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Feb. 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Ryan Matthew Gluys v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25A-CR-01488
• Judges: Foley, May, Altice

• Disposition: Reversed and Remanded

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (26.4K)

• PDF

Disposition

Reversed and Remanded

Combined Opinion

                        by Judge May

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana
FILED
Ryan Gluys, Feb 25 2026, 8:36 am

Appellant-Defendant CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

v.

State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff

February 25, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-CR-1488
Appeal from the Rush Circuit Court
The Honorable Brian D. Hill, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
70C01-2405-CM-264

Opinion by Judge May
Judges Altice and Foley concur.

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1488 | February 25, 2026 Page 1 of 13
[1] Ryan Gluys appeals following his conviction of Class A misdemeanor invasion

of privacy. 1 Gluys raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as:

1. Whether reversible error occurred when Gluys was removed
   from a pretrial diversion program without a hearing at which the
   State proved Gluys violated their agreement; and

2. Whether the State proved Gluys committed harassment in
   violation of a protective order.

No reversible error occurred when Gluys was removed from the pretrial

diversion program without a hearing, but Gluys’s conviction of invasion of

privacy must be reversed because the trial court relied on the wrong statute

when determining whether Gluys committed harassment in violation of the

protective order. We accordingly reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History
[2] Prior to the events at issue herein, Gluys had a child (“Child”) with Amanda

Blackford. The record does not reflect Child’s exact age, but we can infer that

Child is still a minor. Blackford thereafter became romantically involved with

Nevada Benedict. 2

1
Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(1).
2
Before trial, Benedict and Blackford married, and Benedict changed his last name to “Blackford.” (Tr. Vol.
II at 13.) We nevertheless refer to him as Benedict throughout this opinion to distinguish him from Amanda
Blackford.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1488 | February 25, 2026 Page 2 of 13
[3] On September 1, 2022, the Hancock Superior Court entered an Order of

Protection for Benedict, Blackford, and three other members of their household.

The Order “enjoined [Gluys] from threatening to commit or committing acts of

domestic or family violence or harassment against” Benedict, Blackford, and

the other members of their household. (Ex. Vol. at 4.) By its terms, the Order

of Protection was to expire on September 1, 2024. (Id. at 3, 6.) The Order was

served on Gluys on September 9, 2022. (Id. at 7.)

[4] In August 2023, Gluys and Blackford signed an Agreed Entry to resolve

custody and parenting time issues regarding Child, and the Hancock County

Court signed the Agreed Entry to make it the court’s order. The Agreed Entry

provided the parties would co-parent “by communicating with one another in

writing by email only and only about their [child]. All communication shall be

non-abusive in nature and reasonable at all times.” (Id. at 8.)

[5] On May 10, 2024, while Child was with Gluys, Child called Blackford for

assistance because Child felt unsafe. Benedict called 911, and police went to

Gluys’s house and removed Child. At 1:29 a.m. on May 11, 2024, Gluys sent

an email to Blackford that said:

You don’t deserve to be a Mother. I hope you kill yourself! I’ll
be praying for you! I’ll pray you suffer and die! You piece of shit
horror bitch! The world will [sic] better off without trash horrors
like you[.]

(Id. at 12.) Then, at 4:13 a.m. on May 11, 2024, Gluys sent an email to

Blackford that said:

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1488 | February 25, 2026 Page 3 of 13
Now, I hope, you know how it is. You use to be cool…you’ve
been just a hateful bitch for a long time to me[.]

(Id. at 13.) Finally, six minutes later, Gluys sent an email to Blackford that

said:

Don’t ever talk to me again unless it’s through a lawyer[.]

(Id. at 14.) When Blackford checked her email later on May 11, she saw these

messages and called the police to report that Gluys violated the protective

order.

[6] On May 13, 2024, the State charged Gluys with invasion of privacy based on

his alleged violation of the protective order. In August 2024, Gluys and the

State entered a Pretrial Diversion Agreement – the State agreed to withhold

prosecution “so long as the Defendant complies with the terms of the

Agreement” and Gluys agreed to pay fees, to not commit criminal offenses for

six months, to not use or possess illegal substances, to not be intoxicated on

alcohol, to report any change of address, and to “[m]aintain general good

behavior.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 50.)

[7] On September 18, 2024, the State filed a motion asking the trial court to set trial

on Gluys’s charge of invasion of privacy because Gluys violated his pretrial

diversion program. According to the State’s motion, the State had charged

Gluys with Level 6 felony intimidation and Class A misdemeanor operating a

vehicle while intoxicated under cause number 30D02-2409-F6-1710. (Id. at 54.)

The court set dates for a final pretrial conference and a bench trial.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1488 | February 25, 2026 Page 4 of 13
[8] After multiple continuances prompted by changes of defense counsel and

defense motions, a pretrial conference finally occurred on May 6, 2025. At this

hearing, Gluys requested new counsel and a jury trial. The trial court explained

to Gluys that he could not change counsel again and that he had waived his

right to a jury by failing to request a jury prior to his first trial setting in July

1. At the bench trial on May 20, 2025, Gluys renewed his demand for a

jury trial, which the trial court agreed to “note” for the record, and then Gluys

asserted:

One additional issue, Judge, um, again, for the record, there was
a Pretrial Diversion entered in this case, Mr. Gluys does not
believe, in fact, that he violated that diversion because the
diversion says that he should commit no criminal offenses either
felony or misdemeanor. Um, the case that triggered the
reinstitution of the proceedings in this case is still pending in
Hancock County. He, therefore, does not believe that he
violated the Pretrial Diversion Agreement. Um, he indicated his
attorney advised him that, um, if the diversion was violated, the
process would start over. Um, I advised him I didn’t necessarily
agree with that but that, he’s alleging that he relied on that, you
Honor.

(Tr. Vol. II at 10.) The trial court asked about Gluys’s reliance, and counsel

indicated Gluys believed he could request a jury trial if he was removed from

the diversion program. The trial court denied Gluys’s request for a jury trial,

and then counsel asked for a separation of witnesses for trial.

[9] The trial court heard testimony from Benedict, Blackford, and the investigating

officer. The State admitted into evidence the protective order, the agreed

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1488 | February 25, 2026 Page 5 of 13
paternity order, and the emails from Gluys to Blackford. The court found

Gluys guilty of invasion of privacy and imposed a thirty-day executed sentence.

Discussion and Decision
1. Pretrial Diversion
[10] Gluys first challenges the revocation of his pretrial diversion agreement.

However, an appellant generally cannot raise an issue on appeal that was not

presented to the trial court. Benjamin v. State, 233 N.E.3d 506, 512 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2024). On September 18, 2024, the State moved for the trial court to set a

trial date because Gluys had violated his pretrial diversion agreement. At no

point thereafter did Gluys file an objection to his cause being set for trial

without a hearing to determine whether he had violated the agreement.

Instead, on the morning of the trial, in the midst of arguing about whether

Gluys should be allowed to assert his right to a jury trial, Gluys’s counsel

indicated Gluys did not believe he violated the pretrial diversion agreement.

Counsel did not argue Gluys was entitled to a hearing regarding the revocation

of that agreement, nor did counsel cite any authority to support such an

argument. Gluys accordingly waived this issue by failing to properly assert it

before the trial court. See id. (holding Benjamin waived Evidence Rule 704

objection to admission of evidence by presenting only a relevance objection at

trial).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1488 | February 25, 2026 Page 6 of 13
[11] Despite waiver at trial, we may reverse on appeal if the appellant can

demonstrate an error that was fundamental. Peters v. State, 959 N.E.2d 347, 352

(Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

Fundamental error is “error so prejudicial to the rights of the
defendant that a fair trial is rendered impossible.” The
fundamental error rule is extremely narrow, and applies only
when “the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles,
the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting
error denies the defendant fundamental due process.”

Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Wilson v. State, 931 N.E.2d 914, 919 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied). Gluys cannot demonstrate fundamental error,

however, because he had no due process right to a hearing before the revocation

of his pretrial diversion program. 3 See J.S. v. State, 136 N.E.3d 255, 258 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2019) (holding due process does not require a hearing before removal

from a pretrial diversion program). Nor has Gluys demonstrated the revocation

of his pretrial diversion program constituted the type of prosecutorial behavior

that “impaired the reliability and usefulness of an important prosecutorial tool

and tended to undermine the integrity and credibility of the criminal justice

system to an extent compelling reversal[.]” Bowers v. State, 500 N.E.2d 203, 204

(Ind. 1086). We accordingly turn to Gluys’s second argument.

3
Moreover, on August 14, 2025, Gluys pled guilty to one of the two crimes alleged by the State in support of
his removal from pretrial diversion, see
https://public.courts.in.gov/mycase/#/vw/CaseSummary/eyJ2Ijp7IkNhc2VUb2tlbiI6IkZOc3NpbkRsd21s
ZG5FYm1GLVNLQ3RsajVVbG52NVB2WFBqeWZyZGxZejAxIn19 [https://perma.cc/CZ3S-L48N],
which suggests the State could have proven that Gluys violated his pretrial diversion agreement.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1488 | February 25, 2026 Page 7 of 13
2. Invasion of Privacy
[12] Gluys next argues the State failed to prove he committed harassment as

required to convict him of invasion of privacy. The State’s charge of invasion

of privacy indicated:

Gluys did knowingly violate a protective order to prevent
harassment issued under I.C. 34-26-5 by the Hancock County
Superior Court in 30D01-2208-PO-1059 to protect Amanda
Blackford, to wit: sent messages to . . . Blackford in violation of
the protective order valid through September 1, 2024, contrary to
the form of the statutes in such cases made and provided by I.C.
34-46-1-15.1(a)(1) and against the peace and dignity of the State
of Indiana.

(Appellant’s App. Vol 2 at 14.)

[13] Invasion of privacy occurs if someone “knowingly or intentionally violates . . .

a protective order to prevent domestic or family violence or harassment issued

under IC 34-26-5[.]” Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1 (2023). Benedict obtained a

protective order against Gluys under Indiana Code chapter 34-26-5, and that

order prohibited Gluys from “threatening to commit or committing acts of

domestic or family violence or harassment against” Benedict, Blackford, and

the other members of their household.4 (Ex. Vol. at 4.)

4
The State asserts on appeal, as it argued at trial, that “the protective order, which was issued to prevent
domestic or family violence or harassment, prohibited Gluys from having ‘any contact’ with Amanda (Tr. 13;
Ex. 1).” (Br. of Appellee at 14); see also (Tr. Vol. II at 40-41). Neither Exhibit 1 nor page 13 of the Transcript
provides evidence that the protective order prohibited all contact between Gluys and Blackford.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1488 | February 25, 2026 Page 8 of 13
[14] Our legislature determined that the definition of “harassment” for purposes of

the crime of invasion of privacy would be the definition provided in Indiana

Code section 34-6-2-51.5. Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2 -150 (2019). That definition of

harassment includes

conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but is not limited
to, repeated or continuing impermissible contact:

(1) that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional
distress; and

(2) that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress.

Ind. Code § 34-6-2-51.5 (2019).

[15] Gluys argues prejudicial error occurred because the trial court applied the

incorrect statutory definition of harassment to determine whether he violated

the protective order. Gluys asserts, and the State concedes, that the trial court

relied on the definition of harassment found in Indiana Code section 35-45-2-

The protective order does prohibit Gluys “from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or directly or
indirectly communicating with the Petitioner.” (Ex. Vol. at 4.) However, the “Petitioner” was “Nevada Lee
Benedict” not Blackford. (Id. at 3, 4.)
The protective order also indicated Gluys “may not communicate” with Blackford until a custodial order had
been entered regarding Child. (Id. at 5.) However, a custody order was entered in August 2023, and the
communications at issue did not occur until May 2024, which renders moot the “may not communicate”
provision regarding Blackford in the protective order.
Accordingly, we reject the State’s erroneous factual assertion that the protective order prohibited Gluys from
having “any contact” with Blackford. Because the protective order did not prevent all contact between Gluys
and Blackford, the State’s references to the requirements of the Agreed Entry in the paternity proceedings are
also irrelevant for purposes of determining whether Gluys committed invasion of privacy.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1488 | February 25, 2026 Page 9 of 13
2(a)(2) (1996), which provides: “A person who, with intent to harass, annoy, or

alarm another person but with no intent of legitimate communication: . . .

communicates with a person by telegraph, mail, or other form of written

communication[.]” The transcript demonstrates the trial court quoted the

criminal definition of harassment from Title 35, rather than the civil definition

of harassment from Title 34, as the court was determining whether to find

Gluys guilty. (Tr. Vol. II at 42.)

[16] In bench trials, we generally apply a presumption that a trial court knows and

applies the law correctly. Porter v. State, 272 N.E.3d 996, 1000 (Ind. Ct. App.

2025). “The presumption may be rebutted if the trial court’s oral remarks

‘disclose use of an erroneous standard with clarity and certainty[.]’” Id.

(brackets in Porter) (quoting Moran v. State, 622 N.E.2d 157, 159-60 (Ind. 1993)).

Herein, we cannot apply that presumption because the trial court’s own

statement indicates it relied on the wrong statutory definition of an element

required to declare Gluys guilty. See, e.g., Hernandez v. State, 45 N.E.3d 373, 378

(Ind. 2015) (“[r]eversal is required if the jury’s decision may have been based

upon an erroneous instruction”) (bracket in Hernandez) (quoting Harrington v.

State, 413 N.E.2d 622, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)).

[17] The State suggests we should ignore the trial court’s references to the incorrect

statute as “immaterial,” (Br. of Appellee at 15 n.3), and Gluys argues on reply

that we cannot see the error as immaterial when the two definitions of

harassment have different elements. (See Reply Br. at 11-12.) We agree with

Gluys. Herein, the trial court convicted Gluys based upon the elements of the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1488 | February 25, 2026 Page 10 of 13
criminal harassment statute that required the trial court to find Gluys

communicated “with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm[,]” Ind. Code § 35-45-2 -

2(a)(2), rather than the correct definition required the trial court to find Gluys’s

communication “would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress”

and “actually cause[d] [Blackford] to suffer emotional distress.” Ind. Code §

34-6-2-51.5 (2019). Nothing the trial court said after reading the incorrect

statute suggests the trial court considered the objective and subjective elements

of emotional distress required by Section 46-6-2-51.5. We cannot say it was

“immaterial” that the trial court used the incorrect definition of harassment to

determine if Gluys violated the terms of the protective order by harassing

Blackford, when the legislature chose those specific elements to be in the

definition applicable to harassment for purposes of a criminal conviction of

invasion of privacy. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 827 N.E.2d 1131, 1134 (Ind.

2005) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 373-74 (1970)) (“[I]t is bedrock law

that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to have the [fact-finder] instructed

on all of the elements of the charged offense.”).

[18] The State also argues that we can affirm Gluys’s conviction because the

evidence was sufficient to demonstrate Gluys committed harassment under the

correct statutory definition. However, we may not affirm on this basis because

as a reviewing court, it is not our place “to prejudge what a [fact-finder] might

have determined if it had been properly instructed.” Taylor v. State, 922 N.E.2d

710, 719 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. granted 940 N.E.2d 823 (Ind. 2010), grant of

trans. vacated & opinion reinstated 936 N.E.2d 1241 (Ind. 2010), trans. vacated 940

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1488 | February 25, 2026 Page 11 of 13
N.E.2d 829 (Ind. 2010). We do not know what the trial court would have

determined if it had considered the objective and subjective emotional distress

elements for harassment as defined in Section 34-6-2-51.5 (2019), and we do not

assess criminal guilt de novo. See id. (“Harmless-error analysis has no place

where, as here, an essential instruction on the underlying offense is missing

entirely.”). We accordingly reverse Gluys’s conviction of invasion of privacy

and remand for the trial court to determine Gluys’s guilt using the definition of

harassment required by the statutes in effect when he committed his crime. See,

e.g., Miller v. State, 77 N.E.3d 1196, 1197 (Ind. 2017) (holding that, when trial

court in bench trial applied the wrong legal standard, the appropriate remedy

was for appellate court to “remand for the trial court to reconsider the case

under the correct legal standard”).

Conclusion
[19] Gluys has not demonstrated reversible error occurred when he was removed

from his pretrial diversion program without a hearing. However, the trial

court’s reliance on the improper definition of harassment when determining

whether Gluys committed invasion of privacy requires us to reverse his

conviction and remand for the trial court to reconsider based on the correct

definition. We accordingly reverse and remand.

[20] Reversed and remanded.

Altice, J., and Foley, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1488 | February 25, 2026 Page 12 of 13
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Cara Schaefer Wieneke
Wieneke Law Office, LLC
Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Andrew M. Sweet
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1488 | February 25, 2026 Page 13 of 13