Add Note # Thomas a King v. McLaren Health Corporation

Michigan Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 366152
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Disposition: Vacated and Remanded

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Disposition

Vacated and Remanded

Lead Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

THOMAS A. KING, UNPUBLISHED
February 27, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellant, 8:46 AM

v No. 366152
Oakland Circuit Court
MCLAREN HEALTH CORPORATION, LC No. 2022-195906-CD

Defendant-Appellee.

ON REMAND

Before: FEENEY, P.J., and SWARTZLE and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This employment-related civil-rights action is before the Court on remand from our
Supreme Court. King v McLaren Health Corp, ___ Mich ___ (2025) (Docket No. 168207) (King
II). Specifically, on October 24, 2025, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, our Supreme Court
vacated this Court’s judgment in King v McLaren Health Corp, unpublished per curiam opinion
of the Court of Appeals, issued January 30, 2025 (Docket No. 366152) (King I), and remanded to
this Court for reconsideration in light of Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC, ___ Mich
__; __ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 163989). King II, unpub order at 1. The parties submitted
supplemental briefing in late 2025, and the matter is now ripe for resolution on remand.

The underlying facts of this dispute can be found in King I, slip op, pp 1-2. On remand,
this Court is asked to reconsider whether the trial court erred when it concluded that plaintiff’s
claims were time-barred by a six-months limitations period included in plaintiff’s employment
application. Specifically, plaintiff asks that we apply Rayford to this dispute and remand the case
back to the trial court for a review of whether plaintiff’s filing was reasonable, as that term was
described in Rayford. Defendant offers several reasons why this Court should not remand and
instead affirm summary disposition in its favor. We take each of defendant’s arguments up in turn.

First, defendant argues that plaintiff has waived any reliance on the Rayford decision. This
argument is without merit. Throughout the proceedings, plaintiff has argued that the shortened
limitations period set forth in his employment agreement was against public policy. As noted in

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King I, plaintiff relied on a concurring opinion by Justice Welch in McMillon v Kalamazoo, 983
NW2d 79, 82 (Mich, 2023) (WELCH, J., concurring), for the argument that contractual limitations
periods for employment-related civil rights claims should be invalid. Justice Welch reiterated
many of the same points in her majority opinion in Rayford. In fact, in King I, this Court expressly
recognized that our Supreme Court had several cases pending before it on whether a contractual
limitations period should be held invalid. King I, slip op, p 6. Parties are generally free to argue
a point in a more sophisticated way on appeal, as long as the point is not novel. Glasker-Davis v
Auvenshine, 333 Mich App 222, 228; 964 NW2d 809 (2020). We conclude that plaintiff did not
waive this issue.

Second, defendant urges this Court not to apply Rayford to this current dispute; instead,
Rayford should be applied only to cases filed after its date of issuance (i.e., July 31, 2025). To the
contrary, we conclude that Rayford does apply to the current case. As a matter of common sense,
our Supreme Court specifically vacated this Court’s judgment in King I and remanded for
reconsideration in light of its Rayford decision. If the Supreme Court intended for Rayford to
apply only to cases initiated after the date of that decision, then there would have been little reason
to remand here.

Even setting this observation aside, it has long been established that “the general rule is
that judicial decisions are to be given complete retroactive effect.” Hyde v Univ of Mich Bd of
Regents, 426 Mich 223, 240; 393 NW2d 847 (1986). Although Rayford did overturn settled
precedent of this Court—a factor generally weighing in favor of prospective application, see
League of Women Voters of Mich v Secretary of State, 508 Mich 520, 566; 975 NW2d 840
(2022)—Rayford explained that it was not overturning any of its own settled precedent. Rayford,
___ Mich at __; slip op, pp 19-28. This certainly weighs in favor of complete retroactive effect.
In fact, a prior panel of this Court has already applied Rayford to an employment action initiated
prior to July 31, 2025. See Johnson v Best Buy Co, Inc, __ Mich App __; __ NW2d ___ (2025)
(Docket No. 363807). Accordingly, we conclude that Rayford applies here.

Third and finally, defendant asks that this Court conclude that the shortened limitations
period here was reasonable. The trial court did not have the benefit of Rayford when it ruled on
defendant’s motion for summary disposition. We will not short-circuit the regular litigation
process by taking up this question in the first instance on appeal, especially given the possibility
that the reasonableness of the shortened limitations period might require further factual
development.

The trial court’s grant of summary disposition in defendant’s favor is vacated, and the
matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and
Rayford. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron

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