Sean William Lee v. State of Tennessee - Post-Conviction Relief Appeal

IN THE COURT O F CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JACKSON Assigned on Briefs F ebruary 3, 2026 SEAN WILLIAM LEE v. ST ATE OF TENNESSEE Appeal from the Crim inal Court for Shelby Count y No. I04-00029-32 Chris Craft, Judge No. W2025-0095 4-CCA-R3-PC The pro se Petitioner, Sean William Lee, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-convicti on relief. On a ppeal, the Petition er a rgues that his guilty plea to mu ltiple child sex of fenses was invol untarily and unknowin gly entered. Specifically, h e submits tha t he was misi nformed the T ennessee Bureau of In vestigation would b e s upervising him while he was on the sex offender r egistry, i nstead of the Te nnessee Department of Corre ction, the entity actually supe rvising him, rende ring his plea constit utionall y infirm. Because this particular issue was not first properl y presented in the post-con victi on c ourt, this court i s without authorit y to engage in plen ary review. Ac cordingly, the j udgment of the post- conviction c ourt is affirme d. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgm ent of the Cr iminal C ourt Affirm ed K YLE A. H IXS ON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, i n which M ATTHEW J. W IL SON and S TEVEN W. S WORD, JJ., joined. Sean Willia m Lee, Bart lett, Tennes see, Pro Se. Jonathan Skrmet ti, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter; La cy E. W ilbe r, Senior Assistan t Attorney Ge neral; and Steve Mulroy, District A ttorney Gene ral, for t he appellee, Sta te of Tennessee. 02/27/2026

OPINION I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCED URAL H ISTORY 1 A. Petitioner’s Guilty -Plea ded State an d Federal C onvictions In August 2004, the Petit ioner, by way of crimi nal information in the Crimin al Court for She lby County, Te nnessee, was charge d with three c ounts of attempted ag gravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age. Se e Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39- 12-101, -13- 504. The f irst two instances were alleged to ha ve occurred betwe en May 1 and August 11, 2003, and the third betwee n October 1 and 31, 2003. Se e Doe v. Lee, No. 21-cv-02 156-atc, 2022 WL 205 82022, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. A ug. 25, 2022). The Petitioner was also cha rged therein w ith one count of c riminal solicitat ion of a minor to commit aggravated sex ual battery, which w as said to have o ccurred between January 3 and 4, 2004. Se e id.; see al so Tenn. C ode An n. § 39-13-528. On August 18, 2 004, the Petitioner ent ered a best interest, or Alford, 2 plea t o all of the Shelb y Count y off enses as charge d, and in exchange, h e receive d an e ffective three- year sentence, which was suspended to six years of probation. His ju dgment for ms indicated t hat he was re quired t o enroll “on [the] sex o ffender registr y” within forty-e ight hours of his relea se fr om inc arceration. A ccording to the tr anscript of hi s guilt y pl ea hearing, 3 the prosecutor, in announci ng the ter ms of the agree ment, s tated that the t hree attempted a ggravated sexual battery charge s were “qualifyin g offenses that require[d] the [Petitioner] to be plac ed under the c ommun ity supervision o f the Tennessee Boa rd of [P]arole and Probatio n for the remainder of his life.” During the plea colloquy, the Petitioner said that he understood these felony convictions would “be on [his] record . . . as sex offenses from now on.” The trial cour t then explain ed, “Because of that, 1 The r ecord on appeal i s sparse. However, this cou rt can t ake judicial notice of its own records. See T enn. R. Ap p. P. 13(c); Harris v. State, 30 1 S.W.3d 141, 147 n.4 (Tenn. 2010) (noting that an appellate court may take ju dicial notice of its own records). Thus, we have t aken judicial notice of the appellate record filed in the P etitioner’s previous error coram no bis case. We utilize th at appellate record, as well a s federal opinions involving the Pet itioner, to supply many of the necessary procedural and factual de tails. 2 Thi s type of plea i s named after North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), in which the Un ited States Supreme Court discussed the right of an accused to plead guilty in his or he r ow n best interest while still professing actual innocence. 3 The post-conviction court cited to these excerpts from the guilty plea t ranscript in its order of summary dismissal. The Petitioner also attached a portion of the guilty plea transcript to a filing in t he technical record, as well as to his appel late brief.

you’re g onna have to b e supervised for li fe. You’re gon na ha ve t o report where you live, where you work, and things like th at to the Tennessee Bure au o f Investiga tion.” The Petitioner indicate d that his attorney had informed him of “all of these reporting requirement s.” Thereafter, in 2005, the Petitioner pled guilty in the United States District Court for the Western Distri ct of Tennessee “to using a com puter/telephone sy stem for the p urpose of persuading a minor to e ngage in sexual acts. ” Lee v. Riv era, No. 16 CV00144, 2017 WL 1217222, at *1 (E.D. A rk. Mar. 13, 2017) (c iting 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)) (setting forth th e magistrate’s proposed findings an d recom mendations). In June 200 6, the Pe titioner w as sentenced to 188 months’ imp risonmen t, with supe rvised relea se for l ife. Id. The imposition of this s entenc e wa s based, in part, upon t he findin g that the Pe titioner had prior convictions in Tennessee for sex offenses. Id. Fol lowing the Petit ioner ’ s guilty plea, he began an extensive series of legal proceeding s in d istrict courts challe nging his federal conviction and sentence. See Lee v. Be asley, No. 1 8-cv-000 75, 20 18 WL 5541 15 9, at *1-2 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 1 0, 2018) (detaili ng the procedural history of t he Petition er ’ s various filings in fed eral courts prior to that da te). Concomitan tly with the se federal procee dings, the Petit ioner filed a state pet ition for a writ of error coram nobis in December 2013 w ith t he Crimin al Court for Shelby County contesting the instant State convic tio ns. Se e generally Lee v. State, No. W2014- 00335-CCA-R3-E CN, 2014 WL 7179336 (Tenn. Crim. A pp. Dec. 17, 2014) (memorand um o pinion), perm. app. denied (T enn. Apr. 14, 2015). A s “newly disc overed evidence” entitling him to c oram nobis relie f, the Petitioner cit ed t o “his Novem ber 2 013 ‘chance discovery that the c riminal court jud ge [who sen tenced hi m] failed to a bide by Tennessee la w at se nte ncing, thereby r enderin g the sentence illegal and there fore void, ’ resulting in an unkno wing guilty plea.” Id. at *1 (citatio n modified). His s pecifi c complaints were “that counsel led hi m to be lieve he had been c harged by indic tment, when it was, instead, a c riminal information;... a presentence report w as not prepare d;... he [was not] told of the co mmunity supervisio n requirement; an d . . . there was no discussio n before the fine and costs were assessed.” Id. “[T]he coram nobis cour t concluded that the petition had been fi led ‘more than e ight years too late,’ for [the Petit io ner] had not alleged the existence of any ne wly discove red evidence but, instead, comp lained that his guilt y plea was involunt ary, counsel had been ineffect ive, and the judgment was void.” Id. at *2. On appeal t o this court, the p anel affirmed, explaining that t he Petitioner “had not discovered any new ‘evidence,’ recognizing, instead, alleged defe cts in the sentencing procedure” were not co gnizable c laim s in a c oram nobis proceeding. Id. (citation omitted). This court a lso observed tha t “the record support [ed] t he conclu sion of the coram no bis

court that the petition was untimely, for it was not filed within one year of the date the trial court judgment became fi nal.” Id. (c iting Tenn. Code Ann. § 2 7-7-103). Finally, this c ourt noted th at, even if the pl eading wer e tr eated as a petit ion fo r post-conviction reli ef, it was still time-ba rred. Id. (citin g Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-10 2). The Pe titione r w as ultima tely released fr om i ncarceration in 2019. Doe, 202 2 WL 20582022, at *2. Upon his release, the Pet itioner had fo rty-eight hours to enro ll with Tennessee’s sexual of fender registry bas ed upon his A ugust 2004 Shelby County convictions. Id. There after, t he Petitioner began mo unting challenges to the p resent Shelby County convictions in fe deral cou rts, including the constitutiona lity of the Tennessee Se xual O ffender and Violent Sexual Offender Re gistration, Verification, and Tracking Act (“SO RA”), as amended, on sever al gr ounds. Se e gene rally id.; Doe v. Lee, No. 21-cv-02156-atc, 2023 WL 2001051 (W.D. Tenn. Ja n. 25, 2023). Generall y speaking, at the root of the Pe titioner’s claim s attacki ng these convic tions is tha t SO RA, which was not e ffective until A ug ust 1, 2004, should not be a pplied retroactively to him. 4 See 20 04 Tenn. Pub. Act s, ch. 921. SORA, which ha s been a mended mu ltiple times sin ce it s enactment, co ntinues t o be in effect today. Se e Tenn. Co de Ann. §§ 40-39-201 to 218. Eventually, the Pe tition er requested, and r eceived, a preli minary injunc tion from the United States Western District Court prohibiting the State of T ennessee from applying and enforcing SO RA again st the Petitioner, i n toto, as violative of the Ex P ost Facto Cla use. Doe v. Lee, No. 21-cv-02156-at c, 2023 WL 8190708, at *1- 2 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 27, 2023). However, the Si xth C ircuit ulti mately rever sed the district court’s decisio n enjo ining application of SORA in its totality to the Petiti oner. Does #1–9 v. Lee, 102 F.4th 330, 332 (6th Cir. 2024). Rath er, the Sixth Circui t reasoned that the di strict court, utilizin g Tennessee’s typ ical el ision analysis, sho uld have severed the specific provision s of Tennessee’s sch eme that w ere unconstitut ional as applied to the Petit ioner. Id. at 340-41. The case was remand ed to the dis trict cou rt for a deter mination of which s pecific unconstitutio nal provisions, i f any, Tenne ssee was enforcin g against th e Petitioner and f or modification of the inj unction acco rdingly. I d. at 341-4 2. B. Current Po st-Convictio n Petition and Pro ceedin gs The Pet itioner, retur ning to state c ourt, filed the instan t petit ion for po st-convicti on relief in the Criminal Court for Shelby Count y on May 21, 2025. An amendment to tha t petition was filed th e sa me da y. A s ha s be en o bserved by ma ny of the oth er c ourts addressing the Petitio ner’s va rious c hallenges, he has presented yet a nother rambling and 4 At the time the Pet itioner committed these a cts, Tennessee’s S exual Offender Regis tration and Monitoring Act of 1994 wa s in effect.

disjointed filing. Fr om the current post-conviction petition and i ts amendment, we identify these broad claims for relief: (1) a “ violation of due pr ocess and e x post fac to claus es” based upon the applicat ion of SORA’s obligati ons a nd classifica tions to him for pre-SORA conduct; (2) a breach of the plea agreeme nt and entry of an involuntary plea bec ause SORA’s requ irements were “not disclosed [to him] or c ontemplated at the time of [his] plea”; (3) ineffective a ssistance of c ounsel due to tri al counsel’s fa ilure to advise him of SORA’s c onditions; (4) a void judgment because the tria l court “la cked jurisdiction or imposed a sentence unauthor ized by law,” or alternatively, a voidable judgment given that his guilt y plea was “ obtaine d through a f undamentally defect ive process,” rende ring it unknowing and involu ntary; (5) “repu tational harm wit hout du e process” of law, specifically, the fail ure to make in dividualized findings before classifying hi m a s a “violent” and “child” sexual offender; and (6) SORA’s provisions were unconstitutional as they were void for vague ness. Within these v arious arguments, th e Petitioner c ited as “SORA’s p unitive effe cts”: its lifeti me reporting a nd supervisio n requirement, the “ public shaming” and “o ngoing stigma” from its clas sifications, and i ts restric tions o n reside ncy, travel, and emp loymen t. Addressing th e issue of t imeliness, th e Petiti oner averred that “[h]e was without fault in failing to previo usly raise these cla ims” and that “[s]trict application of procedura l rules in this contex t would result in denial of due process a nd access to the c ourts.” T he Petitioner also cited Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 40-30-102(b) and conte nded that a new constitut ional r ight ha d been recognize d that required retr oact ive applic ation, “t hat [n]ew facts and evide nc e ha[d] arisen that were n ot discoverab le through due dil igence at the time of the orig inal conviction,” and that “[t]he judgment is v oid or voidable because the sentencin g court la cked authori ty to impo se obligations ba sed on a non-existent la w.” On June 17, 2025, the post-conviction court ente red an order summa rily dismissing the petition. The post-conviction court first listed a litany of the Petitioner’s filings over the years attempting to void his guilty plea—one filing seeking to “cancel the plea agreement” because it was induc ed by fraud; multiple filings alleging an illegal sentence for various reasons; a petition to withdraw his guilty plea because he had not been advised of the conseque nces of his plea, partic ularl y communi ty su pervision for life; several petitions f or writs of error c oram nobis; an d “ma ny other motion s.” The post-convic tion court noted that the Petitioner ha d “ known for over [twenty ] years th at h e” was su bjected to SO RA’s requirements and that the Petitioner was still seeking relief “ on the s ame grounds” as raised in the Decembe r 2013 coram no bis petitio n. According to the post- conviction co urt, t he Pe titioner had “alle ge[d] no newly discov ered defects in his pl ea, no n ewly disc overed eviden ce, and... no ne w c ase law tha t wou ld ha ve

rendered his plea[]... unknowing or not voluntary.” It also conclude d that it ha d not imposed “an u nconstitu tional retroacti ve punis hment upon the [P]etitioner w hen he e ntered his plea of gui lty to” these offenses in 2004. For these reasons, the post-conviction c ourt dismissed the petition as t ime-b arred, its being filed well beyond the one-year limita tions period for post-convict ion petitions. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30- 102. In addition, it determined that, e ven if the petitio n were treated as a motion to reo pen a prio r post-convicti on proceedi ng, th e Pet itioner h ad failed to meet any of th e requirement s to reopen under Te nnesse e Code Annotate d secti on 40-30-117. On June 25, 202 5, the Petitioner f iled a ti mely notice of a ppeal. Almost t wo m onths later, on A ugust 21, 2025, the Peti tioner filed in the post-conviction court a “Supplement to Ame nded Petition for Post-Convic tion Relief,” attempting “to in corporate additio nal grounds in s upport of th e claims ass erted th erein.” Specifical ly, the Petitioner a rgued that present enf orcement of SORA’s communi ty supervision for lif e obliga tion by th e Tennessee Dep artment of Cor rection (“TDO C”), rather than th e T ennessee Bu reau of Investigati on (“TBI”), was unl awful. He clai med that TD OC superv ision “ex ceed[ed] the authority de legated by the sente ncing c ourt a nd impo se[d] substa nti al liberty restri ctions without judicial or statut ory authorization” in violation of due pr ocess of l aw. The Petitioner cited t o t he trial c ourt’s pur ported statement during t he guilty pl ea hearing that his su pervision would be c onducted by the T BI, not th e T DOC. He also submitted that there wa s no provisio n within SO RA auth orizing t he TDOC to enforce registrat ion obligations. Accordin g to the P et itioner, this enforceme nt discrepancy constitu ted a material chan ge to the plea agree ment and re ndered his ju dgment s void or voida ble. II. A NALYSIS On appeal, th e Pet itioner’s conte ntion in his principal brief is th at his guil ty plea was unknowing and in voluntary beca use the trial court “mate rially misadvi sed” him that the TBI was going to supervise him whil e on the sex offende r regi stry, rather tha n the TDOC, the entit y now supervising him. Acco rding to the Petiti oner, he “could not [have ] possibly und erst[ood] the rea lity of TDOC’s punit ive superv ision—wi th its GPS, therap y, and warra ntless se arches—be cause the cou rt directed him to a dif ferent, powerless agency.” He in dicates that “its e x post fac to enforcem ent has been fu ndamentall y unfair.” He later states in a “ dec laration” attached to his principal brief that he woul d not have pled guilty “had [he ] kn own [the] T DOC would i mpose lifetime p unitiv e supervision.” He concludes that a “critic al te rm” o f his guilty plea was a “ legal f iction” because the “ TBI has no authority to su pervise offender s and its role is purely admin istrative.” A s for his petition being t imely, the Petiti oner submits that “[t]hi s misr eprese ntation constitute s a later-arising ground” re quiring equ itable tollin g of the li mitations pe riod.

The State r equests w aiver of this supe rvising authority issue give n tha t it was no t raised in the post-convi ction court and is raised for the first time on appeal. The Petitioner responds to the State’s waiver request by asserting that “claims of voi d or ille gal sentences under T enn[essee] R[u le] Crim[inal] P[rocedure ] 36.1 are jurisd ictiona l, n ot sub ject to waiver, and revie wable de novo at an y time.” He also states that, be cause he is a pro se litigant, his “petition mu st be l iberally c onstrued to enco mpass th e core claim that the sentencing court’s oral pronouncement of [TB I] supervision rendered the se ntence i llegal and the plea involu ntary.” Acc ording to the Petitione r, “[t]he State’s silence on the merits concedes that the sent ence is void and t he plea was not knowing and intell igent.” The Petitioner als o asks for pl ain error re view if th e issue is dee med waiv ed. Tennessee C ode Anno tate d section 40 -30-106(g) provides tha t “ [a] gr ound for relief is waived if the petitioner personally or through an attorney failed to present it for determinati on in any proceeding bef ore a court of compete nt ju risdiction in whic h the ground could have been presented,” with limi ted exceptions tha t are not applicable here. “[A]n appe llate court’s jurisdictio n is ‘appel late only.’” State v. Bris tol, 654 S.W.3 d 917, 925 (Tenn. 2022) (first quoting Tenn. Const. ar t. VI, § 2; and then citing Ten n. Code Ann. § 16-5-108(a)). “It extends to those issue s th at ‘ha[ve] been formulated and passed upon in some i nferior tri bunal.’” Id. (quoting Fine v. Lawle ss, 205 S.W. 124, 124 (1918)). A s a general prop osition, this court wi ll not address i ssues that w ere not raised in the post-convicti on petitio n or addressed by the post-conviction court. Brown v. State, 928 S.W.2d 45 3, 457 (Ten n. Crim. Ap p. 199 6); s ee State v. J ohnson, 9 70 S.W. 2d 500, 508 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (stating that issues raised for the first time on appeal are waived). On appeal, the crux of the Petitio ner’s issue in his principal brief deals with supervision by the TDO C, rather than what he insinuates was promised superv ision by the TBI, and whethe r he was “mate rially misad vised” regardin g the appropriat e supervisi ng agency renderi ng his g uilty ple a involunta rily and unknowi ngly ente red. A ny underly ing legal basi s for thi s clai m is certainly impr ecise, at best. Although we generally afford p ro se litigants gr eater lenienc y tha n lawyers, the y nevertheles s are not “e ntitled to shift th e burden of litigating their case to the c ourts.” State v. B enson, N o. W2017-01276-CCA - R3-CD, 2018 W L 4562928, at * 3 (Tenn. Cri m. App. Sep. 21, 2018) (citing Chiozza v. Chiozza, 315 S.W.3d 48 2, 487 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009)). Moreover, in his reply brief, the Petitioner focuses on Rule 36.1, contending th at his j udgments are vo id and his sentenc es illegal, and tha t such m atters can be corrected at any time. We note that an appellant cannot abandon a n argument a dvanced in his or he r p rincipal brief a nd adv ance a new arg ument to support an issue in t he reply brief. See Tenn. R. App. P. 27; Hu ghes v. Tenn. Bd. of

Prob. & P arole, 514 S.W.3d 707, 724 (Ten n. 2017) (“Issues raised f or the first t ime in a reply brief are waived. ”). Furthermore, while the Petitioner raised several broad c hallenges in hi s post-convicti on petition and amendment, incl uding an involuntary and unknowing plea, as well as clai ming that his judgments are void or voidabl e, the particula rs of this distinc t issue regarding the app ropriate supervisi ng agency were absent. In both his petition and amended petition, the P etitioner challenged the imposition o f the punitive effects of SORA as it related to the c ommunity supervi sion f or life requir ement, his classif ication as a vio lent child se x offende r, and its restrictio ns on residenc y, trav el, a nd employ ment. As pre sented, we are unable to disc ern any correlati on be tween the Petitio ner’s appellate argum ent regarding the app ropriate superv ising authority to the claim s ma de in the post-convi ction petition an d its amendme nt. 5 We observe th at, on August 21, 2 025, the Pe titioner filed a “Supplement t o Amended Petition for Po st-Conviction Rel ief” in the post-convict ion court, wherein he attempted to inco rporate the cla im he now r aises on appe al regardi ng the appropria te supervising agency. However, thi s pleading w as never considere d by the post-c onvicti on court, an d righ tly s o. Here, the post- convicti on court’ s orde r summ arily dis missin g the post-convicti on petition, e ntered on June 17, 2025, dis posed of all th e issues in the case. Thus, it constituted a final judgme nt. See Ten n. Co de Ann. § 16-5-1 08; Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b). “Onc e a judgmen t becomes final or a timely notice of appeal has been filed, the trial court lo ses j urisdict ion o ver the ma tter.” Stat e v. B oyd, 51 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Tenn. Crim. App. 20 00) (cit ations omitte d); see also Ten n. R. Ap p. P. 4(a), (c). When t he Pe titioner’s notice of appeal was fil ed with this c ourt on June 25, 2 025, the post- conviction court was divested of its jur isdict ion. See State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2 d 8 34, 837 (Tenn. 1996) (“The jur isdiction of th e Court of Criminal Appeals attaches upon the filin g of the notice of appeal an d, therefore, the trial court lose s jurisdiction.”). Thus, it ha d no authority to 5 We note that, on February 8, 2 026, after briefing was complete and th is c ase was doc keted for on-briefs adjudication by this c ourt, the Petitioner has submitted a “Notice of Supplemental Author ity.” See Tenn. R. App. P. 27(d). In this filing, the P etitioner c ites to the re cent United State s Supreme Court case of Ellingburg v. United States, No. 24-482, 607 U.S. ---, --- S.Ct. ---, 2026 WL 135982, at *1 (Jan. 20, 2026) (holding that restitution under the Mandatory Victim’s Restitution Act is criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clau se), and a rgues t hat it di rectly suppo rts his ex post f acto challenge t o SORA’s community s upervision for life requirement. He claims that “[t]his authority directly su pports Issue IV of [his] brie f,” relating to an ex post facto vio lation. First, there is no Issue IV in ether t he Petitioner’s principal brief or his reply brief. Moreover, as discussed, the Petit ioner’s argument on a ppeal is confined to the a ppropriate supervising agency and whether he was ma terially m isadvised during his guilty plea. This opinion adds l ittle, if anything, to the arguments raised on ap peal.

consider any suppleme nt to the Petitioner’s amended petitio n for post-convict ion relief filed thereafte r. Because the Petitioner failed to pro perly pres ent the details of this sp ecific claim in the post-convicti on c ourt, we agree with the State that the issue is waived. Se e Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this r ule shall be construed as re quiring relief be granted to a party res ponsible f or an error or who faile d to t ake whatever actio n was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful e ffect of an error.”); see a lso State v. Howard, 504 S.W.3d 260, 277 (Te nn. 2016) (“It is well -settled that a defendan t may not advoca te a different or novel po sition on a ppeal.”); State v. Johnson, N o. M2023-0 1477-CCA-R3-C D, 2024 WL 2795847, a t * 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Ma y 31, 2024) (“Because the petitio ner failed to raise the c laims at th e trial level [in his mo tion to corre ct an ille gal sentence], t he issues are waived.”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. D ec. 10, 202 4); Howze v. Stat e, No. W2018- 02046-CCA-R3- PC, 2 019 WL 5168652, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. A pp. Oct. 14, 2019) (determinin g waiv er w hen the p etitioner did not raise either of his specific ineffective assistance of counsel c laims in the post- conviction court, but rathe r for the first time on appeal). To hold ot herwise would r equire a tr ial c ourt t o a ddress every p ossible punitive aspect of Tennessee’s s ex offender r egistry, in cluding the appro priate supervising age ncy, when a pro se litigant fi les post-conviction pleadings challenging a guilty ple a, which would lead to unworkable results. And la stly, w e note t hat plai n e rror review is not a vailable in p ost-convict ion proceedings. Holland v. State, 61 0 S.W.3d 45 0, 458 (Ten n. 2020). III. C ONCLUSION Given t he Pe titioner’s waiver o f his o nly ap pellate is sue, th e judgment of the post- conviction c ourt is affirme d. s/ Kyle A. H ixson KYLE A. HIXSO N, JUDGE