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Nov. 28, 2025 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Blackwing

Utah Supreme Court

• Citations: 2025 UT 60

• Docket Number: Case No. 20230752

• Opinion

• Authorities (32)

• Cited By (3)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (7.8K)

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Combined Opinion

This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter
2025 UT 60

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellant,
v.
KAIN BLACKWING,
Appellee.

No. 20230752
Heard May 13, 2025
Filed November 28, 2025

On Appeal of Interlocutory Order

Third District Court, West Jordan
The Honorable A. Chelsea Koch
No. 171400665

Attorneys:
Derek E. Brown, Att’y Gen., Christopher A. Bates, Spec. Asst.
Solic. Gen., Salt Lake City for appellant
Trevor J. Lee, Park City, for appellee

JUSTICE HAGEN authored the opinion of the Court in which
CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE,
JUSTICE PETERSEN, and JUSTICE POHLMAN joined.

JUSTICE HAGEN, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 Defendant Kain Blackwing stands charged of
orchestrating the attempted murder of fourteen-year-old C.G. to
prevent her from testifying that he raped her. From his jail cell
where he awaited trial on the rape charge, Blackwing allegedly
directed three women with whom he had a polygamous
relationship to murder C.G. and her parents in their home. The plan
STATE v. BLACKWING
Opinion of the Court

ultimately failed, and the State charged Blackwing with
solicitation, conspiracy, and attempted murder.
¶2 The State filed a notice of intent to introduce various
categories of evidence that it characterized as “intrinsic,” meaning
evidence that “would be considered part of the case narrative and
have important probative value that bears directly on the crime
charged.” State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶ 14 n.7, 328 P.3d 841,
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, 391 P.3d
1016. Relevant to this appeal, the State sought to offer the details of
the rape case involving C.G., Blackwing’s prior conviction for
raping one of his alleged co-conspirators, and his relationship with
all three women, including alleged instances of manipulation,
coercion, and control. Blackwing moved in limine to exclude the
evidence. The district court granted Blackwing’s motion in part
excluding most of the proposed evidence under rules 401, 402, 403,
and 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
¶3 We granted the State’s petition for interlocutory review.
We affirm the district court’s exclusion of Blackwing’s prior rape
conviction under rule 403. But we hold that the district court
exceeded its discretion in excluding the other proposed evidence.
In doing so, we adopt the rule that evidence of acts that are intrinsic
to a charged crime do not constitute “other act” evidence within the
meaning of rule 404(b). Because the case involving C.G. and
Blackwing’s relationship with his alleged co-conspirators are both
directly related to the conspiracy and solicitation charges, the
evidence was not subject to 404(b). And, given the probative value
of this evidence, we conclude that the court exceeded its discretion
in excluding the evidence as either irrelevant under rules 401 and
402 or unduly prejudicial under rule 403. We affirm the court’s
exclusion of the prior rape conviction but reverse its remaining
rulings and remand the case for trial or other further proceedings.
BACKGROUND 1
¶4 Kain Blackwing lived in a polygamous relationship with
Raven Blackwing and Theresa Baker, whom he met when both

---

1 We recite the version of events from relevant case documents

and for background purposes only. We emphasize that all
descriptions of Blackwing’s behavior are unproven allegations and
that he is presumed innocent. See State v. Jolley, 2025 UT 9, n.1, 568
(continued . . .)

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Opinion of the Court

women were minors. Blackwing maintained a patriarchal role in
the household. He made all major decisions, instructed Raven and
Theresa on his spiritual theories, and required them to follow his
rules. He also instructed them to address him as “My Lord” and
told them that, if they disobeyed his rules, they “would be
punished and possibly killed.”
¶5 In 2013, Blackwing met Tina, 2 who was also a minor at the
time. He introduced her to his home and began mentoring her in
his spiritual theories and the rules of his house. With Blackwing’s
encouragement, Tina moved in with him, Raven, and Theresa. Like
the other women in the household, Tina was subject to Blackwing’s
rules and breaking those rules involved punishment and “required
a process of apology and restitution to him.” Blackwing repeatedly
warned Tina he had “killed thousands of . . . people.”
¶6 In 2017, Blackwing was convicted by a jury of multiple
counts of rape and other sexual offenses perpetrated against Tina
in March and April 2014. In that case, the State established absence
of consent due to Blackwing’s enticement, coercion, and
manipulation of a relationship of special trust with Tina. Evidence
presented in the case also showed that Blackwing used similarly
coercive and manipulative tactics on Raven and Theresa.
¶7 Around the same time Blackwing committed the sex
offenses against Tina, he also sexually assaulted C.G., a fourteen-
year-old relative who had stayed overnight at his home. C.G.
reported the sexual assault to her parents, who then informed law
enforcement. In July 2014, Blackwing was arrested and charged—
in a separate case from the one involving Tina—with a single count
of rape against C.G. and was held in custody awaiting trial.
Blackwing ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of forcible sexual
abuse in the case involving C.G.
¶8 The events of the present case occurred while Blackwing
was charged with the rape of C.G. and detained pretrial. While in
jail, Blackwing allegedly solicited and conspired with Raven,
Theresa, and Tina to murder C.G. and her parents. Blackwing

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P.3d 1040; see also UTAH CODE § 76-1-501(1) (“A defendant in a
criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each element
of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.”).
2 A pseudonym.

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STATE v. BLACKWING
Opinion of the Court

discussed the plan with the women during jail visiting hours and
over the phone, using coded language derived from video games.
According to Tina’s preliminary hearing testimony, Blackwing
wanted C.G. and her parents dead to prevent C.G. from testifying
against him. Without C.G.’s testimony, Blackwing believed that he
would avoid conviction and be able to leave the United States.
¶9 Blackwing directed the women to break into C.G.’s home,
suffocate her using plastic wrap and chloroform, incapacitate her
parents by injecting them with heroin, and set the house on fire.
After receiving Blackwing’s instructions, the women began
procuring the necessary supplies and prepared to carry out
Blackwing’s plan. In September 2014, Theresa stayed behind at
home while Raven and Tina broke into C.G.’s home wearing dark
clothing, ski masks, and gloves. But a family friend staying at the
home caught the women going down the stairs after breaking in.
After an altercation, another resident of the home called the police,
leading to Raven and Tina’s arrest. Among other things, the women
were carrying syringes, a knife, a Taser, and matches.
¶10 Based on these events, in February 2017, the State charged
Blackwing with three counts of solicitation for aggravated murder,
one count of conspiracy to commit aggravated murder, and one
count of attempted aggravated murder. The State later filed a notice
of intent to introduce prior crimes evidence pursuant to Utah Rule
of Evidence 404(b). Relevant to this appeal, the State sought to
introduce evidence of the following: (1) Blackwing’s sexual assault
of C.G.; (2) Blackwing’s conviction for the rape of Tina; and
(3) Blackwing’s relationship with Raven, Theresa, and Tina,
including his past manipulation and coercion. In response,
Blackwing filed a motion in limine to exclude the evidence, arguing
that it was extrinsic to the charges and constituted inadmissible
character evidence under rule 404(b), or, alternatively, that the
evidence was unfairly prejudicial under rule 403.
¶11 In a written order the district court granted the motion in
part and denied it in part. The court started with evidence of the
case involving C.G. The court held that this evidence was “intrinsic
to the charges in the instant case” because “[w]hile they are not part
of the same criminal episode, the fact that there was a pending case
with C.G. as the witness i[s] inextricably intertwined.” Since the
court found the evidence to be intrinsic, it ruled that rule 404(b) did
not apply. Instead, the court excluded the evidence as irrelevant
under rules 401 and 402 and unduly prejudicial under rule 403. The

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Opinion of the Court

court limited the State to introducing evidence that Blackwing was
charged with a crime and C.G. was the sole witness.
¶12 Next, the court excluded all evidence from the prior case
in which Blackwing was convicted of raping Tina. The State sought
to introduce that evidence to show that “Blackwing had a long term
history of sexual, psychological and emotional manipulation of
[Tina].” The court determined that the details of that case were not
intrinsic to the present case and that rule 404(b) applied. The court
explained that Blackwing’s “prior rape conviction[] against . . .
[Tina] is [not] relevant to whether or not he solicited her to commit
murder or conspired with her to commit murder” nor is it “relevant
to what the State must prove at trial.” The court then concluded
that the evidence was not offered for a non-character purpose and
therefore must be excluded. In a footnote, the court noted that the
evidence would also be subject to exclusion under rule 403.
¶13 Lastly the court ruled on evidence of Blackwing’s past
manipulation, coercion, and command of Raven, Theresa, and
Tina. The State argued that “Blackwing’s alleged long-term
manipulation of the women . . . is direct evidence of his soliciting,
requesting, and commanding them to commit murders, and that
the nature of their relationship is relevant to the formation of a
conspiracy.” The court explained that “[t]his evidence supports
both proper and improper inferences.” On the one hand, “the
dynamics of the relationship between the parties . . . may be offered
for a proper, non-propensity purpose.” But on the other hand, the
State was, in the court’s view, seeking to introduce the evidence to
show that “Blackwing has a propensity for coercing, commanding,
and manipulating these women, and he did so again in this case.”
Because the evidence supported both proper and improper
inferences, the court proceeded to a rule 403 analysis to weigh the
tendency of the evidence to sustain a proper inference against its
propensity to be misused for an improper purpose.
¶14 The court concluded that evidence of Blackwing’s acts of
manipulation, coercion, and control must be excluded under rule
403. It ruled that the “general nature and dynamics of the
relationship” would not garner an improper inference from the
jury at trial. But specific details of Blackwing’s manipulation and
control, such as “cult-like bad acts,” punishing the women for
disobeying, making death threats, and requiring the women to call
him “My Lord,” had “little to no probative value in the instant
case.” The court explained that the State did not need to show that

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STATE v. BLACKWING
Opinion of the Court

Blackwing manipulated the women to prove the elements of the
offense, only that he solicited them. The court determined that the
manipulation and control evidence was “unduly prejudicial” and
would “likely confuse or mislead the jury.” It therefore concluded
that “specific bad acts regarding the relationship between the
women and Blackwing” were inadmissible under rule 403.
¶15 We subsequently granted the State’s petition for
interlocutory review of the district court’s order.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶16 The State challenges the district court’s exclusion of
evidence. We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse
of discretion. See State v. Ring, 2018 UT 19, ¶ 17, 424 P.3d 845. When
a district court applies the correct legal standard, its decision “to
admit or exclude evidence is only an abuse of discretion if it is
beyond the limits of reasonability.” Id. (cleaned up). But a district
court abuses its discretion when it admits or excludes evidence
under the wrong legal standard. State v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, ¶ 12,
367 P.3d 981. And “whether the district court applied the proper
legal standard in assessing the admissibility of evidence is a
question of law that we review for correctness.” State v. Green, 2023
UT 10, ¶ 43, 532 P.3d 930 (cleaned up).
ANALYSIS
¶17 At Blackwing’s upcoming trial, the State wants to offer
evidence of his alleged conduct leading up to the charged offenses.
Under our rules, all relevant evidence is admissible unless a
constitutional provision, statute, or rule provides otherwise. See
UTAH R. EVID. 402. But the Utah Rules of Evidence limit the State’s
ability to introduce evidence of other acts a defendant may have
committed. “Evidence of prior bad acts must clear several
evidentiary hurdles before admission—rules 404(b), 402, and 403.”
State v. Green, 2023 UT 10, ¶ 63, 532 P.3d 930 (cleaned up).
¶18 The primary rule at issue here, rule 404(b), provides that
“[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to
prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular
occasion the person acted in conformity with the character.” UTAH
R. EVID. 404(b)(1). But such evidence “may be admissible for
another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack
of accident.” Id. R. 404(b)(2).

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Opinion of the Court

¶19 If the evidence is offered for a proper purpose under rule
404(b), the court must next determine whether the evidence is
relevant. Under rule 402, the evidence must be relevant to be
admissible, and relevance “is defined in rule 401 as evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Green, 2023
UT 10, ¶ 63 (cleaned up).
¶20 Finally, if the court concludes that the evidence is relevant,
it must determine whether the evidence is admissible under rule
403. To be admissible under that rule, the court must find that the
evidence “does not pose a danger for unfair prejudice that
substantially outweighs its probative value.” Id. ¶ 64 (cleaned up).
¶21 We address each category of evidence in the order
addressed by the district court: (1) evidence of the case involving
C.G.; (2) evidence of the crimes against Tina; and (3) evidence of
Blackwing’s relationship with the co-conspirators. In our
discussion of the first category of evidence, we clarify the
governing standard for each of the rules applicable to other acts
evidence—rules 404(b), 402, and 403. See id. ¶ 63. We then apply
those clarified standards throughout our opinion.
I. EVIDENCE OF THE CASE INVOLVING C.G.
¶22 In its written order on Blackwing’s motion in limine, the
district court first addressed the evidence regarding the case
against Blackwing for raping C.G. The court determined that the
evidence was “intrinsic to the charges in the instant case” and
therefore not subject to rule 404(b). The court then assessed its
relevance under rules 401 and 402 and whether the risk of prejudice
substantially outweighed its probative value under rule 403. The
court ruled that evidence that C.G. was the sole witness in a
criminal case against Blackwing was admissible, but that all other
evidence regarding the case must be excluded for lack of relevance
under rules 401 and 402 and undue prejudice under rule 403. We
address each rule separately and conclude that the district court
exceeded its discretion in excluding the evidence.
A. Rule 404(b) and Intrinsic Evidence
¶23 Blackwing urges us to affirm the district court’s ruling on
the alternative ground that the crime committed against C.G. is
inadmissible other act evidence under rule 404(b). The district court
did not conduct a rule 404(b) analysis because it determined that

7
STATE v. BLACKWING
Opinion of the Court

the evidence fell outside the scope of the rule. Specifically, the court
ruled that “[e]vidence of the case involving C.G. is intrinsic to the
charges in the instant case.” Because “Blackwing is alleged to have
conspired to kill and solicited to kill a witness in a criminal
proceeding,” the court reasoned that the current charges “would
not make sense without some information about the other case.”
Those facts, it continued, are “necessary preliminaries” to the
charged conduct. (Quoting United States v. Lambert, 995 F.2d 1006,
1007 (10th Cir. 1993).)
¶24 The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic evidence
was first acknowledged by this court in a footnote. State v. Lucero,
2014 UT 15, ¶ 14 n.7, 328 P.3d 841 (cleaned up), abrogated on other
grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, 391 P.3d 1016. In Lucero, the
State had argued, as an alternative basis for affirmance, that the
challenged evidence was “part of the continuing narrative rather
than an independent act.” Id. In recounting that argument, we
stated,
Since rule 404(b) applies only “to evidence that is
extrinsic to the crime charged,” United States v. Mower,
351 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1230 (D. Utah 2005) (emphasis
added), this would preclude applicability of the rule
altogether. This is because rule 404(b) applies only to
“other” acts—if the evidence of prior acts is
“inextricably intertwined” with the crime that is
charged, or if both the charged crime and the prior act
are considered “part of a single criminal episode,”
then rule 404(b) would not apply. Id. Rather, the act
would be considered part of the case narrative and
have important probative value that bears directly on
the crime charged.
Id. But we concluded, “This is not the case here.” Id.
¶25 Indeed, each time the State has argued that evidence is
intrinsic, this court has relied instead on a traditional 404(b)
analysis to uphold the admission of challenged evidence. See, e.g.,
State v. Andrus, 2025 UT 32, ¶ 87, 575 P.3d 1071 (upholding the
admission of evidence for a proper purpose under rule 404(b) after
“[a]ssuming without deciding that the evidence was extrinsic”);
State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, ¶ 15, 108 P.3d 730 (declining to reach
whether evidence was “admissible as ‘intrinsic evidence’ under a
federal analysis because we conclude[d] that it was admissible
under a traditional Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) analysis”). But the

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Opinion of the Court

court of appeals has squarely held that “[e]vidence forming such
an ‘integral part of the charged conduct’ is ‘beyond the reach of rule
404(b).’” State v. Sorenson, 2023 UT App 159, ¶ 14, 542 P.3d 529
(quoting State v. Hood, 2018 UT App 236, ¶¶ 32–33, 438 P.3d 54); see
also State v. Main, 2021 UT App 81, ¶ 19, 494 P.3d 1056.
¶26 Blackwing characterizes the distinction between intrinsic
and extrinsic evidence as “the intrinsic exception” to rule 404(b).
He argues that the intrinsic exception is a reincarnation of the
English common law doctrine of res gestae, which functioned as an
exception to the general common law prohibition against the “use
of character or propensity evidence to establish a defendant’s
guilt.” In his view, the intrinsic exception improperly “exempts
from Rule 404(b) scrutiny any ‘evidence [that] is directly connected
to the factual circumstances of the crime and provides contextual
or background information to the jury.’” (Quoting United States v.
Parker, 553 F.3d 1309, 1314 (10th Cir. 2009).) He urges us to follow
the path of other courts that have distanced themselves from the
intrinsic exception. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 249
(3d Cir. 2010).
¶27 If we adopt the distinction, Blackwing urges us to define it
narrowly. He contends that the “inextricably intertwined”
standard for intrinsic evidence is “vague and unintelligible” and
that “‘quite simply, no one knows what it means.’” (Quoting Green,
617 F.3d at 246.) He asks us to “strictly cabin its application to the
historical uses of admitting (1) evidence that is necessary to prove
the charged offense, and (2) uncharged acts performed
contemporaneously with the charged crime that facilitate the
commission of the charged crime.”
¶28 We decline Blackwing’s invitation to reject the distinction
between intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. And we disagree with
Blackwing’s characterization of it as a judicially created exception
to rule 404(b). Rather, it is a text-based application of the rule that,
by its own terms, applies to “other acts,” not to acts directly
connected to the factual circumstances of the crime.
¶29 Rule 404(b) prohibits evidence of “a crime, wrong, or other
act” when introduced “to prove a person’s character” in order to
show that “on a particular occasion the person acted in conformity
with the character.” UTAH R. EVID. 404(b)(1). Rule 404(b) does not
apply to evidence of the crime charged, because such evidence does
not implicate a person’s purported propensity to act in
conformance with the character exhibited by the evidence. Instead,

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STATE v. BLACKWING
Opinion of the Court

rule 404(b) applies to crimes, wrongs, or other acts separate from
the charged offenses. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶ 14 n.7.
¶30 The difficulty lies in articulating a workable standard for
distinguishing between facts that are part of the charged crimes
that are not subject to rule 404(b) and other acts that are. We noted
in Lucero that intrinsic evidence is generally “considered part of the
case narrative and ha[s] important probative value that bears
directly on the crime charged.” Id. The Tenth Circuit has defined
intrinsic evidence as that which is “directly connected to the factual
circumstances of the crime and provides contextual or background
information to the jury.” Parker, 553 F.3d at 1314 (cleaned up).
“Extrinsic evidence, on the other hand, is extraneous and is not
intimately connected or blended with the factual circumstances of
the charged offense.” Id. (cleaned up).
¶31 We agree with these articulations of the standard and
adopt them. Evidence is intrinsic and thus outside the scope of rule
404(b) when there is a direct relationship between the act and the
charged crime. 3 To be considered intrinsic, the acts must be an
“integral and natural part of the . . . circumstances surrounding the
offense for which the defendant” is charged, United States v. Irving,
665 F.3d 1184, 1213 (10th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up), or “directly
connected to the factual circumstances of the crime,” Parker, 553
F.3d at 1314 (cleaned up). This definition does not include acts that
are “only tangentially related to the charged crime” and are merely
used to “complete the story” or “explain the circumstances.” United
States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoted in State v.
Thornton, 2014 UT App 265, ¶ 43 n.10, 339 P.3d 112, aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 2017 UT 9, 391 P.3d 1016).
¶32 We decline to adopt Blackwing’s proposed definition of
intrinsic evidence because it is too narrow. He would limit intrinsic
evidence to that which “is necessary to prove the charged offense.”
That framing would invite courts to scrutinize whether it would be
possible to prove an element of the offense without the evidence,

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3 We find the “inextricably intertwined” language quoted in

State v. Lucero to be unhelpful. 2014 UT 15, ¶ 14 n.7, 328 P.3d 841,
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, 391 P.3d
1016. We would expect any relevant evidence to be “intertwined”
with the charged crimes and very little evidence is truly
“inextricable” in the sense that it cannot be excluded from other
admissible evidence.

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Opinion of the Court

subjecting all but the most essential act necessary to complete the
crime to a 404(b) analysis.
¶33 We also reject his suggestion to limit intrinsic evidence to
acts that occur contemporaneously with the charged crime. See, e.g.,
Green, 617 F.3d at 249 (limiting the use of intrinsic evidence to “acts
performed contemporaneously with the charged crime” (cleaned
up)); United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (same);
Rojas v. People, 504 P.3d 296, 308 (Colo. 2022) (en banc) (same).
Conduct that directly facilitates or otherwise plays an integral role
in an offense often occurs before the crime is completed. Similarly,
intrinsic evidence can arise from conduct that occurs after the crime
is completed. See State v. Von Niederhausern, 2018 UT App 149, ¶ 21
n.6, 427 P.3d 1277 (noting that courts have allowed the use of “other
crimes, wrongs, or acts” evidence where “those acts occurred after
the charged conduct”); see also Main, 2021 UT App 81, ¶¶ 18–24
(holding that evidence that the defendant, who murdered his
father, later assaulted and kidnapped a friend was intrinsic
evidence admissible in the murder trial to explain why inculpatory
evidence from the murder was found at the friend’s house).
¶34 Under the definition of intrinsic evidence we adopt today,
the district court correctly ruled that Blackwing’s sexual assault of
C.G. was intrinsic and not subject to rule 404(b). Blackwing was
charged with solicitation and conspiring to murder C.G. because
she was a witness in the sexual assault case against him. There is a
direct relationship between the sexual assault and the crimes for
which Blackwing is on trial. The alleged sexual assault of C.G. led
to Blackwing’s arrest. While detained pending trial, he allegedly
hatched the scheme to murder C.G. and her parents to escape
punishment. According to the State, he then solicited the women in
his household to carry out the killings and reached the agreement
giving rise to the conspiracy charges. There is a direct relationship
between the sexual assault of C.G. and the charged crimes. Because
the sexual assault played a direct role in the commission of the
crimes on trial, the district court properly concluded that the
evidence was intrinsic and not subject to rule 404(b).
B. Rule 402
¶35 The district court ruled that evidence regarding “the
specifics of C.G.’s case, including the facts or specific allegations,
charges and outcome, are not relevant to elements the State must
prove in the instant case.” The State sought to introduce “specifics
of the case involving C.G.” because, it argued, “the sexual abuse of

11
STATE v. BLACKWING
Opinion of the Court

C.G. was the very reason for the conspiracy charge in the instant
case.” 4 The court disagreed and ruled that only the “fact that C.G.
was the sole witness in a criminal case against Blackwing [would
be] admissible at trial.”
¶36 In making this ruling, the court applied the wrong legal
standard by raising the relevance bar too high. Rule 402 provides
that relevant evidence is admissible unless another constitutional
provision, statute, or rule provides otherwise. See UTAH R. EVID.
402. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Id. R. 401.
The bar for relevance “is very low, and even evidence with the
slightest probative value is relevant.” State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34,
¶ 34, 44 P.3d 805 (cleaned up).
¶37 To meet that low bar, evidence need not directly prove or
disprove the fact of consequence, so long as it has “any tendency to
make [the] fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” UTAH R. EVID. 401. This means that only a “logical
connection between the evidence and th[e] fact of consequence” is
required, and that “connection to an element need not be direct, so
long as it exists.” 2 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE TOOMEY
MCKENNA, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 11.3, Westlaw (database updated
Dec. 2024). In other words, evidence can be “a step on one
evidentiary route to the ultimate fact.” Old Chief v. United States, 519
U.S. 172, 179 (1997).
¶38 The district court excluded the details of the case involving
C.G. because those details were “not relevant to [the] elements the
State must prove in the instant case.” But relevant evidence is not
limited to disputed facts that bear on the elements of a claim or

---

4 On appeal, Blackwing contends that the State failed to preserve

its legal theory of relevance. Blackwing contends that the State
argued below that “the sexual abuse of C.G. was the very reason
for the conspiracy,” but now on appeal, the State argues that “the
more serious the charges Blackwing was facing,” the “length[ier
the] sentence” and thus “the stronger his motive to silence her.” We
do not view this as a new issue, but as further development of the
theory of admissibility presented to the district court. See Gressman
v. State, 2013 UT 63, ¶ 45, 323 P.3d 998 (“Issues must be preserved,
not arguments for or against a particular ruling on an issue raised
below.” (cleaned up)).

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Opinion of the Court

defense. See United States v. Gonzalez, 110 F.3d 936, 941 (2d Cir. 1997)
(explaining that “the trial court may admit evidence that does not
directly establish an element of the offense charged” (cleaned up)).
Rather, “some evidence that is merely ancillary to evidence that
bears directly on the issues may be admissible.” 1 KENNETH S.
BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185.1, Westlaw (Robert
P. Mosteller ed., database updated Feb. 2025) [hereinafter
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]. The “evidence need only tend to prove
the government’s case, and evidence that adds context and
dimension to the government’s proof of the charges can have that
tendency.” Gonzalez, 110 F.3d at 941. For instance, evidence can be
relevant for purposes such as providing logical coherence to the
events of the case, demonstrating the credibility of a witness, or
helping the jury understand evidence that will be offered at a later
phase of trial. See United States v. Boros, 668 F.3d 901, 908 (7th Cir.
2012) (explaining that evidence is relevant if “its exclusion would
leave a chronological and conceptual void in the story” (cleaned
up)).
¶39 The ability to offer evidence beyond what is strictly
necessary to prove the case is not a special privilege afforded only
to the prosecution. Any party is entitled to offer more than
sanitized evidence that proves the elements of a claim or defense.
Parties are entitled to offer evidence “that merely fill[s] in the
background of the narrative and give[s] it interest, color, and
lifelikeness.” MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185.1. Likewise, rule 401’s
low threshold grants courts leeway to admit evidence—subject to
other evidentiary rules—that presents the case in a logically
coherent manner to the factfinder. Evidence can have “force
beyond any linear scheme of reasoning” and can have a narrative
impact “not only to support conclusions but to sustain the
willingness of jurors to draw the inferences, whatever they may be,
necessary to reach an honest verdict.” Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 187.
¶40 An application of rule 402 that worked otherwise would
present practical difficulties to the party that bears the burden of
proof on an issue at trial. See id. at 188 (“If jurors’ expectations are
not satisfied, triers of fact may penalize the party who disappoints
them by drawing a negative inference against that party.” (cleaned
up)). It would also encroach on the jury’s fact-finding role. The jury
makes factual determinations based on the entirety of the evidence
presented, not on isolated items of evidence that are presented in a
vacuum. As the Supreme Court explained, “the evidentiary
account of what a defendant has thought and done can accomplish

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Opinion of the Court

what no set of abstract statements ever could, not just to prove a
fact but to establish its human significance, and so to implicate the
law’s moral underpinnings and a juror’s obligation to sit in
judgment.” Id. at 187–88.
¶41 Under the correct legal standard, evidence of Blackwing’s
sexual assault of C.G. and the resulting charges is relevant because
those facts precipitated the alleged solicitation and conspiracy to
commit aggravated murder in this case. Under the State’s theory,
Blackwing solicited and conspired with Raven, Theresa, and Tina
to murder C.G. to prevent her from testifying against him. Limiting
the State’s evidence to the mere fact that Blackwing was charged
with a crime to which C.G. was the sole witness would rob the jury
of critical context needed to assess the State’s theory. The
seriousness of the underlying crime matters, as does the nature of
Blackwing’s crime and C.G.’s role as the alleged victim. If
Blackwing had been charged with shoplifting, for instance, and
C.G. was a bystander who happened to be the only witness to the
theft, a jury would rightly question Blackwing’s motive to commit
murder. But evidence that Blackwing was facing trial for raping a
fourteen-year-old relative makes it more plausible that Blackwing
was willing to take such extreme measures to silence her.
¶42 Other details surrounding the underlying crime may also
prove relevant to the State’s theory of how the solicitation and
conspiracy played out. For instance, Blackwing initially directed
Raven, Theresa, and Tina to only murder C.G., but later the plan
evolved to include C.G.’s parents. The State contends that the
parents’ involvement in the case—including their decision to report
Blackwing to law enforcement—is relevant to “explain Blackwing’s
decision to go after [C.G.’s] parents.” We agree. Excluding the
evidence would leave a chronological or conceptual void in the
story and impair the jury’s ability to assess the logical force of the
State’s evidence. See Boros, 668 F.3d at 908. Details allow the jury to
use their common sense when evaluating whether the State has met
its burden of proof. Such evidence is not inadmissible simply
because the State could prove each element of the offenses without
it.
¶43 By excluding all evidence of the case involving C.G. other
than the fact that she was the sole witness to a crime allegedly
perpetrated by Blackwing, the district court raised the relevance
bar well above its low threshold. In doing so, the district court
applied the wrong legal standard. And because it applied the

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wrong legal standard, it exceeded its discretion by excluding the
evidence under rule 402. See State v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, ¶ 12, 367
P.3d 981.
C. Rule 403
¶44 The district court also ruled, in the alternative, that the
evidence must be excluded under rule 403. The court reasoned
“that any probative value of [the fact that C.G.’s case was a sex
crime] or the details of the sex crime, is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice” because this “type of underlying
crime has little to no probative value in the instant case.” The court
explained that “evidence of a sex crime involving a child is highly
inflammatory, and admitting such evidence has an undue
tendency to suggest decision on an improper or emotional basis.”
(Citing State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822, 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).)
¶45 Under Utah Rule of Evidence 403, a district court may
exclude otherwise relevant admissible evidence “if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair
prejudice.” Rule 403 is a balancing test, where the district court
considers the probative value of the evidence, against its potential
for unfair prejudice. At the outset, the court must “indulge a
presumption in favor of admissibility.” Green, 2023 UT 10, ¶ 78
(cleaned up). “The probative value of evidence is judged by the
strength of the evidence and its ability to make the existence of a
consequential fact either more or less probable and the proponent’s
need for the evidence.” State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1140 (Utah
1989) (cleaned up).
¶46 In performing the weighing required by rule 403, the
district court undervalued the probative value of the evidence and
overstated the risk of prejudice. As to the evidence’s probative
value, the court’s misunderstanding of the legal standard for
relevance infected its assessment of the probative value under rule
403. The court ruled that the “type of underlying crime” in the case
involving C.G. had “little to no probative value in the instant case”
because the “specific allegations, charges and outcome, are not
relevant to elements the State must prove in the instant case.” But
as we explained above, relevant evidence is not limited to evidence
that directly proves the elements of the crime.
¶47 With that understanding, the probative value of the
evidence becomes apparent. The underlying criminal case
involving C.G. allegedly motivated Blackwing to plan C.G.’s
murder, a plan from which his current charges arise. Under the

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Opinion of the Court

State’s theory of the case, the nature of the crime in C.G.’s case was
critical to explain Blackwing’s motivation. We agree with the State
that the jury’s ability to assess the strength of the State’s case would
be impaired if it could not hear evidence about the factual context
in which the events underlying the charged offenses occurred. That
context is what gives the State’s evidence its logical force and
explains why the crimes might have unfolded the way the State
contends. Both the severity and the nature of the underlying rape
are highly probative to the jury’s assessment of the case.
¶48 Under rule 403, relevant evidence is presumed to be
admissible. See Green, 2023 UT 10, ¶ 78; see also UTAH R. EVID. 402.
Thus, a trial court must be careful not to treat all prejudicial
evidence as excludable under rule 403, because “all effective
evidence is prejudicial in the sense of being damaging to the party
against whom it is offered.” State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ¶ 53, 191
P.3d 17 (cleaned up). Rule 403 allows exclusion only where, as
relevant here, the evidence poses a risk of “unfair prejudice” to the
opposing party. Id. (cleaned up). Unfairly prejudicial evidence is
evidence that has a “tendency to influence the outcome of the trial
by improper means, or if it appeals to the jury’s sympathies, or
arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish or
otherwise causes a jury to base its decision on something other than
the established propositions of the case.” Olympus Hills Shopping
Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 455 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994) (cleaned up).
¶49 Importantly, relevant evidence may be excluded under
rule 403 only “if its probative value is substantially outweighed” by
the risk of unfair prejudice. UTAH R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added).
When “evidence is prejudicial but is at least as probative it is
properly admissible.” State v. Alinas, 2007 UT 83, ¶ 36, 171 P.3d 1046
(cleaned up). And, “even if the evidence has the potential for
prejudicing a defendant, it will be admitted if it has unusual
probative value.” State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106, ¶ 31, 61 P.3d 1019. Even
“minimally probative evidence need not always be excluded”
unless its probative value “is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.” Johnson, 784 P.2d at 1141 (cleaned up).
¶50 Here, the district court reasoned that the evidence should
be excluded under rule 403 because “evidence of a sex crime
involving a child is highly inflammatory, and admitting such
evidence has an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper or emotional basis.” This reasoning overlooks the role of

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the sex crime in the charged offenses. Evidence that a defendant
committed a sex crime against a minor always poses some risk of
inflaming the jury. But when a defendant is on trial for that very
crime, such evidence suggests a decision on a proper basis. See UTAH
R. EVID. 404(c); Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, ¶¶ 26–27. The probative value
of the evidence makes it highly prejudicial; indeed, the defendant
would not be convicted without it. But it is not unfair prejudice.
¶51 This case is one step removed from that scenario, but it is
not a very long step. Under the State’s theory of the case,
Blackwing’s alleged sexual assault of C.G. led to his prosecution for
that crime which in turn led to his effort to escape accountability by
having her killed. Although Blackwing is not on trial for the alleged
sexual assault, the facts of this case are rooted in that underlying
crime. And the factual circumstances that allegedly gave rise to the
crime charged are highly probative to reaching a decision on a
proper basis. 5
¶52 The district court exceeded its discretion in categorically
excluding nearly all evidence regarding the nature of the
underlying crime. Still, there may be details of the sexual assault
case that would be needlessly gratuitous so that the risk of
inflaming the jury substantially outweighs the probative value. The
State has indicated that it does not seek to admit a “blow-by-blow”
account of Blackwing’s alleged crimes against C.G., just the “basic
facts.” On remand, the district court may still need to decide
whether particular pieces of evidence warrant exclusion under rule
403 on a piece-by-piece basis in response to specific objections. But
the district court’s blanket exclusion of any evidence of the
underlying case beyond the fact that Blackwing was charged with
a crime to which C.G. was the only witness was an abuse of
discretion based on a misunderstanding of rule 403.
II. EVIDENCE OF CRIMES AGAINST TINA
¶53 The State also challenges the exclusion of evidence
regarding Blackwing’s relationship with co-conspirators Raven,

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5 Evidence that the defendant allegedly committed an
uncharged act also poses a risk of suggesting a conviction on an
improper basis, but courts can mitigate that risk by instructing the
jury that the defendant is on trial only for the charged crimes and
cannot be convicted “simply because [jurors] believe [the
defendant] may have committed some other act(s) at another time.”
See MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2d CR411.

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STATE v. BLACKWING
Opinion of the Court

Theresa, and Tina. The State filed notice of its intent to introduce
two categories of evidence. First, it sought to admit the details of a
case in which Blackwing was convicted of rape and other crimes
against Tina under a theory of enticement and coercion. Second, the
State sought to admit evidence of Blackwing’s relationship with
Raven, Theresa, and Tina. The State argued that “evidence relating
to the dominance that [Blackwing] exercised over the women
residing with him will bear directly on his ability to command these
same women to kill for his benefit.”
¶54 The district court and the parties have addressed the case
involving Tina separately from the relationship between Blackwing
and all three women. But we view the conduct that gave rise to the
case involving Tina simply as additional evidence of Blackwing’s
relationship with her. We will address the evidence of Blackwing’s
treatment of Tina together with the other relationship evidence in
the next section.
¶55 But the State seeks to introduce evidence that goes beyond
Blackwing’s conduct. It also wishes to introduce Blackwing’s
conviction for the crimes against Tina. The district court excluded
that evidence. Specifically, it ruled that “[t]he fact that Blackwing
has been convicted of rape charges where [Tina] was the victim is
not intrinsically intertwined with the” charges in this case, and is
“not offered for a proper, non-propensity purpose.” It noted that
the evidence would also be subject to exclusion under rule 403
because “few things are more prejudicial to a defendant than the
admission of multiple recent rape convictions.”
¶56 We affirm the court’s ruling excluding the conviction
under rule 403. We agree with the State that evidence that
Blackwing enticed and coerced Tina to engage in sexual acts while
she was a minor demonstrates the nature of the relationship and
the degree of control he exercised over her. For the reasons set forth
in the following section, that evidence is intrinsic to the charged
offenses and highly probative. But the fact that Blackwing was
charged with and convicted of those acts carries no independent
probative value. It shows only that another factfinder credited that
evidence. The jury that will be empaneled in this case can weigh
the evidence and assess credibility for itself. Evidence of a
conviction would encourage the jury to abdicate its fact-finding
responsibility and would be overly prejudicial. See Robinson v.
Taylor, 2015 UT 69, ¶¶ 32–33, 356 P.3d 1230 (discussing risk that the
jury may use the conviction against the defendant for improper

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purposes). Therefore, we affirm the district court’s exclusion of
Blackwing’s conviction for the crimes against Tina.
III. EVIDENCE OF RELATIONSHIP WITH CO-CONSPIRATORS
¶57 The State next challenges the district court’s ruling
excluding evidence of Blackwing’s “specific, controlling and
unusual, cult-like bad acts including specifics of the alleged
manipulation and coercion, such as punishment for disobeying,
death threats and requiring the women to call him ‘Lord.’” The
State argues that the district court erred in treating the evidence as
extrinsic to the charged offenses and in finding that the probative
value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the risk of
unfair prejudice. We agree with the State on both points.
A. Rule 404(b)
¶58 Unlike the evidence of the case involving C.G., the district
court could not “find that the specific evidence of the women and
Blackwing’s relationship is so ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the
charged crimes that it falls outside the scope of rule 404(b).”
(Quoting State v. Hood, 2018 UT App 236, ¶ 31, 438 P.3d 54.) The
court then went on to apply rule 404(b). It found that the evidence
was offered for both a proper purpose—“explaining the dynamics
of the relationship between the parties”—and an impermissible
propensity purpose—showing that “Blackwing has a propensity
for coercing, commanding and manipulating these women, and he
did so again in this case.” Having found that the evidence supports
both proper and improper inferences, the court went on to assess
the relevance of the evidence and to conduct a rule 403 balancing
analysis.
¶59 The State asserts that the district court erred by applying
rule 404(b) at all. In the State’s view, Blackwing’s long-term
manipulation of his co-conspirators is not “other act” evidence that
falls within the scope of the rule but is intrinsic to the charged
crimes of conspiracy and solicitation to commit murder. We agree.
¶60 The State argues that Blackwing’s sexual assault of Tina is
intrinsic because it shows that Blackwing “systematically enticed
and coerced Tina into joining a household where he had authority
over all important decisions and enforced his will through threats
and fear.” This in turn helps explain “how he was able to convince
Tina . . . to do something . . . most people would flatly refuse.”
Additionally, the State argues that the evidence of Blackwing’s
history of manipulation and control of all three women “explains

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STATE v. BLACKWING
Opinion of the Court

how the parties came to know each other, the nature of their
relationship, and why Blackwing would feel comfortable asking
them to commit a serious crime.”
¶61 Blackwing’s alleged acts of manipulation, control, and
dominance over the women are directly connected to the alleged
solicitation and conspiracy. Those acts are not tangentially related
but directly contributed to his ability to carry out the alleged
crimes.
¶62 Evidence of Blackwing’s coercion and control of the
women is part and parcel of proving that there was indeed a
conspiracy. To prove conspiracy, the State must prove, among
other things, that Blackwing “agree[d] with one or more persons to
engage in or cause the performance” of the crime. UTAH CODE § 76-
4-201. The State intends to prove that the required agreement was
formed as a result of the relationship between the parties.
According to the State’s theory, Blackwing trusted the women to
follow his instructions because he had trained them to do so by
punishing them if they did not follow his commands and
threatening further punishment, including death. Cf. United States
v. Robles-Alvarez, 874 F.3d 46, 51 (1st Cir. 2017) (holding that
evidence of prior drug smuggling trip was intrinsic to a conspiracy
charge because it explained why the defendant “would have
trusted the pair and decided to go into business with them”). Those
alleged facts also explain why the women would have entered into
an agreement to carry out the crime. The State intends to show that
by the time Blackwing hatched the murder plot from jail, the
women were already conditioned to do anything to please him.
¶63 The relationship is also key to the solicitation charge. To
prove solicitation, the State must show Blackwing “solicit[ed],
request[ed], command[ed], offer[ed] to hire, or importune[d]
another person” to commit the crime. UTAH CODE § 76-4-203(1)
(2014). 6 As with the conspiracy charge, the State intends to prove
that Blackwing selected the women for the assignment because
they were already within his control. The district court rejected that
argument, reasoning that it did not matter whether the women
“were easily manipulated by Blackwing” because “the women
could have been complete strangers, and if he solicited them to

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6 The legislature has recently made changes to the criminal
solicitation provision of Utah’s criminal code. We cite the version
in effect at the time of the alleged crime.

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Opinion of the Court

commit a murder, he would still be guilty.” While Blackwing could
have solicited strangers to commit the murders, he did not. He
instead allegedly commanded three women under his sway to
commit the murders on his behalf. The State seeks to prove that he
had the power to do so because he brought the women into his
household, trained them to follow his commands and call him
Lord, and punished them when they disobeyed. The evidence of
Blackwing’s alleged dominance over the women shows why he
selected them, issued an edict in coded language, trusted them to
remain silent, and knew that they would carry out his plan. Such
evidence is intrinsic to the crime charged.
¶64 In addition, the unusual degree of control Blackwing
exercised over the women is highly probative of his role in the
alleged crime. Blackwing was in jail when the women attempted to
carry out the murder plot, which might raise a reasonable doubt
about whether Blackwing was involved or whether the women
acted alone. The State bears the heavy burden of proof at trial and
is entitled to anticipate and proactively disprove the theory that the
women acted on their own initiative. See id. § 76-4-203(2) (2017)
(“An actor may be convicted [of solicitation] only if the solicitation
is made under circumstances strongly corroborative of the actor’s
intent that the offense be committed.”). Evidence that Blackwing
controlled every aspect of their lives tends to prove that the women
would not have planned the murder and broken into the victim’s
home absent Blackwing’s express direction.
¶65 In finding that the evidence was extrinsic and fell within
rule 404(b), the district court relied on a court of appeals decision
that is factually distinguishable. In State v. Hood, the court of
appeals determined that evidence of a defendant’s prior
excommunication from The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints was not intrinsic to the defendant’s charges of rape and
sodomy. See 2018 UT App 236, ¶ 32, 438 P.3d 54. The court
explained that while the defendant’s “excommunication and
professed desire to return to the church may have provided the jury
with insight into” his relationship with the victim, there was no
evidence to suggest that the defendant had shared that information
with the victim “for the purpose of coercing or intimidating her into
submitting to the charged conduct.” Id. The court concluded that
the evidence was not “an integral part of the charged conduct”
because it did not “facilitate[] or otherwise play[] a role in the
commission” of the crimes. Id.

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Opinion of the Court

¶66 In contrast, Blackwing’s control and manipulation of the
women did facilitate and play a role in the commission of the
charged crimes. Under the State’s theory, the conspiracy was
formed because the women had been conditioned to follow
Blackwing’s commands. While the conditioning occurred before
the motive to commit murder arose, it was still a necessary
preliminary step to completing the crime. According to the State, it
was Blackwing’s unusual level of control over the women that
enabled him to carry out the crimes. Because the evidence is
intrinsic to the solicitation and conspiracy charges, rule 404(b) does
not apply. Rather, the acts are “considered part of the case narrative
and have important probative value that bears directly on the crime
charged.” State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶ 14 n.7, 328 P.3d 841,
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, 391 P.3d
1016. 7
B. Rule 403
¶67 Lastly, the district court conducted a rule 403 balancing
test for the evidence of Blackwing’s relationship with the three
women. Because the court had determined that the evidence was
subject to rule 404(b), it attempted to balance the permissible
inferences that could be drawn from the evidence against the risk
that the jury would draw an improper propensity inference. The
court ruled that the “general nature and dynamics of the
relationship” would not garner an improper inference from the
jury at trial. But specific details of Blackwing’s manipulation and
control, such as his “cult-like bad acts,” punishing the women for
disobeying, making death threats, and requiring the women to call
him “My Lord” carried “a significant propensity for improper
inference” and have “little to no probative value in the instant
case.” The court determined that such evidence was “unduly
prejudicial” and would “likely confuse or mislead the jury.” It
therefore concluded that “specific bad acts regarding the
relationship between the women and Blackwing” would be
excluded under rule 403.

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7 The district court ruled that this evidence was relevant under

rule 402 “for the purpose of explaining the dynamics of the
relationship between the parties.” Neither party takes issue with
this ruling, and Blackwing does not ask us to affirm on the
alternative ground that the evidence was irrelevant. So, we proceed
with analyzing the evidence’s admissibility under rule 403.

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¶68 We conclude that the district court exceeded its discretion
by categorically excluding evidence of any specific acts intended to
prove Blackwing’s domination and control of his alleged co-
conspirators. Because the acts are intrinsic to the charged crimes
and not subject to 404(b), there was no need for the district court to
weigh the permissible and impermissible inferences that could be
drawn from the evidence. Instead, the court’s task was to determine
whether the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the
probative value.
¶69 Where, as here, the evidence is part and parcel of the
charged offense, the probative value of the evidence will be at its
zenith. And the acts that the State identified in its notice are
prejudicial only because they tend to prove the proposition for
which they are offered. Because the evidence does not present a risk
of unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs its probative value,
the court exceeded its discretion in excluding it.
¶70 While we reverse the categorical exclusion of the “specifics
of the alleged manipulation and coercion,” the district court retains
discretion to rule on rule 403 objections raised at trial. The danger
associated with particular items, including the risk of unfair
prejudice or the presentation of needlessly cumulative evidence,
may substantially outweigh the probative value of that evidence on
an item-by-item basis. See UTAH R. EVID. 403. But the blanket
exclusion of all specific acts tending to show Blackwing’s
dominance over his alleged co-conspirators resulted from an
incorrect application of the rules.
CONCLUSION
¶71 We affirm the district court’s order excluding evidence of
Blackwing’s conviction for the rape of Tina because the risk of
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of that
evidence. We reverse the exclusion of the evidence regarding
Blackwing’s sexual assault of C.G. and treatment of his co-
conspirators because that evidence is relevant, intrinsic to the
charged crime, and its probative value is not substantially
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. We remand for trial or
other proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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