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Feb. 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

VAN DUSEN v. WASATCH COUNTY

Utah Supreme Court

• Citations: 2026 UT 1

• Docket Number: Case No. 20250860

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.7K)

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Combined Opinion

This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter
2026 UT 1

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BRUCE VAN DUSEN, BRUCE QUADE, SHAWN SAVARINO, and
DOMINIC SAVARINO,
Appellants and Cross-appellees,
v.
WASATCH COUNTY,
Appellee and Cross-appellant,
and
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS
Appellee.

No. 20250860
Heard December 8, 2025
Filed February 5, 2026

On Direct Appeal

Fourth District Court, Wasatch County
The Honorable Jennifer A. Mabey
No. 230500146

Attorneys:
Robert E. Mansfield, Megan E. Garrett, Michael W. Combs,
Salt Lake City, for appellants and cross-appellees
Scott H. Sweat, Jonathan B. Woodward, Heber City,
for appellee and cross-appellant
David J. Jordan, David L. Mortensen, Tanner B. Camp,
Justin W. Starr, Christopher A. Bates, Salt Lake City, for appellee

JUSTICE PETERSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which
JUSTICE HAGEN, JUSTICE NIELSEN, JUDGE MORTENSEN, and
JUDGE NEIDER joined.
VAN DUSEN v. WASATCH COUNTY
Opinion of the Court

Having recused themselves, CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT and
ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE POHLMAN do not participate herein;
COURT OF APPEALS JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN and
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE CAMILLE L. NEIDER sat.

JUSTICE PETERSEN, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints announced
plans to build an 88,000 square-foot temple in Heber Valley, Utah.
Wasatch County approved the project. But a group of nearby
residents (Petitioners) sued, alleging that the project violated local
land-use regulations and state law. The district court rejected those
claims and dismissed the Petitioners’ case. And they appealed.
¶2 Shortly after prevailing in the district court, the Church
began construction on the temple. Upon learning of this, Petitioners
moved the district court to stop the Church from building while
their appeal was pending. They argued that they would suffer
irreparable harm if the Church continued to build but then lost on
appeal. The district court agreed and granted the injunction,
thereby halting construction during the appellate process.
¶3 The Church wants to begin building the temple
immediately. Accordingly, it has appealed the district court’s
order, and it moves this court to vacate the district court’s
injunction under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 8. It
acknowledges that if the injunction is lifted and it resumes
construction, it is taking the risk that it may lose on appeal and, as
a result, may incur both the cost of construction and the cost of
restoring the site to its prior condition. However, it states that it is
willing to take that risk.
¶4 In this scenario, Petitioners have not identified what
irreparable harm the construction would cause. For this reason, we
grant the Church’s motion and suspend the injunction pending
resolution of the appeal.
BACKGROUND
¶5 The Church announced plans to build a temple in Heber
Valley. Wasatch County adopted Ordinance 23-16, approving a
legislative development agreement for construction of the project.
The agreement authorized construction of an approximately 88,000
square-foot temple reaching 200 feet in height; an approximately

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Opinion of the Court

2,000 square-foot maintenance building; and related parking,
landscaping, and improvements on an 18-acre site.
¶6 The Petitioners—property owners who live near the
proposed temple site—feared that the project would directly and
adversely impact their health, welfare, privacy, and quiet use and
enjoyment of their property. They sued the County to stop the
temple from being built. In their complaint, Petitioners alleged that
Wasatch County’s adoption of the Ordinance failed to comply with
its preexisting land-use regulations, the Wasatch County Code, and
state law. And they sought a declaration that the Ordinance was
“invalid, unenforceable, void, and of no force and effect,” and
requested that it be “reversed and set aside.” They also made a
claim for injunctive relief to stop construction of the temple.
¶7 The Church intervened in the case. And the Church and
the County later moved for summary judgment. Petitioners
opposed the motion and filed their own cross-motion for summary
judgment.
¶8 The district court granted summary judgment to the
Church in full and to the County in part. And it denied Petitioners’
cross-motion. The court concluded that Petitioners had failed to
show that the Ordinance was “preempted or contrary to state or
federal law.” It also held that Petitioners failed to “overcome the
highly deferential standard of review” governing whether land use
actions are consistent with the County Land Use, Development,
and Management Act. The court dismissed the case. And
Petitioners appealed.
¶9 Soon thereafter, the Church began building the temple. In
response, Petitioners moved under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 62
to stop the construction pending their appeal. The district court
concluded that Petitioners were asking for an injunction under rule
62(c), and it treated their motion accordingly. Ultimately, it granted
the motion and enjoined the Church from construction activities
during the pendency of Petitioners’ appeal.
¶10 In its oral ruling, the court noted that both parties had
assumed the standards applicable to preliminary injunctions also
governed injunctions pending appeal. So the court adopted that
approach and analyzed whether: “(1) there [was] a substantial
likelihood that the applicant [would] prevail on the merits of the
underlying claim; (2) the applicant [would] suffer irreparable harm
unless the order or injunction issue[d]; (3) the threatened injury to
the applicant outweigh[ed] whatever damage the proposed order

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VAN DUSEN v. WASATCH COUNTY
Opinion of the Court

or injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined; and
(4) the order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the
public interest.” UTAH R. CIV. P. 65A(f).
¶11 The court applied a “sliding scale” approach to the factors,
concluding that the moving party must satisfy all four, though not
in equal measure. Under that framework, the court explained that
the weight assigned to each of the factors “may vary depending
upon the circumstances.” The court began its analysis with
irreparable harm.
¶12 The court asked whether allowing construction to proceed
during appeal would cause Petitioners irreparable harm if the
Church ultimately lost. It concluded that it would, reasoning that
Petitioners would suffer irreparable harm by being forced to
endure construction activity only for that activity to later be
deemed unlawful or invalid. The court therefore found that this
factor weighed in Petitioners’ favor.
¶13 The court next balanced the threat of this harm against the
harm the Church asserted it would suffer if an injunction issued.
The Church identified increased construction costs as its primary
harm if it were required to wait until the end of the appeals process
before breaking ground. The court reasoned that, “by their very
nature,” irreparable injuries outweigh monetary damages and
therefore concluded that this factor, too, weighed in Petitioners’
favor.
¶14 Turning to the public-interest factor, the court
acknowledged that many Church members were eager to visit a
temple in Wasatch County. At the same time, the court identified a
strong public interest in “ensuring that land use decisions are made
in compliance with applicable law.” The court further reasoned
that “it is in the public interest, as a whole, to have finality in the
legal decision determining whether the construction of the temple
fits that criteria.” Pending that final determination on appeal, the
court held that an injunction maintaining the status quo would be
in the public interest. The court defined the status quo as “the last
uncontested status between the parties which preceded the
controversy”—here, “the vacant land upon which the [Church]
seeks to build.”
¶15 With respect to the final factor—Petitioners’ likelihood of
success on the merits—the court acknowledged that it had already
ruled against Petitioners on the merits. The court reaffirmed its
belief that its prior ruling was “correct in light of the undisputed

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Opinion of the Court

facts in this matter and the controlling caselaw.” But the court also
reiterated its “sliding scale” approach to the injunction factors,
explaining that a weaker showing on one factor may suffice when
the remaining factors strongly favor relief.
¶16 The district court concluded that the equities weighed
“heavily in favor of the injunction.” Because those factors strongly
favored relief, the court held that, as to the likelihood of success on
the merits, it was “sufficient that the petitioners have raised
questions going to the merits that are sufficiently serious and
substantial that they are fair ground for continued litigation.” The
court also emphasized that its underlying merits decision would be
reviewed de novo on appeal. For these reasons, the court concluded
that the likelihood-of-success factor likewise favored granting the
injunction.
¶17 Having granted the injunction, the court next addressed
whether a bond or other security was required. The Church
presented evidence that if construction were delayed by 12 to 18
months, it would cost the Church between $7.8 to $11.4 million in
increased construction costs. The court rejected this amount as too
high. Instead, it ordered Petitioners to post a $10,000 bond to
compensate the Church for its potential costs and attorney fees on
appeal, in the event it prevailed.
¶18 The Church appealed the district court’s rule 62(c) ruling.
Simultaneously, it moved this court under Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 8 to suspend1 the district court’s injunction.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶19 The merits of the underlying appeal are not before us here;
we consider only the injunction. The Church pursues two different
avenues of relief. First, it has appealed the district court’s injunctive
order and asks us to reverse it. We review a district court’s decision
under rule 62(c) for an abuse of discretion. UTAH R. CIV. P. 62(c)
(“[T]he court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant
an injunction during the pendency of appellate proceedings upon
such conditions for the security of the rights of the adverse party as

---

1 The Church has styled its motion as a “Motion to Vacate,”

under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a)(1)(B). However, the
rule does not include the word “vacate,” so we construe the
Church’s motion as a motion to “suspend” the district court’s
injunction. The practical result is the same.

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VAN DUSEN v. WASATCH COUNTY
Opinion of the Court

are just.” (emphasis added)). However, we review any underlying
legal issues for correctness. Jenco, LC v. Valderra Land Holdings, LLC,
2025 UT 20, ¶ 15 n.7, 572 P.3d 381 (“Because misapplication of the
law constitutes an abuse of discretion, correctness is the
appropriate standard of review.” (cleaned up)). Second, the Church
has moved this court under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 8 for
an order suspending the injunction. Such a motion asks us to
exercise our own discretion in the first instance. Thus, no standard
of review applies.
ANALYSIS
¶20 We may proceed either by addressing the Church’s appeal
of the district court’s rule 62(c) injunctive order, or by resolving the
Church’s rule 8 motion. We elect to resolve the rule 8 motion.
Although we decide in the first instance whether to grant relief
under rule 8, we consider the district court’s order and its reasoning
because the Church asks us to suspend that order. Ultimately, we
conclude that an injunction is not warranted under the
circumstances here, and we suspend the injunction.
¶21 Under rule 8, “A party may move the appellate court
for . . . an order suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting
injunctive relief.” UTAH R. APP. P. 8(a)(1)(B). However, before
seeking such relief, “a party must first seek the requested relief in
the trial court unless the party can show extraordinary
circumstances or that the trial court has already rejected the basis
for the requested relief.” Id. R. 8(a)(2). If the movant has done so, it
must include, “as applicable, the reason the trial court denied the
requested relief, [or] the reason the trial court denied the basis for
the requested relief.” Id. R. 8(b)(2). If the appellate court decides to
grant the requested relief, it:
may waive the requirement for a bond or other
security if the movant demonstrates:
(A) a substantial likelihood of prevailing on appeal;
(B) the movant will suffer irreparable harm without
the injunction;
(C) the irreparable harm to the movant outweighs
whatever harm the injunction may cause the party
enjoined; and
(D) the injunction is not adverse to the public interest.
Id. R. 8(c)(3).

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Opinion of the Court

¶22 Thus, in deciding whether to grant the Church’s motion,
we first consider whether it sought the requested relief in the trial
court as rule 8(a)(2) requires. In this case, it was the Petitioners who
initially sought relief in the trial court. And it was the Church who
opposed it. But we conclude that by opposing Petitioners’ motion
in the trial court, the Church satisfied rule 8(a)(2)’s requirement that
the requested relief first be sought there. Although the Church was
not the movant in the trial court, it sought from that court the same
relief it requests from us—that no injunction issue. Accordingly, we
conclude that the Church has satisfied rule 8(a)(2).
¶23 Next, the movant must provide “the reason the trial court
denied the requested relief.” Id. R. 8(b)(2). This requirement does
not reflect a standard-of-review framework; our decision on a rule
8 motion is not conditioned on affirming or reversing the district
court’s order. But a rule 8 movant must persuade us that we should
reach a different result than did the district court. And to do that,
we need to know why the district court denied the relief the movant
seeks from us.
¶24 In the district court, the Petitioners asserted that an
injunction pending appeal was necessary because otherwise, they
would suffer irreparable harm. They presumed that the
preliminary injunction factors outlined in Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 65A applied to their request under rule 62. Accordingly,
they argued that: (1) there was a substantial likelihood they would
prevail on appeal; (2) they would suffer irreparable harm unless the
injunction issued; (3) the threatened injury to Petitioners
outweighed whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause
the Church; and (4) the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse
to the public interest. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 65A(f).
¶25 Addressing the parties’ arguments under this framework,
the district court ultimately concluded that Petitioners would suffer
irreparable harm if the Church commenced construction and then
lost on appeal.
¶26 In addressing Petitioners’ motion to us, both parties
assume that our determination of whether to grant or modify
injunctive relief under rule 8 is governed by the preliminary
injunction standard outlined in rule 65A. But rule 8 does not say
that. Instead, it directs us to consider those factors only when
deciding whether to waive any bond requirement. However,
neither party has addressed the language of rule 8.

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VAN DUSEN v. WASATCH COUNTY
Opinion of the Court

¶27 That said, in deciding how to exercise our discretion under
rule 8, we consider the record and arguments presented to us. And
importantly, the reason the district court granted injunctive relief
to the Petitioners was to prevent what it deemed to be irreparable
harm. The primary question before us, then, is whether we agree in
substance with the district court’s assessment. Because we
conclude that Petitioners have not identified any specific
irreparable harm that may occur absent an injunction pending
appeal, we grant the Church’s motion and suspend the injunction.
¶28 Irreparable harm exists when a party’s injury cannot be
remedied by monetary damages or other legal relief, even if that
party ultimately prevails on the merits. See Johnson v. Hermes
Assocs., 2005 UT 82, ¶ 18, 128 P.3d 1151. To establish irreparable
harm, a party must show that it is unlikely to be made whole by an
award of monetary damages or other legal remedy. See id. Put
differently, irreparable harm typically refers to an injury which
“cannot be adequately compensated in damages.” Carrier v.
Lindquist, 2001 UT 105, ¶ 26, 37 P.3d 1112 (cleaned up).
¶29 The district court found that the Petitioners would suffer
irreparable harm “if construction on the temple is allowed to
proceed, and then later it was determined to be unlawful” on
appeal. But the court did not provide further specifics.
¶30 In their briefing before us, Petitioners have expanded on
the harm they would suffer if the Church began constructing the
temple and then lost on appeal. Petitioners assert that, because they
live near the temple, they “would immediately suffer harms of loss
of privacy, noise and light pollution, and other detrimental
impacts.” However, they do not explain how those harms would
arise from the commencement of construction, as opposed to the
operation of a fully constructed temple.
¶31 Petitioners also assert, in broad terms, that construction
will cause environmental harm. Utah caselaw has, at times,
recognized environmental damage as irreparable. For example,
in Hunsaker v. Kersch, we explained: “Trees, in particular, might
take many years to replace. Loss of agricultural, ornamental, and
shade value could be fundamentally irreparable.” 1999 UT 106,
¶ 10, 991 P.2d 67. But Petitioners offer no factual basis to support
such a claim here. They do not describe the lot, the surrounding
land, or the local ecology. Nor do they allege that construction
would destroy any unique environmental feature—such as
ornamental or shade value—or pose environmental threats

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Opinion of the Court

incapable of remediation through compensatory damages. See, e.g.,
Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1261 (10th Cir.
2003) (holding that plaintiffs demonstrated irreparable injury
where development threatened the death of bald eagles and
destruction of their breeding habitat).
¶32 Finally, Petitioners refer to a “Staff Report” in the record,
which states that the temple would create traffic that is significantly
higher than a typical residential development. But this potential
harm also seems to flow from people visiting a completed temple,
not necessarily from the initial construction process.
¶33 For its part, the Church explained at oral argument that it
recognizes that, by beginning construction before the appeal is
final, it is assuming the risk that it could lose on appeal. In that
scenario, the Church understands that it may well lose what it
spent on construction and bear the cost of restoring the site to its
previous condition.
¶34 We acknowledge that such an eventuality may cause
inconvenience for Petitioners and that the land, which is now
vacant, would be changed. But Petitioners have not explained how,
if they prevail on appeal and the construction is halted, they will
have been irreparably harmed in the interim.
¶35 Without that, we are persuaded that the injunction in this
case should be suspended.
CONCLUSION
¶36 For these reasons, we grant the Church’s motion under
rule 8 and suspend the injunction pending the appeal of this matter.

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