Albert Dejuan White appeal drug and firearm convictions

1 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON February 3, 2026 Session STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ALBE RT DEJUAN WHITE Appeal from the Circuit Cour t for Tip ton County No. 11361 A. Blake Neill, Judge ______________ __________________ ___ No. W2025-0025 3-CCA-R3-CD ______________ __________________ ___ Defendant, Albert Dejuan White, appeals his Tipton County Circuit Court trial convictions of posses sion w ith int e nt to deliver twenty- six grams or more of coca ine, posse ssion of a firearm during the c ommission of a dangerous felony, and posse ssion of drug paraphernalia, arguing that the trial court e rred by denying his moti on to supp ress e vidence and stateme nts obtai ned during the sea rch of h is residen ce and th at the eviden ce wa s insufficient to support his convictions. Disc erning no reversible error, w e affirm t he judgments of t he trial c ourt. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgm ents of the Circuit Court Affi rmed M ATTHEW J. W ILSON, J., de livered th e opinion of the court, in which K YLE A. H IXS ON, J., joined. S TEV EN W. S WORD, J., concurring in p art and concurri ng in th e results. Josie Holland, Memphis, Tennesse e (on appeal); and J. Barney Witherington, IV (at trial), for the appellant, A lber t Dejuan White. Jonathan S krm etti, Attorney General and Reporter; G. Kirby Ma y, Assistant Attorney General; Mark Davidson, District Attorney General; and Sean Hor d and Jaso n Poyne r, Assistant District Attorne ys General, for the appellee, Sta te of Ten nessee. OPINION Defendant’ s convict ions for possessio n of cocaine with the intent to de liver, possession a firearm du ring the commission of a dangerous felony, and possess ion of drug paraphernalia arose fro m the July 11, 2023, e xecution of a search war rant at the residence Defendant s hared with his elderly parents. 02/27/2026

2 Factual and Procedur al Background On Ma rch 4, 2024, th e Tipton C ounty G rand J ury c har ged Defe ndant with one c ount of possessio n with inte nt to deliver twenty-six gra ms or mor e of coca ine, see T enn. Co de Ann. § 39-17-417, one count of posses sion w ith intent to de liver on e-half o unce or mor e of marijua na, see id., one coun t of posses sion of a firearm during t he commissio n of or attempt to commit the d angerous fe lony o f coca ine possessio n a fter hav ing previously been convicted of two f elony offenses, see id. § 3 9-1 7-1324, a nd one cou nt of possessio n of drug paraphernalia, see id. § 39-17-425. I. Motion to Suppre ss Following h is indictm ent, Defen dant moved to suppress the ev idence obta ined during t he search of the residence he shared wi th his pa rents (“ the residence”), ar guin g that the affidavit in support of the se arch warrant did not contain facts sufficient to establis h a nexus between the alleged criminal conduct and the residence, and the statements he m ade to l aw e nforcement offic ers duri ng the e xecuti on of the warr ant, arguing that the statemen ts were taken in the absen ce of Miran da 1 warnings. At the heari ng on the m otion, T ipton County Sh erif f ’ s Office (“TC SO”) Investig ator Christopher Baylo us testified t hat he led a n investigation into Defendant’ s alleged drug activity a nd that, as par t of his investigati on, h e obtained and exec uted a searc h warrant at the address listed on D efendant’ s driver ’ s lic ense, car registrati on, and cell phone acc ount. The investi gator te stified that before obtainin g the search wa rrant, he and oth er officers monitored a ser ies o f three completed controlled buys be tween Defe ndant an d a confidential informant 2 in f ront of the re sidence using GPS-equipped recording equipment and a camera-eq uipped drone. Additionally, a f ourth controlle d buy wa s sc heduled to occ ur at the reside nce on t he da y the warra nt was e xecuted. The inve stigator a pplied for a warrant to search the reside nce and pre mises where the controlled buy s occurred for: “An y evidence which c ould have been use d to facilitate or othe rwise c ontribute to the posses sion, sale, manufacture, or delivery of Sche dule II narcotics, including but not limite d to narcotics, ledge rs, cellular telephone s, pa rapherna lia, a nd or pr oceeds gained or comingled with proceeds obtained throu gh the illegal trafficking of narcotics.” The a ffidavit in support of th e se arch warrant, whi ch was al so exhibited t o the inve stigator ’ s testimony, contained t he followin g factual basis: 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2 The informant also testified at t he hearing, but we have not in cluded her testimony bec ause our review of the validity of the search wa rrant is confined to the information included in the af fidavit.

3 Statement of Fact s and Circumstances In Support of Probable Cause Investigator Chr is Bayl ous states the follo wing under oat h: (Background of Investigation) After several months o f receiving intel that [Defendant] 3 was con ducting na rcotics transactions a t mult iple locat ions throughout T ipton County, T ennessee, a s well as, his resid ence of 356 W alton Loop, Covington, T i pton C ounty, T enne ssee 3801 9, I nvestigators began atte mpting to acquire a c onfidential inf ormant t o utiliz e for the purpose of pur chasing ille gal narcot ics from [Defendant]. On multi ple occasions, T ipt on County Sheriff ’ s Offi ce Narcotics Inves tigators s poke w ith undercover agent 00420, a bout [De fenda nt]. Undercover agent 00420 advised that t hey were very a ware of [Defendant], a nd he i s most commonly kno wn as “ Big Juan.” Wh en ask ed if whether or not they co uld purchase na rcotics from [Defen dant], undercover a gent 00 420 stated “ yes, that when they were previously a drug user, they purchased cocaine from [Defendant]. Undercove r Agent 00420 th en spoke with [Defendant], an d arranged a narc otics transaction for $100.00 worth of powder co caine. (Incident # 230 7051710) On 05 July 2023, T ipton County Sheriff ’ s Of fice Narcot ics I nvestigators met with Undercover Agent 00420 in referen ce to a prearranged deal to purch ase 1.5 grams of Cocaine for $100.00 from [Defe ndant]. The agen t was provide d $100.00 in TCSO Drug Fund cur rency to conduct the narcotics transacti on. The UA was a lso equipped with audio and surveil lance equipment to obser ve a nd live time monitor the transacti on. The Undercover Agent met [Defendant] at hi s resi dence locat ed at 356 W alton L oop in Covington, TN and purchased 1.5 grams of a white pow dery substance for $10 0.00. Investigators re mai ned in the area conducting surveillanc e until the transa ction was comp leted. After makin g t he purch ase, th e UA retu rned t o a pr edetermined location and Investigat or Baylous t ook possession of the 1.5 grams of whit e powdery substance and placed it into evidence. Prior to the 1.5 grams of powdery s ubstance being placed into evidence it was f ield t ested. The result of the field te st 3 W e have omitted Defendant’ s date of birth and social security nu mber.

4 indicated a positive result for the presence of cocaine. The 1 5 grams will be submitt ed for te sting and this incident will be forwarded to the District Attorney for consideratio n of prosecution for Deliver y of S chedule I I. This inc ident occurre d at approximately 1710 hour s. Prior to and upon completion of the operation both th e Undercover Agent and Unde rcover Agent’ s ve hicle were searche d. This transac tion was also observed by Invest igat or Brandon W illiams. (Incident # 230 7061800) On 06 July 2023, T ipton County Sheriff ’ s Office Narcot ics Investigators me t with UA 00420 in reference t o a p rearranged deal to pur chase 1.5 grams of Cocaine (powder) an d 1.5 gra ms of C ocaine (rock) for $2 00,00 from [Defe ndant]. The a gent was pr ovided $2 00.00 in TCSO Drug F und currency to conduct the na rcotics transaction. The UA was also eq uipped with audio and surveillance equipment to observe and live ti me monitor th e transaction. The Undercover Agent met [Defendant ] at his resi dence located at 356 W alton Loop in Covington, TN and purchased 1.5 grams of a white powdery substa nce and 1.5 grams of a white rock substance for $20 0.00. Investigators re mai ned in the area conducting surveillanc e until the transa ction was comp leted. After makin g t he purch ase, th e UA retu rned t o a pr edetermined location and Investigat or Baylous t ook possession of the 1.5 grams of whit e powder y substance along with the 1.5 grams of white ro ck subs tance and place d it into evidence. The 1.5 grams of pow der an d 1.5 grams of rock w ill be submitted fo r testing and this incident will be forwarded to the District Attorney fo r consi dera tion of p rosecutio n for Delivery of Schedule II. This inc ident oc curred at approximately 180 0 hours. Prior to a nd upon c ompletion of the operation both the UA and UA ’ s vehicle were searched. Thi s transaction was also observed by Invest igat or Brandon W illiams. (Incident # 230 7072000) On 07 July 2023, T ipton County Sheriff ’ s Office Narcot ics Investigators me t with UA 00420 in reference t o a pre arranged de al to pu rchase 4 gra ms of Cocaine (powder) and 4 grams of Cocaine (rock) f or $400.00 from [Defendant]. The agen t was provid ed $400.00 in TCSO D rug Fund currency to cond uct the narco tics trans action. The UA was also eq uipped with audio an d surveillance equipme nt to observe and live ti me m onitor the tr ansaction. The Unde rcover Agent me t [Defendant ] at his res idence loc ated a t 356 W a lton

5 Loop in Covington, T N and purchased 4 gra ms of a white powdery substa nce a nd 4 g rams of a wh ite roc k subst ance for $400.00. I nvestigato rs re mained in the are a cond ucting surveillance un til the tr ansaction was co mpleted. After ma king the purcha se, the UA returned to a predetermined location a nd Investigator Baylous too k posses sion o f the 4 grams of w hite powdery substa nce a long with the 4 grams of white rock substance and pla ced it into evidence. The 4 g rams of powder and 4 grams of ro ck will be su bmitted for testing and this incident will be forwarded to the Dist rict Attorney for consideratio n of prosecution for Deli very of Schedule II. Thi s incident oc curred at ap proximately 2000 hours. Prior to and upon comple tion of t he operati on both the UA an d UA ’ s vehicle were searche d. This trans action was a lso observed by Investigator Br andon W illiam s. (Continuatio n of Inve stigation) Due to the fact that multipl e transactions betw een Undercover Agent 00420 and [Defendant], have occurred, I bel ieve tha t [D efendant] is in possession of a large quantity of illega l narcot ics and has been known to hide large quantities of na rcotics, proceeds from narcotics tran sactions and/or other evidence throughout h is property i n loca tions n ot commonly located or accessed b y law enforcement. Further more on 7-1 1-2 023 UA 00420 advised that another transaction was schedul ed for 7-1 1-2023. (Undercover Agent Rel iability) U ndercover Agent 00420, has been a paid Informa nt with the T ipton Co unty Sheriff ’ s Offi ce since June of 2022 Undercover A gent 00420 has conducted no less th an twenty (20) undercover operations wi th the T ipton County Sheriff ’ s Office involving the purc hasing and intelligence gathering of multipl e narcot ics tra f fickers w ithin T ipton Cou nty. T en nesse e. The Undercover A gent began their assistance with provid ing name s of know n narcotics tr affickers within T ipton County, T ennessee, fo1 1ow ed by: purchas ing narcotics from those n arcotics traf fickers for Investigators to present to the Distr ict Attorney for co nsideration of prosecution. Many of t hose tran sactions are set to be presente d to the T ipt on County Grand Jur y in upcomin g term(s). O n every underc over oper ation cond ucted utiliz ing Underco ver Agent 00420 a s a p urchaser o f narcotics and/or intel ligence gathering, they have bee n succes sful o n both se gments. In all

6 accounts, the U ndercover A gent ha s been d etermined to be extremely relia ble and trustworthy. Experience and Basis of Knowle dge of Affia nt Investigator Chris Ba ylous, with th e T ipton County Sh eriff ’ s Offi ce since August 2 017, havi ng the authority a s an acti ve sworn l aw enfor cement officer by stat ute fro m T ennesse e Co de Annotated 38-08-107 e t. seq. I gr aduated fro m the T ennessee Law E nforcemen t T rai ning Academy (T LET A) in March of 2018 and a m currently assigned to the Crimin al Investigation s Division. I have six years of se rvice in law enforcement, all of which have b een with the T ipton County Sheriff ’ s Of fice. My law enforcem ent experience includes spec ialized traini ng i n the areas of patrol te chniques, firear ms tra ining, special weapons and tactic s, poli ce supervis or cour se, crime scene managemen t and processing, case file documentation, interview and i nterrogation techniq ues, evide nce processing, and courtroom pr ocedures and te stimony. I ha ve be en a ssigned to the Criminal Invest iga tion Division of the T ipton C ounty Sheriff ’ s Of fice holdin g the rank of I nvestig ator since Ma y 2023. I have also pre viously served in the Unit ed Sta tes Arme d Forces both in the Uni ted St ates Marine Corps as well as the United States A rmy where I was Honorably Discha r ged achieving the rank of Staff Sergeant. I have been a P.O.S.T certified law e nforceme nt officer since gradua tin g the ac ademy and have maintained my certification with a minimum of forty hours of in service t rai ning each year. CONCLUSION Therefore, cons idering the foregoing, your Af fiant believes based on his knowledg e, training and exper ience that evidence of violation s of T e nnessee Code Annotate d § 39-17-4 17, Possession of Sched ule II narcotic s with the intent to manufacture, sell a nd/or deliver will be located at the residence. Based on the in formation cont ained in t he affidavit, th e trial co urt issued a warrant t o search: the residenc e, “[a]ll oute r buildin gs loc ated on the premises, ” “[a]ll v ehicles loc ated on the pre mises,” “ [a]ll open a reas or property grounds loc ated on the premises,” “[a]ll locked a nd unlocked compa rtments/safes an d bedrooms within” the residence, and “[a] ny attic spaces or other sp aces within” the residenc e.

7 Investigator Ba ylous te stified tha t SW A T officers arrived at the res idence be fore he did and pla ced Defend ant in handcuffs. When he arrived, the inv estigator told Defenda nt that they were there to execute a search wa rrant and provi ded him with a copy of the warrant. Investig ator Baylous s aid he did not pr ovide Defe ndant with Miranda warnings because he d id not inte nd to ask Defendant any question s. At some point, Inve stigator Brandon W illiams told Invest igator Ba ylous that Defendant “ was going to show us where the narcotic s were located on the property.” Investigator Baylo us asked Defendant whether he was “going to show us where the drug s are,” and De fendant t old of ficers tha t “ they w ere out to wards the she d, and he starte d walking that direc tion.” Officers found the narcoti cs i n a she d behind the hou se. Investigator Baylou s sta ted that De fendant m ade no othe r stateme nts at the scene. Investigator Baylous said that because the se arch warrant was for the residence, groun ds, any outbui ldings or v ehicles on the premis es, officers would have se arched the she d regardless of wha t Def endant told them. Investigator W illi ams testified that he monitored each of the controlle d transactions between Defendant and the confi dential informant, all of which occurre d in the roa d in front of the residenc e or in its driv eway. Investigator W illiams recalled spea king to Defendant on the day of the searc h but sa id t hat he did not provide Miranda warnings to Defendant b ecause he “ didn’ t ask him any ques tions” re lated to the investi gation. He stated that although he could not recall how their conversation began, Def endant asked him to take h is e lderly parents ba ck into the house. Investigator W illiams told D efendant t hat he knew that the officers were there to execute a se arch war rant an d that he woul d be glad t o “speed up the process.” At that point, De fendant said that he would “show [officers] where everything i s if we ca n get my ma ma and d addy back in the house out of the weathe r.” Investigator W illiams de nied tellin g Defendant direc tly tha t the y would allow his parents to go inside more quickl y if Defendant told them w here the drugs w ere located. TCSO De puty Z ach W all ace, who was one of the first officers to arri ve to help execute t he search warrant, recalled tha t when the of ficers bega n to ar rive, Defe ndant was standing in the driveway of the r esidence. A s s oon as he saw t he officer s, Defenda nt “thre w two small bags with a white substa nce into t he ditc h across the street.” Defendant wa s placed in ha ndcuf fs im mediately t hereafter. Defendant testified that at the time of the sear ch o f the residence, he live d there with his parents because his m other was sic k and he had tempora rily sepa rated from h is wife. Defendant said that he kept a ll hi s pos sessions in a single room at the residence a nd that he was free to come and g o as he wished fro m that room. Defendant a rgued t hat the facts a s al leged in t he affidavit in support of the searc h warrant were insufficie nt to establish a nexus b etween th e c ontrolled buys and the residence itself becaus e it did not contain any inform ation to e stablish that Defendant re sided there.

8 In a written orde r denyi ng the motion, th e trial court describe d the issu e as “a close call” but c oncluded that the af f idavit co ntained sufficient facts to support t he finding of probable c ause to search the reside nce. The c ourt observe d that (1) all three c ontrolled buys occurred at the reside nce, (2) the contr olle d buys occurred o n consecutive day s, and (3) the af fidavit expl ici tly provide d that the tr ansactions occurred at Defendant’ s r esidence. II. Bench T rial Immediatel y prior to t rial, the State di smissed Count 4 of the in dictment, which charged Defendant wit h possession wit h intent to deli ver marij uana, and procee ded to a bench trial o n the rema ining charges. Investigator Bayl ous testified that after arrangin g multiple controlled buys between Defendant a nd a confid ential informant at Def endant’ s r esidence, he obta ined and e xecuted a search warrant a t Def endant’ s residenc e on J uly 11, 2023. He said that me mbers o f the SW A T team “interc epted” Defendant “durin g the exchange or just prior to whe n the [fourth] e xchange was supposed to happen.” Defendant was detained in ha ndcuf fs, a nd his family me mbers were e scorted outsi de to wait. During the search, of fic ers found a 12-gauge shotgun “propped up in the corner” of a bedroom tha t contained numerou s persona l items belon ging to Defendant, in cluding copies of his dr iver ’ s li cense bearing th e a ddress of t he residence, ba nk deposit slips with that same address, a p olice report from an accident listing De fendant’ s a ddress as the residence, Defendant’ s social security card, and c lothing and sh oes consistent with Defendant’ s size. A pe rsonal safe found in the room conta ined $8,02 2 in cash. Offi cers discovere d “a prepackage of green plant-like material believed to be marijuana” an d a bag conta ining 80.5 gram s of “a white powde r substance” “located in a n outbuilding beh ind the primary residence.” Inve stigator Bayl ous said that while he was searching another part of the property, Investigator W illiams approa ched him and said that Defendant had a greed to tell them where the n arcotics were located. He stated that he then asked Defendant “to co nfirm t hat he was g oing to show us w here the narcotics were” an d that Defenda nt “walke d us to a shed that w as behind t he residence.” Investiga tor Baylo us said that the shed was liste d in the search warrant as part of the property to be searched and that officers would hav e searched the shed even if Defendant ha d not led t hem to it. During cross-exam inatio n, Inve stigator Baylous agreed tha t in his type-written report, he stated that he ha d asked Defend ant t o show th em w here the drugs were located. Investigator Baylous said that h e conducted surveillance on th e residence at times o ther than the controlle d buys and observe d Defendant coming and going from the residence. Investigator Bayl ous stated that Defend ant selec ted the location where the controlled buys were to occur. I nvesti gator Baylous said that Investigator W illiams observed Def endant on the property du ring each transactio n. H e stated that “ at lea st two” of the transaction s occurred “dire ctly in fr ont of the reside nce at the end of the drivewa y.”

9 During redirect examina tion, Investigator Baylous testified that he considered the driveway to be a part of the residence. He also stated that of ficers did not discover a ny documents that listed a dif ferent address for Defendant. Investigator Baylous recalle d that Defendant te stified at t he suppressio n hearing that he wa s liv ing at the resi dence at the t ime of the controlled buys and the search. He testified that he discovered that Defendant had a prior convicti on for felo ny evading arrest. Deputy W al lace te stified c onsistently w ith his testimony a t the suppression hearing during dire ct e xamination, and we w ill not repeat it here. During cross- examination, the deputy confirme d that he obser ved Defendant standin g either in the driveway or in the roadway just at the e dge of the dri veway a nd that he saw tw o “ items f ly th rough t he air” from the area w here De fendant stood a lone into th e ditch across th e road. TCSO Deputy Br yan L avery arri ved at Defen dant’ s re sidence just after the SW A T team a nd was asked to deploy his narcotics-trained canine to the are a of the ditch whe re the two items landed. When the canine indicated the presence of nar cotics, Deputy Lavery advised other officers o n the scene but did not col lect the item s himself. TCSO D etective Javier Rodrigue z took photo graphs an d collec ted ev idence dur ing the execution of the se arch warrant at Defend ant’ s re sidence. After Deputy Lavery told him tha t the can ine h ad located items i n the dit ch, Dete ctive Rodrigue z photo graphed and collected the t wo plasti c bags containing a whi te powdery substance. Detective Rodriguez also photographed and collected items from inside a shed on the property, including: “ a re d bag with gre en leafy substance i n a vacuum s ealed bag” and a scal e. A USB flash drive containing 172 photog raphs and one video r ecording ta ken du ring the e xecution of t he search warrant was ex hibited to the detective ’ s testimony. D etective Rodr iguez testified that he obtained a key to a safe inside the residence from “either [Defendant’ s] sister or of f a key chain” at the resi dence and gave i t to Investi gator Baylous. Investigator W i lliams te stified tha t whe n he arr ived at the re sidence, t he SW A T team had Defendan t a nd his pare nts out side. Inve stigator W illi ams said that he did not ask Defendant any que stions and th at, inste ad, D efendant asked the in vestigat or “if w e could get his mama and his daddy back in the house ” given that “it was ho t outside and they are elderly.” Inve stigator W illi ams told Defenda nt that as soon a s the p olice were done w ith the se arch, “we’ll get them back in t he house as soon as we c an. The quicker we fi nd the drugs or contraband, we can g et them back inside.” At that point, Defendant said, “if we can get the m back insid e, I’ll take you to them. I’ll s how you where they’re at.” During cross-e xamina tion, I nvestigator Williams testifi ed that h e conducted surveillance of the three completed controlled buys that precipitat ed the search in this case and th at on each occa sion, he observed Defendant “com ing fr om the house, from the side of the ho use” to the edge of the road to mee t the confide ntial inf ormant, who “w ould pull up to the reside nce.”

10 TCSO Deputy and E vidence T ech nician Andrew H arrington test ified th at he received t he items col lected duri ng the sear ch, inc luding “a 12 gauge semiautoma tic shotgun” a long w ith three magazines and ammunit ion a nd th ree bags containing white powder. Deputy H arrington sent the th ree ba gs—one weighing 80 grams, one we ighing 3.6 gra ms, an d one weighing 2.6 grams— of white powder to the T ennessee Bureau of Investigati on (“TBI”) for testing. De puty Harrington also identified a scale and two boxes of “fold top baggies” collecte d during the search. Finall y, Deputy Harrington t estifi ed that he placed the $8,022 in c ash that was colle cted during the search in to a bank ac count. TBI Special Agent an d Forensic Scienti st Ra chel Strandquist perf ormed forensic testing on the white pow dery su bstance discovered in a shed in Defendant’ s b ackyard and determined that it was 79.31 grams of coc aine. T esting of “w hite compressed pow der” found in the ditch e sta blished that it w as 3.3 9 grams of cocaine, a n d testing of “an off- white, rock-lik e su bstance” found in the same ditch establis hed that it w as 3.13 gra ms of cocaine. Based upon this evide nce, the tria l court c onvicted Defendant of possession wit h intent to de liver twen ty-six grams or mo re of c ocaine and posse ssion of d rug parapherna lia. The court reserved r uling on t he remaining count charging possession of a firearm with the intent t o go arme d duri ng the com mission of a da ngerous f elony and invited the parties to submit supplement al briefing and a r gument on the issu e. After liste ning to supplement al arguments at the s entencing hearing, the t rial court c onvicted Def endant of the r emaining charge. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial c ourt imposed a Ra nge I s entence of ten years’ incarceration for D efendant’ s conviction of possession with intent to de liver twenty- six gr ams or more o f cocaine, a concurrent sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for his conv iction of possession of drug paraphernalia, and a c onsecutive sent ence of five yea rs to be served at 100 percent b y operation of law for his convic tion of poss ession of a firearm during the commission of a d angerous felony. Defendant f iled a tim ely but unsuc cessful motion for new trial in which he challenged the tr ial co urt’ s denia l of his mot ion to suppres s and th e suf ficienc y of the evidence supportin g his convicti on of p ossession of a firearm during the commissio n o f a dangerous felony. This timely app eal followe d. Analysis On a ppeal, Defenda nt asserts that the trial co urt erre d by denying h is motion to suppress the evidenc e a nd statements obtained during the search of the resi dence he share d with his parents and the sufficiency of th e convicting evidence. W e consider each claim in turn.

1 1 I. Motion to Suppre ss Defendant argues that t he trial court should have suppresse d t he evid ence obtained during the execution of the search warrant because the information in the warrant af f idavit was insufficient to establish a nexus be tween the controlled bu ys and the residence, beca use the warrant failed to describe the pla ce to be se arched wit h cons titutionally suf f icient particularity, a nd beca use the warrant affida vit failed to establi sh the reliability of the confidential inf ormant. The State c ontends that the trial c ourt did not e rr by c oncluding that the w arrant satisfied the nexus requirement and that Defendant waived plenary review of the remain ing claims. W e agree with the State. A. Standar d of Review A trial court’ s factual findings on a motion t o suppr ess are conclusive on appe al unless the evidence pr eponderates against the m. State v. B inette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 217 (T enn. 2000); State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (T enn. 1996). Thus, qu estions of credibility, the weight and value of the evidence, and the resol ution of conflicting evidence are matters e ntrusted to t he trial jud ge a s t he trier of fact. Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23; see also T e nn. R. A pp. P. 13(d). “T he pa rty preva iling in the trial cou rt ‘is entitled to the strongest legi timate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as a ll reasonable and le gitimate i nferences that ma y be drawn fro m [th e] e vidence.’” State v. T uttle, 515 S. W.3d 282, 299 (T e nn. 2017) (quoting State v. Be ll, 42 9 S.W.3d 524, 529 (T e nn. 2014). W e re view the trial court ’ s appli catio n of the law to the fac ts de novo, “and the appellate court is n ot o bliged t o af ford a presumption of correct ness to the lower court’ s conclusion s of law.” Id. (citing State v. W alton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (T enn. 2001)). B. General Pr inciples Both the s tate and federa l const itutions offer protection from unreasonable searches and seizures; the ge neral r ule is tha t a w arrantless search or s eizure is presumed unreasonable, a nd any evi dence disc overed i s su bject to suppr ession. See U.S. C onst. amend. IV; T e nn. Con st. a rt. I, § 7. Conv ersely, “in a d oubtful or ma r ginal case a sea rch under a warra nt may b e sustainabl e where w ithout one it would f all.” T uttle, 515 S.W.3d at 300 (quoting United States v. V entr esca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1 965)). T o b e valid, a search w arrant must be issued b y a neutr al a nd detache d magistr ate based upon proba ble ca use s upplied by affidavit that pa rticularl y describes the pe rson, place, or property to be searc hed. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; T enn. Co nst. art. I, § 7; T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 6-103; see also T enn. R. Cri m. P. 41(c); State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 182 (T enn. 2016). “Probable cause for t he issuance of a search wa rrant e xists when, ‘given all the cir cumstances set forth in the af fidavit... there is a fair prob ability that contraband or evidence of a cr ime will be f ound in a particul ar place,’ w hich in this insta nce was the defendant’ s re sidence.” State v. Ag uilar, 437 S. W.3d 88 9, 89 9 (T e nn. Crim. App. 2013) (quoti ng Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). Because the probabilities

12 involved “are not technical” but are, inste ad, “the factu al a nd practical considerations of everyday life on whic h reasonable and pru dent men, not legal technicians, act,” the determinati ons “are extremely fact-depen dent. ” T uttle, 515 S.W.3d at 300 (first quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); and th en Bell, 429 S.W.3d at 534). When “consideri ng whether proba ble c ause s upported issua nce of a search wa rrant,” this court “may conside r only the af fidavi t and may not consider other evide nce provided to or known by the issuing magistrate or posse ssed by the affiant.” Id. at 299 (qu oting State v. Henning, 975 S.W. 2d 290, 295 (T e nn. 1998); an d then citing State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2 d 430, 432 (1989)). W e examine the information in the af fidavit to determine whether, “as a whole,” the inf ormation therein “provided the ma gistrate with ‘ a s ubstantial basis for concluding tha t a searc h warrant would uncov er evidence of wrongd oing.’” Id. (quo ting Jacumin, 77 8 S.W.2d at 432). G iven the fact-driven nat ure of the probable ca use determinati on, we “af ford ‘ great de ference’ t o a magistra te’ s deter mination that probable cause exist s.” Id. at 300 (quoting Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 43 1-32; a nd c iting S tate v. Saine, 297 S.W.3d 199, 207 (T e nn. 2009)). “When th e affidavit se eks to establish proba ble c ause f or a search warrant, it must ‘set forth fac ts from which a re asonable conc lusion m ight be dra wn that the evidence is in the place t o be searched.’” Id. (quoting State v. Smith, 868 S. W.2d 561, 572 (T e nn. 1993)). “In o ther words, the a ffidavit must demon strate a nexus between the crimina l acti vity, the place to be searched, a nd the items to be seized.” Id. (citing Saine, 297 S.W.3d at 206). “The nexus between the place to be searche d and t he items to be seized may be establi shed by the type of crime, the nature of the items, a nd the normal infere nces where a criminal would hide the eviden ce.” Smith, 868 S.W.2d at 572. The court may also “consider whether the cri minal ac tivity under inv estigation was an isolated e vent or a pr otracted pattern of c onduct.” T uttle, 515 S.W.3d at 301 (quot ing Sai ne, 297 S.W.3d at 206). Notably, a lthough the affidavit must establi sh a nexus be tween the place to be searched and the evidence to be seize d, it “ need not im pli cate a particular person in the crime under investigation.” Id. (fir st c iting Zur cher v. The Stanfor d Daily, 43 6 U.S. 547, 556 (1978); and then Uni ted States v. Burney, 7 78 F.3d 536, 540 (6th Cir. 2015)). C. The Affidavit Here, the a f fidavit established that of f icers had gathe red information that Defe ndant “was con ducting narcotic s tran sactions” at his re sidence, that t hey confi rmed this information by arra nging four controlled drug transaction s betwee n Defendant and an “undercover a gent,” a nd that three of t he transactions were co mpleted be fore the application for the sea rch warrant. T he affidavit provide d that on Ju ly 5, 6, and 7, 20 23, the undercover agent met Defendant at the residence and that on each occasion the undercover agent exchanged c ash f or a white substan ce tha t fiel d te sted posit ive for cocaine. The affidavit also provi ded tha t office rs surveilled the area both be fore a nd after each tr ansaction, that t he undercove r age nt w as equipped to a llow officers to monitor the transaction in real time, and t hat Investigator W il liams observed each transaction. Finally,

13 the affidavit included Investigator Baylou s’ assertion t hat, giv en the number of transactions, it was his belief that Defendant wa s in posses sion of “ a la r ge quan tity of ille gal narcotics” and that he “ has been kn own to hide lar ge quantities of narcotics, proceeds from narcotics transacti ons and/or othe r evide nce throughout his pr operty in l ocations not commonly loc ated or a ccessed by law e nforce ment.” Although Defe ndant cites State v. Nightwine i n support of his claim t hat the nexus requirement was no t met, as the trial co urt correctly conc luded, tha t case i s e asily distinguishable from this one. First, a nd perhaps most i mportant g iven our standard of review, the trial court granted the motion to suppress in Nigh twine after concluding th at the State had failed to e stablish a nexus requirement. State v. Nig htwine, No. M2013- 00609-CCA-R3CD, 2013 W L 666 9393, at *3 (T enn. C rim. A pp. Dec. 17, 2013). This distinction is imp ortant b ecause, on appea l, w e “afford ‘grea t defere nce’ to a magistra te’ s determinati on.” T uttle, 515 S.W.3d at 300 (quoting Ja cumin, 778 S. W.2d a t 431-3 2; and citing Saine, 297 S.W.3d at 207). Se cond, unlike the a f fidavit in this case, whi ch st ates that each of the contro lled buys took place at Defen dant’ s reside nce, the affidavit in Nig htwine listed two separate addr esses where controlled purchases took place a nd did not state “that the sales took place at Mr. Nightwine’ s reside nce located at 1 15 Emory Street. Rather, t he affidavit asserts only t hat the sales took plac e ‘at 1 15 Emor y Stre et’ withou t any furth er specificity as to the loc ation of the sales or r eference to the r esidence.” Nightwine, 2013 WL 6669393, a t *6 (T e nn. Crim. Ap p. Dec. 17, 2013). Third, un like the officers in this case, who “observe[d] and live time mo nitor[ed]” each transac tion v ia r ecording e quipment and surveilla nce at the same locati on, the of ficers in Nightwine “list ened to” transa ctions that took place a t t wo different locati ons. Id., at *1-2. Fourth, unlike the tr ansactions in this cas e, w hich took place within days of ea ch othe r and involved a single c onfidential informant, the four tran sactions in Nightwi ne t ook place over the co urse of five months a nd involved at least two di fferent undercover purcha sers. Id. In our view, the informa tion in the a ffidavit w as sufficient t o esta blish proba ble cause a nd, sp ecifically, to sa tisfy the nexus re quirement. The affidavit need not contain “definite proof that the seller keeps his supply at his residence,” instead, the nexus requirement is met “if there are some addition al facts, (such as that. .. the seller or buyer went to his home prior to the sale or after the sale. ..) which would support th e infe rence that the sup ply is p robably located there.” See Saine, 297 S.W.3d at 2 06 (quoting 2 W ayne R. La Fave, Sea r ch and S eizur e: A T r eatise o n th e Fourth A mendme nt § 3.7(d) (4th ed. 2 004 & Supp. 20 08-09)). The affidavit in thi s case supplies just that. Throughout the affidavit, the place to be se arched is referred to as Defe ndant’ s residenc e, and th e affidavit provide d that successive controlle d buys between the confidential informa nt and De fendant were completed at t hat residence only days be fore the warrant was issue d. Id. (finding that warrant met the nexus re quirement even th ough “ [t]he af fidavit did not state, for exampl e, that criminal activ ity occurred at Mr. Saine’ s residence or that the fruits of the search were observed th ere”). T he a f fidavit also contain ed informa tion ab out Investigator Baylous’ experience in law enforc ement and his sta teme nt that, “based on his knowledge, training

14 and experienc e,” he b elieved tha t e vidence of Defendan t’ s p ossession of “ Schedule II narcotics with the intent to ma nufacture, se ll and/or deliver wil l be located at th e residence.” In thr ee re lated issues, Defendant contends that the w arrant failed to particularly describe the pla ce to be searched or the eviden ce to be seized, that th e sc ope of the s earch was too broad, and that the knowledge base for the confidential informa nt was insufficient to establi sh tha t the inf ormant wa s reliable. The Stat e asserts that D efendant has wai ved our consi deration of these claims becau se he ra ises them for the fir st time on appeal. W e agree with th e State. Defendant insists in his reply brief that these new challenges are merely “additional reasons” supporting his a rgum ent that the affidavit failed to establ ish pr obable c ause. Although it i s true tha t all these f actors are p art of the overall p robable c ause determi nation, they are separate issu es that require distinct inquiries. Here, Defendant specifical ly asserted in the tria l cou rt that “[t]here is not a sufficient nexus betwee n the locat ion where the alleged undercover purchases occurred and the place to be searche d.” Y et a “m otion t o suppress, like any othe r motion, i s required to s tate the gro unds upon which it is predicated with part icularity. ” Sta te v. Burton, 751 S.W.2 d 440, 445 (T enn. Cr im. A pp. 1988) (citing T enn. R. Crim. P. 47). The fa ilure to include an issue in a motion t o suppress results in waiver of that issue. State v. St anhope, 476 S.W.3d 382, 396 (T en n. Crim. App. 2013) (concluding th at the de fendant waive d issue of whether o f ficers vio lated his privilege against self-incriminat ion by asking for con sent to subm it to gun shot re sidue t esting because he f ailed to include that issue in his motion to sup press the st atements he provided to police (first citin g T enn. R. Crim. P. 12(f)(1); and then State v. Bu rtis, 664 S.W.2d 305, 310 (T enn. Crim. App. 1983)). Furthermore, Defendan t failed to include the se “ additional” theorie s in his motion for new tri al. “In a motio n f or new t rial, the defendant must set forth the factual grounds on which he relies, the legal grounds for the trial court’ s rulin g, and a concise statement as to why the trial court’ s dec ision was in e rror.” Id. (quoting St ate v. Harbison, 539 S.W.3d 149, 164-65 (T enn. 2018)). When crafting ar gument in a motion for new trial, a defendant should not “sim ply alle ge, in general terms, tha t the tr ial court comm itted error, either by taking som e a ction or by admitti ng or exclud ing evide nce” but should “identify the spe cific circumstances gi ving ris e to the alleged e rror so that it may be reasonably identified in the context of the entire trial.” Fahe y v. Eldridge, 46 S.W.3d 138, 142-43 (T enn. 2001) (citing State v. Ash burn, 914 S. W.2d 108, 1 14 (T enn. Crim. Ap p. 1995)). “G rounds not raised in a motion fo r new trial a re waived for purpo ses of appe al.” Harbis on, 539 S.W.3d at 16 4. Because Defenda nt di d not include these sp ecific issues in eith er his motion to suppress or motion for new tria l, they are waived. Defendan t ha s no t asked this court to review the issue for plain error, and, according ly, we decline to do so. The first and best way to obtain plain erro r review is to ask fo r it. See State v. Thomps on, No. W2022-0 1535-

15 CCA-R3-CD, 2023 W L 4552193, a t *5 (T en n. Crim. App. July 14, 2023) (“Because the ‘[d]efendant bears the burden of persuasion to show that he is entitled to plai n error relief,’ a defenda nt’ s failure to request this relief we ighs again st any such conside ration on our own.” (firs t q uoting St ate v. D ixon, No. M2021- 01326-CCA-R 3-CD, 2022 WL 523928 9, at *21 (T enn. Crim. App. O ct. 6, 2022); and then citing State v. Cornwell, No. E 201 1- 00248-CCA-R3- CD, 2012 WL 5304149, at *18 (T enn. Crim. A pp. Oct. 25, 2012))) (alteration i n Thompso n). In sum, un der our deferential standard of r eview, we conclude the trial court did not err by denying De fendant ’ s moti on to suppres s. D. Fruit of the Poisonous T r ee Defendant claims that the trial court should have suppressed the statements h e provided to the police directing the m t o the d rugs stashed a t h is resi dence as fruit o f t he illegal search of hi s pro perty. W e note t hat although D efendant’ s supp ression mot ion st ated in conclusory fashio n th at “ [a]ll evidenc e seized and state ments made are fruit of the poisonous tree and must be suppr essed,” he did not specifi cally argue that th e sta tements he ma de to la w e nforcement were the fruit of w hat he cla imed w as an ille gal search. Additionally, Defe ndant did not raise th is argument in the hearing on t he motion to suppress or in his motion f or new tr ial. Acc ordingly, it is waive d. Moreover, because we ha ve concluded that the warra nt was valid and the se arch legal, Defendant is not entitl ed to relief on this issue. E. Miranda Defendant asserts that t he trial court shoul d h ave suppressed the stateme nts that he gave to law enforce ment because they were gi ven during a custodi al interrogation withou t the benefit of Miranda warnings. T he State concedes that Defendant was in custody when he made the stateme nts a nd that he was not provided with Miranda warnings but argues that the statements wer e spontaneous and not made in response to interrogation. The State also argues, in the alte rnative, that the admissio n of the stateme nts was ha rmless. Both the st ate and fede ral constitutions provide al l persons with a privile ge agains t compulsor y se lf-incrim ination. U.S. C onst. a mend. V (“[N]o person... shall be c ompelled in any c riminal ca se to be a w itness agains t himsel f.”); T enn. Const. a rt. I, § 9 (“[I]n all criminal pro secutions, the accused... shall not be compelled to gi ve evidence against himself.”) In Miranda, the U nited State s Supre me Court he ld tha t “t he prosecutio n ma y not us e sta tements, whe ther exc ulpatory or inculpato ry, stemmin g from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the u se of procedura l safeguard s effective to secure the privilege against self-i ncrimination.” Mira nda, 384 U.S. at 444. The Cour t define d “cu stodial interrogation” as “questionin g ini tiated by law enforceme nt offi cers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any signifi cant way.” Id. T o sa fegua rd the privilege aga inst self-inc rimination,

16 “[p]rior to a ny questioning, the person m ust be warne d that he has a right to rem ain silent, that any sta tement he does mak e may be used as e vidence agains t hi m, and tha t he h as a right to the presence of an attorney, either reta ined or appo inted.” Id. Miranda warning s are required onl y “w hen a su spect is (1) in cus tody an d (2) subjected to qu estioning or its functional equivalent.” State v. Moran, 621 S.W.3d 249, 257 (T en n. Crim. App. 2020) (citing W al ton, 41 S.W.3d at 83). The parties agree and the trial court conclude d that Defendant was in custody when he inte racted with Inve stigators W illiams and Baylous. Although we need not acc ept the parties’ agre ement, it i s our vie w that the e vidence supp orts the conc lusion that Defendant was in c ustody. H e w as h andcuffed by mem bers of the SW A T team just b efore o fficers started executing the search warrant and remai ned hand cuf fed and under the w atchful e ye of other of ficers throughout the search. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. W e turn next t o the question whet her De fendant was subj ected to inte rrogation. See id. at 478 (“The fundamental import of the pri vilege while an i ndividual is i n custody is not w hether he is allowed to t alk to the p olice with out the benef it of warnin gs a nd cou nsel, but w hether he can be interroga ted.”). “‘Interrogati on’ for purposes of Mi randa includes ‘expre ss questio ning or its functional equiv alent.’” St ate v. Northe rn, 262 S.W. 3d 741, 750 (T enn. 2008) (quoting Rhode I sland v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-0 1 (1980). The Supreme Court defined the “functional equiva lent” of express ques tioning as “any words or ac tions on the part of the police (othe r tha n those normal ly attendan t to arrest an d c ustody) tha t the po lice should know a re r easonably like ly t o elic it an inc riminating re sponse from th e suspec t.” I nnis, 446 U.S. at 301 (footnote s om itted); see a lso North ern, 262 S. W.3d. at 750. The determinati on whether the de fendant has been subjected t o the functional eq uivalent of interrogation “focuses primarily upon the perc eptions o f the suspect, rather tha n the inten t of the police,” but reco gnizing that “the polic e su rely cann ot be held accountable for the unforeseeabl e results of their words or act ions,” the Cour t held t hat “the definition of interrogation can e xtend o nly to w ords or a ctions on the pa rt of p olice officers that t hey should have known wer e reasonably li kely to elicit an i ncriminating re sponse.” Inni s, 446 U.S. at 301-02 (foot notes omitte d). “ Any stat ement given fre ely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admis sible in evidence.” M iranda, 38 4 U.S. at 478. Here, Investigator Williams’ accr edited testimony established that he spoke t o Defendant while t he search was ongoin g but did not ask him any direct questions. Duri ng their interactio n, w hich began with small tal k between the two, De fendant asked if they could accele rate the s earch so that his elder ly parent s cou ld go bac k inside the house. Investigator W ill iams told Defendant that he knew that the of ficers were there to execute a search warrant and that he would be glad to “speed up the process.” Investigator Williams told Defendant that as soon as the police were done with the sear ch, “we’ll get them back in the house as soon as we can. The quic ker we find the dr ugs or contraba nd, we ca n g et

17 them back inside.” Def endant then said th at h e would “ show [officers] where ever ything is if we can ge t my mam a and da ddy back in the house out of the w eather.” Inve stigator W illiam s insisted that he did not promise to allow Defendant’ s pare nts to go back inside in exchange for Defen dant’ s directing th em to the drugs. Investigator Ba ylous’ ques tioning of Defendant w as co nfined to his confirm ing what Defendant had said to Investigator W illiam s. The trial co urt conclu ded that the officers’ intera ction w ith Defendant was not the function al equivale nt of interroga tion. W e a gree. Defendant, and not the of fice rs, was the first to inquire abou t sp eeding up the searc h process so that his parents could go back inside. C f. State v. Hubbar d, No. W20 16-01521- CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 247237 2, at *4 (T en n. Crim. App. June 7, 2017) (holding that defendant had been subjected t o the “functio nal equivalent” of inte rrogation when “the defendant in this case did not engage t he officer in c onversation r egarding his case; the offi cer engaged the def endant in conversat ion, and th is conversation w ent beyond simply asking for the persona l inform ation needed to fac ilitate the a rrest”); State v. Br own, No. M2013-02327-C CA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 4455 42, at *12 (T enn. C rim. App. Feb. 3, 2015) (concluding that “asking a suspect wh y he w as at a particula r location when i nvestigating an attempt ed aggravated bur glary is a que stion that a polic e officer should have known was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminatin g res ponse”). In respo nse, Invest igator W illia ms told Defend ant that the inve stigator kne w w hy the other o fficers we re there and t hat the more quickly t hey disc overed contraband, the more quic kly Defendan t’ s parents would be allowed to go back i nside. Defenda nt then tol d Investigato r W illiams he would dire ct the m to the d rugs. Inve stigator Bayl ous’ only que stion to De fendant was p osed to confir m the earlier stateme nt. Eve n if Investigator W illia ms’ telling Defend ant th at his parents would be allowed inside as s oon as officers found w hat the y w ere looki ng for coul d be see n a s “reasonably lik ely to el icit an incriminating response from the defend ant,” it c ould not be deemed a “psychol ogical ploy[]” of the ty pe t hat “amount[s] to inter rogation.” Northe rn, 262 S.W.3d at 753 (first quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 299; and then citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450). Additiona lly, “the record reflects that the police were ‘engaged in activity calculated to produce evidence a gainst the defendant by ot her me ans’” w hen the conversatio n took pla ce between Defe ndant and Investigator W illiams. State v. Maraschiel lo, 88 S.W.3d 586, 603 (T e nn. Crim. App. 2000) (cit ation omitted). W e conclude that the record does not e stablish that Defendant wa s interrogate d and, consequently, Mira nda warnings were not req uired. Furthermore, the sol e remedy for a Miranda violation is the sup pression of an y statements ma de durin g a c ustodial interr ogation. See State v. Clim er, 400 S. W.3d 537, 567 (T enn. 2 013) (c iting Uni ted States v. Patan e, 5 42 U.S. 63 0, 642 -43 (2004)). A Miran da violation “ does not ca tegorically pr ohibit the government fr om using n ontestim onial evidence de rived f rom such statements.” State v. W ashington, No. W2 022-01201-SC-R11- CD, 2025 WL 2847 585, at *6 (T enn. Oc t. 8, 2025) (citi ng Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 567), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jan. 5, 2026) (No. 25-6564). Suppres sion of physical evidence, e ven if it could be consid ered as “frui ts” o f the Miranda v iolation, is n ot r equired.

18 Climer, 40 0 S.W. 3d at 567. “The F ifth Amendment’ s pri vilege agai nst self-incri mination is not implicate d by the introductio n at trial of physical e vidence resul ting from voluntary statements. ” Id. Inste ad, courts ne ed no t suppre ss physical evidenc e “disc overed as a res ult of a statement elicite d in viola tion of Miranda ” unless the state ments were obtained through “actual co ercion in obtaining the statement.. . or when t he invoc ation of the right to re main silent or t o have coun sel pre sent is not s crupulously hon ored.” I d. (qu oting W alton, 41 S.W.3d at 92). “When a defendant’ s will is overcome so that the statement is a ‘product of coercion,’ the statem ent is not volunta ry, and it wo uld violate the Self- Incrimination Clause t o use the statement or any resulting e vidence in a criminal tria l.” W ashingt on, 2025 WL 2847585, at *6 (quo ting Climer, 400 S.W.3d a t 5 67-68). Be cause Defendant does not ar gue that hi s statements were not voluntary, their exclusion would not lead to the exc lusion of the drugs that he le d the officers to discove r. Although Defe ndant d oes not specify which statements he wa nted suppr essed, th e only sta tements of Defe ndant a dmitted at trial were tho se indic ating he would show th e offi cers where the dru gs were located. Even if we ha d conclu ded t hat these state ments should have b een s uppressed, w e w ould h ave no trouble concl uding that their a dmission was harm less beyon d a reasonable doubt consi dering the other overwhel ming evi dence of Defendant’ s gu ilt. See Arizona v. Fulmina nte, 499 U.S. 279, 2 96 (1991) (applying constitution al harmless error a nalysis to errone ous admission of confession); see also State v. Koffman, 2 07 S.W.3d 309, 320 (T enn. Cri m. App. 2006); State v. Dean, 76 S.W. 3d 352, 371 (T enn. Crim. App. 2001). II. Sufficiency of the Evid ence Defendant c hallenges t he sufficiency of the evidenc e, arguing that t he State faile d to establish that he kn owingly posse ssed the cocaine, dr ug paraph ernalia, a nd firearm seized during the search of his residence. The S tate asserts that t he evidence was suf ficient to support ea ch of Defenda nt’ s con victions. W e agree with the State. W e revie w a challe nge to the s uf ficiency of t he c onvicting e vidence to de termine whether, “ after vie wing the evidence in the li ght mo st fav orable to t he pros ecution” a nd providing the State wit h “the strongest legit imate view of the evidence a s well as all reasonable and leg itimate inferences whic h ma y be drawn therefro m,” “ any rational trier of fact co uld ha ve foun d the esse ntial e lements of th e crime beyond a reasonabl e dou bt.” Jackson v. V ir ginia, 4 43 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (citat ions omitte d); State v. Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 729 (T en n. 201 1) (citations omitted); T e nn. R. App. P. 13. Our review “is identical whether the c onviction is predicated on direct or circumsta ntial evidence, or a combinatio n of both.” State v. W ill iams, 558 S.W.3d 633, 638 (T e nn. 2018) (citing State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (T enn. 2 01 1)). Importantly, a guilty verdict re moves the presumption of innoc ence a nd re places it w ith one of guilt on app eal, shifting the burden to the defendant t o de monstrate why the evi dence is legally insufficient to support the conviction. Davis, 354 S.W.3d at 729 (citin g St ate v. Sisk, 3 43 S. W.3d 60, 65 (T enn. 2011)).

19 W e must decline any invitation to revisit witness credibility or any purported discrepancies in the ev idence b ecause the fac tfinder, not this co urt, r esolves all questio ns involving t he cre dibility of the witnesses, the weight and va lue to be given to evi denc e, and the factua l dispu tes raise d by such evidence. See Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d a t 379 (c iting State v. Campbel l, 245 S.W. 3d 331, 335 (T enn. 2008)). According ly, thi s court will neithe r re- weigh nor rec onsider the evidence when eva luating the suf ficiency of t he convicting proof. State v. Stephe ns, 521 S.W.3d 718, 724 (T enn. 2017). A. Conviction O ffenses 1. Possession of Co caine with Intent to Deli ver Defendant was convict ed of posse ssion with i ntent to de liver 26 g rams or m ore o f cocaine. “It is an of fe nse f or a defendant to kn owingly ... [p]ossess a controlled subs tance with in tent to... de liver... the controll ed s ubstanc e.” T enn. Code Ann. § 39-17- 417(a)(4). A person “acts kno wing ly with respe ct to the conduct or to circumsta nces surr ounding the conduct whe n the pe rson is awa re of t he natur e o f the c onduct or th at the c ircumstance s exist.” Id. § 39-1 1- 302 (b). Coca ine is a controlled sub stance. See id. § 39-17-408(b)(4). The trier of fact may infer “from the amount of a controll ed substanc e or substa nces possessed by an offender, along with ot her r ele vant facts surro unding the ar rest, t hat the controlled substance or substances were possessed with the purpose of selling or otherwise dispensing.” Id. § 39-17-419. “Other re levant fact s” incl ude the weight a nd str eet value of the drugs, the packag ing of the drugs, the pr esence of a la r ge amo unt of cash, and the presence of w eapons. Se e, e.g., Sta te v. Nels on, 275 S.W.3d 851, 86 7 (T enn. Crim. App. 2008); Sta te v. Br o wn, 915 S.W.2d 3, 8 (T enn. Cr im. App. 1995); St ate v. Matt hews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 782 (T enn. Crim. Ap p. 1990). When, as here, a n “accused is not i n exclusiv e possession of the place where the c ontrolled s ubstance is found, ad ditiona l incrimin ating facts and circumstance s must be presente d” th at “affirmatively link the accused to the controlled s ubstance.” Id. These include: (1) whether th e drugs w ere i n plain vie w; whether contraband was in close proximity to the defendant; conduct on t he part of the defendant indicativ e of guilt, including furtive gestu res and fl ight; (4) the q uantity of dr ugs present; (5) the p roxi mity of the defen dant’ s effects to the contraband; (6) t he pres ence of drug para phernalia; (7) wheth er the defendant was under the influence of or possessed additional narc otics; (8) the defendant ’ s rela tionship to th e premises; and (9) incriminati ng st atement s made by t he defendant. State v. Richar ds, 286 S.W.3d 8 73, 885-6 (T enn. 2009) (footnotes o mitted).

20 2. Possession of a F irearm Defendant was als o convicted of possess ion of a firearm with the intent to go ar med during the comm ission of a dangerous felony after having been prev iously convicte d of a dangerous f elony. Co de sect ion 39-17-1324 p rovides t hat “[i]t is an offense to posse ss a firearm or a ntique firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a da ngerous felony.” T en n. Code A nn. § 39 -17-1324(a). Possession with i ntent to deliver cocaine is lis ted as a dangerous felony. Id. § 39-17-1324(i) (1)(AA). The statu te provides for enhanc ed pe nalties “if th e defe ndant, at th e time of the offense, had a prior felony convi ction,” which “means that the pe rson se rves and is released or discharged from, or is s erving, a separat e period of i ncarcerati on or s upervision for t he commission of a dangerous felony prior to or at the time of comm itting a dan gerous felony on or a fter January 1, 2008.” Id. § 39-17-1324(g)(2). 3. Possession of Dr ug Paraphe rnalia Finally, Defendant was c onvicted of posse ssion of drug paraphernalia. T enn. Code Ann. § 39-17-425(a)(1). The Code defines dru g parap hernalia as the “equipment, products and materials of a ny kind which are used, intended for use, or des igned for use i n planting, propagating, cultivati ng, growing, ha rvesting, ma nufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, p rocessing, p reparing, testi ng, analyzing, p ackagin g, repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, injecting, in gesting, inhaling or ot herwise introducing into th e human body, a controll ed substance.” Id. § 39-17-402(12). Whe n determining “whether a particular object is dr ug parapherna lia,” the t rier of fa ct “ shall, in addition to all oth er logically rel evant facto rs, consider”: (1) Stateme nts by the o wner or anyone in cont rol of the object concerning its use; (2) Prior con victions, if any, of the owner or of anyone in control of th e ob ject f or viola tion of a ny sta te o r f ederal la w relating to co ntrolled substances or controlled substance analogues; (3) The existence of an y residue of controlle d substan ces or controlled s ubstance an alogues on the obje ct; (4) Instr uctions, oral or writte n, provided with the object concerning its use; (5) D escriptive materials accompanying the ob ject that explai n or depict it s use; (6) The manne r in which the object is disp layed for s ale;

21 (7) T he existence and scope of legitimate uses for the object in the commu nity; and (8) Expert te stimony conc erning its use. Id. § 39-17-424. B. Possession Generally Defendant stands c onvicted of t hree possession o f fenses. T enne ssee courts recognize that pos session may be either actua l or constructive. State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900, 903 (T enn. 2001). A person constructi vely possesse s a contr olled substance when he or she has “the power and intent ion at a given time to exercise domi nion and control over [the c ontraband] e ither direc tly or through oth ers.” Id. at 903 (quoting State v. P atterson, 966 S.W.2d 435, 445 (T enn. Crim. A pp. 1997)). In other words, constructive possession is the “ability to re duce a n obje ct to actual po ssession.” State v. Coop er, 736 S. W.2d 125, 129 (T enn. Crim. App. 1987). However, “[t]he mere presence of a person in an area where [contraband is] disc overed is not, al one, suf ficient.” State v. Bigsby, 40 S.W.3d 8 7, 90 (T enn. Crim. A pp. 2000) (citing Cooper, 736 S.W.2d at 129). “ Like wise, mere as sociatio n with a person who does in fact control the drug s o r property w here the drugs a re discovere d is insuf ficient t o supp ort a finding th at the pe rson possessed the drugs.” Cooper, 736 S.W.2d at 129. “Possession need not be exclusive and may be exercised jointly with more than one person.” Ric har ds, 286 S.W.3d at 885 (cit ations omitted). C. Evidence in this Case Here, the e vidence established that Investigato r Baylous learned that De fendant ha d been selling dr ugs out of his resi dence. T o c onfirm his suspici ons, Investigator Baylous contacted a confidential informant who then arranged to purchase cocaine from Defendant on three occas ions. Defe ndant c hose his re sidence to b e the location for each transac tion, and all three transactions took place within a week prior to the execution of the search warrant. Investig ator Williams o bserved each transaction a nd sa w Defendant coming f rom the side of the house to deliver the drugs to the confidential informant, who sat in a vehicle parked a t the end of t he driveway. Whe n officers went to e xecute the search warrant at Defendant’ s reside nce, De fendant was standing at the end of the driv eway. Deputy W allace saw Defendant t hrow two items that turned out to be baggies containing cocaine across the road and into the ditch. While executing the warra nt, officers found a firearm and a set of scales in a bedroo m tha t also containe d co pies of Defend ant’ s drive r ’ s lic ense a nd socia l security card, m ail bearing Defendant’ s name, and clothing and sho es consistent with a man of Defen dant’ s siz e. A sa fe in the room containe d $8,022. A shed on the prope rty contained m ore than eig hty grams of cocai ne and ba ggies. In our vie w, the seizur e of mo re tha n eig hty gra ms of c ocaine, scales, baggies, a loaded gun, and a large amount of cash from the resi dence Defen dant shared with his

22 elderly parents, particula rly when coupled with Defendant’ s recent drug sales at the residence to a c onfidentia l informant on thre e separate occa sions and h is le ading office rs directly to some of the seized drugs, was sufficient to supp ort all his c onvictions. Alt hough Defendant suggest s tha t we should exc lude hi s statemen ts that he w ould show officers to the drugs f rom our analysis of th e sufficiency of the evi dence, the l aw is clear t hat “ we evaluate the suf f iciency of the evidence in light of all of the evidence presented to the jury, including the impr operly admitted evidence.” State v. McLawhorn, 636 S.W.3d 210, 237 (T enn. Cr im. App. 2020) (first citi ng State v. Longstr e et, 619 S.W.2 d 97, 99-101 (T e nn. 1981); a nd the n St ate v. Gilley, 29 7 S.W. 3d 739, 763 (T enn. Crim. App. 2008)). Even if Defendant did not have exc lusive co ntrol ove r any of the se ite ms, he ce rtainly ha d “the ability to reduce [these items] to ac tual possess ion.” Cooper, 7 36 S.W.2d a t 129. Clearly, the evidence e stablish ed that Defendant ha d the a bility to reduce the drugs to actual possession given that he did so during each controlle d buy and when he threw two baggies of cocaine a cross the r oad in full vi ew of Deputy W all ace. A s to th e f irearm, “the State was not req uired to prove that the Defenda nt w ielded or used the w eapon for the jury to find all of the nec essary ele ments o f p ossession of a firearm w ith t he intent to go ar med during the commission of a dangerous felony.” State v. W atkins, No. W 2020-01006-CC A- R3-CD, 2021 WL 5919 1 19, at *7 (T enn. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2021) (ci tations omitted). In our view, it was enou gh that the fire arm was found in Defenda nt’ s bedro om a mong Defendant’ s other possessions. Fur thermore, the disc overy of all these item s tog ether supports the inferen ce th at Defendant posse ssed the c ocaine with i ntent to delive r it. Conclusion Based upon the fore goin g analysis, we affirm t he judgments of th e trial court. s/ Matthew J. W ilson MA TTHEW J. WILSO N, JUDGE